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Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

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Emirates B777 gear collapse @ DXB?

Old 22nd Aug 2016, 02:15
  #1041 (permalink)  
 
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Any word when, or if, they are going to release the flight recorder info?
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 02:21
  #1042 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by ExSp33db1rd View Post
A training Capt. once asked our Sim. detail what was the first thing to do in the event of an engine failure ?

All answers from the assembled candidates were considered incorrect, eventually he said "Sit on your hands and do nothing but think, too many instances of the wrong engine being shut down through precipitous action"
Believe it or not, I actually "verified" the wrong engine in a light twin BFR (earned me another check flight the next day).

Reading through all these posts I'm almost detecting a vibe from some along the lines of "we don't need to think anymore because we have SOPs and automation". I'm kinda concerned about that.

Is thinking a dying part of aviation?
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 05:37
  #1043 (permalink)  
 
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Is thinking a dying part of aviation?

Yes. Well, it is until you blindly follow an unsuitable SOP up a blind alley and then the CP will ask, "for gawd's sake what were you thinking?"
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 05:44
  #1044 (permalink)  
 
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Capn Bloggs
You may read my post on thread Young ATPL FO 200hrs TT. In Airbus FBW at FL350 you never yank the stick back, what is the average pitch and bank used at FL350 you don't need a genius to know or teach this nor dozens of hour required to practice in the SIM. You have to switch both FDs to get airbus ATHR in speed mode should be taught in a classroom.You don't fly an approach without monitoring your speed, Vapp-27kts in A320 at Bangalore, Vapp-31kts in B777 at SFO, good visibility, no clouds, serviceable aircraft, people who were involved had thick log books. In airbus thrust levers don't move and yet they do so in B777 but the result is same. You tell me why? The biggest tragedy/comedy is that at that time these pilots were under check. What does the check captain write in the report when he himself doesn't know what the speed was? Without automation there will be no CAT3, no long range flying. The industry will find solution through technology by better automation so the human factor is not allowed to come in. Hasn't it dawned on you that this is commercial aviation means it's sole purpose is to make money and not give pleasure or sense of adventure to employees who sit in front. Without profit everybody goes home in utmost safety, pilots included.
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 06:12
  #1045 (permalink)  
 
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BugSmasher1960 and RAT 5
A training Capt. once asked our Sim. detail what was the first thing to do in the event of an engine failure ? Sit on your hands and do nothing but think
In your dislike for procedures or over confidence in your own innovations you don't notice how ridiculous and dangerous the above statement is. When engine fails on take off if you sit on your hands and think then rest of the work will be only at your funeral. When Engine fails you don't think, you instantly react and maintain control the aircraft. Identifying the correct engine before shutting down is very much part of the SOP you don't need to think for that. Somebody smarter than you has put it in the SOP.
until you blindly follow an unsuitable SOP up a blind alley
Rat come on! Can there be a suitable SOP for a person who has visceral hatred for any procedures except his own irrelevant innovations? I think manufacturer's test pilots deserve more respect than that.
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 07:39
  #1046 (permalink)  
 
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So based on what we know so far from the accident and the culture of the region, airline and regulator, who or what is going to be found to BLAME. This is not an analysis of who is to blame!

Latent factors:
Weak regulator that lets the airline do pretty well whatever it likes.
Local Chief Pilots and EVP Flt Ops who think maximum automation is the safest philosophy, although both manufacturers think otherwise.
Training Department that is seriously under Fleet managements thumb
Airline that treats all FTL limits as targets and as negotiable.
Boeing A/THR mode subtleties that can confuse
Regulator and Airline both agree burying head in sand on bad things is best philosophy, so as not to damage country's reputation.
To ensure this the regulator is allegedly using two of the airline's staff on secondment to help with the investigation

On the Day factors:
Local Captain, who has only been a Capt for about a year
F/O relatively new to airline.
Although rested, flight and landing took place at circadian low.
Summer wind conditions that can be fluky causing direction shifts close to ground.

Blamestorming Analysis:
Boeing and Rolls Royce will get minimal blame otherwise they will demand a proper investigation. The airline and country brand must be protected at all costs, so the airline will get minimal blame, maybe a little placed on the training department. The Capt will receive little blame, as he is a local and you do not want to question the quality of local pilot training and skills, or the command upgrade process. The Aussie F/O might get some blame for not supporting the Capt properly, unless the Qantas unions can protect him. ATC likewise may get some of the blame for confusing the pilots by giving them an instruction during the G/A, but that won't stick very well. Only solution BLAME Mother Nature, as plainly severe windshear caused this accident to happen. There, everybody happy now.

One thing we are never likely to know is the Truth
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 08:13
  #1047 (permalink)  
 
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Building Induced Windshear

Alphaprot,

Good summation..however...

