B-738 Crash in Russia Rostov-on-Don
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they are always uniquely qualified.
What makes you think that that particular ehh...sim was "uniquely qualified"...
especially, given that in the video that trim wheel clearly doesn't have enough speed to move the stab to the position the stab indicator displays at the end of the video.
Originally Posted by KRH270/12
The Plane impacted with massive bank angle!
A video from some distance upwind and in line with the approach shows no sideways motion at all.
N4790P
Semantics really...
What makes you think that that particular ehh...sim was "uniquely qualified"...
especially, given that in the video that trim wheel clearly doesn't have enough speed to move the stab to the position the stab indicator displays at the end of the video.
What makes you think that that particular ehh...sim was "uniquely qualified"...
especially, given that in the video that trim wheel clearly doesn't have enough speed to move the stab to the position the stab indicator displays at the end of the video.
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The videos show large bank angle.
People always assume bank = turn , but thats not always true, especially not for very high bank angles close to 90 degree with massive pitch down. Thats why a chrash on centerline does not mean no bank!
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Fantastic article on pitch trim and I believe scenario #1 is a distinct possibility.
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2627.pdf
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2627.pdf
Exactly what I suspect is the case in this accident.
Too many Boeing pilots don't know how the trim system on the plane they fly works, especially those who come from other types with different trim system.
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The video of the Bagram crash shows a B747 stall in the climb and immediately roll 90 deg without turning, then goes nose down into terrain. A high bank angle with stalled wings produces no turning moment.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_VyHa05LyIA
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_VyHa05LyIA
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Originally Posted by 737er
Fantastic article on pitch trim and I believe scenario #1 is a distinct possibility.
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2627.pdf
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/2627.pdf
I've been following this thread from the start. Correct me if I am wrong but this was two Captains flying together?
An early CRM course I attended showed evidence that Captains flying together were statistically more likely to be involved in an incident/accident. Also the data showed that two Training Captains flying together was an even worse crew combination.
Something to do with the cross cockpit command authority gradient.
An early CRM course I attended showed evidence that Captains flying together were statistically more likely to be involved in an incident/accident. Also the data showed that two Training Captains flying together was an even worse crew combination.
Something to do with the cross cockpit command authority gradient.
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https://www.rt.com/news/337400-pilot...boeing-rostov/
If this report is true (not fully believing it until the official reports come out) it seems the Captain wanted to counter act the windshear/turbulence by climbing aggressively with full power while performing the GA (apparently pulled back too much) . The climb rate was so great (light a/c, flaps retracted) , the FO counter acted the Captain's decision in disagreement and the a/c was given conflicting commands and stalled. Seems like the Captain wanted to make a 3rd attempt manually and was frustrated (anyone would be)...question is did they attempt stall recovery and failed with TOGA thrust set the whole way after they realized the change in g-force? Pretty scary situation...Any thoughts guys?
If this report is true (not fully believing it until the official reports come out) it seems the Captain wanted to counter act the windshear/turbulence by climbing aggressively with full power while performing the GA (apparently pulled back too much) . The climb rate was so great (light a/c, flaps retracted) , the FO counter acted the Captain's decision in disagreement and the a/c was given conflicting commands and stalled. Seems like the Captain wanted to make a 3rd attempt manually and was frustrated (anyone would be)...question is did they attempt stall recovery and failed with TOGA thrust set the whole way after they realized the change in g-force? Pretty scary situation...Any thoughts guys?
It was a standard flight crew complement. The FO may have had command experience previously (very likely given total time), but he was not a FZ commander.
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RT is suggesting opposite inputs from the two pilots separated the control column .....
