Mid-Air Collision over Southern Germany (merged)
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Maybe one of the targets wasnīt shown on the controllers screen? According to the Swiss Accident Investigation Bureau it has happened before (http://www.bfu.admin.ch/common/pdf/1744d.pdf).
And wouldnīt this be a good explanation why the DHL never got an avoiding instruction, and neither of the two planes was instructed to turn???
And wouldnīt this be a good explanation why the DHL never got an avoiding instruction, and neither of the two planes was instructed to turn???
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Right at the beginning of this thread someone suggested that ATC had a lot to answer for. This has been discussed at great length without any real answer. Then matters started to take a turn against the Swiss ATC in ZRH who vehmently defended their position. Who wouldn't I suppose.
Now! The executive director in an interview on TV admitted two things. Their anticollision system WAS turned off "for maintenance" with NO apparent loss of integrity! And, that ONE of the TWO controllers had taken an unauthorised break! "But this should not have impaired the functioning of ATC" - what absolute tosh and arrogance!
They have from the outset tried to set themselves aside from this accident and now they admit this. Does that sound like a system that a pilot would be confident with?
I will refrain from making any further comment.
Now! The executive director in an interview on TV admitted two things. Their anticollision system WAS turned off "for maintenance" with NO apparent loss of integrity! And, that ONE of the TWO controllers had taken an unauthorised break! "But this should not have impaired the functioning of ATC" - what absolute tosh and arrogance!
They have from the outset tried to set themselves aside from this accident and now they admit this. Does that sound like a system that a pilot would be confident with?
I will refrain from making any further comment.
So how often were/are controllers issuing separation instructions in en route airspace with just 50 seconds to go?
Perhaps this ATC sector developed this habit over time and nobody stopped to consider the size of bet being placed on instant aircrew response made necessary by the lack of margins.
And what consideration was given to allowance for lost comms?
Just to add to the many other good questions that have been raised.
Perhaps this ATC sector developed this habit over time and nobody stopped to consider the size of bet being placed on instant aircrew response made necessary by the lack of margins.
And what consideration was given to allowance for lost comms?
Just to add to the many other good questions that have been raised.
Props are for boats!
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Yes this seems to be pointing at the controllers. The fact they have admitted in instructing the Russian Plane to descend only 45-50 secounds before the point of crossed flight paths( impact in this case), is very unerving. 50 seconds at a combined closure speed of say 900kts is about 6-7 miles from impact, to me thats too short. Was there a problem in the handover?
Those with international experience, will understand the problems with language, and handovers to different centres all over the world. Was this a factor this time? The language thing comes up alot I notice.
Those with international experience, will understand the problems with language, and handovers to different centres all over the world. Was this a factor this time? The language thing comes up alot I notice.
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Most here in this forum are infinitely more qualified to comment in detail so I have but two questions that have been provoked by all that I have read.
1. What do we know of the experience of the one controller left "in charge" by the absentee second controller?
Something in the back of my mind is saying, "if I were a trainee or new and had been told to mind the fort in absentia and do nothing might I react slowly and only post-haste at the last moment"?
and .. not contradictory but along the same lines
2. Are we actually being told that the timing of 50 seconds for a first/last call to initiate separation where a/c are on a collision course is considered "normal" for Swiss ATC?
If I have misunderstood I apologise, but if not, then are we to presume that "normally" (in daylight hours) for example, congestion of Swiss airspace is such that a max time for an avoiding action call is ALWAYS 50 seconds? If so then clearly someone has been way over optimistic with the ability of a system to cope.
RIP to all souls lost.
All sympathy to the two ATC controllers.
Condolences to families, friends and colleagues.
1. What do we know of the experience of the one controller left "in charge" by the absentee second controller?
Something in the back of my mind is saying, "if I were a trainee or new and had been told to mind the fort in absentia and do nothing might I react slowly and only post-haste at the last moment"?
and .. not contradictory but along the same lines
2. Are we actually being told that the timing of 50 seconds for a first/last call to initiate separation where a/c are on a collision course is considered "normal" for Swiss ATC?
