Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)
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I agree all should stop over-speculating.
This is not helped at all by Swiss ATC and DHL indulging in blaming others already.
Since Swiss ATC have put their side, I feel the following thoughts:
1. 8-10NM (at 90deg) is far too late to describe as even "less than ideal". As someone else said, will be interesting to say what urgency prefixes were applied to the calls.
2. A Plan B is required here - the second call maybe, and certainly the third call should surely have been to the DHL ac? There are a number of legitimate reasons why the Russian aircraft did not, or could not respond. There is, for instance, a known issue with some radios in our fleets where they "go to sleep" and aircraft have not responded for minutes to call. Advice to us - if you don't hear something for a long time (which would be along time at night), click the Tx key...
3. IMHO, the Russian pilot could only be "blamed" if he read back the instruction, and only THEN did not comply.
4. Leaving it so late to start avoiding action, not only increases the possibility of collision by no response (which did not happen here), but TCAS getting involved.
5. Hard to blame TCAS ?? Basically, the 2 anti collision systems (ATC and TCAS) were both "working" in a "just in time" manner - and unfortunately took the 50:50 worst case. TCAS is designed to be a backstop to ATC, and hence is "just in time". ATC should not be...
I do not like pointing the finger, but am very concerned by Swiss ATC throwing the mud. IMHO, in that they have started throwing it, its alright to throw some back...
NoD
This is not helped at all by Swiss ATC and DHL indulging in blaming others already.
Since Swiss ATC have put their side, I feel the following thoughts:
1. 8-10NM (at 90deg) is far too late to describe as even "less than ideal". As someone else said, will be interesting to say what urgency prefixes were applied to the calls.
2. A Plan B is required here - the second call maybe, and certainly the third call should surely have been to the DHL ac? There are a number of legitimate reasons why the Russian aircraft did not, or could not respond. There is, for instance, a known issue with some radios in our fleets where they "go to sleep" and aircraft have not responded for minutes to call. Advice to us - if you don't hear something for a long time (which would be along time at night), click the Tx key...
3. IMHO, the Russian pilot could only be "blamed" if he read back the instruction, and only THEN did not comply.
4. Leaving it so late to start avoiding action, not only increases the possibility of collision by no response (which did not happen here), but TCAS getting involved.
5. Hard to blame TCAS ?? Basically, the 2 anti collision systems (ATC and TCAS) were both "working" in a "just in time" manner - and unfortunately took the 50:50 worst case. TCAS is designed to be a backstop to ATC, and hence is "just in time". ATC should not be...
I do not like pointing the finger, but am very concerned by Swiss ATC throwing the mud. IMHO, in that they have started throwing it, its alright to throw some back...
NoD
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A terrible accident. Thoughts are with the bereaved. One interesting point was that the TU-154 was very new for its type, being rolled off the line in 1995. In fact newer than the 757 that was involved.
It could have been a lot worse; I dread to think of the damage that would have been caused if two heavies collided over a large city. A lot of us (me included) thought that with TCAS in use, mid air collisions were a thing of the past. No doubt RVSM will be put into the spotlight in the wake of this event. I hope the hard work done by ATC in implementing RVSM will not be wasted.
MG
It could have been a lot worse; I dread to think of the damage that would have been caused if two heavies collided over a large city. A lot of us (me included) thought that with TCAS in use, mid air collisions were a thing of the past. No doubt RVSM will be put into the spotlight in the wake of this event. I hope the hard work done by ATC in implementing RVSM will not be wasted.
MG
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A small rant ... if I may ...
Every time there is an accident the circumstances are - logically I might add - discussed ad nauseum by pilots, engineers, ATC, cabin crew, and even spotters. This is to be expected. I too use these discussions as a learning tool, even though I'm still only on small aircraft.
And envariably, some a$$ will pipe up whining about all the speculation .... "Why don't we wait for the investigation ... blah blah blah ...." "You have no right to speculate .... blah blah blah .."
For those that whine on and on about the post accident discussion ... go $%#& yourself, alright? We (most of us) are pilots and the conversations here are no more than that happening around the world at airports and FBOs everywhere. It's with both a morbid curiosity and for the sake of knowledge that we exchange ideas about these tragedies. If it offends you ... DON"T EFF'N READ IT!
PO'd ...
Minh
And envariably, some a$$ will pipe up whining about all the speculation .... "Why don't we wait for the investigation ... blah blah blah ...." "You have no right to speculate .... blah blah blah .."
