Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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Am I missing something, didn't the aircraft have full left rudder when the autopilot disconnects?
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Originally Posted by aguadalte
the arithmetical sum of dual inputs was a contributing factor to that accident!
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why freeze the trim wheels, why spin back during stall?
Does anyone of you know?
The video below shows an interesting simulation of high altitude stall.
Stall begins at 1:30, then trim wheels freeze, for g <0.5...
Now look at 2:15, while the aeroplane increases speed, the trim wheels start to roll back
, then finally at 2:32, trim wheels spin forward and the aeroplane exits stall in about 10 seconds.
https://youtu.be/Tyg_qFbnnUU?t=85
The video below shows an interesting simulation of high altitude stall.
Stall begins at 1:30, then trim wheels freeze, for g <0.5...
Now look at 2:15, while the aeroplane increases speed, the trim wheels start to roll back
, then finally at 2:32, trim wheels spin forward and the aeroplane exits stall in about 10 seconds.https://youtu.be/Tyg_qFbnnUU?t=85
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You still don't get it, do you? You just mentioned Pilot Flying actions. You have no idea of how a multi crew complex aircraft is flown...
Touched a nerve there? Just relax. Am not going to go into credentials.Multi Crew Aircraft are never flown in dual input mode, being it yoke or stick. Never.
If the PM understood what situation they were in, he should either have told the PF what to do in clear words, or announce that he has control and then do it himself. Both never happened. Because he seemed to never have understood.
It would have been a problem as much on a yoke aircraft, if the PM doesn't realise what is going on and lets the PF pull double-digit pitch values. It is pure speculation that the slight forward stick of the PM would have transformed into nose down commands on a yoke aircraft with a (possibly panicked) PF putting full backward force on it.
The big elephant in the room is basics, and not even in the sense of skills, but in the sense of knowledge how a wing works and has to be treated.
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Frequency of switch to alt law?
Hi, I'm a layperson that has lurked for quite a while and first time posting.
With the the Air France flight and now this Air Asia flight both having situations where the flight system has switched to alternate law from normal law and subsequent crew confusion and LoC and aircraft loss, I'm curious as to how often (and if it is even logged and disclosed) that aircraft crews experience situations that result in change of law and their ability to cope?
The very interesting (to me at least) Vanity Fair article about Air France a few years ago made the observation that when a complex machine takes care of itself 98% of the time (and humans more or less just monitor the machine), when the 2% problems arise that cause the machine to lose the ability to fly itself, it is probable that the situation is so complex that the flight crew will have issues understanding and coping with the situation.
so my question stems from this articles assertion and wondering if, in day to day commercial piloting this is truly an issue?
With the the Air France flight and now this Air Asia flight both having situations where the flight system has switched to alternate law from normal law and subsequent crew confusion and LoC and aircraft loss, I'm curious as to how often (and if it is even logged and disclosed) that aircraft crews experience situations that result in change of law and their ability to cope?
The very interesting (to me at least) Vanity Fair article about Air France a few years ago made the observation that when a complex machine takes care of itself 98% of the time (and humans more or less just monitor the machine), when the 2% problems arise that cause the machine to lose the ability to fly itself, it is probable that the situation is so complex that the flight crew will have issues understanding and coping with the situation.
so my question stems from this articles assertion and wondering if, in day to day commercial piloting this is truly an issue?
Phoenix, an interesting simulation; you focus your thoughts on trim. As yet I have not been able to find any reference to longitudinal trim in the report, nor in the FDR data; have I overlooked something?
Without accurate trim data the simulation would be meaningless.
For those who continue to debate sidesticks, coupling, etc, consider that trim is a powerful control system, which if inappropriately positioned can alter the apparent relationship between stick and aircraft motion.
In a conventional aircraft, a miss positioned nose-up trim requires a push force to fly level, and even more force (displacement) to lower the nose.
