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Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

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Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

Old 11th Sep 2016, 23:51
  #1441 (permalink)  
 
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Er, in the real world "negative outcomes" are increasingly rare.
On what basis do you make this statement? We could argue endlessly about the validity of my statement & I accept that this is a subjective matter of opinion.

No, it does not undermine my post with respect to the inability to "prove" a negative, you simply cannot show evidence for a non-outcome. "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence". This is the basis of Hume's Problem ie "The black Swan" as made famous by Nassim Taleb's book of the same name.

As for the world being run by accountants, give me a break. Airlines (and all public companies) are run by a management team that answers to shareholders.
Agreed, my lack of precision. By "accountants" I didn't mean the literal accountants, but the more generic term for financiers & shareholders who simply view the world through the prism of a balance sheet and an investment to generate returns.

Last edited by CurtainTwitcher; 12th Sep 2016 at 00:42.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 02:39
  #1442 (permalink)  
 
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I can see the hours required for upgrade increased due to the experience of new hires or lack of. Hours do not reflect experience anymore.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 05:10
  #1443 (permalink)  
 
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CurtainTwitcher,

Your post is very true and can be summed up with this old aviation saying:

If you think safety is expensive, you should try an accident.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 06:37
  #1444 (permalink)  
 
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I can see the hours required for upgrade increased due to the experience of new hires or lack of. Hours do not reflect experience anymore.
Do more hours make you better or worse at handling the type of incident weíre discussing here? Would someone with 10,000 hours on the 777, i.e. 10,000hrs of autothrottle usage be preferable to someone who had 200hrs but it was all manual or would it be the other way round?

I remember when converting onto my first jet that I had very few problems with the physical handling of go-arounds and the like but often didnít press the right buttons to sync the automatics. That was fine as an outcome as the flightpath was as intended and it didnít take long to reengage the right modes once capacity allowed. ANC as posted above.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 07:13
  #1445 (permalink)  
 
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This debate has been circulating of a good many years, and is usually resurrected after an avoidable accident. Circulating because it seems to never end. The opinions about the problems & causes seem to be consistent. I have read many suggestions about solutions, but no concerted common plan. IMHO, relevant to jet airliners, chugging around in a spam-can is fun but not a solution. I still feel that the basic MPL course has been diluted too much. I spoke to some CPL colleges and there is an opinion that a jet airliner pilot can be taught almost everything in a ZFT sim. The basic PPL might be enough and then it's in the box being crammed full of MCC/CRM/SOP. Sony play station should start building a/c.
Basic CPL training is the same for everyone, but should it be? Previously a CPL was 250hrs. You could then leap into an air taxi and hour build. You were not in a rigid SOP world flying a high powered performance A a/c. You had to rely on basic airmanship and if you survived for a year or two your learning curve was steep and educational. It was a wonderful world of balancing & combining airmanship, manual flying and management of a flight often in testing Wx conditions into basic airfields with basic aids, and running the show yourself. A marvellous foundation on which to build a career.
The MPL has diluted that foundation extremely. The airline prof' check LPC/OPC is orientated towards very basic skills and rote following of SOP's in very simplistic scenarios. Handling skills in the common manoeuvres is generally OK in both LHS & RHS. The 4 year F/O who can fly now thinks a command is the norm. The biggest difference between LHS & RHS is how & what to think about. It is a management role of the whole operation. How to digest multiple information and make judgements and then apply them as a team. This is hugely different from just flying, but is it taught and encouraged? Is a/c knowledge & systems knowledge deep enough? No.
I think rigid SOP philosophy has tried to cover too many of those decision making possibilities. This starts wth 'minimum fuel' being the norm and you better have a mighty good reason not to follow that rule. I found senior SFO's didn't know how to decide a safe fuel figure, which might well be minimum. Then, en-route, the continue-divert decision making was scant on dodgy Wx days. Training was orientated too much towards correct following of SOP's and procedures. The comfort zone was defined and quite small. Circumstances which shift a crew towards the edges of that comfort zone can cause incidents and even worse. We are seeing perfectly serviceable a/c being mis-managed mis-handled. I think the root cause goes back to basic training and recurrent training of jet airliner programs. There is now such a variety of commercial pax aviation operations, from air taxis - turbo-prop airlines - biz jets - airliners that I think the initial class training needs to be reviewed.
We hear much 'beating of gums' by general airline pilots. We don't hear much from XAA's, NTSB's, AIB's, airline HOT's, airline CP's. Why the silence? Where is the joint debate including those who need to authorise, mandate & execute any changes? Pilots' comments on this subject have been repeated for years, but nothing has changed and accidents are still occurring. For how much longer?