For those that whine on and on about the post accident discussion ... go $%#& yourself, alright? We (most of us) are pilots and the conversations here are no more than that happening around the world at airports and FBOs everywhere. It's with both a morbid curiosity and for the sake of knowledge that we exchange ideas about these tragedies. If it offends you ... DON"T EFF'N READ IT!
PO'd ...
Minh
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Two observations:
a)An ATC has a traffic conflict between 2 aircraft.One is local,the other foreign.One speaks English fluently,the other has at best a moderate understanding of aviation English.He knows the command he gives must be acted upon immediately.To whom should he give that rapid fire command?Requires intuitive and lightning thinking I agree but a lot of ATCO's fit that bill.
b)Having received no response first time from the first a/c,why waste time with a second attempt.Go straight to plan B and give an opposing command(ie.climb,or turn if climb not available) to the second a/c?This raises the question of which command the 2nd pilot must follow?His TCAS command to descend or the ATC command to climb?
Too early to judge or speculate even...the fact that a handoff had just occured makes it more difficult for the ATCO...he hasnt had a chance to ascertain the communication skills of either aircraft.But he would be correct in assuming that his best chance for quick compliance came with the DHL a/c not the Russian.To exclusively pursue the Russian a/c because they were the offending party(wrong level) is too literal an approach.More lateral thinking needed.
Condolences to the families of all those involved.
a)An ATC has a traffic conflict between 2 aircraft.One is local,the other foreign.One speaks English fluently,the other has at best a moderate understanding of aviation English.He knows the command he gives must be acted upon immediately.To whom should he give that rapid fire command?Requires intuitive and lightning thinking I agree but a lot of ATCO's fit that bill.
b)Having received no response first time from the first a/c,why waste time with a second attempt.Go straight to plan B and give an opposing command(ie.climb,or turn if climb not available) to the second a/c?This raises the question of which command the 2nd pilot must follow?His TCAS command to descend or the ATC command to climb?
Too early to judge or speculate even...the fact that a handoff had just occured makes it more difficult for the ATCO...he hasnt had a chance to ascertain the communication skills of either aircraft.But he would be correct in assuming that his best chance for quick compliance came with the DHL a/c not the Russian.To exclusively pursue the Russian a/c because they were the offending party(wrong level) is too literal an approach.More lateral thinking needed.
Condolences to the families of all those involved.
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As a UK Area Controller I'm rather worried by what has been said about this " just in time " technique.
The comments made in this thread now seem to be supported by the Official Swiss Press Releases with the Russian aircraft having been given a very late descent clearance. I hope I'm wrong.
If I have crossing High Level traffic and have not acheived vertical separation by 20 miles , I reckon I've not done my job.
Sometimes where there is some uncertainty about acheiving vertical separation and 2 aircraft are "dead ringers" , you'll get a radar heading just to guarantee some sort of lateral spacing. Kinda makes me feel more comfortable!
Heaven knows what the final report will show although I'm sure TCAS will come under close scrutiny.
Over the years I've seen some weird resolutions that only an engineer could love!
Like all NATS controllers I've been half expecting something like this in UK Airspace.
The feeling amongst us is " Thank Christ it wasn't me!"
My prayers for everyone involved.
The comments made in this thread now seem to be supported by the Official Swiss Press Releases with the Russian aircraft having been given a very late descent clearance. I hope I'm wrong.
If I have crossing High Level traffic and have not acheived vertical separation by 20 miles , I reckon I've not done my job.
Sometimes where there is some uncertainty about acheiving vertical separation and 2 aircraft are "dead ringers" , you'll get a radar heading just to guarantee some sort of lateral spacing. Kinda makes me feel more comfortable!
Heaven knows what the final report will show although I'm sure TCAS will come under close scrutiny.
Over the years I've seen some weird resolutions that only an engineer could love!
Like all NATS controllers I've been half expecting something like this in UK Airspace.
The feeling amongst us is " Thank Christ it wasn't me!"
My prayers for everyone involved.
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Leading on from what BigBrutha says, I believe that this fact in itself shows the imperative to redesign the FIR regions of Europe, and makes a mockery of the claims that this would in fact denegrate safety which unions are claiming prior to the forthcoming Europe-wide strike.
I hope that this was not a TCAS failure like the BA incident over China, as this would have a serious implication for the integrity of the system. Enough speculation though, and lets wait for the authorities' conclusions.