I would add Density Altitude (DA) and Building Induced Windshear/Turbulence to the mix....

Note the proximity of the Emirates maintenance hangars (A380 capable) to the Runway...less than 450m!....

Further, note that in general, Automated Weather Stations (AWS) globally, round 'wind direction' to the nearest deca degree (nearest +/- 10 deg)...

Speed is also recorded +/- a margin.....

The density altitude (DA), given the adverse combination of OAT and air pressure at the time was SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER than ISA for Dubai....

Unfortunately, this crew were subjected to a multitude of adverse environmental conditions (vertical windshear, possible building induced Windshear/Turbulence and an elevated DA) which SHOULD be highlighted by the accident investigation team, if they are on the ball....

DATUM
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 08:45
  #1048 (permalink)  
 
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Prima facie it appears that although not catastrophic but there was a wind shift, initially head wind shear then changing to tail wind. The head WS part caused excess energy situation leading to IAS increase and float that made the crew initiate a GA. Excess speed converting to height may have given the crew indication of +climb leading to retraction of the gear but wind shift to tail and increased drag from open doors of retracting gear made the aircraft contact the runway. With unlocked gear collapsing fuselage took the impact and was destroyed. If the gear was not retracted the aircraft would have survived. The only question that remains to be answered is whether the crew retracted the gear prematurely? From available information it is not possible to say that.
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 11:06
  #1049 (permalink)  
 
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The cynics on here should reflect that they are questioning the integrity not only of Emirates and the GCAA but also Boeing, Roll-Royce and numerous other aviation bodies. There is simply no way that they would sign off their contribution to any report that did not contain the true facts. Has any ICAO-required report , ever, been found to be false or fabricated? Findings have been disputed after publication on rare occasions such as Egyptair but that is not the same. An interim report will appear around 2nd September which will cover the basics of the accident in accordance with ICAO requirements. Unlikely to include FDR data because it is not required at this stage and it is too early to expect it.
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 11:40
  #1050 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Vilas
The industry will find solution through technology by better automation so the human factor is not allowed to come in.
The operative word being WILL. Until then, because pilots can't fly any more (Children of the Magenta), aeroplanes will continue to crash. But who cares? Said operators will still be making money...
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 11:48
  #1051 (permalink)  
 
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The cynics on here aren't just questioning the 'integrity' of companies such as Boeing and Rolls. For there to be any 'cover-up', those manufacturers would be forced to accept that the equipment was simply incapable of flying safely in the prevailing ambient conditions. If operated correctly, and after many millions of flight hours, I suspect that's a pretty unlikely scenario?

But then, money talks.

As for the 'old and bold' (read 'better!') versus 'magenta line' arguments. There are indeed very many traps awaiting the unwary in modern equipment. Apart from the most rudimentary of skills, there is a significant disconnect between what passed as acceptable in the 'halcyon days', and what is required of a modern airline pilot now. It's like comparing Stanley Matthews with Lionel Messi. There is no reason whatever to suggest that good and bad pilots occur in any different proportion these days, than ever they did. Modern pilots are simply the same people facing different problems. (For example ULH with perhaps less than one landing per month, and you'll be lucky if you can still fly like Chuck Yeager) Different coping strategies than simple 'practice', are required! To suggest anything else is just silly. Or pompous?

Last edited by 4468; 22nd Aug 2016 at 12:06.
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 11:53
  #1052 (permalink)  
 
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Has any ICAO-required report , ever, been found to be false or fabricated?
This is a suggestive question, but an interesting one.

You don't necessarily have to 'falsify' a report. But you can raise exaggerated attention to some minor details or protagonist (you will always find some) as to divert from the real holes in the Swiss cheese.
Has been done in the past to protect the biggies involved. It basically 'can never be' the manufacturers, the airline, the country with its regulator. Too much interest and money involved.

That leaves the active crew and the weather.
The weather has been ghastly, agreed, but it had been like that many times before and even worse, the sandpit is known for these effects. Blame it on the weather and make a fool out of yourself.
The crew has one particular component that involves the biggies' interests mentioned above. So i fear that the other component will get the major share. If you think his union will protect him, think twice ..... I don't believe it one second. Their company depends too much of the one involved and all three will gladly pick on the handy scape goat.
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 12:12
  #1053 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by BugSmasher1960 View Post
For what little it's worth, in my limited time at the sharp end, in any non-normal situation I was happy enough to use SOP but - having done that - it was never a case of then just sitting back "fat, dumb, and happy".