If I have misunderstood I apologise, but if not, then are we to presume that "normally" (in daylight hours) for example, congestion of Swiss airspace is such that a max time for an avoiding action call is ALWAYS 50 seconds? If so then clearly someone has been way over optimistic with the ability of a system to cope.
RIP to all souls lost.
All sympathy to the two ATC controllers.
Condolences to families, friends and colleagues.
Last edited by brockenspectre; 4th Jul 2002 at 06:06.
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Interesting facts here are that with TCAS a TA occurs at approx 40 seconds from closest point of approach (CPA) depending on altitude related sensitivity and an RA is given 25secs before CPA. Considering the 50 second call not much room for manouvre is there.
One other point that appears to have not been considered in all the other posts is that of the collision height of 35250ft. Here the westbound aircraft had almost completed the necessary descent instruction but unfortunately the north bound aircraft had apparently initiated the TCAS descent requirement. However, everything should become clearer with the transcript of the CVR
As stated by teeteringhead and well covered by CRM courses lose a link and the chain is broken and in this case as others with dire effects.
One other point that appears to have not been considered in all the other posts is that of the collision height of 35250ft. Here the westbound aircraft had almost completed the necessary descent instruction but unfortunately the north bound aircraft had apparently initiated the TCAS descent requirement. However, everything should become clearer with the transcript of the CVR
As stated by teeteringhead and well covered by CRM courses lose a link and the chain is broken and in this case as others with dire effects.
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Firstly my deepest condolences to all those concerned. This is a real tragedy and it's up to us all to make sure that nothing like this can happen again.
There is much talk about altitude separation, by various means over this incident. I was an Intercept Controller in the military until recently, not an ATCO' just a "Freddie". But I was thoroughly trained and examined in ATC procedures and separation techniques. I was taught from day one the correct way to separate aircraft is lateraly. A ten degree heading change when aircraft are 40 miles apart will give a lot of separation.
Leaving it to trying to achieve 1000ft separation with 50 secs to go to collision, late at night, with one aircraft from a country whose understanding of English might not be the best, flying an old airliner, is seriously reducing the odds.
Let us let the investigation take its course and have everyone learn from this tragic event.
God bless their souls, may they rest in peace.
There is much talk about altitude separation, by various means over this incident. I was an Intercept Controller in the military until recently, not an ATCO' just a "Freddie". But I was thoroughly trained and examined in ATC procedures and separation techniques. I was taught from day one the correct way to separate aircraft is lateraly. A ten degree heading change when aircraft are 40 miles apart will give a lot of separation.
Leaving it to trying to achieve 1000ft separation with 50 secs to go to collision, late at night, with one aircraft from a country whose understanding of English might not be the best, flying an old airliner, is seriously reducing the odds.
Let us let the investigation take its course and have everyone learn from this tragic event.
God bless their souls, may they rest in peace.
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Seems there are 2 fundamental factors here:
1) ZRH ATC totally screwed up by not giving DHL avioding action, regardless of equipment or number of controllers;
2) 154's apparent failure to respond to radio or TCAS. This leads to the question of whether they had an avionics or electrical problem (even a coffee spilt on the pedestal could cause this). The lack of response could very concievably have been out of their control and the press and Swiss blaming the Russian crew is at the least premature.
ZRH's statement that they leave separation to the last minute is not comforting. As for RVSM, I can't see a problem - they were at the same level, not 1000' apart.
TCAS is a great piece of kit which I understood to be mandatory for ops in JAA airspace. It also takes precedence over any other instructions from ATC or GPWS so it's unlikely that confusion existed over which to follow.
As for the comments about 'too many gizmos' and 'use the Mk1 eyeball' , it's immpossible to tell visually if you're at different levels until you're almost on top of each other when at altitude, and what about when you're in cloud?
