Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
7. Forgot to push thrust levers forward.
8. Game over.
8. Game over.
But I imagine, with hands on throttles at that stage things would have gone differently. That would have saved the day.
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Oakape, wiggy
Nobody knows FCOM inside out nor is it required. But it is not unreasonable to expect a thorough knowledge of the aircraft systems, automation and performance of take off and landing phase where there is severe time constraint. Simple thing like not adjusting seat properly has led to runway excursion after engine failure because pilot was not able to apply differential braking. When three different situations for GA are mentioned in the manual there is no reason for a pilot not to know them. I remember one of my instructor telling me, you get paid for what you do below 500ft. above that any one can do it. Modern aircrafts require very little old fashioned throttle and stick skills. It is these limitations of computers what they will do and what they won't is all that is required. Someone in airline has to go through the accident database and seek manufacturers advise before making/changing procedures/trg. syllabus. But is not done and sometimes changes are made idiosyncratically and changed again after an incidence or they continue waiting for one to happen. Non verbalising and thereby non monitoring of FMA has caused so many incidents and yet it sparks a heated argument about its requirement. The aircraft and engines in general are so safe may be this much effort is considered superfluous. Ultimately it is another business and unless profitability is seriously affected nothing will change and that too will change towards better/safer automation.
Nobody knows FCOM inside out nor is it required. But it is not unreasonable to expect a thorough knowledge of the aircraft systems, automation and performance of take off and landing phase where there is severe time constraint. Simple thing like not adjusting seat properly has led to runway excursion after engine failure because pilot was not able to apply differential braking. When three different situations for GA are mentioned in the manual there is no reason for a pilot not to know them. I remember one of my instructor telling me, you get paid for what you do below 500ft. above that any one can do it. Modern aircrafts require very little old fashioned throttle and stick skills. It is these limitations of computers what they will do and what they won't is all that is required. Someone in airline has to go through the accident database and seek manufacturers advise before making/changing procedures/trg. syllabus. But is not done and sometimes changes are made idiosyncratically and changed again after an incidence or they continue waiting for one to happen. Non verbalising and thereby non monitoring of FMA has caused so many incidents and yet it sparks a heated argument about its requirement. The aircraft and engines in general are so safe may be this much effort is considered superfluous. Ultimately it is another business and unless profitability is seriously affected nothing will change and that too will change towards better/safer automation.
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7B. Nope, didn't forget, but I'm just sayin' that at that stage they believed they were "protected" by the automation
It's worth remembering that neither of these guys set out with the intention to crash an aeroplane that day. They'd probably had nothing particularly untoward happen in their respective careers and if they'd allowed some bad habits to develop those habits had been let through because 99% of the time nothing much happens and when something does happen the automatics work as expected.
The point is that we should take this as an opportunity to examine our own habits and make sure we haven't allowed them to deteriorate. Do we always read the FMA? I bet most of us do, some of us do most of the time but might have lapses under pressure, and a few of us are slack and don't really do it at all. Do we always monitor the automatics adequately? I bet everyone here has been a bit slack on occasion, humans make bad monitors after all.
If you were to ask those two guys prior to the accident if they push the thrust levers up on a go-around, I'm sure they'd've said "of course!" but we aren't perfect and don't always react under pressure the way we'd like to think we would. Maybe we think we push the levers up but really we've got into the habit of just following them up with the autothrottle. It seems the Airbus system wins this little battle.
I ask myself, would you have pushed the thrust levers up? And I'm absolutely certain I would have, but I've flown with a bloke who selected flap zero after take-off instead of gear up and he was utterly dumbfounded that he'd done it. So I like to think I would but maybe given the right combination of fatigue, mindset, procedures, previous experience etc, I'd screw it up as well.
Stay ever vigilant out there
.