"When one of the control columns becomes jammed, the crew can override (breakout) the faulty control. The control columns are interconnected below the cockpit floor by a torque tube with a device that enables the controls to be separated from each other. The Elevator Breakout Mechanism connects both control columns by two springs which will separate the columns when ± 30Lbf/13Kgf is used to overcome them. When applied, the control columns are mechanically separated from each other. Note that deflection of the elevators is significantly reduced and a higher force is needed to move the elevators. (even higher than with manual reversion)"
"When one of the control columns becomes jammed, the crew can override (breakout) the faulty control. The control columns are interconnected below the cockpit floor by a torque tube with a device that enables the controls to be separated from each other. The Elevator Breakout Mechanism connects both control columns by two springs which will separate the columns when ± 30Lbf/13Kgf is used to overcome them. When applied, the control columns are mechanically separated from each other. Note that deflection of the elevators is significantly reduced and a higher force is needed to move the elevators. (even higher than with manual reversion)"
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https://www.rt.com/news/337400-pilot...boeing-rostov/
With the caveat this reporting could be completely wrong:
The article indicted the crew attempted two auto lands where earlier in this thread it was stated only manual landing with use of a the hud were the only authorized company specs. (Personally I think this is bad reporting)
"Meanwhile, according to Kommersant’s sources, the recorder revealed that flight FZ981 had made two attempts to land in automatic mode, and since a veering squall wind hampered the second attempt, the pilot decided to make a third approach for landing in manual mode."
If the aircraft was in windshear where the GPWS recognized it, the warning would have clearly been heard on the recording and I would have thought that would have been reported.
If the aircraft was not in actual windshear a normal go around should have been accomplished (to maintain energy), only reverting to the windshear recovery procedure when the pilots observed or GPWS reported Windshear.
I find the possible dual control situation extraordinarily troubling.
With the caveat this reporting could be completely wrong:
The article indicted the crew attempted two auto lands where earlier in this thread it was stated only manual landing with use of a the hud were the only authorized company specs. (Personally I think this is bad reporting)
"Meanwhile, according to Kommersant’s sources, the recorder revealed that flight FZ981 had made two attempts to land in automatic mode, and since a veering squall wind hampered the second attempt, the pilot decided to make a third approach for landing in manual mode."
If the aircraft was in windshear where the GPWS recognized it, the warning would have clearly been heard on the recording and I would have thought that would have been reported.
If the aircraft was not in actual windshear a normal go around should have been accomplished (to maintain energy), only reverting to the windshear recovery procedure when the pilots observed or GPWS reported Windshear.
I find the possible dual control situation extraordinarily troubling.
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During,manual go arounds,never needed much trim if any....i would believe if they needed a high amount of trim nose down would be if they initially way over pitched the aircraft.(whatever the cause may be).
If this report is true (not fully believing it until the official reports come out) it seems the Captain wanted to counter act the windshear/turbulence by climbing aggressively with full power while performing the GA (apparently pulled back too much) . The climb rate was so great (light a/c, flaps retracted) , the FO counter acted the Captain's decision in disagreement and the a/c was given conflicting commands and stalled. Seems like the Captain wanted to make a 3rd attempt manually and was frustrated (anyone would be)...question is did they attempt stall recovery and failed with TOGA thrust set the whole way after they realized the change in g-force? Pretty scary situation...Any thoughts guys?
Unless the FR24 data is very wrong, it shows a loss of control but it is difficult to see a stall in there, in fact quite the opposite. For reasons yet to be revealed it seems there was a pitch control issue, be it self-induced or system failure related.
The reporters for this TV network look like they are in a kind of Russian-English-Russian feedback loop involving this site and random bits of aeroplane manuals. I think we’ve exhausted most avenues of speculation and are awaiting the FDR output...
Psychophysiological entity
Was that SIM ride supposed to be taken seriously?
While the PF seemed to be waggling the stick about perhaps to liven up the smooth air.
And as for that screw jack. I've got antique furniture that sounds better than that when it reached the top of the run.
I've never understood Boeing and that million-turn philosophy. The BAC 1-11 wheel was supremely accurate and quite simply part of the hand flying. It's hard to see why there would be two such disparate design philosophies.
Instead the LH seat operator wasted what could be critical time making feeble hand movements
And as for that screw jack. I've got antique furniture that sounds better than that when it reached the top of the run.
I've never understood Boeing and that million-turn philosophy. The BAC 1-11 wheel was supremely accurate and quite simply part of the hand flying. It's hard to see why there would be two such disparate design philosophies.
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Was that SIM ride supposed to be taken seriously?
It hurts the eyes for sure.
Last edited by de facto; 28th Mar 2016 at 17:43.
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You did an awesome job with the MH17 reporting.
About this Kommersant' article (and it's direct translation on RT with only their own addition about steering separation) it for me looks not more believable than that "knuppel" business.
MAK issued press-release concerning this latest "investigation results". In short it can be translated into "who are all this people and what are they talking about?".