Unfortunately the growth of aviation means a greater reliance on fall backs such as TCAS, and like any system it's not 100% reliable. I fly brand new US aircraft and TCAS is intermittent on a couple of them, particularly at lower levels, as the antennas are often poorly sealed and water fouls up the signal.
1) ZRH ATC totally screwed up by not giving DHL avioding action, regardless of equipment or number of controllers;
2) 154's apparent failure to respond to radio or TCAS. This leads to the question of whether they had an avionics or electrical problem (even a coffee spilt on the pedestal could cause this). The lack of response could very concievably have been out of their control and the press and Swiss blaming the Russian crew is at the least premature.
ZRH's statement that they leave separation to the last minute is not comforting. As for RVSM, I can't see a problem - they were at the same level, not 1000' apart.
TCAS is a great piece of kit which I understood to be mandatory for ops in JAA airspace. It also takes precedence over any other instructions from ATC or GPWS so it's unlikely that confusion existed over which to follow.
As for the comments about 'too many gizmos' and 'use the Mk1 eyeball' , it's immpossible to tell visually if you're at different levels until you're almost on top of each other when at altitude, and what about when you're in cloud?
Unfortunately the growth of aviation means a greater reliance on fall backs such as TCAS, and like any system it's not 100% reliable. I fly brand new US aircraft and TCAS is intermittent on a couple of them, particularly at lower levels, as the antennas are often poorly sealed and water fouls up the signal.
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It is fair to say that the Air Traffic System was probably largely responsible for this tragic event. The real question is what specifically was the problem, and how can this be avoided in the future.
Firstly, one must realise that ATC systems around the world all operate and function in a different manner. Whilst we all work on the standard separation minimums as required by the appropriate authorities, we do so in different ways with different tools. We are trained in different schools and in different schools of thought. Many ATC units do not have the benefit of conflict detection, specialised sectors, state of the art equipment and more with this in mind; it is possible that one ATC would see this mid-air as an absolute ATC (controller) error, whilst another ATC would see this as an absolute ATC (system) error.
There is a tendency in the developed world, to reduce the size of a sector that any one ATC will work, often referred to as sausage factories, where there is a production line (if you will) of controllers working small sectors with aircraft spending just a short time in a sector, and then being moved along.
In other parts of the world (often where there is less traffic), the responsibilities of individual controllers cover a wider range of tasks, a single controller could be working the departures, arrivals, final approach, doing his/her own coordination with adjacent sectors etc, and often, these controllers work without the aid of a safety net (STCA/MTCD).
The importance of this difference is not immediately obvious; after all, both methods get the job done. The difference however is deep. The problems start in the training of controllers.
In the specialised environment, controllers are often not exposed to the big picture controlling, they develop their experience(s) in an environment where there is always a safety net, and there is always someone to do the coordination. Technology and redundancy are accepted as standard. Specific methods are used to resolve specific conflicts, and controlling traffic often becomes more of a monitoring function than a decision-making process.
In the other scenario, controllers grow up in an environment where they are always required to back themselves, check and re-check their separations, be prepared for Radar, Radio and Transponder failures. ATCs in this environment will often offset an aircrafts heading slightly for a climb through, so that in a worst case scenario, a reduction in separation would occur and not a near-miss. They will devise & refine new methods of dealing with situations as they arrise, and always be aware that there is more than one way to do the same thing.
Simply put, there are small tricks of the trade that may or may not get trained in the specialised environment, and even if they are taught theoretically, they are certainly hardly exercised in reality.
What may seem to be a basic task to the big picture ATC, might require the prompt of conflict detection equipment in the specialised environment. Additionally it may happen that when faced with a unique and unusual situation, the specialised ATC may not be trained or practiced in taking simple & immediate remedial action, or "design" a solution off the cuff.
The bottom line is that if we condition ATCs to work in a certain manner, using specific tools and safety features, then we dare not expect them to perform at the same level of efficiency when we remove those vital tools. I suppose the equivalent would be to ask a (modern) pilot to navigate accurately using sextant, chart and compass.
