Turkish Airlines cargo 747 crashes in Kyrgyzstan
Airmanship
#383
Airmanship can be considered as the combination of many human attributes. If so, in this accident, which part(s) of 'airmanship' were less than required, what combination, what strength of influence, etc, contributed to the outcome.
'Failed' Airmanship implies blame, no better than Human Error.
Look deeper into the circumstance, seek alternative understandings.
Airmanship - Professionalism in Flight'
https://www.dropbox.com/s/dt57h800ee...nship.PDF?dl=0
Airmanship can be considered as the combination of many human attributes. If so, in this accident, which part(s) of 'airmanship' were less than required, what combination, what strength of influence, etc, contributed to the outcome.
'Failed' Airmanship implies blame, no better than Human Error.
Look deeper into the circumstance, seek alternative understandings.
Airmanship - Professionalism in Flight'
https://www.dropbox.com/s/dt57h800ee...nship.PDF?dl=0
The idea that a manufacturer needs to design a system as complex as a 747 Auto-land to cater for such poor attitude, skill & self-awareness/situational awareness beggars belief.
All it took was a standard low-vis approach & some high terrain causing excess height for this crew to crash and kill themselves and 36 other people. The PiC and to a lesser extent, the SiC, was an accident waiting to happen.
What is of note is the lack of any depth on the pilot’s background, training and recent simulator/line-check performance, especially considering the repeated comments about the psycho-emotional state of the PiC and the SiC less so.
All it took was a standard low-vis approach & some high terrain causing excess height for this crew to crash and kill themselves and 36 other people. The PiC and to a lesser extent, the SiC, was an accident waiting to happen.
What is of note is the lack of any depth on the pilot’s background, training and recent simulator/line-check performance, especially considering the repeated comments about the psycho-emotional state of the PiC and the SiC less so.
FWIW for anyone who might be interested; I found the original Russian translation and asked ChatGPT to give me synonyms for the Russian phrase “psycho-emotional” used in the English translation or “психоэмоциональной”.
Here is what it said:
Here is what it said:
- Psychosocial
- Emotional-psychological
- Mental-emotional
- Psycho-affective
- Emotionally psychological
Probably no, they’re just not fulfilling their obligations under international convention. The implementation of the convention in state law may specify penalties for something like this but it’s unlikely.
What additional information do you expect from a final report? The crew decision making process caused a perfect working 747-400 with lots of fuel to crash behind the runway with a fully operational ILS.
It is difficult to understand why some people risk their life for a 10 minutes earlier touch down instead of playing it safe.
My FIs told me, if it does not look good, go around. And in this case I do not find a single reason why not to.
It is difficult to understand why some people risk their life for a 10 minutes earlier touch down instead of playing it safe.
My FIs told me, if it does not look good, go around. And in this case I do not find a single reason why not to.
"What are a State’s reporting obligations during and after an aircraft accident investigation?
Under Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, States in charge of an investigation must submit a Preliminary Report to ICAO within thirty days of the date of the accident, unless the Accident/Incident Data Report has been sent by that time. Preliminary Reports may be marked as confidential or remain public at the investigating State’s discretion.
The State conducting the investigation of an accident or incident shall also make the Final Report publicly available as soon as possible and, if possible, within twelve months.
If the report cannot be made publicly available within twelve months, the State conducting the investigation shall make an interim statement publicly available on each anniversary of the occurrence – detailing the progress of the investigation and any safety issues identified.
For accidents or incidents involving an aircraft of a maximum mass over 5 700 kg, States in charge of an Annex 13 investigation must submit a copy of the accident investigation Final Report to ICAO."
https://www.icao.int/about-icao/FAQ/...ns-faq-11.aspx
What additional information do you expect from a final report? The crew decision making process caused a perfect working 747-400 with lots of fuel to crash behind the runway with a fully operational ILS.
It is difficult to understand why some people risk their life for a 10 minutes earlier touch down instead of playing it safe.
My FIs told me, if it does not look good, go around. And in this case I do not find a single reason why not to.
It is difficult to understand why some people risk their life for a 10 minutes earlier touch down instead of playing it safe.
My FIs told me, if it does not look good, go around. And in this case I do not find a single reason why not to.