With a FBW system, there may not be any direct force relationship so the emphasis is on stick displacement. A miss positioned nose-up trim requires a constant displacement (off set) in the nose-down direction, the need for which may not be readily apparent considering normal operation with auto follow-up trim, and particularly when flying with protected systems and / or without stall training with the protections disabled.
For those who wish to look cross cockpit in a FBW aircraft they might better spend their time looking at the trim positon.
There may be similar issues relating to the rudder positon and trim. The ‘small’ rudder offset was probably limited by the higher speed cruise protection, but a greater range may have been available as speed is reduced.
Rudder trim was unavailable; the FDR indicates that the initial offset was not corrected manually.
This, and possibly a longitudinal trim issue, probably contributed to the continuous spiral descent, during which the wings remained in a stall condition.
Without accurate trim data the simulation would be meaningless.
For those who continue to debate sidesticks, coupling, etc, consider that trim is a powerful control system, which if inappropriately positioned can alter the apparent relationship between stick and aircraft motion.
In a conventional aircraft, a miss positioned nose-up trim requires a push force to fly level, and even more force (displacement) to lower the nose.
With a FBW system, there may not be any direct force relationship so the emphasis is on stick displacement. A miss positioned nose-up trim requires a constant displacement (off set) in the nose-down direction, the need for which may not be readily apparent considering normal operation with auto follow-up trim, and particularly when flying with protected systems and / or without stall training with the protections disabled.
For those who wish to look cross cockpit in a FBW aircraft they might better spend their time looking at the trim positon.
There may be similar issues relating to the rudder positon and trim. The ‘small’ rudder offset was probably limited by the higher speed cruise protection, but a greater range may have been available as speed is reduced.
Rudder trim was unavailable; the FDR indicates that the initial offset was not corrected manually.
This, and possibly a longitudinal trim issue, probably contributed to the continuous spiral descent, during which the wings remained in a stall condition.
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Whatever happened to the " I have control" -- "You have control" system that I grew up with in a bygone era of aviation?
Having only one pilot on the controls avoids any confusion about who is doing what.
Having only one pilot on the controls avoids any confusion about who is doing what.
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Whatever happened to the " I have control" -- "You have control" system that I grew up with in a bygone era of aviation?
Having only one pilot on the controls avoids any confusion about who is doing what.
Having only one pilot on the controls avoids any confusion about who is doing what.
Obviously, with independent, non-connected "joysticks" this tactile feedback would be unavailable.
Last edited by wanabee777; 5th Dec 2015 at 10:54.
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Connected
On 24 July 2014, an MD-83, you know, a plain vanilla old fashioned aircraft with interconnected yokes, stick shakers and moving thrust levers STALLED while cruising at FL310 over Mali, it dipped the left wing and descended at extremely high vertical rate with pilot input consisting mainly of FULL AFT YOKE and FULL RIGHT AILERON (the ideal controls to keep it in the left spin).
On 16 August 2005 an MD-82 stalled during cruise at FL330 over Venezuela. The loss of airspeed was not noticed in time and pilot actions were insufficient to prevent a full stall. No proper recovery actions were taken. The pilot maintained full aft stick all the way down, with stick shaker and aural stall warning active.
B737 at AMS was mentioned many times already.
Egyptair 990 showed the physical reality of 2 people both working their own yoke - their efforts are summed, not electronically like in Airbus, but mechanically: if one pulls with 300 daN, and the other pushes with 300 daN, the result is nil elevator effect, unless the opposing forces overcome the mechanical breakout feature that keeps the yokes connected. The result then is, one elevator up, the other down, pitch effect on aircraft hard to predict, roll effect taking place.
The proper way to take control, is by really taking it (override button in Airbus), (making sure that other guy relases yoke in Boeing) and then applying proper recovery controls.
....
You get it, stop the perpetual discussion about Airbus systems.
About the "startle effect" of complicated malfunctions, bla, bla, ....
Put a 16 year old kid in a glider, and by the time that he goes up for his first solo trip, he has practised 35 MAYDAY FUEL Emergencies (zero fuel in tanks), has done full blown spins, full blown stalls, 2 winch cable breaks at low altitude and a total flight experience of 5 hours 57 minutes.
