Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?
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Chaps, Ladies
Those of us who are of some age and from the UK may remember the Schedule 8 & schedule 10 test format for the renewal of an AR/IR and the company OPC. During the schedule 8 check, the man from the ministry would come to ensure that skill retention was above the line, and that skill fade in a limited amount of items if any had not dropped below the line and affected safety.
The schedule 8 items were very limited as the skill fade, which concerned the man from the ministry were the handling of an Engine failure at V1, demonstrating bank and pitch control prior to flap retraction, transitioning to a higher bank after flap retraction, while following the needles outbound on the SID and then entering the hold correctly and not forgetting to time it.
We then had to Perform an ILS approach RAW data and at minimums perform a go-around. Finally we also needed to demonstrate a non precision approach and a full stop landing using reverse thrust with an outboard engine inoperative.
Those of you who believe that skills are eroding have no real basis to compare skill retention data. There is no scientific evidence that pilots of the years past where better than us today in skill based exercises. Actually the contrary may be true due to better engineered jets.
The mishandling of planes during critical phases of flight has not contributed to any significant accidents in the last 30 years since automation became more ubiquitous.
None of these items checked diligently on the skill retention lists of years gone by have been a problem recently in any of the accidents on the Air Asia 320, Air france 330 or on the emirates 777.
How would you be a better pilot or for that mater a better rested pilot if you hand flew any modern jet around the globe at Flight level 290 out of RVSM airspace?
One does not need to be an expert in human factors to see that wasting time flying manoeuvres that are not relevant in a particular skill set does not improve the overall skill set for a particular task as a go-around. Spending hours flying around does not make you better at performing go-arounds it makes you more tired.
The definition of skill is the ability to do something well, it's expertise. In order to become proficient in a skill one needs to be trained to do a particular task again and again.
Competence rather than skill is the ability to do something successfully, by using skills, knowledge, attitude, and it depends on ability.
As we have moved to more complex aircraft skill training is not enough. What is required is a competency based training environment, which looks at competency rather than skill.
I am not in Emirates therefore I cannot comment on the training and continuous Pilot Development these two chaps received, or for that matter what the rest of the Emirates Pilots receive.
Scientifically proven, pilots when reacting to stimulus from the environment, we don't decide on a course of action based on a classical decision making model as we don't have time. We react to what we perceive is happening and we match our reaction to what we have done in the past. We do not optimise we are satisficing, as do fire chiefs, trauma doctors and nurses and for that matter army officers on the battle field.
Our brains are woefully underpowered for what we want them to do in time critical events thus we use heuristics.
On the day the two chaps had to process within seconds, inputs from the environment, from the aircraft, combine that with knowledge and rules in the OMA and in the FCOM and then make a decision under critical time pressure and react by matching what they have done in the past with this event.
It's funny that some have criticised their reaction as unskilful. The contrary is evident. They were very skilful. Years of training worked and they retracted the FLAPS to 20 as required, they pressed the TOGA buttons, they pitched to up, they retracted the Gear as required and the PM even had the presence of mind to call Speed as he is required to do.
No one teaches or requires the PM to look at engine thrust during a go-around and good luck to all of us if we think that the solution is to include one more item in the process during a high task load event. What is required is competency training.
What is also evident is that they lacked the competency not the skill to do the manoeuvre as clearly their understanding of the automation failed them on this occasion, which is probably because they have not been trained in such an event, and or fatigue and or the startle effect.
Remember it is proven scientifically that Subject Matter Experts (pilots) in highly risky environments react to stimuli with recognition primed decisions. These actions require competency not just skill. This requires proper competency training not just skill based tick boxing.
Combine the above with fatigue as we no longer fly sensible hours rather we fly to the limits and any one of us on the day could have ended up in the same situation, as having no thrust available on a go-around is something that we are not taught and we don't expect.
There but for the grace of God go I
Those of us who are of some age and from the UK may remember the Schedule 8 & schedule 10 test format for the renewal of an AR/IR and the company OPC. During the schedule 8 check, the man from the ministry would come to ensure that skill retention was above the line, and that skill fade in a limited amount of items if any had not dropped below the line and affected safety.
