Turkish Airlines cargo 747 crashes in Kyrgyzstan
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The Interstate Aviation Committee informs that the investigation of the Boeing 747-412F TC-MCL is underway.
An inspection flight of Manas ILS has been performed as per a specifically designed program coordinated with all participating States. The results of the inspection flight are being analyzed by the investigation team as well as ILS recorded data related to its operation on the day of the accident.
In accordance with ICAO Annex 13 the investigation team is releasing Preliminary Report that contains factual information currently available to the investigation team as well as findings of examinations conducted by the time of its release. In case additional information becomes available, the Report may be clarified and updated.
The investigation team is analyzing operational and maintenance documentation related to the accident as well as onboard and ground recorders data.
A Flight Control Computer recovered from the accident site has been sent to the NTSB in Washington DC, USA for specific examinations.
Upon completion of the investigation activities, Final Report will be issued.
Preliminary Report (1.68 MB)
An inspection flight of Manas ILS has been performed as per a specifically designed program coordinated with all participating States. The results of the inspection flight are being analyzed by the investigation team as well as ILS recorded data related to its operation on the day of the accident.
In accordance with ICAO Annex 13 the investigation team is releasing Preliminary Report that contains factual information currently available to the investigation team as well as findings of examinations conducted by the time of its release. In case additional information becomes available, the Report may be clarified and updated.
The investigation team is analyzing operational and maintenance documentation related to the accident as well as onboard and ground recorders data.
A Flight Control Computer recovered from the accident site has been sent to the NTSB in Washington DC, USA for specific examinations.
Upon completion of the investigation activities, Final Report will be issued.
Preliminary Report (1.68 MB)
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1.18.1. FMA FAULT 2
As per the Boeing Company explanation, FMA FAULT 2 record means that the AFDS identified pitch mode failure that is the a/c could no longer be tracking the glideslope beam (see FCT 747 Pages 5.19 - 5.20).The mode failure results in the following:
- the pitch flight director bars are removed from the PFDs;
- a yellow line is displayed through the G/S mode annunciation on the PFDs (FMA);
- both MASTER CAUTION lights are illuminated;
- a MASTER CAUTION aural is activated;
- an amber AUTOPILOT caution message is annunciated on EICAS.
Meanwhile the A/P will not disengage. In the pitch channel the A/P will maintain an inertial path which track a constant 3° slope regardless of the actual glideslope angle at a certain airdrome. The path will be maintained until a valid glideslope signal is regained or until the crew intervenes by disengaging the A/P or initiating a go-around (TOGA switch pushed).Without crew intervention the A/P will maintain the inertial path until the FLARE mode is engaged. The Autoland status LAND 3 (or LAND 2) will also continue being annunciated. According to the manufacturer’s information the inertial path generation is a feature in Boeing airplane models 737, 747-400/-8, 757, 767, 777, 787 that allows the A/P to continue the approach for disruptions of either G/S or LOC ground station signals.
As per the Boeing Company explanation, FMA FAULT 2 record means that the AFDS identified pitch mode failure that is the a/c could no longer be tracking the glideslope beam (see FCT 747 Pages 5.19 - 5.20).The mode failure results in the following:
- the pitch flight director bars are removed from the PFDs;
- a yellow line is displayed through the G/S mode annunciation on the PFDs (FMA);
- both MASTER CAUTION lights are illuminated;
- a MASTER CAUTION aural is activated;
- an amber AUTOPILOT caution message is annunciated on EICAS.
Meanwhile the A/P will not disengage. In the pitch channel the A/P will maintain an inertial path which track a constant 3° slope regardless of the actual glideslope angle at a certain airdrome. The path will be maintained until a valid glideslope signal is regained or until the crew intervenes by disengaging the A/P or initiating a go-around (TOGA switch pushed).Without crew intervention the A/P will maintain the inertial path until the FLARE mode is engaged. The Autoland status LAND 3 (or LAND 2) will also continue being annunciated. According to the manufacturer’s information the inertial path generation is a feature in Boeing airplane models 737, 747-400/-8, 757, 767, 777, 787 that allows the A/P to continue the approach for disruptions of either G/S or LOC ground station signals.
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I've never flown a 747, but from the description of the altitude/airspeed during the approach, they must have been hotter than a firecracker.
They never seemed to have their energy under proper control and thus got an impossible start on the glideslope.
That seems to be what started things going pear shaped.
This was going to be a crew swap destination. Gethomeitis after a long day?
They never seemed to have their energy under proper control and thus got an impossible start on the glideslope.
That seems to be what started things going pear shaped.
This was going to be a crew swap destination. Gethomeitis after a long day?