So, back to the mid-air,
I am not defending the controllers actions or lack of action; I only wish to point out that there may be more to the situation than meets the eye (or the ear when the tapes are made public).
As ATCs, some of us may feel that the resolution to the conflict could have been as simple as an offset heading or an early decent instruction. To other ATCs, this may not have been so obvious.
If the latter is the case, then the system has failed, and the man is just the last link in a chain of unfortunate and fatal events.
Firstly, one must realise that ATC systems around the world all operate and function in a different manner. Whilst we all work on the standard separation minimums as required by the appropriate authorities, we do so in different ways with different tools. We are trained in different schools and in different schools of thought. Many ATC units do not have the benefit of conflict detection, specialised sectors, state of the art equipment and more with this in mind; it is possible that one ATC would see this mid-air as an absolute ATC (controller) error, whilst another ATC would see this as an absolute ATC (system) error.
There is a tendency in the developed world, to reduce the size of a sector that any one ATC will work, often referred to as sausage factories, where there is a production line (if you will) of controllers working small sectors with aircraft spending just a short time in a sector, and then being moved along.
In other parts of the world (often where there is less traffic), the responsibilities of individual controllers cover a wider range of tasks, a single controller could be working the departures, arrivals, final approach, doing his/her own coordination with adjacent sectors etc, and often, these controllers work without the aid of a safety net (STCA/MTCD).
The importance of this difference is not immediately obvious; after all, both methods get the job done. The difference however is deep. The problems start in the training of controllers.
In the specialised environment, controllers are often not exposed to the big picture controlling, they develop their experience(s) in an environment where there is always a safety net, and there is always someone to do the coordination. Technology and redundancy are accepted as standard. Specific methods are used to resolve specific conflicts, and controlling traffic often becomes more of a monitoring function than a decision-making process.
In the other scenario, controllers grow up in an environment where they are always required to back themselves, check and re-check their separations, be prepared for Radar, Radio and Transponder failures. ATCs in this environment will often offset an aircrafts heading slightly for a climb through, so that in a worst case scenario, a reduction in separation would occur and not a near-miss. They will devise & refine new methods of dealing with situations as they arrise, and always be aware that there is more than one way to do the same thing.
Simply put, there are small tricks of the trade that may or may not get trained in the specialised environment, and even if they are taught theoretically, they are certainly hardly exercised in reality.
What may seem to be a basic task to the big picture ATC, might require the prompt of conflict detection equipment in the specialised environment. Additionally it may happen that when faced with a unique and unusual situation, the specialised ATC may not be trained or practiced in taking simple & immediate remedial action, or "design" a solution off the cuff.
The bottom line is that if we condition ATCs to work in a certain manner, using specific tools and safety features, then we dare not expect them to perform at the same level of efficiency when we remove those vital tools. I suppose the equivalent would be to ask a (modern) pilot to navigate accurately using sextant, chart and compass.
So, back to the mid-air,
I am not defending the controllers actions or lack of action; I only wish to point out that there may be more to the situation than meets the eye (or the ear when the tapes are made public).
As ATCs, some of us may feel that the resolution to the conflict could have been as simple as an offset heading or an early decent instruction. To other ATCs, this may not have been so obvious.
If the latter is the case, then the system has failed, and the man is just the last link in a chain of unfortunate and fatal events.
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one of the most depressing things about this incident is that it happened at a time when traffic levels were low and that there was no one to second guess the single controller ....... I just wonder if the constant theme in the Airline World of trying to get a quart out of a pint pot is not leading us into much greater danger?
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Tu154 Crew not listening out?
Whippersnapper
RE: "154's apparent failure to respond to radio or TCAS. "
The UNCTUOUS Post on Page 10 (of this thread) addresses this point quite effectively.
The CHIRP about the Radio Management Panel (RMP) explains it all to me - and quite satisfactorily (and the CVR might amplify this). The Russian pilots possibly got a call from the galley about "what meals they each wanted" (and of course because captain and copilot have to eat different meals, they would have both been on intercom (and off the ATC VHF monitors automatically, courtesy of the glitch in most aircraft's RMP setup - as described in the CHIRP).