The schedule 8 items were very limited as the skill fade, which concerned the man from the ministry were the handling of an Engine failure at V1, demonstrating bank and pitch control prior to flap retraction, transitioning to a higher bank after flap retraction, while following the needles outbound on the SID and then entering the hold correctly and not forgetting to time it.
We then had to Perform an ILS approach RAW data and at minimums perform a go-around. Finally we also needed to demonstrate a non precision approach and a full stop landing using reverse thrust with an outboard engine inoperative.
Those of you who believe that skills are eroding have no real basis to compare skill retention data. There is no scientific evidence that pilots of the years past where better than us today in skill based exercises. Actually the contrary may be true due to better engineered jets.
The mishandling of planes during critical phases of flight has not contributed to any significant accidents in the last 30 years since automation became more ubiquitous.
None of these items checked diligently on the skill retention lists of years gone by have been a problem recently in any of the accidents on the Air Asia 320, Air france 330 or on the emirates 777.
How would you be a better pilot or for that mater a better rested pilot if you hand flew any modern jet around the globe at Flight level 290 out of RVSM airspace?
One does not need to be an expert in human factors to see that wasting time flying manoeuvres that are not relevant in a particular skill set does not improve the overall skill set for a particular task as a go-around. Spending hours flying around does not make you better at performing go-arounds it makes you more tired.
The definition of skill is the ability to do something well, it's expertise. In order to become proficient in a skill one needs to be trained to do a particular task again and again.
Competence rather than skill is the ability to do something successfully, by using skills, knowledge, attitude, and it depends on ability.
As we have moved to more complex aircraft skill training is not enough. What is required is a competency based training environment, which looks at competency rather than skill.
I am not in Emirates therefore I cannot comment on the training and continuous Pilot Development these two chaps received, or for that matter what the rest of the Emirates Pilots receive.
Scientifically proven, pilots when reacting to stimulus from the environment, we don't decide on a course of action based on a classical decision making model as we don't have time. We react to what we perceive is happening and we match our reaction to what we have done in the past. We do not optimise we are satisficing, as do fire chiefs, trauma doctors and nurses and for that matter army officers on the battle field.
Our brains are woefully underpowered for what we want them to do in time critical events thus we use heuristics.
On the day the two chaps had to process within seconds, inputs from the environment, from the aircraft, combine that with knowledge and rules in the OMA and in the FCOM and then make a decision under critical time pressure and react by matching what they have done in the past with this event.
It's funny that some have criticised their reaction as unskilful. The contrary is evident. They were very skilful. Years of training worked and they retracted the FLAPS to 20 as required, they pressed the TOGA buttons, they pitched to up, they retracted the Gear as required and the PM even had the presence of mind to call Speed as he is required to do.
No one teaches or requires the PM to look at engine thrust during a go-around and good luck to all of us if we think that the solution is to include one more item in the process during a high task load event. What is required is competency training.
What is also evident is that they lacked the competency not the skill to do the manoeuvre as clearly their understanding of the automation failed them on this occasion, which is probably because they have not been trained in such an event, and or fatigue and or the startle effect.
Remember it is proven scientifically that Subject Matter Experts (pilots) in highly risky environments react to stimuli with recognition primed decisions. These actions require competency not just skill. This requires proper competency training not just skill based tick boxing.
Combine the above with fatigue as we no longer fly sensible hours rather we fly to the limits and any one of us on the day could have ended up in the same situation, as having no thrust available on a go-around is something that we are not taught and we don't expect.
There but for the grace of God go I
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about positive rate issues
Well the aircraft went from 0 to 85' so I would assume that qualifies as positive rate.
But it seems to me that in real life - what is needed is to define positive rate as a combination of two factors Increasing air speed AND increasing altitude as a minimum useful definition.
When inerita/energy available as a function of speed is traded for altitude gain, the speed will decrease.
Via wiki- consider a bicycle or car or plane going x miles per hour and as it starts UP a hill by coasting, with NO additional power /pedaling /thrust applied it will eventually stop- and absent sufficent pedaling or power input- it wil go back DOWN the hill
Ditto for an airplane with too late application of power.
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It's interesting to see how some were advocating the use of sophisticated anemometers, criticising the lack of real time data available to the pilots when all they had to do was move the thrust levers forward 
.
.