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Yep, you sure can't blame Mr. Boeing for this one...
And it looks like most of our earlier ADS-B data analysis here was right on the money. They came smoking in high and fast above the glide slope as surmised. It should have been an immediate go around on an unstable approach long before getting anywhere near the ground.
They sat there fat, dumb and happy watching the autopilot fly into the ground on a low vis approach with these indications:
And, the raw data glideslope indicators pegged off the bottom.
They ignored a EGPWS glideslope alert approaching 300 feet AGL.
The anomalous momentary false glide slope capture may have contributed to the confusion and I am surprised that you can still get LAND 2 with all the other alerts. I'll let the geniuses over at the training building figure out all the modes and submodes later, I'm going around.
Yet another perfectly good airplane flown into the ground due to mismanaged (or unmanaged) automation.
And it looks like most of our earlier ADS-B data analysis here was right on the money. They came smoking in high and fast above the glide slope as surmised. It should have been an immediate go around on an unstable approach long before getting anywhere near the ground.
They sat there fat, dumb and happy watching the autopilot fly into the ground on a low vis approach with these indications:
- the pitch flight director bars are removed from the PFDs;
- a yellow line is displayed through the G/S mode annunciation on the PFDs (FMA);
- both MASTER CAUTION lights are illuminated;
- a MASTER CAUTION aural is activated;
- an amber AUTOPILOT caution message is annunciated on EICAS.
- a yellow line is displayed through the G/S mode annunciation on the PFDs (FMA);
- both MASTER CAUTION lights are illuminated;
- a MASTER CAUTION aural is activated;
- an amber AUTOPILOT caution message is annunciated on EICAS.
They ignored a EGPWS glideslope alert approaching 300 feet AGL.
The anomalous momentary false glide slope capture may have contributed to the confusion and I am surprised that you can still get LAND 2 with all the other alerts. I'll let the geniuses over at the training building figure out all the modes and submodes later, I'm going around.
Yet another perfectly good airplane flown into the ground due to mismanaged (or unmanaged) automation.
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I'm wondering about Safety Recommendations #3 :
Is that wise?
3. It is recommended that air traffic controllers, in case they have pertinent equipment available, inform flight crews on significant altitude deviations from that established by the charts, especially for ICAO CAT II and CAT III approaches and Low Visibility Procedures, therefore, introducing respective amendments to the procedures and job description of air traffic control personnel should be considered.
Maybe it has to do with this:
This statement was released by MAK on feb 17th
The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) - official website
So the preliminary report was available in time(!) but the Turks wanted it to "review". Interesting the "review" took longer than the preliminary investigation!!! As a result the mentioned recommendation (ATC) may have been placed to take away some of the catastrophic failure of the flightcrew.
In compliance with ICAO Annex 13 Preliminary Report shall be released within 30 days after the accident. However, as the Accident Investigation Board of Turkey (KAIK) representing the State of Registry and Operator has expressed a wish to review the draft Preliminary Report, it will be released after comments from the Turkish Accredited Representative have been received.
The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) - official website
So the preliminary report was available in time(!) but the Turks wanted it to "review". Interesting the "review" took longer than the preliminary investigation!!! As a result the mentioned recommendation (ATC) may have been placed to take away some of the catastrophic failure of the flightcrew.
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The Turks want to make sure that the report reflects the Turkish interests. They also want to make sure that no mention of the nature of the payload is in the report, as that it not a contributing factor to the crash.
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After clicking on mentioned MAK link and scrolling to the bottom you'll see a link to the preliminary report
preliminary report
Probably been there the whole time, guess the Turks did review it more quickly after all
preliminary report
Probably been there the whole time, guess the Turks did review it more quickly after all
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Some safety recommendations:
Interesting recommendations, I think I need some time to digest that.
Do they really remind us to actually check an approach chart for approach and to make a go around when you don't see the runway at minimums?
1. It is recommended that the crews pay attention to following approach charts, monitoring distance and altitude during reference points (FAF, LOM, LMM) overflight when conducting ILS approaches, especially ICAO CAT II and CAT III approaches.
2. It is recommended that flight crews be informed that in case ground references are not visible, go-around shall be initiated not lower than the established decision height.
2. It is recommended that flight crews be informed that in case ground references are not visible, go-around shall be initiated not lower than the established decision height.
Do they really remind us to actually check an approach chart for approach and to make a go around when you don't see the runway at minimums?
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"Do they really remind us to actually check an approach chart for approach and to make a go around when you don't see the runway at minimums? 
regretfully, in this case and too many other ........ yes
regretfully, in this case and too many other ........ yes