I have to agree that I though DHL's spokesperson to be very offensive in what he said on BBC at lunchtime.
I hope that this was not a TCAS failure like the BA incident over China, as this would have a serious implication for the integrity of the system. Enough speculation though, and lets wait for the authorities' conclusions.
I have to agree that I though DHL's spokesperson to be very offensive in what he said on BBC at lunchtime.
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ATC Not Assertive Enough
ATC is definitely on the hot seat on this one. If the Russian crew did not respond to ATC instructions in a timely manner, then the onus was on ATC for issuing an immediate vector to the second (DHL) airplane to avoid converging traffic.
Too early to tell what the TCAS Resolution Advisory commanded, if in fact it had advised the DHL pilots to descend, or whether it had commanded a climb. Likewise, the TU-154's TCAS Resolution Advisory and its pilots' maneuvering response will come to light upon both airplanes' CVR and FDR analysis.
Too early to tell what the TCAS Resolution Advisory commanded, if in fact it had advised the DHL pilots to descend, or whether it had commanded a climb. Likewise, the TU-154's TCAS Resolution Advisory and its pilots' maneuvering response will come to light upon both airplanes' CVR and FDR analysis.
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Altimeters?
Does anybody know what is the standard altimeter fit on the TU-154? I am wondering whether it had standard (Imperial) altimeters or Metric altimeters. Would the the Russian crew have been flying at an indicated FL360 or at the metric equivalent?
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In response to some queries about the amount of time ATC leaves itself to solve conflicts, I make the following observations:
As a previous contributor wrote, the likes of London are very much a 'belt and braces' unit (the cliche they apply themselves).
Karlsruhe (Rhein) is also of the same mold: this is because the units are still built around 'time over point' conflict resolution. The radar is used to abuse this strip based information until it makes some kind of sense from a capacity point of view.
Certainly Maastricht, and by second hand knowledge Swiss control and Copenhagen, work in a slightly different manner. Although it is always considered important to keep in mind radio-failure or radar failure circumstances, the time-based margin of error is commonly around two minutes.
Inside this time, alarm bells ahould be going inside a controllers head, and via conflict alert with the equipment too. But I would stress that it is not uncommon for controllers to leave a situation to somewhere around this margin.
Reports that the last instructions were given to the TUP 50 secs from impact are meaningless without knowledge of the apparent urgency behind the message.
'Descend now'
'Descend immediately '
'Avoiding action. Descend... '
But what is even now obvious is that there were two aircraft involved, and yes messages should have been passed to both aircraft....
'Turn immediately left 60 degrees.... '
Problem solved.
Even as a controller, to my mind ATC has the most to answer at this time. And Christ I feel for them.
As a previous contributor wrote, the likes of London are very much a 'belt and braces' unit (the cliche they apply themselves).
Karlsruhe (Rhein) is also of the same mold: this is because the units are still built around 'time over point' conflict resolution. The radar is used to abuse this strip based information until it makes some kind of sense from a capacity point of view.
Certainly Maastricht, and by second hand knowledge Swiss control and Copenhagen, work in a slightly different manner. Although it is always considered important to keep in mind radio-failure or radar failure circumstances, the time-based margin of error is commonly around two minutes.
Inside this time, alarm bells ahould be going inside a controllers head, and via conflict alert with the equipment too. But I would stress that it is not uncommon for controllers to leave a situation to somewhere around this margin.
Reports that the last instructions were given to the TUP 50 secs from impact are meaningless without knowledge of the apparent urgency behind the message.
'Descend now'
'Descend immediately '
'Avoiding action. Descend... '
But what is even now obvious is that there were two aircraft involved, and yes messages should have been passed to both aircraft....
'Turn immediately left 60 degrees.... '
Problem solved.
Even as a controller, to my mind ATC has the most to answer at this time. And Christ I feel for them.
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Lukewarm.. wrote "the likes of London are very much a 'belt and braces' unit (the cliche they apply themselves). Karlsruhe (Rhein) is also of the same mold: this is because the units are still built around 'time over point' conflict resolution. The radar is used to abuse this strip based information until it makes some kind of sense from a capacity point of view. "
As a London controller I don't understand quite what he means, although I will very readily admit to being a "belt and braces" man. Very little UK airspace is operated procedurally nowadays; it's certainly 100% radar in the busy areas. We employ flight progress strips as aide memoires, not primarily to determine separation. If we based our separations on times I dread to think what would be the result as ATC and aircraft "estimates" are frequently wildly inaccurate for many reasons. In the London TMA it's 100% radar control. Strips, telephones and other devices assist us but the tactical decisions are based on what we're watching on radar.