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They were doing a GA in windshear conditions.
The wind measurements, not from anemometers, but from profilers, would have identified the exact conditions, providing SA to the crew to avoid the entire situation.
The wind measurements, not from anemometers, but from profilers, would have identified the exact conditions, providing SA to the crew to avoid the entire situation.
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They were doing a GA in windshear conditions.
The wind measurements, not from anemometers, but from profilers, would have identified the exact conditions, providing SA to the crew to avoid the entire situation.
The wind measurements, not from anemometers, but from profilers, would have identified the exact conditions, providing SA to the crew to avoid the entire situation.
give it a rest, your bone has no flesh. It's not about wind readings.
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Either you have never sat at the controls of an airliner or you are one of those pilots who should have ventured into the academic sphere. Which one is it?
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Gear should not normally be retracted until pilot(s) have a known positive rate of climb with throttles advanced and producing adequate thrust. Adequate altitude, sound/vibration from engines producing thrust and the human body feeling accelerations are some clues. Training for common sense?
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On AB types in this type of senario, you get all sorts of hooters & warnings ( once power applied) is the 777 the same? Not mentioned in the report but quite a distraction if you are not expecting it. (Note was part of my brief when landing at GIB as it was never trained)
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If they left the Gear down
What would have been to outcome, if they just left the landing gear down. Would it have been a lot worse than it was?. Been thinking about this, but not keeping me awake at night. 
On AB types in this type of senario, you get all sorts of hooters & warnings ( once power applied) is the 777 the same?
Ask yourself this, if the crew in question had used manual thrust for the last 1000ft of the last 200 approaches they had done ( ie the thrust levers were part of their subconscious motor skills) , would the accident have happened?
Serious question. Take the time to think about it. It is the heart of this accident.
Serious question. Take the time to think about it. It is the heart of this accident.
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Framer, I agree. Boeing's policy of using autothrottle at all times on the 777 contradicts their policy on all their other types of disengaging autothrottle when hand flying. Airlines will follow that policy because of modern litigation. It is a bad policy that erodes basic handling skills and instrument scan and creates speed/thrust complacency. Furthermore, it is poor design if pressing TOGA after touchdown, however brief, gives TOGA modes on both axis of the FD but leaves the thrust at idle - deliberate mixed modes in unique circumstances with PFD indications that you have what you selected is a recipe for this sort of accident. It doesn't mean that the crew shouldn't have been aware that the thrust levers never advanced, but Boeing are largely responsible, just like they were for the same system behaving stupidly and similar crew over-reliance and system confusion in SFO.
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Framer
Spot on, too much reliance on A/T, same as Asiana @ SFO, and Turkish Airways @ Schipol.
Lesson for airline training departments, A/T doesn't always do what you expect, when it stuffs up close to the ground if pilots don't actually 'pilot' it turns to s$&t remarkable quickly.
Why are we having this conversation, why aren't we just hand flying more often and learning from experience that, for example 29 degrees nose up at 38,000' with AF447 is inviting disaster?
Why aren't we hand flying all visual approaches, ingraining muscle memory with exactly what control inputs and thrust lever positions 'feel right'?
The answer to both these questions need to be asked of training departments. My airline actively discourages hand flying. When I mention my concerns to management pilots they typically reply, "if crew hand fly we get more altitude busts, and hand flying above 25,000 makes you non RVSM," plus other lame excuses.
I fear that this issue will be addressed as a result of this accident, not enough paying passengers were injured, and unfortunately the crew will wrongly get the entire blame for this one.
Lesson for airline training departments, A/T doesn't always do what you expect, when it stuffs up close to the ground if pilots don't actually 'pilot' it turns to s$&t remarkable quickly.
Why are we having this conversation, why aren't we just hand flying more often and learning from experience that, for example 29 degrees nose up at 38,000' with AF447 is inviting disaster?
Why aren't we hand flying all visual approaches, ingraining muscle memory with exactly what control inputs and thrust lever positions 'feel right'?
The answer to both these questions need to be asked of training departments. My airline actively discourages hand flying. When I mention my concerns to management pilots they typically reply, "if crew hand fly we get more altitude busts, and hand flying above 25,000 makes you non RVSM," plus other lame excuses.