This thread has drifted away from the EK incident and, perhaps naturally, reverted back to the debate about basic skills and airline culture. Regarding training: I relate to my doctor & lawyer friends: they do a basic foundation course and then specialise. Each are of considerable length. We do a short CPL - ATPL foundation and then a very basic type rating course. The checks we perform and similar for all classes. is this the correct method for our profession? The operating world has changed hugely; the training & checking world less so. Are they in step/phase/balance? Are they coordinated?

As many have said $$$ is the controlling factor in many minds. One wonders if the huge compensation payouts claimed after accidents could have been better spent.

Last edited by RAT 5; 12th Sep 2016 at 07:41.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 08:31
  #1446 (permalink)  
 
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framer

The B777 is designed for the auto throttle to be engaged from the very start of the flight until the very end. It stays engaged for the landing. It's the way the manufacturer intended.
I understand that Harry. I probably didn't make my point clearly, but that was in fact my point.
The design of the system means that when the pressure comes on, when the brain is working at maximum capacity to process large amounts of information, the pilot no longer has subconscious muscle memory to push the levers up. Why would he? All he has done year in year out is push a button and all is well.
Do more hours make you better or worse at handling the type of incident we’re discussing here? Would someone with 10,000 hours on the 777, i.e. 10,000hrs of autothrottle usage be preferable to someone who had 200hrs but it was all manual or would it be the other way round?
IMO the pilot with 200 hours of manual thrust would not have crashed the aircraft, and the 10,000hour 777 pilot would be more likely to crash the aircraft than a 5000hr 777 pilot.
Every time the button is pushed and the result is satisfactory, the likelihood of a mentally overloaded pilot instinctively pushing the thrust up reduces.
What's the answer? Expensive would be my first guess. Automation reduces risk more than it creates it to a certain point and then it doesn't. I think we may be there. As others have pointed out we have had year on year ( bar one) an improving safety record but the types of crashes have changed. I think the optimum safety position would be to have similar line SOP's / aircraft systems as we do now, but a large increase in ZFT sim manual flying.
I'm not suggesting it will happen, ( it won't) but an hour of raw data manual flying in the sim once a month would see the industry make a major dent in the safety record for the first time in twenty years.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 10:32
  #1447 (permalink)  
 
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On what basis do you make this statement?
On the basis that commercial aviation today is safer than at any point in history.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 10:33
  #1448 (permalink)  
 
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Harry the cod, " neither is acknowledging an ATC instruction at such a critical stage of flight".

Since when have ATC been allowed/required to instruct aircraft to go around in a situation like this? It is not their business to do so and it may have had more significance than is currently realised, in addition to interrupting at an inappropriate time. Only pilots should make this decision, or not, as the case may be. Do you agree?
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 12:38
  #1449 (permalink)  
 
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Having read nearly every post with interest I have the following point to add.

If the 777 knows it has WoW and knows not to apply TOGA, then why can it not inform the crew of that if they push the button. A simple voice alert of 'No TOGA' would inform the crew that their request for TOGA was not implemented by the automatics?
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 12:57
  #1450 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by portmanteau
Since when have ATC been allowed/required to instruct aircraft to go around in a situation like this?
Please read the report. ATC did no such thing, they only observed the aircraft going around and issued an altitude clearance (not that doing so at that stage was a terribly good idea...).
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 12:58
  #1451 (permalink)  
 
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Only pilots should make this decision.........
You are right P, but it's possible that SOP made the decision here and the aviation world is heading more in the direction of SOP decision making than the driver making the decisions.

Slowly the situation is degenerating into the pointy end being occupied by dumbed down drivers being propped up by automation and a big of book of words.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 14:26
  #1452 (permalink)  
 
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604: Indeed. However one wonders at the command courses in some airlines. Hitherto all 'LOFT' exercises in recurrency training had mostly been single failures of simple nature. In command courses they 'should' be a little more complicated and include multiple failures and subtle ones that require sound knowledge of the a/c, the environment and sound common sense management of the scenario. I wonder if, in your world, that is happening, or are the better SOP disciples being promoted without little advanced education?
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 14:59
  #1453 (permalink)  
 
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In command courses they 'should' be a little more complicated and include multiple failures and subtle ones that require sound knowledge of the a/c, the environment and sound common sense management of the scenario.
Where is the relevance of multiple (or indeed ANY) 'failures', or "common sense management" in this DXB scenario?