What needs to be connected is the pilot's brain to FLYING, not to "being a pilot".
Don't reply with "the pilot flying AF447 was a glider pilot". Perhaps he did a bit of flying in a glider during some training segment, but clearly he was also one of the "brain not connected to flying" bunch.
Do "we" handfly passenger jets - yes we do, only the boring high level cruising stuff is autopilot compulsory because of RVSM rules. Unfortunately not every company in the world is so very relaxed with keeping manual flight skills sharp.
On 16 August 2005 an MD-82 stalled during cruise at FL330 over Venezuela. The loss of airspeed was not noticed in time and pilot actions were insufficient to prevent a full stall. No proper recovery actions were taken. The pilot maintained full aft stick all the way down, with stick shaker and aural stall warning active.
B737 at AMS was mentioned many times already.
Egyptair 990 showed the physical reality of 2 people both working their own yoke - their efforts are summed, not electronically like in Airbus, but mechanically: if one pulls with 300 daN, and the other pushes with 300 daN, the result is nil elevator effect, unless the opposing forces overcome the mechanical breakout feature that keeps the yokes connected. The result then is, one elevator up, the other down, pitch effect on aircraft hard to predict, roll effect taking place.
The proper way to take control, is by really taking it (override button in Airbus), (making sure that other guy relases yoke in Boeing) and then applying proper recovery controls.
....
You get it, stop the perpetual discussion about Airbus systems.
About the "startle effect" of complicated malfunctions, bla, bla, ....
Put a 16 year old kid in a glider, and by the time that he goes up for his first solo trip, he has practised 35 MAYDAY FUEL Emergencies (zero fuel in tanks), has done full blown spins, full blown stalls, 2 winch cable breaks at low altitude and a total flight experience of 5 hours 57 minutes.
What needs to be connected is the pilot's brain to FLYING, not to "being a pilot".
Don't reply with "the pilot flying AF447 was a glider pilot". Perhaps he did a bit of flying in a glider during some training segment, but clearly he was also one of the "brain not connected to flying" bunch.
Do "we" handfly passenger jets - yes we do, only the boring high level cruising stuff is autopilot compulsory because of RVSM rules. Unfortunately not every company in the world is so very relaxed with keeping manual flight skills sharp.
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old fashioned aircraft with interconnected yokes
None of those accidents mentioned had anything to do with "interconnected yokes" except EgyptAir. There were no "dual inputs" in the Mali crash, nor the Venezuela crash, nor the AMS crash.
And EgyptAir had a pilot determined to destroy the airplane with everyone on board. Hardly a comparison with QZ8501.
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These crews who were not capable of correct recovery techniques, deserve some sympathy as essentially they were not qualified to enact that recovery.
1) I do not know of any simulators that have the correct algorithms to represent aircraft handling characteristics at high altitude.(Set to about 15000 ft airiest height)
2) No in general pilots do not handle the aircraft at high altitude, especially in alternate law on an AB. (note example Roll rate inc from 15deg sec to getting on for 60deg second) The companies and legislation essentially forbids it.(they are aware of the possible consequences)
3) Handling at high level is quite different to low level. Stall recovery is the same as far as technique is concerned BUT to get the aircraft to position itself to that; is quite different. (For instance try hand flying a clb from 38 to 40 thousand in an actual A330 or a B767 or similar)
4) Ergonomically a side stick is far easier to over control than a yoke. (example how often do you "hit" the rolls stops on a rough approach? Quite often on a side stick rarely on a yoke)
5) If the aircraft departs the flight envelope, the aircraft is in un charted territory that even the test pilots probably have not seen.
We all believe we are better than the next man. It is the nature of being a pilot, however in general it is not the case.
Essentially all these crews were suddenly confronted with an odd handling aircraft probably in turbulence and trying to re- invent the wheel with no prior training or experience of flight at that level.
And IMHO training high altitude manoeuvres on a simulator that is only representing "feel" of 15000 ft is negative training and probably compounded the errors.
