Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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xcitation's question begs another question I have always wondered about:
How many working pilots actually read these reports in detail? Do they have the time? Or the interest? I imagine the answers to this are all over the map. It would seem, in the absence of any pertinent facts
that, had FO studied the report, a lot of ppl would still be walking around the planet.
I know a certain pilot who blogs about piloting, and after a brief initial discussion on AF447, it was obvious that he had little interest in any of he nuts-and-bolts of that crash. Maybe complacency is part of this problem.
How many working pilots actually read these reports in detail? Do they have the time? Or the interest? I imagine the answers to this are all over the map. It would seem, in the absence of any pertinent facts
that, had FO studied the report, a lot of ppl would still be walking around the planet.I know a certain pilot who blogs about piloting, and after a brief initial discussion on AF447, it was obvious that he had little interest in any of he nuts-and-bolts of that crash. Maybe complacency is part of this problem.
The published CVR transcripts are mostly sanitised, they only show what has been said and not how it was said. As they say it is not what you say but how you say it, remember Billy Connoly and the meaning of the f word ? Sometimes voice stress analysis is provided which gives a better understanding of the events unfolding before the eyes of the crew and their reactions. Nothing of the kind seems to have been provided in this instance. Why is that I wonder, is it because all that was recorded was just routine and said in the expected sang froid manner of Sully Sullenberger.
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Bingo
mm43 wrote: Likewise, could you be forced to accept that the PIC actually said, "full down"
(First, it's good to see you posting again. It takes me back to the days of AF447...)
People familiar with Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) – especially those who study linguistics, and specifically those who are involved in the study and use of aviation English – will immediately realise the significance of mm43's observation. His exact interpretation of the Captain’s words has been the subject of MUCH discussion among those who have heard the audio file.
For those unfamiliar with spoken Indonesian, there are many English words that start with the letter "f" (or that contain an "f") wherein the "f" is pronounced by many Indonesians as a "p". Examples are "Fantastic" and "Coffee" and many other words where an "f" is commonly treated as a "p". To emphasise the point, there are also native Indonesian words, spelled with an "f" but always pronounced as "p" (i.e. “kafan”, which is always pronounced as “kapan”). There are historical and linguistic reasons for this but for the purpose of this discussion that background is not important. What IS significant is that there is a very good argument to be made that the Captain was saying, “Full Down!” And some of us believe (for many reasons additional to what I mentioned here) that’s exactly what he said…
(First, it's good to see you posting again. It takes me back to the days of AF447...)
People familiar with Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) – especially those who study linguistics, and specifically those who are involved in the study and use of aviation English – will immediately realise the significance of mm43's observation. His exact interpretation of the Captain’s words has been the subject of MUCH discussion among those who have heard the audio file.
For those unfamiliar with spoken Indonesian, there are many English words that start with the letter "f" (or that contain an "f") wherein the "f" is pronounced by many Indonesians as a "p". Examples are "Fantastic" and "Coffee" and many other words where an "f" is commonly treated as a "p". To emphasise the point, there are also native Indonesian words, spelled with an "f" but always pronounced as "p" (i.e. “kafan”, which is always pronounced as “kapan”). There are historical and linguistic reasons for this but for the purpose of this discussion that background is not important. What IS significant is that there is a very good argument to be made that the Captain was saying, “Full Down!” And some of us believe (for many reasons additional to what I mentioned here) that’s exactly what he said…
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I've been a bit slow in reading the full accident report and analyzing the parameters provided, too much other stuff going on in life.
The commonality with the loss of control that occurred in AF447 after the drop to Alternate law is too compelling a similarity to ignore.
I've had bad vertigo at night and I've seen roll PIO in a simulator and I'm trying to form an opinion on which of these might have been at play that terrified the PF. Of course it could have been solely that he was terrified of simply handflying in actual instrument conditions.
In any case, we now have two cases where apparently weak sticks completely lost the bubble by inexplicably pulling back on the stick when unexpectedly thrust into an Alternate Law-Roll Direct situation. That is the common thread I am concerned about.