I think it's fairly clear that they really didn't have any clue where they were in relation to the runway - the rushed app was only the precursor
They had plenty of clues but did ignore them all. Hard to believe in their IMC environment that they pressed on. Luck goes only so far if it is not replaced by airmenship fast enough in any pilots career. I would be surprised if this crew human performance break down had not shown up earlier.
They had plenty of clues but did ignore them all. Hard to believe in their IMC environment that they pressed on. Luck goes only so far if it is not replaced by airmenship fast enough in any pilots career. I would be surprised if this crew human performance break down had not shown up earlier.
And there was no additional external stress. They were the only plane in the area. IMC and some terrain restrictions but other than that it should have been a normal working night. There are probably some issues unrelated to the flight that the CRM and human performance of both crew members was so low.
Can I say from the outset that I am not a professional aviator of any description but I watched the video linked by #punkalouver and I was staggered.
Firstly, from a layman's (with more than a passing interest and understanding of aviation) perspective the quality of the video and explanation was extremely good, streets ahead of the "Air Crash Investigation" programmes on National Geographic; I hope I have not been taken in by nonsense.
It was obvious, albeit knowing how the story ended, that things were starting to go awry as the crew requested and were denied descent when they requested it, if I recall correctly, from FL220, and after that there appeared to be a snowballing of mistakes caused, it seems to me, in no small part by appalling CRM. Nothing was directly inferred during the film, but was part of the issue perhaps the military background of both crew members and perhaps a different mental attitude towards risk management? I am just intrigued as to how thing were allowed to get progressively worse to the point where, the accident was unavoidable, given that I am sure both the Captain and First Officer will have been correctly trained, and had an abundance of experience each, and between them. There was mention of a previous incident involving the Captain, but that wasn't held against him in the programme, and at the end of the day sometimes sh1t happens.
Firstly, from a layman's (with more than a passing interest and understanding of aviation) perspective the quality of the video and explanation was extremely good, streets ahead of the "Air Crash Investigation" programmes on National Geographic; I hope I have not been taken in by nonsense.
It was obvious, albeit knowing how the story ended, that things were starting to go awry as the crew requested and were denied descent when they requested it, if I recall correctly, from FL220, and after that there appeared to be a snowballing of mistakes caused, it seems to me, in no small part by appalling CRM. Nothing was directly inferred during the film, but was part of the issue perhaps the military background of both crew members and perhaps a different mental attitude towards risk management? I am just intrigued as to how thing were allowed to get progressively worse to the point where, the accident was unavoidable, given that I am sure both the Captain and First Officer will have been correctly trained, and had an abundance of experience each, and between them. There was mention of a previous incident involving the Captain, but that wasn't held against him in the programme, and at the end of the day sometimes sh1t happens.
Being held high on descent is almost a daily occurrence and even something which could have been anticipated given minimum safe altitudes. Getting the aircraft back on profile should be a walk in the park for any professional pilot experienced on the type.
Instead of taking steps to get the aircraft back on profile the Captain put the blame on ATC for holding them high.
I don't actually blame the crew directly for this accident but the regulatory and training (or perhaps I should say lack of) systems which allowed them to get into this situation.
Instead of taking steps to get the aircraft back on profile the Captain put the blame on ATC for holding them high.
I don't actually blame the crew directly for this accident but the regulatory and training (or perhaps I should say lack of) systems which allowed them to get into this situation.
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Poor energy management early in the approach and get-there-itis put them in their graves. Had the overrun been flat farmland they’d probably have got away with either mud in the tyres or an embarrassing shudder to a halt and a lot of explaining to do.
If you were being very generous then you could argue that the automation didn’t help them by continuing to track the false GS but there were plenty of clues that all was not going to plan.
The high terrain could have been anticipated by the MSA and presumably minimum vectoring altitude charts, plus the STAR laid out well in advance the descent profile they’d have to hit. There were no big surprises here, apart from the temperature adjusted lowest cleared altitude.
Not a good show.
If you were being very generous then you could argue that the automation didn’t help them by continuing to track the false GS but there were plenty of clues that all was not going to plan.
The high terrain could have been anticipated by the MSA and presumably minimum vectoring altitude charts, plus the STAR laid out well in advance the descent profile they’d have to hit. There were no big surprises here, apart from the temperature adjusted lowest cleared altitude.
Not a good show.