The last item of any NNCL for me was always "think think think and then think some more".
Originally Posted by vilas View Post
BugSmasher1960 and RAT 5

In your dislike for procedures or over confidence in your own innovations you don't notice how ridiculous and dangerous the above statement is. When engine fails on take off if you sit on your hands and think then rest of the work will be only at your funeral. When Engine fails you don't think, you instantly react and maintain control the aircraft. Identifying the correct engine before shutting down is very much part of the SOP you don't need to think for that. Somebody smarter than you has put it in the SOP. Rat come on! Can there be a suitable SOP for a person who has visceral hatred for any procedures except his own irrelevant innovations? I think manufacturer's test pilots deserve more respect than that.
Not sure if you're including me in that, but I started by saying that I have no problem with SOPs - my question is - in essence - "are pilots still actively thinking once they've run the NNCL / SOP"? Or are they too trusting of the SOP / automation to handle events? (case-in-point go-arounds after pressing the TOGA button).
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 13:31
  #1054 (permalink)  
 
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Prima facie it appears that although not catastrophic but there was a wind shift, initially head wind shear then changing to tail wind. The head WS part caused excess energy situation leading to IAS increase and float that made the crew initiate a GA. Excess speed converting to height may have given the crew indication of +climb leading to retraction of the gear but wind shift to tail and increased drag from open doors of retracting gear made the aircraft contact the runway. With unlocked gear collapsing fuselage took the impact and was destroyed. If the gear was not retracted the aircraft would have survived. The only question that remains to be answered is whether the crew retracted the gear prematurely? From available information it is not possible to say that.
vilas,

Is that analysis presuming there was no thrust delivered from the engines? Isn't that the 'only' question that remains to be answered? I can't for my life believe the engines are so slow to spool up that they couldn't have arrested an impact from a bounce/wind shift (even in 49 deg C heat).
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 13:54
  #1055 (permalink)  
 
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The real question, asked rhetorically by many in this thread, is if the PF pushed the TOGA switches, and thereafter followed up (as he was supposed to do) by pushing the thrust levers forward. If he did, then there would have been thrust, if not, then most likely there would have been only idle thrust, not enough to keep the aircraft flying.
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 13:56
  #1056 (permalink)  
 
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Glofish, sorry but statements such as "has been done in the past"... " can never be" etc are not worth much unless backed up by evidence. There are plenty of sources to refer to, try planecrashinfo.com for worldwide figures:

A sample stat is Causes of Fatal Accidents in % from 2000 to 2010 ( aircraft with 19 pax and above):

Pilot Error 34
Pilot Error Weather related 18
Pilot Error Mechanical related 5
Other Human Error 6
Weather 6
Mechanical Failure 22
Sabotage 9

Some food for thought perhaps?
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 14:16
  #1057 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Hogger
is if the PF pushed the TOGA switches, and thereafter followed up (as he was supposed to do) by pushing the thrust levers forward. If he did, then there would have been thrust,
Unless TOGA mode didn't engage, and when he took his hand off the throttles to control the Go Around, they came back to Idle...
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 14:25
  #1058 (permalink)  
 
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I'm pretty sure the they know exactly what happened.
They have all the information from all the recorders.
They will have flown the attempted go around many times in the sim.
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 16:35
  #1059 (permalink)  
 
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BugSmasher1960 and Rat
I somehow get the feeling that both of you are not in touch with contemporary situation in aviation otherwise you would not be lamenting the demise of the thinking pilot. Rather the whole process of thinking is now well organised. When something happens you don't sit on your hands because somebody said so but Fly(establish control of the flight path or ensure it is still there), navigate(make sure you are going where you want to or make short term decision to hold or change direction) and communicate immediately if deviating from clearance, if not then when convenient. Dealing with abnormal/emergencies every important item like throttle, fuel lever is confirmed by both pilots before acting on it. Once you are finished with it a situational assessment is made like seeing the problem in its entirety, options, risks and benefits of each of them and decision taken in agreement with the other and as you execute the decision it is periodically checked that it still remains the right one. This is not the demise of the thinking pilot but even a dumb pilot is guided to think along a well thought out plans rather than leaving it to random individual brilliance or idiocy to come out with consistent results. Thinking is not dead but rather the pilot is prevented from acting without thinking like in the old days. it doesn't leave much to be unnecessarily creative unless you want to show that you are different.
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Old 22nd Aug 2016, 16:56
  #1060 (permalink)  
 
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portmanteau, # 1063.
One problem with using so called sources of accident data is that there is no explanation of what 'human error' means, nor how such a classification can 'cause' an accident. Thus most of what is quoted is of little use for improving safety.
For a mechanical failure, fix the mechanics, for a human 'failure', fix what, how ...

For this accident, if the GA system design contributed, is this the major contributor, or is the human because of the weakness in system operation, or jointly; or due to documentation, certification, ... etc. Like many recent accidents this one has the potential for similar complexity. It's not what caused it, it is why the contributions came together at the time, and how we can learn from this will be the important aspect for safety.
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