I fear that this issue will be addressed as a result of this accident, not enough paying passengers were injured, and unfortunately the crew will wrongly get the entire blame for this one.
Originally posted by Aluminium shuffler
Furthermore, it is poor design if pressing TOGA after touchdown, however brief, gives TOGA modes on both axis of the FD but leaves the thrust at idle - deliberate mixed modes in unique circumstances with PFD indications that you have what you selected is a recipe for this sort of accident.
Furthermore, it is poor design if pressing TOGA after touchdown, however brief, gives TOGA modes on both axis of the FD but leaves the thrust at idle - deliberate mixed modes in unique circumstances with PFD indications that you have what you selected is a recipe for this sort of accident.
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So pushing the thrust levers up on a GA........ who would have thought? Nearly every student pilot would be able to guess that would be a good idea!
Let's look at how much Boeing trusts TOGA.....
Let's have a look at Windshear memory items:
Windshear TOGA
Thrust lever maximum (aggressively)
A/P disengage
A/T disengage
etc.....
Let's have a look at GPWS warning memory items:
A/P disengage
A/T disengage
Thrust lever maximum (aggressively)
etc....
Go Around procedure
TOGA Flap 15
Go Around attitude
Verify Go Around thrust
Positive rate Gear Up
At no point does Boeing suggest that pushing TOGA by itself is sufficient evidence that thrust has done as TOGA is supposed to do. In single syllables NEVER TRUST TOGA in critical situations, because if it doesn't do as you expect it to do, left uncorrected at a critical time, a disaster will ensue.
Let's look at how much Boeing trusts TOGA.....
Let's have a look at Windshear memory items:
Windshear TOGA
Thrust lever maximum (aggressively)
A/P disengage
A/T disengage
etc.....
Let's have a look at GPWS warning memory items:
A/P disengage
A/T disengage
Thrust lever maximum (aggressively)
etc....
Go Around procedure
TOGA Flap 15
Go Around attitude
Verify Go Around thrust
Positive rate Gear Up
At no point does Boeing suggest that pushing TOGA by itself is sufficient evidence that thrust has done as TOGA is supposed to do. In single syllables NEVER TRUST TOGA in critical situations, because if it doesn't do as you expect it to do, left uncorrected at a critical time, a disaster will ensue.
0837:19 RAAS aural message
0837:23 Aircraft becomes airborne
0837:27 Flap lever moved
0837:28 ATC issue clearance, which was also read back correctly
0837:29 Gear lever selected up
0837:35 Both TL's moved from idle
0837:23 Aircraft becomes airborne
0837:27 Flap lever moved
0837:28 ATC issue clearance, which was also read back correctly
0837:29 Gear lever selected up
0837:35 Both TL's moved from idle
Thrust levers advanced at second 35.
That is 12 seconds. Now slowly count to 12, and realize how unbelievably long 12 seconds are.
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gazumped
I have agreed with everything you have said, but for the benefit of the uninitiated, it's probably worth pointing out that attempting a go-around WITHOUT (at some stage!) pushing the TOGA buttons, puts you in a (completely different) world of hurt!!!
Going around after landing is something practiced, (if ever?) once, for every 99+ go-arounds from DA. Though I fully accept it should be briefed moderately frequently.
Depending on how rigorously this crew were trained, it may not be too surprising they got it wrong?
Whichever way you look at it, the airline itself has some very significant questions to answer!
I have agreed with everything you have said, but for the benefit of the uninitiated, it's probably worth pointing out that attempting a go-around WITHOUT (at some stage!) pushing the TOGA buttons, puts you in a (completely different) world of hurt!!!
Going around after landing is something practiced, (if ever?) once, for every 99+ go-arounds from DA. Though I fully accept it should be briefed moderately frequently.
Depending on how rigorously this crew were trained, it may not be too surprising they got it wrong?
Whichever way you look at it, the airline itself has some very significant questions to answer!
Last edited by 4468; 7th Sep 2016 at 10:55.
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PM should have ignored ATC and equally ATC should not have issued an instruction when it must have been apparent the crew had their hands full. Crew had not asked for any clearance for obvious reasons. The long first landing happened right opposite the tower. Why did ATC assume the crew were going for GA and not a second landing?