You're solving the wrong problem, and possibly one that doesn't even exist?

These pilots experienced no 'failures'. They just weren't able to fly the aeroplane. As has happened numerous times now! My position is, the 'system' set them up to fail!

Let's solve the problems we are facing, THEN move on to situations that are frequently well handled. Such as the multiple failures, and common sense management of the Qantas A380.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 15:29
  #1454 (permalink)  
 
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Andrasz, pilots would follow the missed approach procedure which is printed on the arrival charts precisely so that the pilots know what to do next without unnecessary contact with or by ATC at a critical time. Aviate Navigate Communicate, remember. Only when they have cleaned up and climbed away might ATC confirm the crew's intentions. No, ATC did not observe the aircraft going around before they issued their instruction which was before the gear was even selected up. They might have thought they did but they were not in the cockpit or inside the pilots heads, who might very well have been considering putting it down, regardless of sop when up comes an instruction to climb 4000ft......
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 15:34
  #1455 (permalink)  
 
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'Cool' Drivers

And part of the problem is that Captains, legally responsible to the management and the general public for the safe and sensible conduct of their flights, are referring to themselves, I suppose thinking they are being 'cool', as drivers. You are NOT. You are the Captain of an aircraft.
Drivers belong on golf courses or in lorries.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 15:47
  #1456 (permalink)  
 
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Rat 5 I would assume someone on a command course should know their aircraft so technical stuff should be "as read" unless lack of knowledge shows up. The command check should be a complex senario possibly with no correct answer but the check airman should be looking at the methodology & reasoning the candidate is displaying. This crew I am sure knew the system but got "thrown" by the unusual nature of the event & failed to respond appropriately. I am not a great believer in the quoted "musle memory" as in my experience aeroplanes never fail or do what they do in the simulator. It takes a PILOT to cope. Unfortunately they are few & far between these days. Not the individuals fault it is their training departments. So many people apportion blame when in fact it is human to err & their selection & training are shown wanting.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 16:28
  #1457 (permalink)  
 
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Slowly the situation is degenerating into the pointy end being occupied by dumbed down drivers being propped up by automation and a big of book of words.

Guys: I am with you. I was responding to 604's comment.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 17:03
  #1458 (permalink)  
 
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Those of you who live in the UK may have heard a spoof radio ad about a computer controlled car, after listing a couple of imaginary features and then a third which says and if you see a deer off to the side running towards you-open the drive menu , select and click on the scary face icon , to begin evasive action-only if feature activated,

So if airlines mandate so much automatic flying why have the thrust levers at all with that philosophy: if they are there standing proudly up on the consol they are there for a reason -like to push fully forward if you need more thrust
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 18:00
  #1459 (permalink)  
 
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A go-around should not be a difficult or unusual manoeuvre but a BAULKED LANDING is!
Procedurally, there is very little difference between the two. Yes, the engines may be at a lower power setting and may take a bit longer to spool up, but the procedures are essentially the same. And if only the main gear touched down and the nosegear did not (which would be the case if the aircraft lands long and the pilots elect to go around) the procedure is essentially the same. And in all cases the critical part of the procedure is to increase thrust. Because in all cases the maneuver requires increasing the energy state of the aircraft (both airspeed and altitude must be increased, in this situation they cannot be traded). This absolutely requires lots of thrust. Changing attitude (bringing the nose up) and/or changing configuration (changing flap and/or gear position) without also increasing thrust will result in failure of the maneuver. For whatever reason, that appears to be what happened here; the pilots failed to ensure a sufficient increase in thrust. Clearly they had more than sufficient flying speed at touchdown because they traded that speed for 85 feet in altitude. But without more thrust, the outcome when they had used up their kinetic energy reserve was inevitable: the aircraft would descend. The only question is how severe will the impact be when the descending flight path intersects the ground? Fortunately the descent rate was low enough that the impact was survivable for all aboard and the aircraft held together enough to enable an orderly (well mostly) evacuation after the hull came to rest. Sadly, a firefighter subsequently died. One must wonder what the circumstances were of that tragedy. That death should (probably) not have happened.
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Old 12th Sep 2016, 19:22
  #1460 (permalink)  
 
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Procedurally, there is very little difference between the two. Yes, the engines may be at a lower power setting and may take a bit longer to spool up, but the procedures are essentially the same.
This crew did EXACTLY what they had ALWAYS done to go-around.

That's precisely why they crashed! Because they SHOULD have done something different!

The "procedures are (NOT) essentially the same"!

Sorry.
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