The much quoted Elephant in the room is the various certifying authorities allowing aircraft to be flown by un trained pilots.
1) I do not know of any simulators that have the correct algorithms to represent aircraft handling characteristics at high altitude.(Set to about 15000 ft airiest height)
2) No in general pilots do not handle the aircraft at high altitude, especially in alternate law on an AB. (note example Roll rate inc from 15deg sec to getting on for 60deg second) The companies and legislation essentially forbids it.(they are aware of the possible consequences)
3) Handling at high level is quite different to low level. Stall recovery is the same as far as technique is concerned BUT to get the aircraft to position itself to that; is quite different. (For instance try hand flying a clb from 38 to 40 thousand in an actual A330 or a B767 or similar)
4) Ergonomically a side stick is far easier to over control than a yoke. (example how often do you "hit" the rolls stops on a rough approach? Quite often on a side stick rarely on a yoke)
5) If the aircraft departs the flight envelope, the aircraft is in un charted territory that even the test pilots probably have not seen.
We all believe we are better than the next man. It is the nature of being a pilot, however in general it is not the case.
Essentially all these crews were suddenly confronted with an odd handling aircraft probably in turbulence and trying to re- invent the wheel with no prior training or experience of flight at that level.
And IMHO training high altitude manoeuvres on a simulator that is only representing "feel" of 15000 ft is negative training and probably compounded the errors.
The much quoted Elephant in the room is the various certifying authorities allowing aircraft to be flown by un trained pilots.
Last edited by IcePack; 5th Dec 2015 at 17:25.
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_Phoenix;
The Trim Horizontal Stabilizer, (THS) trim position is a function of elevator movement and position, nothing else.
The concept behind the design, and actuality of trim position is to render elevator position neutral. In the Airbus this is done automatically. In conventional aircraft this is manually done by the crew when the autopilot is not engaged.
This neutralizing does not occur immediately; - the THS does not "chase" elevator position so much as follow it up over a short period of time.
The THS did respond to stick position in the AF447 accident about 40 seconds after the loss of airspeed information when the stick was essentially held in the full-up stick position until impact.
In simulator exercises, the THS responds to the full-forward (ND) stick position and returns to it's cruise setting within about 13 seconds.
For simulator exercises, please be aware that there is no "stall data" for these aircraft and the simulator, rather the software programmer and/or aerodynamicist is mathematically estimating performance of aircraft behaviour during the full stall. This is changing as many here would know.
The key in stall recovery is to unload the wing...reduce the AoA and start the wing flying again. This means getting the nose down as quickly (aggressively) as possible and keeping it there until the wing is flying again, (absence of buffet, reducing rate of descent). This results in very high rates of descent and considerable loss of altitude, (up to 18,000fpm, 15,000ft of height lost).
This doesn't necessarily require an AoA indicator although that would be a valuable addition to the kit, but I doubt if it would have made a difference here, or in AF447.
Stall AoA at high altitude, high-Mach numbers can be as low as 6°. Typical cruise AoAs are around 2°to 2.5°
The stick input is a 'g' demand - it is not an actual elevator-position "request", (in Direct Law, it behaves conventionally just like say, a B737's elevator system).
Because the THS "follows up" elevator position over time, it's movement is related to and corresponds to stick position. Remember, in Normal Law, (and Alternate Law) the elevator is positioning itself to sustain 1g flight, (1g being perpendicular to the aircraft's longitudinal axis!).
The stall warning was sounding in this video so the aircraft was in Alternate Law, (with reduced protections).
A full description of re-configuration when certain system or autoflight components are lost is provided below. While the schematic may appear complex if one doesn't fly or more particularly, fly the Airbus, to those who do fly the aircraft, it is, (or should be, depending upon the air carrier's training and standards group), second nature:
I hope this helps further understanding.
#3634 (permalink) Does anyone of you know?
The video below shows an interesting simulation of high altitude stall.
Stall begins at 1:30, then trim wheels freeze, for g <0.5...