As a London controller I don't understand quite what he means, although I will very readily admit to being a "belt and braces" man. Very little UK airspace is operated procedurally nowadays; it's certainly 100% radar in the busy areas. We employ flight progress strips as aide memoires, not primarily to determine separation. If we based our separations on times I dread to think what would be the result as ATC and aircraft "estimates" are frequently wildly inaccurate for many reasons. In the London TMA it's 100% radar control. Strips, telephones and other devices assist us but the tactical decisions are based on what we're watching on radar.
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Tu154 safety statistics
Common among the Western media hype and expert (sic) opinions is the claim that the Tupolev 154 is 'unsafe'.
For the record, the percentage of Tu154 hull losses (from all causes) is comparable to several US jets. viz:
5.9% of all Tu154s built have been lost.
4.8% of Boeing 727s
7.5% of Boeing 737-200s
9.7% of Douglas DC-9-30s.
source http://aviation-safety.net/statistics/aircraft.html
I expect most PPruNers knew this already, but maybe a journo will read this too.
For the record, the percentage of Tu154 hull losses (from all causes) is comparable to several US jets. viz:
5.9% of all Tu154s built have been lost.
4.8% of Boeing 727s
7.5% of Boeing 737-200s
9.7% of Douglas DC-9-30s.
source http://aviation-safety.net/statistics/aircraft.html
I expect most PPruNers knew this already, but maybe a journo will read this too.
Further speculation to muddy the waters....
There have been at least 3 ASRs raised due to the following:
Over Siberia (I think only under procedural control): Aircraft A (British) at x metres has been warned about aircraft B (Russian - based in Krasnoryarsk (sp?)) on reciprocal track at x + 500m. As the ac approach A has been given an RA climb TOWARDS B. This is due to B's height being (mis-)reported by B's TCAS as ALSO BEING x metres. This then caused A's TCAS to initiate the climb.
As I said this has happened at least 3 times - all with the same aircraft B.
Now I know TCAS gets its height info from Mode C, same as ground ATC so I don't think the above is a factor here. However, I'm busy trying to dig out the tail number for ac B.
There have been at least 3 ASRs raised due to the following:
Over Siberia (I think only under procedural control): Aircraft A (British) at x metres has been warned about aircraft B (Russian - based in Krasnoryarsk (sp?)) on reciprocal track at x + 500m. As the ac approach A has been given an RA climb TOWARDS B. This is due to B's height being (mis-)reported by B's TCAS as ALSO BEING x metres. This then caused A's TCAS to initiate the climb.
As I said this has happened at least 3 times - all with the same aircraft B.
Now I know TCAS gets its height info from Mode C, same as ground ATC so I don't think the above is a factor here. However, I'm busy trying to dig out the tail number for ac B.
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I felt constrained to send the following message to the BBC in Manchester. Sadly, all too predictable.
This evening on your programme, your newscaster/presenter, Gordon Burns, referred to the mid-air collision between a Russian Tu 154 aircraft and a DHL Boeing 757 Freighter over southern Germany. He commented that the Captain of the Boeing emanated from Liverpool and that the collision occurred 'because the Russian pilot failed to carry out Air Traffic Control instructions to descend'. This is not proved. The Flight Recorder from the Russian aircraft has not yet been read and the Recorder from the Boeing has not yet been found. The bodies are hardly cold, yet your Mr Burns reports the reason for this catastrophe!
There are, in fact, several potential reasons and these will be looked at by the inquiry which will be set up. Most of these reasons will be of a technical nature and the cause of the collision will be ascertained and published.
My interest in this matter is professional in that I am the recently retired Operations Director of a large regional airline and have suffered from terrible howlers at the hands of well-meaning but ignorant reporters in the past.
One would really have hoped that the BBC was able to do better than this.
Yours truly.
This evening on your programme, your newscaster/presenter, Gordon Burns, referred to the mid-air collision between a Russian Tu 154 aircraft and a DHL Boeing 757 Freighter over southern Germany. He commented that the Captain of the Boeing emanated from Liverpool and that the collision occurred 'because the Russian pilot failed to carry out Air Traffic Control instructions to descend'. This is not proved. The Flight Recorder from the Russian aircraft has not yet been read and the Recorder from the Boeing has not yet been found. The bodies are hardly cold, yet your Mr Burns reports the reason for this catastrophe!
