Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)
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RIP
Of course whilst this might not be an issue in this case (other than being at FL360 in apparently clear skies) ... but just how many times have I / you / we seen flight decks at night that are nicely illuminated by their 'Dome Light' ?
Of course whilst it's certainly handy being able to see to do the 'Times Crossword' etc., it's not so good for the old 'night vision' & Cones & Rods - e.g. anybody care to remind us of how long it takes for the human eye to become attuned to seeing in / into the dark ?
Now there's an awful lot to be said for Mark1 Eyeball - and indeed that's some of the reason why our AME's test them for us every six months as part of our Class 1 Medical renewals.
So on the basis that first and foremost we're meant to be 'professional aviators' - sod the crossword, let’s stop any complacency, get them cockpit lights off at night, start looking outside the bloody windows, and basically let's do what we're being paid to - namely aviate in a professional manner !
Of course there's always the alternative, i.e. "Don't worry, it'll never happen to us - after all we're on radar and we've got TCAS"
Yeah, right !
Ps. Sorry for the rant / lecture but when children are killed it (rather obviously) really REALLY makes me
!
PPs. And before anybody ‘flames’ me, I’m not suggesting that this is what happened in this case but, more over and in any event, we owe it to our innocent charges to act according to our status as professional pilots – i.e. if your kids were on that (or any other) flight, just what would you expect the of the pilots (and controllers) ?
Of course whilst it's certainly handy being able to see to do the 'Times Crossword' etc., it's not so good for the old 'night vision' & Cones & Rods - e.g. anybody care to remind us of how long it takes for the human eye to become attuned to seeing in / into the dark ?
Now there's an awful lot to be said for Mark1 Eyeball - and indeed that's some of the reason why our AME's test them for us every six months as part of our Class 1 Medical renewals.
So on the basis that first and foremost we're meant to be 'professional aviators' - sod the crossword, let’s stop any complacency, get them cockpit lights off at night, start looking outside the bloody windows, and basically let's do what we're being paid to - namely aviate in a professional manner !
Of course there's always the alternative, i.e. "Don't worry, it'll never happen to us - after all we're on radar and we've got TCAS"
Yeah, right !
Ps. Sorry for the rant / lecture but when children are killed it (rather obviously) really REALLY makes me
!PPs. And before anybody ‘flames’ me, I’m not suggesting that this is what happened in this case but, more over and in any event, we owe it to our innocent charges to act according to our status as professional pilots – i.e. if your kids were on that (or any other) flight, just what would you expect the of the pilots (and controllers) ?
Last edited by Devils Advocate; 2nd Jul 2002 at 23:20.
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Sorry to say this, if it hasn’t already been said (there are 11 pages to this thread), but I feel there is another culprit here…..Advance planning.
Now, I’m not over familiar with slot management, so please correct me if I’m totally off track, but this was European airspace, or part of the Eurocontrol area.
Slots have to be approved through airspace.
How then, at 2330 are two aircraft flight planned through the same sector at the same level, when logic suggests planning them at a different level, if nothing else, to avoid controller intervention.
Assuming the German ATC do not have a crystal ball to say what aircraft are where in Swiss airspace, when they hand-over to Swiss ATC, aren’t EuroControl a little responsible for allowing conflicting plans in the first place.
Reading these pages I’m saddened that I have to hear the pitfalls of TCAS from first hand experiences of others following such a tragic accident. Funny how the sales blurbs never mention these things.
My heartfelt condolences to the families who have lost their treasured one’s.
Now, I’m not over familiar with slot management, so please correct me if I’m totally off track, but this was European airspace, or part of the Eurocontrol area.
Slots have to be approved through airspace.
How then, at 2330 are two aircraft flight planned through the same sector at the same level, when logic suggests planning them at a different level, if nothing else, to avoid controller intervention.
Assuming the German ATC do not have a crystal ball to say what aircraft are where in Swiss airspace, when they hand-over to Swiss ATC, aren’t EuroControl a little responsible for allowing conflicting plans in the first place.
Reading these pages I’m saddened that I have to hear the pitfalls of TCAS from first hand experiences of others following such a tragic accident. Funny how the sales blurbs never mention these things.
My heartfelt condolences to the families who have lost their treasured one’s.
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Also posted in ATC issues......