The key to the accident is the missed first and second calls and their response to the urgent third ATC call (but by that time the 757 was in urgent TCAS RA avoidance action and the Russian pilots simply followed ATC instructions, negating the 757 TCAS's RA solution). I would suggest that as it would now appear that the Tu-154 is TCAS equipped, it was that cooking off of the initial TA over the cockpit speakers (and in any headsets they had on) that alerted the Russian pilots - and they then went for the radio Tx/Rx buttons because a 90 degree crossing angle is absolutely the worst for visual acquisition, particularly at night, and they couldn't see the conflicting a/c.
Once they'd re-selected their VHF radios they caught that third urgent ATC instruction. AND THEN, not realising that it was the THIRD (not having heard the first two), they quite reasonably followed the ATC urgent instruction to descend (which by that time was so stale as to be useless). A major glitch with TCAS is that, as in this case, you can have ATC and TCAS working in ignorance of each other (and fatally, against each other). As a last minute J.I.T. (just in time) system it leaves much to be desired. There is also a major glitch between TCAS II variant 7 and earlier TCAS II's (that may well have played a part). The TCAS 2000 use of mode S to give lateral avoidance solutions would be an improvement because any turn will also provide a beautiful visible planform to the other crew (instead of a head-on dot or an oblique profile).
RE: "154's apparent failure to respond to radio or TCAS. "
The UNCTUOUS Post on Page 10 (of this thread) addresses this point quite effectively.
The CHIRP about the Radio Management Panel (RMP) explains it all to me - and quite satisfactorily (and the CVR might amplify this). The Russian pilots possibly got a call from the galley about "what meals they each wanted" (and of course because captain and copilot have to eat different meals, they would have both been on intercom (and off the ATC VHF monitors automatically, courtesy of the glitch in most aircraft's RMP setup - as described in the CHIRP).
The key to the accident is the missed first and second calls and their response to the urgent third ATC call (but by that time the 757 was in urgent TCAS RA avoidance action and the Russian pilots simply followed ATC instructions, negating the 757 TCAS's RA solution). I would suggest that as it would now appear that the Tu-154 is TCAS equipped, it was that cooking off of the initial TA over the cockpit speakers (and in any headsets they had on) that alerted the Russian pilots - and they then went for the radio Tx/Rx buttons because a 90 degree crossing angle is absolutely the worst for visual acquisition, particularly at night, and they couldn't see the conflicting a/c.
Once they'd re-selected their VHF radios they caught that third urgent ATC instruction. AND THEN, not realising that it was the THIRD (not having heard the first two), they quite reasonably followed the ATC urgent instruction to descend (which by that time was so stale as to be useless). A major glitch with TCAS is that, as in this case, you can have ATC and TCAS working in ignorance of each other (and fatally, against each other). As a last minute J.I.T. (just in time) system it leaves much to be desired. There is also a major glitch between TCAS II variant 7 and earlier TCAS II's (that may well have played a part). The TCAS 2000 use of mode S to give lateral avoidance solutions would be an improvement because any turn will also provide a beautiful visible planform to the other crew (instead of a head-on dot or an oblique profile).
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TomPierce,
I agree with you absolutely, on one thing:
You better do refrain from making any further comments!
The same applies to everyone in here who condemn the controllers involved.
Some of you guys behave like those stupid journalists who don't have any idea at all how ATC works.
It's quite simple: If you don't work in ATC you can't have an in depth knowledge of procedures, daily work and problems involved.
Discussing the matter: fine.
Speculating about reasons and blaming someone before the investigation even started: bollocks. That's the above mentioned journos' business.
71 people have died in an absolutely horrific accident.
2 ATCOs have experienced the utter nightmare a controller can possibly encounter. They will have to live with this for the rest of their lives, no matter if guilty or not.