There are, in fact, several potential reasons and these will be looked at by the inquiry which will be set up. Most of these reasons will be of a technical nature and the cause of the collision will be ascertained and published.
My interest in this matter is professional in that I am the recently retired Operations Director of a large regional airline and have suffered from terrible howlers at the hands of well-meaning but ignorant reporters in the past.
One would really have hoped that the BBC was able to do better than this.
Yours truly.
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I'll speculate
Speculation is natural, it also gives an insight to another possibility. As long as we know the difference between speculation and fact, then it is OK.
Here is my speculation.
Swiss ATC sector, late evening, quiet, nothing too demanding, reading book, feet up, maybe chatting about the World Cup Soccer.
ATC looks up, Oh Sh!!!!t, Gives decent instruction to T154.
Simultaneously, T154 gets TCAS RA "CLIMB CLIMB", initial reaction from T154 crew is slow due to contradicting instructions. They decide to do what they always do, comply to ATC, commence decent.
Almost simultaneously, DHL gets TCAS RA, "DECEND DECEND"
Sadly, after decending 700', they meet the other guy.
Conclusion, 2 aircraft that will meet at the same level in less than 1 minute, should have been seperated (already) 2 minutes earlier at the latest.... sorry chaps but it seems too obvious.
THIS IS ONLY SPECULATION, I PRAY THAT I AM WRONG.
Here is my speculation.
Swiss ATC sector, late evening, quiet, nothing too demanding, reading book, feet up, maybe chatting about the World Cup Soccer.
ATC looks up, Oh Sh!!!!t, Gives decent instruction to T154.
Simultaneously, T154 gets TCAS RA "CLIMB CLIMB", initial reaction from T154 crew is slow due to contradicting instructions. They decide to do what they always do, comply to ATC, commence decent.
Almost simultaneously, DHL gets TCAS RA, "DECEND DECEND"
Sadly, after decending 700', they meet the other guy.
Conclusion, 2 aircraft that will meet at the same level in less than 1 minute, should have been seperated (already) 2 minutes earlier at the latest.... sorry chaps but it seems too obvious.
THIS IS ONLY SPECULATION, I PRAY THAT I AM WRONG.
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Failure to Acknowledge ATC calls -CHIRPED
From the Latest CHIRP
Loss of Communications
Since 11 September, my company has adopted a locked flight deck door policy. As a result of this, our only means of communication with the cabin crew is over our cabin interphone via the 'CABIN' selection on the Radio Management Panel (RMP).
The design of the RMP is such that, when a 'TRANSMIT' button is depressed, the associated receiver is automatically selected. However, a receiver can be selected by separately depressing its button, thus enabling more than one function to be monitored at a time. However, as far as the VHF selections are concerned, with ANR headsets it is normal to monitor only one frequency at a time i.e. the one that is being used for transmission. The consequence of this is that when a alternate 'TRANSMIT' selection is made, it de-selects the in-use function (usually VHF 1) in transmit and also receive.
Thus, if VHF 1 is in use and being monitored, when the cabin crew call, the 'CABIN' button is depressed, which de-selects the monitoring on VHF 1. On two occasions now, I have needed to get involved in the conversation and have selected 'CABIN' also, without appreciating that we were both not monitoring our radio. This situation continued for at least a minute or two.
Perhaps I haven't thought about it before, but it seems to me that there has been an increase lately in pilots failing to respond to air traffic calls. Could our ATC colleagues comment?
I believe that, with these new procedures, we should have a completely separate cabin interphone system, which is not accessed via the RMP, thus removing the accidental cessation of monitoring the R/T frequency in use.
Chirp Response
Some operators have specific policies designed to avoid a situation where both pilots might not be monitoring the ATC frequency.
Within the UK, the number of recent cases of pilots failing to respond, although not significantly different from that previously, is a significant concern. More generally, it is understood that the Joint Aviation Authorities are fully involved in an investigation into loss of communication incidents in European airspace.