The point is that we should take this as an opportunity to examine our own habits and make sure we haven't allowed them to deteriorate. Do we always read the FMA? I bet most of us do, some of us do most of the time but might have lapses under pressure, and a few of us are slack and don't really do it at all. Do we always monitor the automatics adequately? I bet everyone here has been a bit slack on occasion, humans make bad monitors after all.
If you were to ask those two guys prior to the accident if they push the thrust levers up on a go-around, I'm sure they'd've said "of course!" but we aren't perfect and don't always react under pressure the way we'd like to think we would. Maybe we think we push the levers up but really we've got into the habit of just following them up with the autothrottle. It seems the Airbus system wins this little battle.
I ask myself, would you have pushed the thrust levers up? And I'm absolutely certain I would have, but I've flown with a bloke who selected flap zero after take-off instead of gear up and he was utterly dumbfounded that he'd done it. So I like to think I would but maybe given the right combination of fatigue, mindset, procedures, previous experience etc, I'd screw it up as well.
Stay ever vigilant out there
.
Isnt #1 undershoot shear?
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at that stage they believed they were "protected" by the automation
Shades of SFX?
I've flown with a bloke who selected flap zero after take-off instead of gear up
Not the first, not the last, not the only one. In my outfit the threat was identified as the call "BUG UP" for flap retraction; and with credit it was changed.
FMA's? All well and good to read them, call them, see them, BUT you need to understand them? I've flown with guys who though they had selected a descent mode on MCP just as the FMA transitioned into ALT HLD. I called out ALT HLD = "Check". This pantomime was repeated a few times before the message got across that the a/c was not descending. There was a dumfounded look of confusion. It didn't matter how it had happened; it was not what was required and therefore need changing.
Same with engine out no A/T is use. ATC says descend. LVL CHG selected and ac/ stays in level flight. FMA says MCP SPD in pitch; A/T is empty. VSI is zero. That also caused some question marks to float out of the cranium. LVL CHG had been pressed; FMA said MCP SPD so why was it not descending? I must add that saying nothing in the back of the sim, just waiting for the dawn to come up and the lights to come on, is the best educational method and the most entertaining. The students I enjoyed the most were those who berated their own dumbness. Others were less self critical.
Shades of SFX?
I've flown with a bloke who selected flap zero after take-off instead of gear up
Not the first, not the last, not the only one. In my outfit the threat was identified as the call "BUG UP" for flap retraction; and with credit it was changed.
FMA's? All well and good to read them, call them, see them, BUT you need to understand them? I've flown with guys who though they had selected a descent mode on MCP just as the FMA transitioned into ALT HLD. I called out ALT HLD = "Check". This pantomime was repeated a few times before the message got across that the a/c was not descending. There was a dumfounded look of confusion. It didn't matter how it had happened; it was not what was required and therefore need changing.
Same with engine out no A/T is use. ATC says descend. LVL CHG selected and ac/ stays in level flight. FMA says MCP SPD in pitch; A/T is empty. VSI is zero. That also caused some question marks to float out of the cranium. LVL CHG had been pressed; FMA said MCP SPD so why was it not descending? I must add that saying nothing in the back of the sim, just waiting for the dawn to come up and the lights to come on, is the best educational method and the most entertaining. The students I enjoyed the most were those who berated their own dumbness. Others were less self critical.
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We've seen at least three serious incidents/accidents over the last few years (SQ at Munich, Asiana at SFO and now EK at DXB) where the pilots' poor understanding of these traps seems to have been a factor.
1. Fail to understand the systems they are (seemingly) totally reliant on AND
2. Fail to fly the airplane.
To me, both are a training problem, and probably not a design problem.
And contrary to this claim:
Auto Thrust
Auto Pilots
Auto Mation
None of it is designed nor programmed by Pilots.
At Boeing (and heritage Douglas) pilots are most certainly HEAVILY involved in the entire design and decision tree process when designing flight controls and automated systems and try out various design options in the simulator before those systems become final. It's one reason Boeing aircraft don't have side sticks and don't have autothrottles that don't move the throttle levers. Their pilots will not accept them.