Of course Airbus has put their test pilots into the same situation and they say, "no big deal, just fly the aircraft." Maybe what we need to do instead is to put some of the newer pilots behind the controls of a simulator that accurately behaves as the aircraft does at altitude and to try to replicate some of these loss of control incidents. Then we could actually interview some survivors to find out what really happens. You could grab them fresh off a line flight while they are still tired to improve the odds of having a loss of control to study.
Until we accurately understand why these loss of control incidents are happening in Alternate law, we are throwing darts in the dark as to the best corrective action.
The commonality with the loss of control that occurred in AF447 after the drop to Alternate law is too compelling a similarity to ignore.
I've had bad vertigo at night and I've seen roll PIO in a simulator and I'm trying to form an opinion on which of these might have been at play that terrified the PF. Of course it could have been solely that he was terrified of simply handflying in actual instrument conditions.
In any case, we now have two cases where apparently weak sticks completely lost the bubble by inexplicably pulling back on the stick when unexpectedly thrust into an Alternate Law-Roll Direct situation. That is the common thread I am concerned about.
Of course Airbus has put their test pilots into the same situation and they say, "no big deal, just fly the aircraft." Maybe what we need to do instead is to put some of the newer pilots behind the controls of a simulator that accurately behaves as the aircraft does at altitude and to try to replicate some of these loss of control incidents. Then we could actually interview some survivors to find out what really happens. You could grab them fresh off a line flight while they are still tired to improve the odds of having a loss of control to study.
Until we accurately understand why these loss of control incidents are happening in Alternate law, we are throwing darts in the dark as to the best corrective action.
Or perhaps we need to concentrate on teaching pilots to do pilot stuff. The industry in now full of 250hr wonder children, who are automatics dependent from just after take off to just before landing. They have never had an opportunity to develop handling skills.
It doesn't matter if it's an Airbus in ALTN law, or a Boeing in a turning departure (Flash airlines and Ethiopian) or a Boeing stalling on approach ( Turkish and Asiana). Some pilots don't have the Skill to consistently handle something slightly out of the normal. No matter what equipment they sit in, if the fella with them is not up to scratch the outcome may not be desirable.
It doesn't matter if it's an Airbus in ALTN law, or a Boeing in a turning departure (Flash airlines and Ethiopian) or a Boeing stalling on approach ( Turkish and Asiana). Some pilots don't have the Skill to consistently handle something slightly out of the normal. No matter what equipment they sit in, if the fella with them is not up to scratch the outcome may not be desirable.
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A non-pilots question. If a person is out of their seat (perhaps pulling a CB), what will a sudden 60 degree (or 102 degree) roll do to them? Couldn't they be thrown around enough to be injured or severely disorientated?
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Unfortunalely on a typical SEP you can not install a reliable AoA indicator...
It is possible. The wings are outside of the prop wash.
It is possible. The wings are outside of the prop wash.
If a person is out of their seat (perhaps pulling a CB), what will a sudden 60 degree (or 102 degree) roll do to them? Couldn't they be thrown around enough to be injured or severely disorientated?
Some pilots don't have the skill to consistently handle something slightly out of the normal. No matter what equipment they sit in, if the fella with them is not up to scratch the outcome may not be desirable.
To stop the rot of automation dependence and automation addiction which is the basis of most loss of control in IMC accidents, the time is well overdue to reverse the rush to still more automation in the simulator and fix the problem by increasing the amount of manual raw data flying given to pilots in the simulator.
Let's face it - you are never going to change the oft myopic view of airline management that manual flying even in the most ideal ATC and weather, is a hazard inflicted on passengers and must be avoided at all costs lest one grumpy passenger complains his coffee is being spilt by the actions of a ham-fisted captain or co-pilot.
It is a good bet that most check pilots and simulator instructors tasked with conducting type rating and recurrent simulator training, would never dream of taking a control seat in order to demonstrate what they want the "student" to do. We are talking about hand flying on instruments without the crutch of a flight director. After all, even the most inexperienced low hour instructor at a flying school has to chance his arm and first demonstrate a manoeuvre to his student. If simulator instructors don't have the skills to do that, they shouldn't be in the job.
if the simulator instructor is too scared of stuffing up in front of the crew member he is supposed to be training, then how on earth can the crew member learn by example? A picture is worth a thousand words is so true in the context of simulator training.