This is one of several reports that we have received describing difficulties associated with the changes recently introduced.
http://www.chirp.co.uk/air_transport/FB62.htm
Loss of Communications
Since 11 September, my company has adopted a locked flight deck door policy. As a result of this, our only means of communication with the cabin crew is over our cabin interphone via the 'CABIN' selection on the Radio Management Panel (RMP).
The design of the RMP is such that, when a 'TRANSMIT' button is depressed, the associated receiver is automatically selected. However, a receiver can be selected by separately depressing its button, thus enabling more than one function to be monitored at a time. However, as far as the VHF selections are concerned, with ANR headsets it is normal to monitor only one frequency at a time i.e. the one that is being used for transmission. The consequence of this is that when a alternate 'TRANSMIT' selection is made, it de-selects the in-use function (usually VHF 1) in transmit and also receive.
Thus, if VHF 1 is in use and being monitored, when the cabin crew call, the 'CABIN' button is depressed, which de-selects the monitoring on VHF 1. On two occasions now, I have needed to get involved in the conversation and have selected 'CABIN' also, without appreciating that we were both not monitoring our radio. This situation continued for at least a minute or two.
Perhaps I haven't thought about it before, but it seems to me that there has been an increase lately in pilots failing to respond to air traffic calls. Could our ATC colleagues comment?
I believe that, with these new procedures, we should have a completely separate cabin interphone system, which is not accessed via the RMP, thus removing the accidental cessation of monitoring the R/T frequency in use.
Chirp Response
Some operators have specific policies designed to avoid a situation where both pilots might not be monitoring the ATC frequency.
Within the UK, the number of recent cases of pilots failing to respond, although not significantly different from that previously, is a significant concern. More generally, it is understood that the Joint Aviation Authorities are fully involved in an investigation into loss of communication incidents in European airspace.
This is one of several reports that we have received describing difficulties associated with the changes recently introduced.
http://www.chirp.co.uk/air_transport/FB62.htm
Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany
Pls do not flame me.
In the summer of 99 I was lucky to see Pushing Tin The story of some ATC people with J. Kusak and J. Mulcovits. (forgive the spelling errors)
There was a line that I instantly fell in love with "An ATC is responsible for more lifes during one shift than a doctor over his entire carreer."
Tonoght I undersatand how serious this phrase is...
In the summer of 99 I was lucky to see Pushing Tin The story of some ATC people with J. Kusak and J. Mulcovits. (forgive the spelling errors)
There was a line that I instantly fell in love with "An ATC is responsible for more lifes during one shift than a doctor over his entire carreer."
Tonoght I undersatand how serious this phrase is...
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Stagger
To answer your?, ATC has NO input OR feedback from TCAS so cannot tell WIHIH apart from the pilots rt & his radar display, but at the end of the day, TCAS should ONLY be giving orders if ATC has NOT done its job properly, so on this basis, even if TCAS made the wrong call, another call should have been made by ATC prior to this happening.
To answer your?, ATC has NO input OR feedback from TCAS so cannot tell WIHIH apart from the pilots rt & his radar display, but at the end of the day, TCAS should ONLY be giving orders if ATC has NOT done its job properly, so on this basis, even if TCAS made the wrong call, another call should have been made by ATC prior to this happening.
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Statistics can be made to mean anything you want.
Remember the TU-154 was still being built in 1994 whereas the other aircraft ceased production at least 10 years earlier. The fatigue life of the TU-154 was 30000 hours or 20000 cycles, how many of the 727,737 and DC9s are approaching (or have passed)three times those figures.
Hull losses per million flying hours may be more appropriate however as most accidents occur during take off or landing perhaps per million cycles may be even better. Each set of figures will give you a different answer.
Remember there are "Lies, damn lies and statistics" - Benjamin Disraeli.
The hull loss figures were quoted but why did you not include the following from the site
Figures do not disguise the tragedy - CR
Remember the TU-154 was still being built in 1994 whereas the other aircraft ceased production at least 10 years earlier. The fatigue life of the TU-154 was 30000 hours or 20000 cycles, how many of the 727,737 and DC9s are approaching (or have passed)three times those figures.
Hull losses per million flying hours may be more appropriate however as most accidents occur during take off or landing perhaps per million cycles may be even better. Each set of figures will give you a different answer.
Remember there are "Lies, damn lies and statistics" - Benjamin Disraeli.
The hull loss figures were quoted but why did you not include the following from the site
Please note that this table does not say anything about the safety of an aircraft type.
Last edited by Captain Rodders; 2nd Jul 2002 at 20:52.