To much reliance on "gadgets and Gizmo's", lets get back to raw ATC and flight operations and also use some of the more basic, and yet effective ATC tools at hand. Radar is wonderful, but at the end of the day the triple redundant radars (as always so proudly advertised by manufacturers!!!) do fail, ours only 2 days ago..... my point is that it is still important not to forget the basics of our procedural standards and build a bit of "fat" into the program to allow for, poor comms, possible language problems, co-ordination failures, radar failures etc. It should be noted that quite a few of these issues are human factor related and on last check we are all human.
I am sure for the controllers that have been in the business long enough and have filled their "little bag of tricks", that one of the most dangerous times is when it is quiet. Having had a few good scares on these grounds, I ensure now that during these times I am proactive with conflict resolution because I have let myself down before through complacency. This point is made not necessarily to the actual case at hand, which investigation is still only in its infancy, but more as a wake up call to us all in every aspect of the industry to ensure we all maintain our highest possible standards and support each other to provide the best and safest service possible.
It goes without saying that regardless of who is responsible, the controllers and supervisors at this centre will be enduring the most horrific time of the lives and it is important we make sure that we give them the support they need.
To much reliance on "gadgets and Gizmo's", lets get back to raw ATC and flight operations and also use some of the more basic, and yet effective ATC tools at hand. Radar is wonderful, but at the end of the day the triple redundant radars (as always so proudly advertised by manufacturers!!!) do fail, ours only 2 days ago..... my point is that it is still important not to forget the basics of our procedural standards and build a bit of "fat" into the program to allow for, poor comms, possible language problems, co-ordination failures, radar failures etc. It should be noted that quite a few of these issues are human factor related and on last check we are all human.
I am sure for the controllers that have been in the business long enough and have filled their "little bag of tricks", that one of the most dangerous times is when it is quiet. Having had a few good scares on these grounds, I ensure now that during these times I am proactive with conflict resolution because I have let myself down before through complacency. This point is made not necessarily to the actual case at hand, which investigation is still only in its infancy, but more as a wake up call to us all in every aspect of the industry to ensure we all maintain our highest possible standards and support each other to provide the best and safest service possible.
It goes without saying that regardless of who is responsible, the controllers and supervisors at this centre will be enduring the most horrific time of the lives and it is important we make sure that we give them the support they need.
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Skyguide concede in-house collision warning system inoperative at time of accident
Anton Maag, Skyguide’s Area Control Centre manager, conceded on Swiss TV’s “10 vor 10” news programme Tuesday night that the ATC in-house collision warning system had been inactive on the night of the mid-air collision. All controllers had been informed of this, as the system was down for maintenance – work which could only be carried out during hours with marginal traffic.
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Throughout the preceeding pages much discussion has centered around TCAS and the various configurations.
Perhaps I have missed it, but it costs $250,000 to install the "mandatory" Mop 7 TCAS ( from scratch) to meet current EU (JAR ) requirements, so are aircraft flying in EU airspace that do not meet these requirements ?? If so how?
Perhaps I have missed it, but it costs $250,000 to install the "mandatory" Mop 7 TCAS ( from scratch) to meet current EU (JAR ) requirements, so are aircraft flying in EU airspace that do not meet these requirements ?? If so how?
on your FM dial
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Alpha Leader posted 2nd July 2002 10:07
“Anton Maag, Chief of Zurich-Kloten Control Tower, and Skyguide Spokesman Patrick Herr, held a press conference today, Tuesday, to review the events of the previous night.
Between 2300 and 2400, there were no unusual occurences in Swiss air control space, with only a few aircraft in the air. Swiss ATC was handed over the Russian TU-154, which was on a East-to-West routing by German ATC at around 2330, whilst the B-757 freighter, on a South-to-North routing, was handed over by Italian ATC to Swiss ATC at 2323. Both planes were at an altitude of 36000 feet (around 11500 meters).”
Alpha Leader posted 2nd July 2002 11:55
“According to Anton Maag, Manager of Skyguide’s Area Control Centre, speaking at a media conference held on Tuesday morning at Zurich Airport, the situation until immediately prior to the mid-air collision had been entirely normal. Given the time of night, few aircraft were in the sky.
…Between 8 and 10 nm (or approx. 1 ½ minutes of flight time) prior to the crossing point ATC instructed the TU-154 crew to initiate a descent – but this instruction was not confirmed. A second identical advice also remained unacknowledged. It was only on the third attempt that the TU-154 crew reacted and began to seek the assigned, lower flight level.
…The TU-154 approaching from the east had been handed over by German ATC to its Swiss counterpart...at 2330. The flight had been advised in a timely fashion, too. The B-757 freighter had crossed the Italian-Swiss border (to the south of the collision site) at around 2300.