Now look at 2:15, while the aeroplane increases speed, the trim wheels start to roll back, then finally at 2:32, trim wheels spin forward and the aeroplane exits stall in about 10 seconds.
https://youtu.be/Tyg_qFbnnUU?t=85
The video below shows an interesting simulation of high altitude stall.
Stall begins at 1:30, then trim wheels freeze, for g <0.5...
Now look at 2:15, while the aeroplane increases speed, the trim wheels start to roll back
, then finally at 2:32, trim wheels spin forward and the aeroplane exits stall in about 10 seconds.https://youtu.be/Tyg_qFbnnUU?t=85
The concept behind the design, and actuality of trim position is to render elevator position neutral. In the Airbus this is done automatically. In conventional aircraft this is manually done by the crew when the autopilot is not engaged.
This neutralizing does not occur immediately; - the THS does not "chase" elevator position so much as follow it up over a short period of time.
The THS did respond to stick position in the AF447 accident about 40 seconds after the loss of airspeed information when the stick was essentially held in the full-up stick position until impact.
In simulator exercises, the THS responds to the full-forward (ND) stick position and returns to it's cruise setting within about 13 seconds.
For simulator exercises, please be aware that there is no "stall data" for these aircraft and the simulator, rather the software programmer and/or aerodynamicist is mathematically estimating performance of aircraft behaviour during the full stall. This is changing as many here would know.
The key in stall recovery is to unload the wing...reduce the AoA and start the wing flying again. This means getting the nose down as quickly (aggressively) as possible and keeping it there until the wing is flying again, (absence of buffet, reducing rate of descent). This results in very high rates of descent and considerable loss of altitude, (up to 18,000fpm, 15,000ft of height lost).
This doesn't necessarily require an AoA indicator although that would be a valuable addition to the kit, but I doubt if it would have made a difference here, or in AF447.
Stall AoA at high altitude, high-Mach numbers can be as low as 6°. Typical cruise AoAs are around 2°to 2.5°
The stick input is a 'g' demand - it is not an actual elevator-position "request", (in Direct Law, it behaves conventionally just like say, a B737's elevator system).
Because the THS "follows up" elevator position over time, it's movement is related to and corresponds to stick position. Remember, in Normal Law, (and Alternate Law) the elevator is positioning itself to sustain 1g flight, (1g being perpendicular to the aircraft's longitudinal axis!).
The stall warning was sounding in this video so the aircraft was in Alternate Law, (with reduced protections).
A full description of re-configuration when certain system or autoflight components are lost is provided below. While the schematic may appear complex if one doesn't fly or more particularly, fly the Airbus, to those who do fly the aircraft, it is, (or should be, depending upon the air carrier's training and standards group), second nature:
I hope this helps further understanding.
Last edited by FDMII; 5th Dec 2015 at 17:11. Reason: insert larger graphic
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The accident report`s conclusions include the following
"5. The weather on route of M635 partially covered by the Cumulonimbus clouds
formation between 12,000 feet up 44,000 feet. The FDR data indicated that the flight was not affected by the weather condition and investigation concludes that the weather was not factor to the accident."
At 22:57 The crew took action for wx and turbulence. Within 3 seconds the first of the RTL warnings appeared on ECAM .
At 23:04 wx avoidance turn was requested and at 23:12 FL380 was requested again for wx.
At 23:16:43 A/P was lost, reversion to Alt Law and left roll up to 54 degree began. Nine seconds after this the aircraft climbed to 38,000 at 11000 ft/sec.
At 23:16:53 P1 said "Oh my God".
At 23:17:29 P2 said " whats going wrong" (in French)".
At 23:17:41 P1 said " my God "
At 23:19:58 Instruction to select CAPT 3.
All that above looks very much like a scenario of the crew trying to get out of an intense CB cell. What evidence was there on the FDR to conclude that wx was not a factor.
Was the P1`s first fearful exclamation brought about by the wrong action of the P2 or was it because they found themselves in a more perilous situation than expected after the climb.