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Centaurus,
The Aircraft itself must be used to fly raw data up to RVSM on a regular basis!
The Sim will never, ever be able to recreate the feel of the aircraft. Sim is for emergency training, not for learning how to bloody fly. That should have been taught years before and upkept during your day to day job.
Any airline not supporting raw data flying is simply a danger in tha air.
Any pilot afraid or unwilling or unable to fly raw data on a regular basis simply has no business on a flightdeck.
Simple solution to the problem.
The Aircraft itself must be used to fly raw data up to RVSM on a regular basis!
The Sim will never, ever be able to recreate the feel of the aircraft. Sim is for emergency training, not for learning how to bloody fly. That should have been taught years before and upkept during your day to day job.
Any airline not supporting raw data flying is simply a danger in tha air.
Any pilot afraid or unwilling or unable to fly raw data on a regular basis simply has no business on a flightdeck.
Simple solution to the problem.
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This is all the inevitable consequence of airlines who have stopped their own training.
Students who have to spend large amounts of their own money will go to the schools that don't fail them - in other words, schools that make it easy, and absolutely minimise the training which might cause them to fail. The same applies to the airlines who cannot man their fleet and make a profit unless they find a way to take cheap, low time, pretty-poor-really pilots. And they all lean on the regulators to 'go easy'.
It is not at all unique to aviation - take a look at railway maintenance for another example.
Students who have to spend large amounts of their own money will go to the schools that don't fail them - in other words, schools that make it easy, and absolutely minimise the training which might cause them to fail. The same applies to the airlines who cannot man their fleet and make a profit unless they find a way to take cheap, low time, pretty-poor-really pilots. And they all lean on the regulators to 'go easy'.
It is not at all unique to aviation - take a look at railway maintenance for another example.
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Connected controls?
So now we have had two Airbus accidents where the PF kept pulling back on the stick of a stalled aircraft, and no one tried to stop him - possibly because they didn't even realize what he was doing.
It has been unfortunate in these two recent cases that the spoken "dual input" warning gets suppressed by the stall warning. But it seems that audio warnings go unnoticed in stressful situations anyway.
In fact, I can think of several warnings that might warrant a more robust way of getting the message across than there is today:
It has been unfortunate in these two recent cases that the spoken "dual input" warning gets suppressed by the stall warning. But it seems that audio warnings go unnoticed in stressful situations anyway.
In fact, I can think of several warnings that might warrant a more robust way of getting the message across than there is today:
- Stall/approach to stall: Now spoken, and indicated by the speed tape. Add a stick shaker and a text message "Stall - pitch down" on the ECAM and the PFD.
- Terrain: Now spoken/whoop, and terrain painted on the NAV display. Add a text message "Terrain - pull up" on the ECAM and the PFD.
- Dual input: Now spoken, and indicator lights on the glare shield. Add a text message "Dual input - PF/PNF roles .. clarify" on the ECAM.
FAA AC: AC 120-109A
The FAA recently revised the AC120-109A "Stall Prevention and Recover Training" - superseding the previous AC 120-109 "Stall and Stick Pusher Training".
FAA AC
No idea if the timing is coincidental or not....
FAA AC
This AC includes the following core principles:
• Reducing angle of attack (AOA) is the most important pilot action in recovering from an impending or full stall.
• Pilot training should emphasize teaching the same recovery technique for impending stalls and full stalls.
• Evaluation criteria for a recovery from an impending stall should not include a predetermined value for altitude loss. Instead, criteria should consider the multitude of external and internal variables that affect the recovery altitude.
• Once the stall recovery procedure is mastered by maneuver-based training, stall prevention training should include realistic scenarios that could be encountered in operational conditions, including impending stalls with the autopilot engaged at high altitudes.
• Full stall training is an instructor-guided, hands-on experience of applying the stall recovery procedure and will allow the pilot to experience the associated flight dynamics from stall onset through the recovery.