At the time of the actual collision, there was very light air traffic, with only a few aircraft in the sky. The two controllers on duty in Zurich had only one sector to look after.”
Volume posted 2nd July 2002 12:49
“On July 1st 2002, 23:35 MESZ (21:35 UTC), well above the Bodensee a midair collision happened...
(Analyzing swiss radio recording, the 154 was advised to sink from FL360 to FL 350 50 seconds prior to the collision…”
Alpha Leader posted 2nd July 2002 23:02
“Swiss ATC company Skyguide’s manager Urs Ryf confirmed that details released by German crash investigators about the timeline involved in the mid-air collision were correct. Accordingly, ATC instructions to reduce altitude were issued about 50 seconds prior to the collision. This morning (Tuesday) Skyguide had still maintained these had been issued up to two minutes earlier.
Skyguide also revealed that at the time of the mid-air collision at 23.35.40, the second controller on duty that night had been taking a break. At this point in time, there were another three planes within the Skyguide air space but 30 to 40 nm away from the collision site.”
Time Line
23:00 or
23:23 B757 handed over to Swiss ATC.
23:30 TU-154 handed over to Swiss ATC.
23:34:10 or
23:34:50 First instruction to TU-154 to descend.
23:35:15 Further instruction to TU-154 to descend.
23:35:40 Aircraft collide.
(times based on above reports)
What was the Swiss air traffic controller doing for the four minutes between 23:30 and 23:34:10 (or 23:34:50)?
We all know that just because an ATCO is not transmitting it does not mean that they are not busy.
The Swiss air traffic controller must have been engaged in activities that were of such a pressing nature that they were of a higher priority than keeping the planes apart.
Whilst I can well imagine that the air traffic controller is experiencing a great deal of distress, I am finding it difficult to summon compassion because of the apparent likelihood that this distress has been largely self-induced.
The controller might be emotionally distressed, but the pilots and their passengers are dead.
May they rest in peace.
“Anton Maag, Chief of Zurich-Kloten Control Tower, and Skyguide Spokesman Patrick Herr, held a press conference today, Tuesday, to review the events of the previous night.
Between 2300 and 2400, there were no unusual occurences in Swiss air control space, with only a few aircraft in the air. Swiss ATC was handed over the Russian TU-154, which was on a East-to-West routing by German ATC at around 2330, whilst the B-757 freighter, on a South-to-North routing, was handed over by Italian ATC to Swiss ATC at 2323. Both planes were at an altitude of 36000 feet (around 11500 meters).”
Alpha Leader posted 2nd July 2002 11:55
“According to Anton Maag, Manager of Skyguide’s Area Control Centre, speaking at a media conference held on Tuesday morning at Zurich Airport, the situation until immediately prior to the mid-air collision had been entirely normal. Given the time of night, few aircraft were in the sky.
…Between 8 and 10 nm (or approx. 1 ½ minutes of flight time) prior to the crossing point ATC instructed the TU-154 crew to initiate a descent – but this instruction was not confirmed. A second identical advice also remained unacknowledged. It was only on the third attempt that the TU-154 crew reacted and began to seek the assigned, lower flight level.
…The TU-154 approaching from the east had been handed over by German ATC to its Swiss counterpart...at 2330. The flight had been advised in a timely fashion, too. The B-757 freighter had crossed the Italian-Swiss border (to the south of the collision site) at around 2300.
At the time of the actual collision, there was very light air traffic, with only a few aircraft in the sky. The two controllers on duty in Zurich had only one sector to look after.”
Volume posted 2nd July 2002 12:49
“On July 1st 2002, 23:35 MESZ (21:35 UTC), well above the Bodensee a midair collision happened...
(Analyzing swiss radio recording, the 154 was advised to sink from FL360 to FL 350 50 seconds prior to the collision…”
Alpha Leader posted 2nd July 2002 23:02
“Swiss ATC company Skyguide’s manager Urs Ryf confirmed that details released by German crash investigators about the timeline involved in the mid-air collision were correct. Accordingly, ATC instructions to reduce altitude were issued about 50 seconds prior to the collision. This morning (Tuesday) Skyguide had still maintained these had been issued up to two minutes earlier.
Skyguide also revealed that at the time of the mid-air collision at 23.35.40, the second controller on duty that night had been taking a break. At this point in time, there were another three planes within the Skyguide air space but 30 to 40 nm away from the collision site.”
Time Line
23:00 or
23:23 B757 handed over to Swiss ATC.
23:30 TU-154 handed over to Swiss ATC.