These "traps" only exist if the pilots:
1. Fail to understand the systems they are (seemingly) totally reliant on AND
2. Fail to fly the airplane.
To me, both are a training problem, and probably not a design problem.
And contrary to this claim:
Auto Thrust
Auto Pilots
Auto Mation
None of it is designed nor programmed by Pilots.
At Boeing (and heritage Douglas) pilots are most certainly HEAVILY involved in the entire design and decision tree process when designing flight controls and automated systems and try out various design options in the simulator before those systems become final. It's one reason Boeing aircraft don't have side sticks and don't have autothrottles that don't move the throttle levers. Their pilots will not accept them.
1. Fail to understand the systems they are (seemingly) totally reliant on AND
2. Fail to fly the airplane.
To me, both are a training problem, and probably not a design problem.
And contrary to this claim:
Auto Thrust
Auto Pilots
Auto Mation
None of it is designed nor programmed by Pilots.
At Boeing (and heritage Douglas) pilots are most certainly HEAVILY involved in the entire design and decision tree process when designing flight controls and automated systems and try out various design options in the simulator before those systems become final. It's one reason Boeing aircraft don't have side sticks and don't have autothrottles that don't move the throttle levers. Their pilots will not accept them.
This moving throttle thing is normal Boeing dogma. There are lots of accidents that prove having the automatics and the pilots control the thrust at the same time does not work. It should be one or the other, which is what Airbus has opted for. Having a yoke moving in front of you doesn't seem to stop the accidents as well.
Even in the Boeing, if you have the autothrottles on you need to read and understand what the FMA says, because even if you push them up to the max noise position, autothrust "could" pull them on back if you let them go. The first column of the FMA tells you if you need to disconnect and push them manually, or hit the switches again to make sure they stay where you want them.
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I've thousands of hours on Airbus and Boeing, narrow and wide bodies of both.
I'll take a sidestick and stationary thrust levers any day.
I'll keep the Boeing manuals and checklists though!
Interesting Flight Global article on RAAS:
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...nsider-429279/
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...nsider-429279/
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Originally Posted by Flight Global article on RAAS
While the inquiry has not specifically stated that the go-around was triggered by the alert, it says the aircraft became airborne, during the go-around attempt, just 4s after the warning sounded.
The General Civil Aviation Authority, which has disclosed factual data on the 3 August accident, has yet to reach any conclusions on the crew’s decision.
The General Civil Aviation Authority, which has disclosed factual data on the 3 August accident, has yet to reach any conclusions on the crew’s decision.
Could it be an SOP violation at Emirates ... ?
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When under stress we all temporally forget some nuance of the automation. See the thread on wizz. But the fallback of basic flying should save the day, however if all you have done is manage the automation their is no fallback. If pilots don't have "seat of pants" grounding then how can they excercise it?
Link to the French Go Around study referred to in a preceding Flight Global article:
https://www.bea.aero/etudes/asaga/asaga.study.pdf
The report identifies most if not all of the factors discussed in this thread. Note the Analysis section from page 119, and Conclusion and Recommendations from pages 134 / 135.
The next difficulty is to identify the most critical issues; ones which can be addressed reliably and will be cost effective.
Given the findings on cognitive limiting and attentional tunnelling, then attempting to improve knowledge, training, monitoring, or CRM may have limited potential; whereas removing the surprise and workload in these situations with improvements to aircraft systems and revised SOPs may show benefit.
https://www.bea.aero/etudes/asaga/asaga.study.pdf
The report identifies most if not all of the factors discussed in this thread. Note the Analysis section from page 119, and Conclusion and Recommendations from pages 134 / 135.
The next difficulty is to identify the most critical issues; ones which can be addressed reliably and will be cost effective.
Given the findings on cognitive limiting and attentional tunnelling, then attempting to improve knowledge, training, monitoring, or CRM may have limited potential; whereas removing the surprise and workload in these situations with improvements to aircraft systems and revised SOPs may show benefit.