And countless people believe they already have the answers as to why and how it has happened and who is to blame. Unfortunately some of them can be found in here, a forum consisting of aviation professionals.
Well, if you wanna claim to be one of them, then behave like one!
I agree with you absolutely, on one thing:
You better do refrain from making any further comments!
The same applies to everyone in here who condemn the controllers involved.
Some of you guys behave like those stupid journalists who don't have any idea at all how ATC works.
It's quite simple: If you don't work in ATC you can't have an in depth knowledge of procedures, daily work and problems involved.
Discussing the matter: fine.
Speculating about reasons and blaming someone before the investigation even started: bollocks. That's the above mentioned journos' business.
71 people have died in an absolutely horrific accident.
2 ATCOs have experienced the utter nightmare a controller can possibly encounter. They will have to live with this for the rest of their lives, no matter if guilty or not.
And countless people believe they already have the answers as to why and how it has happened and who is to blame. Unfortunately some of them can be found in here, a forum consisting of aviation professionals.
Well, if you wanna claim to be one of them, then behave like one!
Rainbow Chaser
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Proceed as Cleared which is why I asked my two questions. What is vital is that the genuine truth here is identified - to have such a tragic accident occur in middle Europe, in what might be considered part of the most sophisticated ATC system in the world means that all branches of the aviation world owe it to all of the aviation world to establish the clean truth, to publish the clean truth and let us all learn from it! Whether it is cultural thinking, regional practice, system failure +/- anything else, it is vital that the clean truth is known here.
Standard Departure excellent post. Thank you!
Standard Departure excellent post. Thank you!
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one aircraft from a country whose understanding of English might not be the best, flying an old airliner
Boeing 757 built 1990
No preconceptions here, are there now ?
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We needed a reminder that air safety, especially in the ATC world, is not something to be taken lightly. We didn't need this reminder, but we have it now.
May I appeal to all colleagues involved in air transport, whether regulation, operation, airline, ATC service provider, from the lowliest tyro to the Chief Pilot, from the ATSA loading strips to the ATC service Director, to remind themselves of this next time they think about cutting a corner, launching an ill-advised initiative, or papering over a crack.
A truly terrible accident. My sympathies and condolences, and those of Mrs NorthernSky and the family, to all concerned.
There are more stars in tonight's northern sky. Let them shine brightly.
May I appeal to all colleagues involved in air transport, whether regulation, operation, airline, ATC service provider, from the lowliest tyro to the Chief Pilot, from the ATSA loading strips to the ATC service Director, to remind themselves of this next time they think about cutting a corner, launching an ill-advised initiative, or papering over a crack.
A truly terrible accident. My sympathies and condolences, and those of Mrs NorthernSky and the family, to all concerned.
There are more stars in tonight's northern sky. Let them shine brightly.
Tsamaya sentle
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Oh, those wild, wild speculations! Noone has seen the CVR transcripts, the black boxes havenīt even been opened yet, most bodies still havenīt been recovered, and we get, in these posts here, everything from "urgent third call from ATC" to "meals being served, therefore the Russian crew did not respond". I am somewhat disappointed about the unprofessionalism of many of the posts in this thread.
Having said that, I must admit I am not a flying professional. But is there not a difference between "rumour" (this forum!) and mere phantasy?
EDDNHopper
Having said that, I must admit I am not a flying professional. But is there not a difference between "rumour" (this forum!) and mere phantasy?
EDDNHopper
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What people in the UK should remember when they point the finger at Swiss ATC is that London controllers routenely accept aircraft from France northbound at the same level as westbound aircraft when both aircraft will cross Brookmans Park (BPK) beacon at the same time. They do this in "the anticipation" that they can change the level or vector the aircraft at a later time......Does this sound familiar?
Furthermore, the single computer that supplies data to the 4 UK atc centres and the busiest airports is switched off about once per week and when this single computer is off or as in recent cases has failed then the conflict alert system is not available to controllers.
Perhaps a UK ATC person could comment on the above.