23:34:10 or
23:34:50 First instruction to TU-154 to descend.
23:35:15 Further instruction to TU-154 to descend.
23:35:40 Aircraft collide.
(times based on above reports)
What was the Swiss air traffic controller doing for the four minutes between 23:30 and 23:34:10 (or 23:34:50)?
We all know that just because an ATCO is not transmitting it does not mean that they are not busy.
The Swiss air traffic controller must have been engaged in activities that were of such a pressing nature that they were of a higher priority than keeping the planes apart.
Whilst I can well imagine that the air traffic controller is experiencing a great deal of distress, I am finding it difficult to summon compassion because of the apparent likelihood that this distress has been largely self-induced.
The controller might be emotionally distressed, but the pilots and their passengers are dead.
May they rest in peace.
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Often wondered about this and I am sure someone here can explain.
How does TCAS deal with an aircraft that is not actually at the FL at which it is reporting to be, due to 1013 not being set at transition?
From my understanding ATC and other aircraft TCAS equipment would observe it to be at the correct FL. The whole time the aircraft could be off the actual FL by the difference between 1013 and QNH which is sometimes quite significant and in extreme cases could be well over 500’ .
I appreciate that TCAS can derive azimuth and distance without any need of altitude input but wondered how it would deal with an apparent conflict where the aircraft were actually vertically separated but appeared to be at the same level and in conflict due to incorrectly set altimeters in one aircraft? Could it give a Descend RA to one aircraft to vacate the apparently common level while in fact descending it towards the other? Or is it "smart" enough to take care of this sort of situation?
I am sure someone can put me straight on this one.
How does TCAS deal with an aircraft that is not actually at the FL at which it is reporting to be, due to 1013 not being set at transition?
From my understanding ATC and other aircraft TCAS equipment would observe it to be at the correct FL. The whole time the aircraft could be off the actual FL by the difference between 1013 and QNH which is sometimes quite significant and in extreme cases could be well over 500’ .
I appreciate that TCAS can derive azimuth and distance without any need of altitude input but wondered how it would deal with an apparent conflict where the aircraft were actually vertically separated but appeared to be at the same level and in conflict due to incorrectly set altimeters in one aircraft? Could it give a Descend RA to one aircraft to vacate the apparently common level while in fact descending it towards the other? Or is it "smart" enough to take care of this sort of situation?
I am sure someone can put me straight on this one.
I stand to be corrected, but I believe the TXP and therefore the TCAS get Barro information direct from the ADC. Therefore what is tramsmitted is raw pressure altitude and ATC correct this for QNH when the aircraft is below transition level. Therefore both TCAS units are using the same Datum regardless of subscale setting.
There was a very near-miss in Japan recently when an aircraft followed an incorrect ATC direction instead of a TCAS RA. TCAS is a wonderful tool IF crews are trained to follow RAs as a first action.
There was a very near-miss in Japan recently when an aircraft followed an incorrect ATC direction instead of a TCAS RA. TCAS is a wonderful tool IF crews are trained to follow RAs as a first action.
Union Goon
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The descent calls to the Russian plane were late. They were SO late that DHL had already called their own RA that they were maneuvering for.
I suspect that part of the delay was that the Russians were being told to climb by their TCAS and decend by ATC. If that was the case and stuck with that choice, they chose badly.
ALWAYS follow the RA. The controller is NOT in the loop of the negotiations between the two aircraft carrying out the avoidance maneuver and doesn't know who has been told to climb and who has been told to descend by the respective TCAS systems. DO MAKE A TURN if given by the controllers, but DO NOT allow the controller to overide the TCAS instructions as to climbing, decending, increase climb, maintain climb, etc...
A suprising number of people don't know that...
(wildass speculation begins)Furthermore, that 154 looks like a 727, and probably can come down like a bag of hammers just like a 727 (IOW a much greater descent rate is possible from the 154) and so even though DHL might have started down first, the 154 could have caught it...(Wildass speculation stopped)
CHeers
Wino
I suspect that part of the delay was that the Russians were being told to climb by their TCAS and decend by ATC. If that was the case and stuck with that choice, they chose badly.
ALWAYS follow the RA. The controller is NOT in the loop of the negotiations between the two aircraft carrying out the avoidance maneuver and doesn't know who has been told to climb and who has been told to descend by the respective TCAS systems. DO MAKE A TURN if given by the controllers, but DO NOT allow the controller to overide the TCAS instructions as to climbing, decending, increase climb, maintain climb, etc...
A suprising number of people don't know that...