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Similar in a way to the Habsheim accident in the early days of the A320. PF allegedly relied on Alpha Floor applying TOGA when the critical AOA was reached, but allegedly forgot - or didn't know - that Alpha Floor was inhibited below 100RA so allegedly didn't firewall the TLs until too late.
Mcdhu
Mcdhu
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tdracer
I am afraid it is not so.
From airbus Safety First Jul 2012 magazine.
Conclusion
As a result of the crew’s decision to abort the landing after they had selected reverse thrust, the aircraft took off with one engine on Idle and the aircraft’stail impacted the runway. This occurrence illustrates that when TOGA is applied after thrust reverser selection, there is a risk of non availability of maximum thrust on one or more engines if the associated reversers do not stow. This protection is triggered by the Auto Idle function of the FADEC, which maintains the engine thrust at Idle as long as the reversers are not stowed. The consequence could be a loss of control if an aborted landing is initiated at that time. We therefore strongly encourage all crews to adhere to the following FCOM recommendation, which is common to all Airbus aircraft types:
“After reverse thrust is initiated, a full-stop landing must be performed.”
Just a clarification - it is possible to abort a landing after selecting reverse thrust as a last resort if the situation dictates (e.g. another aircraft or vehicle on the runway). It's something Boeing now designs for
I'd be a bit surprised if Airbus doesn't design for the scenario as well.
From airbus Safety First Jul 2012 magazine.
Conclusion
As a result of the crew’s decision to abort the landing after they had selected reverse thrust, the aircraft took off with one engine on Idle and the aircraft’stail impacted the runway. This occurrence illustrates that when TOGA is applied after thrust reverser selection, there is a risk of non availability of maximum thrust on one or more engines if the associated reversers do not stow. This protection is triggered by the Auto Idle function of the FADEC, which maintains the engine thrust at Idle as long as the reversers are not stowed. The consequence could be a loss of control if an aborted landing is initiated at that time. We therefore strongly encourage all crews to adhere to the following FCOM recommendation, which is common to all Airbus aircraft types:
“After reverse thrust is initiated, a full-stop landing must be performed.”
Last edited by vilas; 15th Sep 2016 at 19:19.
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Watching FMA?
watching FMA and knowing all the quirks of the auto throttle and other automatics is not as important as watching the actual pitch, bank, power, airspeed and altimeter. I know what I want the aircraft to do and the FMA is really not the most vital thing to watch. Maybe too many years of not having an FMA and too many years of simply having pitch, bank, power, airspeed and altimeter alone to tell me what is actually happening.
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tdracer @ 1557
This article quotes Boeing figures for max landing weight, still air and SEA LEVEL 1800 m required and after the late touchdown this aircraft had 2500 m, so more than enough eh?
Cazale33 @ 131 calculates the density altitude that day was 4620ft, not sea level and possibly with a tail wind thrown in for good luck.
Not sure about the weight but the altitude and tailwind could really mess you up.
I landed at LCY one day with slightly more tailwind than I should have accepted and got much closer to the end on the concrete than I would have liked. It's also a big mistake to go into the performance graphs with actual airfield elevation when all the performance is calculated on density altitude.
This article quotes Boeing figures for max landing weight, still air and SEA LEVEL 1800 m required and after the late touchdown this aircraft had 2500 m, so more than enough eh?
Cazale33 @ 131 calculates the density altitude that day was 4620ft, not sea level and possibly with a tail wind thrown in for good luck.
Not sure about the weight but the altitude and tailwind could really mess you up.
I landed at LCY one day with slightly more tailwind than I should have accepted and got much closer to the end on the concrete than I would have liked. It's also a big mistake to go into the performance graphs with actual airfield elevation when all the performance is calculated on density altitude.
Last edited by c.j.shrimpton; 15th Sep 2016 at 20:31.