The P2`s question is in fact an expression of surprise. Does it not suggest that the the indicated responses he expected by the instruments do not conform to his actions. He is baffled and cannot understand why the situation is worsening.
"5. The weather on route of M635 partially covered by the Cumulonimbus clouds
formation between 12,000 feet up 44,000 feet. The FDR data indicated that the flight was not affected by the weather condition and investigation concludes that the weather was not factor to the accident."
At 22:57 The crew took action for wx and turbulence. Within 3 seconds the first of the RTL warnings appeared on ECAM .
At 23:04 wx avoidance turn was requested and at 23:12 FL380 was requested again for wx.
At 23:16:43 A/P was lost, reversion to Alt Law and left roll up to 54 degree began. Nine seconds after this the aircraft climbed to 38,000 at 11000 ft/sec.
At 23:16:53 P1 said "Oh my God".
At 23:17:29 P2 said " whats going wrong" (in French)".
At 23:17:41 P1 said " my God "
At 23:19:58 Instruction to select CAPT 3.
All that above looks very much like a scenario of the crew trying to get out of an intense CB cell. What evidence was there on the FDR to conclude that wx was not a factor.
Was the P1`s first fearful exclamation brought about by the wrong action of the P2 or was it because they found themselves in a more perilous situation than expected after the climb.
The P2`s question is in fact an expression of surprise. Does it not suggest that the the indicated responses he expected by the instruments do not conform to his actions. He is baffled and cannot understand why the situation is worsening.
N4790P
FDMII
Thank you for your excellent posts. A query. I understood that the enhanced data being released in 2016 for Std 2 single aisle and 2.6? wide body is for stall buffet only and doesn't really change the stall model as such. Have I missed something?
For simulator exercises, please be aware that there is no "stall data" for these aircraft and the simulator, rather the software programmer and/or aerodynamicist is mathematically estimating performance of aircraft behaviour during the full stall. This is changing as many here would know.
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let the automated systems handle the recovery
As an engineer with experience with control systems I appreciate how much better machines handle these complex situations than human beings. On reading the many posts and aided by back of envelope calculations I realize how quickly a stall situation at high altitude can develop, where the air is thin and aerodynamic braking is small and may quickly become unrecoverable. A big red panic button, backed up by an autonomous computer and control system, saying 'Get me out of this situation!' should do the trick. If the situation develops beyond the point where normal controls work, I would recommend a drogue chute.
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I don't understand one thing. Why stall warning have priority over dual input warning?
Stall represent the threatening factor, it is the problem. To solve problems "you" must control the input devices. With dual input situation the control is literally lost. It is only logical to assume that to solve any problem you must first regain control.
Stall represent the threatening factor, it is the problem. To solve problems "you" must control the input devices. With dual input situation the control is literally lost. It is only logical to assume that to solve any problem you must first regain control.
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ZFT;
I'm not close enough to that area of the industry to say anything meaningful or helpful regarding the details of how, when, what such revisions to stall data for simulators may be introduced. I just read the industry informaiton like Flight, AW&ST, FlightGlobal and so on to stay in touch.
We know one thing: such introduction is going to have to go through a very robust process of technical testing and regulatory input and oversight prior to releasing any such performance data to be installed and used as a foundation for routine training with regard to recovering a fully-stalled transport aircraft. Whether the solution includes simulators capable of producing 'g' forces is yet to be seen, but I suspect that will be part of advanced simulators. I just flew these aircraft, nothing else.
I'm not close enough to that area of the industry to say anything meaningful or helpful regarding the details of how, when, what such revisions to stall data for simulators may be introduced. I just read the industry informaiton like Flight, AW&ST, FlightGlobal and so on to stay in touch.
We know one thing: such introduction is going to have to go through a very robust process of technical testing and regulatory input and oversight prior to releasing any such performance data to be installed and used as a foundation for routine training with regard to recovering a fully-stalled transport aircraft. Whether the solution includes simulators capable of producing 'g' forces is yet to be seen, but I suspect that will be part of advanced simulators. I just flew these aircraft, nothing else.