(wildass speculation begins)Furthermore, that 154 looks like a 727, and probably can come down like a bag of hammers just like a 727 (IOW a much greater descent rate is possible from the 154) and so even though DHL might have started down first, the 154 could have caught it...(Wildass speculation stopped)
CHeers
Wino
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Background on Skyguide
The following compiled from info in the public domain:
Skyguide is a company commissioned by the Swiss government to handle ATC in Swiss air space. To the extent of 99.85%, its shares are held by the Swiss Confederation. (This means it is not a statutory body, but - in the eyes of the law - a privately held company). Headquartered in Geneva, Skyguide has been responsible since early 2001 for both civil and military ATC – a unique consolidation of duties in Europe. Some 1400 employees control commercial and military air traffic at Zurich-Kloten, Geneva-Cointrin, Bern-Belp and Lugano-Agno as well as at various military air bases. Skyguide also controls assigned air space over foreign territories (such as over Southwest Germany, where the recent mid-air collision took place). Skyguide’s authority over that particular German sector has been the subject of controversy in the context of the Swiss-German air agreement, as the German side has threatened to re-assign this area to German ATC by way of decree should the current round of negotiations for a new air agreement prove unsuccessful.
The Swiss government recently commissioned a study to look into a permanent ATC system which would also identify aircraft without transponders.
Skyguide’s role has been a regular focus of recent air crash investigations, such as the Crossair crash of 24 November 2001. In the case of the Alitalia crash of 14 November 1990, in which all 46 passengers and crew were killed when their aircraft flew into Stadlerberg, a hill located north of Zurich airport, the final accident report listed nine contributing factors, one being the failure of the assigned air traffic controller to provide a timely warning which could have prevented the crash. However, a criminal investigation was eventually discontinued, and faced with compensation claims, the Federal Court later ruled out any responsibility by air traffic control.
Skyguide is a company commissioned by the Swiss government to handle ATC in Swiss air space. To the extent of 99.85%, its shares are held by the Swiss Confederation. (This means it is not a statutory body, but - in the eyes of the law - a privately held company). Headquartered in Geneva, Skyguide has been responsible since early 2001 for both civil and military ATC – a unique consolidation of duties in Europe. Some 1400 employees control commercial and military air traffic at Zurich-Kloten, Geneva-Cointrin, Bern-Belp and Lugano-Agno as well as at various military air bases. Skyguide also controls assigned air space over foreign territories (such as over Southwest Germany, where the recent mid-air collision took place). Skyguide’s authority over that particular German sector has been the subject of controversy in the context of the Swiss-German air agreement, as the German side has threatened to re-assign this area to German ATC by way of decree should the current round of negotiations for a new air agreement prove unsuccessful.
The Swiss government recently commissioned a study to look into a permanent ATC system which would also identify aircraft without transponders.
Skyguide’s role has been a regular focus of recent air crash investigations, such as the Crossair crash of 24 November 2001. In the case of the Alitalia crash of 14 November 1990, in which all 46 passengers and crew were killed when their aircraft flew into Stadlerberg, a hill located north of Zurich airport, the final accident report listed nine contributing factors, one being the failure of the assigned air traffic controller to provide a timely warning which could have prevented the crash. However, a criminal investigation was eventually discontinued, and faced with compensation claims, the Federal Court later ruled out any responsibility by air traffic control.
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I know we have flogged this one to death before, but this possibly would not have happened had BOTH a/c been cruising at STANDARD cruising levels. I will wait for all the facts, however far too many pilots fly at or request non-standard cruising levels, without too much thought (if any) of opposite direction traffic. They implicitly trust ATC to tell them if a collision risk exists.
All those innocent people (and wonderfully talented children) killed in an accident which could have possibly been avoided by adherrance to basic rules.
All those innocent people (and wonderfully talented children) killed in an accident which could have possibly been avoided by adherrance to basic rules.
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Swiss news agency SDA reports that the flight data recorder of the B-757 has been recovered.
Yesterday, the flight data recorder of the TU-154 and a CVR - believed to be that of the same a/c - had already been found.
Yesterday, the flight data recorder of the TU-154 and a CVR - believed to be that of the same a/c - had already been found.
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There was a comment a few pages back, from an ATCO (?) about proposed SOPs now aircraft have TCAS. It was along the lines of "get lateral separation - let TCAS sort them vertically" when aircraft are getting close.