DFC
Furthermore, the single computer that supplies data to the 4 UK atc centres and the busiest airports is switched off about once per week and when this single computer is off or as in recent cases has failed then the conflict alert system is not available to controllers.
Perhaps a UK ATC person could comment on the above.
DFC
Paxing All Over The World
I have read the posts in this thread from start to finish and realise that it is pointless to be another voice in the wilderness, asking people to read the thread before posting, repeated information adds nothing.
The Chief Pilot has a very fyne system here and it is being overloaded with repeated detail and whole splurges of text pulled from other sources, rather than a simple link, or a one sentance summary.
On Page 7 of this thread, Capt PPRuNe requested:
I should like to echo Paper Tiger's observation about preconceptions but postulate an answer to a point raised early on. Someone asked why the media were concentrating on the Tu 154, this in the context that the blame was being shoved their way.
In all the photographs, still and video, the single largest piece of a/c was the tail section of the Tupolev. Given that the impact was at FL353 (or therabouts) it is worth noting that the tail section with vertical stab and top fins was almost in one piece and engine pods were nearby. It is said that Tupolevs are still built on the Heavy Metal scale!
Seriously, that was what the journos could see, the Boeing seems to be in smaller bits and so attracted less attention from the camera folks. Also, the tailfin had the company emblem on it, something that editors would say adds greatly to the picture, as it is something that people can understand more than just twisted metal. It is also poignant.
The Chief Pilot has a very fyne system here and it is being overloaded with repeated detail and whole splurges of text pulled from other sources, rather than a simple link, or a one sentance summary.
On Page 7 of this thread, Capt PPRuNe requested:
Please feel free to start a condolences thread on the Aircrew Notices forum.
In all the photographs, still and video, the single largest piece of a/c was the tail section of the Tupolev. Given that the impact was at FL353 (or therabouts) it is worth noting that the tail section with vertical stab and top fins was almost in one piece and engine pods were nearby. It is said that Tupolevs are still built on the Heavy Metal scale!
Seriously, that was what the journos could see, the Boeing seems to be in smaller bits and so attracted less attention from the camera folks. Also, the tailfin had the company emblem on it, something that editors would say adds greatly to the picture, as it is something that people can understand more than just twisted metal. It is also poignant.
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Blame
Can everyone stop 'blaming' and apportioning 'responsiblity'. You really are making me sick. It's bad enough that this happened, but to be launching in with fatuous crap about blame........????
Fine, discuss possible 'scenarios', offer 'opinions' etc. Without the facts you are just talking crap. How does anyone yet KNOW that the Russians had received a climb RA? Never heard of TCAS giving conflicting RA's? If the DHL crew had received a TA, where was their situational awareness- not asking for the traffic/ aware the traffic was not responding to descent instruction/knowing the traffic was instructed to descend but blindly following RA to disaster? You can blame the cleaner if you try.
The discussion about TCAS is very important. I have come to realise that it is a double-edged sword: you guys out there relying on it are headed for a fall. And I am not just talking about mis-identifying traffic, either.
Fine, discuss possible 'scenarios', offer 'opinions' etc. Without the facts you are just talking crap. How does anyone yet KNOW that the Russians had received a climb RA? Never heard of TCAS giving conflicting RA's? If the DHL crew had received a TA, where was their situational awareness- not asking for the traffic/ aware the traffic was not responding to descent instruction/knowing the traffic was instructed to descend but blindly following RA to disaster? You can blame the cleaner if you try.
The discussion about TCAS is very important. I have come to realise that it is a double-edged sword: you guys out there relying on it are headed for a fall. And I am not just talking about mis-identifying traffic, either.
PPRuNe Engineering Dept Apprentice
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Sorry to put this up here, but as there are about 19-odd pages of replies to this thread, there are only three replies to the condolences thread on Misc!
I think condolence messages are more important than theories and finger-pointing, and I'm sure many of you agree..........
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...threadid=58388
I think condolence messages are more important than theories and finger-pointing, and I'm sure many of you agree..........
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...threadid=58388