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Simulator training must be done in parallel with real flying exercises.
Real G's must be experienced, situational awareness in a 3d scenario must be instilled. And then there is fear, fear IS the leprosy of aviation.
Fear and panic, together with lack of skills are responsible for most if not all UPRT LOC accidents aside from LOC in IMC.
Fear leads to mental blockage and motion paralysis, it can only be tackled successfully by venturing into unknown territory, not in a sim, but on proper aircraft with competent instructors.
Real G's must be experienced, situational awareness in a 3d scenario must be instilled. And then there is fear, fear IS the leprosy of aviation.
Fear and panic, together with lack of skills are responsible for most if not all UPRT LOC accidents aside from LOC in IMC.
Fear leads to mental blockage and motion paralysis, it can only be tackled successfully by venturing into unknown territory, not in a sim, but on proper aircraft with competent instructors.
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Again
Peekay4, I'll try again.
Those "other accidents" have nothing to do with interconnected yokes - well, the Airbus stall accidents have nothing to do with non-interconnected sidesticks.
The problem in all the accidents is - improper flight control inputs. Many people then say, well the "other pilot"could not see what the flying pilot was doing with his controls, that is why he could not correct the mistake.
In the "other accidens" it was proven empirically that being able to see the controls as they were moved by the faulty pilot did not help one bit in those accidents.
Also many people see the algebraic summing of forces as fatal error in the Airbus system - my Egyptair example shows that summing applies exactly the same with mechanical summing (as long as you do not overpower the breakout mechanism). After overpowering the breakout mechanism, the (possibly) opposite deflections could cancel each other out just as well as an algebraic summing.
The above effects are not the big problem in aviation accidents - apparently insufficient training or insufficient affinity with flying is.
Chronus:
The ECAM annunciated failures have nothing to do with the weather, they were recurring and the fact that event number so and so happened just after the initiation of their deviation turn is just a coincidence.
The exclamation "Oh my god" can be expected from someone who sees that his Pilot Flying is scrxxing up, as obvious from the attitude that he can see on his attitude indicator (PFD).
The exclamation (in French) "What is wrong" is not surprising from the mouth of someone who just pulled an airliner at high altitude into a 40 degrees nose high attitude. It is logical that he then not understands that with full aft stick and the nose near the horizon, the altimeter keeps winding down so rapidly.
His instruments do exactly respond in the way you should expect when you treat an airplane like that, the only problem is, he does not understand that.
Those "other accidents" have nothing to do with interconnected yokes - well, the Airbus stall accidents have nothing to do with non-interconnected sidesticks.
The problem in all the accidents is - improper flight control inputs. Many people then say, well the "other pilot"could not see what the flying pilot was doing with his controls, that is why he could not correct the mistake.
In the "other accidens" it was proven empirically that being able to see the controls as they were moved by the faulty pilot did not help one bit in those accidents.
Also many people see the algebraic summing of forces as fatal error in the Airbus system - my Egyptair example shows that summing applies exactly the same with mechanical summing (as long as you do not overpower the breakout mechanism). After overpowering the breakout mechanism, the (possibly) opposite deflections could cancel each other out just as well as an algebraic summing.
The above effects are not the big problem in aviation accidents - apparently insufficient training or insufficient affinity with flying is.
Chronus:
The ECAM annunciated failures have nothing to do with the weather, they were recurring and the fact that event number so and so happened just after the initiation of their deviation turn is just a coincidence.
The exclamation "Oh my god" can be expected from someone who sees that his Pilot Flying is scrxxing up, as obvious from the attitude that he can see on his attitude indicator (PFD).
The exclamation (in French) "What is wrong" is not surprising from the mouth of someone who just pulled an airliner at high altitude into a 40 degrees nose high attitude. It is logical that he then not understands that with full aft stick and the nose near the horizon, the altimeter keeps winding down so rapidly.
His instruments do exactly respond in the way you should expect when you treat an airplane like that, the only problem is, he does not understand that.