This seems excellent advice - and would apply to us pilots also. Use the TA to try and acquire the likely "traffic" target - prepare for RA, and plan a LATERAL avoidance maneouvre if necessary. Whatever you do, when you get the RA, follow it religously, not just in direction, but 'green sector' RoC/D / attitude.
We are experiencing a "problem" (others?) with the latest TCAS software, where not all "targets" are being displayed on the screen. We have been repeatedly assured that the target not on the screen IS being monitored by TCAS, and will give TAs/RAs. Therefore visible acquisistion is not a guarantee you have the correct traffic...
Swiss ATC - it is fine to say "an error" of theirs to call the descent so late (and I agree it seems the largest factor to date) - but what are the rules? You cannot "blame" someone unless there is a limit they broke... I was reassured by the (UK?) ATCO who stated that he considered he had failed if the aircraft had not "achieved 1000' separation by 20NM". Given, for a 1000' descent an average descent rate of 500' or less, he was never going to have 1000' separation by 5NM. I really hope his intial call to the Russian was prefixed with an urgency attention getter.
Finally, although it is good advice to "keep the lights turned down" etc, I doubt it would have altered anything here vertically - even if one/both aircraft FD lights were "up". It is very difficult to judge relative altitudes by day, let alone night, and I believe there was a mid air in the USA (near NY?) (1 ac a Constellation?) where correctly separated aircraft collided because they visually felt a collision would occur, and one climbed / descended into the other (sloping cloud I think).
Lessons to me - let TCAS look after the vertical, I'll try and help laterally, and I would hope ATCOs would consider likewise when standard distances of achieving vertical separation (well before TCAS would act) have been missed...
NoD
This seems excellent advice - and would apply to us pilots also. Use the TA to try and acquire the likely "traffic" target - prepare for RA, and plan a LATERAL avoidance maneouvre if necessary. Whatever you do, when you get the RA, follow it religously, not just in direction, but 'green sector' RoC/D / attitude.
We are experiencing a "problem" (others?) with the latest TCAS software, where not all "targets" are being displayed on the screen. We have been repeatedly assured that the target not on the screen IS being monitored by TCAS, and will give TAs/RAs. Therefore visible acquisistion is not a guarantee you have the correct traffic...
Swiss ATC - it is fine to say "an error" of theirs to call the descent so late (and I agree it seems the largest factor to date) - but what are the rules? You cannot "blame" someone unless there is a limit they broke... I was reassured by the (UK?) ATCO who stated that he considered he had failed if the aircraft had not "achieved 1000' separation by 20NM". Given, for a 1000' descent an average descent rate of 500' or less, he was never going to have 1000' separation by 5NM. I really hope his intial call to the Russian was prefixed with an urgency attention getter.
Finally, although it is good advice to "keep the lights turned down" etc, I doubt it would have altered anything here vertically - even if one/both aircraft FD lights were "up". It is very difficult to judge relative altitudes by day, let alone night, and I believe there was a mid air in the USA (near NY?) (1 ac a Constellation?) where correctly separated aircraft collided because they visually felt a collision would occur, and one climbed / descended into the other (sloping cloud I think).
Lessons to me - let TCAS look after the vertical, I'll try and help laterally, and I would hope ATCOs would consider likewise when standard distances of achieving vertical separation (well before TCAS would act) have been missed...
NoD
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BIK_116.80 wrote
Why not wait for the FACTS to come out before leaping to conclusions. Your armchair analysis is constructed of a number of reports of what other people have had reported to them. Some of them are media releases. Hardly definitive.
Your cynicism is stunning.
This is a forum of professionals. Try and be one, there's a good chap.
AA
What was the Swiss air traffic controller doing for the four minutes between 23:30 and 23:34:10 (or 23:34:50)?
We all know that just because an ATCO is not transmitting it does not mean that they are not busy.
The Swiss air traffic controller must have been engaged in activities that were of such a pressing nature that they were of a higher priority than keeping the planes apart.
We all know that just because an ATCO is not transmitting it does not mean that they are not busy.
The Swiss air traffic controller must have been engaged in activities that were of such a pressing nature that they were of a higher priority than keeping the planes apart.
Your armchair analysis is constructed of a number of reports of what other people have had reported to them. Some of them are media releases. Hardly definitive.
Whilst I can well imagine that the air traffic controller is experiencing a great deal of distress, I am finding it difficult to summon compassion because of the apparent likelihood that this distress has been largely self-induced.
The controller might be emotionally distressed, but the pilots and their passengers are dead.
The controller might be emotionally distressed, but the pilots and their passengers are dead.
This is a forum of professionals. Try and be one, there's a good chap.
AA