• Reducing angle of attack (AOA) is the most important pilot action in recovering from an impending or full stall.
• Pilot training should emphasize teaching the same recovery technique for impending stalls and full stalls.
• Evaluation criteria for a recovery from an impending stall should not include a predetermined value for altitude loss. Instead, criteria should consider the multitude of external and internal variables that affect the recovery altitude.
• Once the stall recovery procedure is mastered by maneuver-based training, stall prevention training should include realistic scenarios that could be encountered in operational conditions, including impending stalls with the autopilot engaged at high altitudes.
• Full stall training is an instructor-guided, hands-on experience of applying the stall recovery procedure and will allow the pilot to experience the associated flight dynamics from stall onset through the recovery.
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Originally Posted by despegue
Any airline not supporting raw data flying is simply a danger in tha air.
Any pilot afraid or unwilling or unable to fly raw data on a regular basis simply has no business on a flightdeck.
Any pilot afraid or unwilling or unable to fly raw data on a regular basis simply has no business on a flightdeck.
What might be a great help would be some simple modifications to the operation of Alternate Law that would give these weaker sticks a chance to catch their breath rather than throwing them directly into the pool of "Alternate Law, roll direct".
Something as simple as an automatic wing leveler in Alternate Law would probably have prevented both QZ8501 and AF447 and would not interfere with normal control. As I understand, there isn't an announcement of Alternate Law when the change occurs, just indications on the PFD.
I believe it is essential that pilots know that they are in Alternate Law before they consider making that first full deflection aileron input that panics them. All they need to know then is that Alternate Law means gentle corrections!
Discussions about stall recovery procedures are appropriate of course, but fall into the category of putting the ambulance at the bottom of the precipice rather than putting the fence at the top. Once you panic a person, unpredictable effects can negate your best training.
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The Sim will never, ever be able to recreate the feel of the aircraft. Sim is for emergency training, not for learning how to bloody fly.
Sim is for procedure and CRM training. Especially the latter would not have hurt in this case...
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Automatics
Clearly there is a need for improved training. However these incidents which allegedly have a significant component of pilot error will only support the trend to increased automation. I don't envisage airlines reversing the trend and insisting on hand flying at high altitude except in the sim. I recall reading for some types the manufacturers advise against manual flying at very high altitude presumably because of the increased risk.
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There is no way to practice high level handling because RVSM does not permit it. Most airbus pilots retire without having experienced direct law, dual hydraulic or EMER ELEC or forced landing. So there will always some failures that cannot be actually practiced but understood theoretically and that doesn't mean these cannot be executed when required. If the pilots of AF447 and QZ8501 knew the pitch, bank and thrust autopilot uses at those levels they wouldn't have done what they did. This awareness can be instilled in simulator by including it in training syllabus.
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Perhaps positive G could be simulated if a simulator is mounted in a CENTRIFUGE... But negative G would still need another idea, I suspect.
RVSM may be, or is, an ATCC requirement. This could be relaxed for a finite time, say 15 or 20 minutes, by the current controller to allow a small amount of practice at hand flying when Traffic allows.
Someone mentioned a year or two ago that he had had to hand fly a B707 at F/L 41.0. He said that the two pilots found that they had to take it in turns for 20 minutes each.
( They would have covered much the same Air Mileage as I did, hand flying a York for several alternate hours on long sectors, also without A/P.)
LT
RVSM may be, or is, an ATCC requirement. This could be relaxed for a finite time, say 15 or 20 minutes, by the current controller to allow a small amount of practice at hand flying when Traffic allows.
Someone mentioned a year or two ago that he had had to hand fly a B707 at F/L 41.0. He said that the two pilots found that they had to take it in turns for 20 minutes each.
( They would have covered much the same Air Mileage as I did, hand flying a York for several alternate hours on long sectors, also without A/P.)
LT
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That should NOT be possible. That should NEVER EVER happen. You can argue AoA indicators and control laws and sidesticks until you're blue in the face; what it needed was pilots who could fly the <expletive deleted> plane! If you lose sight of that, you've lost sight of the damned *profession*.