Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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A/P Off?
Ha! At last, a question that even I can answer! Dlen asked:
One would think so, especially after it was concluded during the AF447 investigation that pilots would greatly benefit from this. BUT! Here's the rub:
It is strongly discouraged by (most) airlines, even prohibited, because A/P can do a better, more efficient job (cheaper) of keeping the airplane stable during this very tight-enveloped phase of flight.
Our safety is being traded-off for bucks. Hope I got this right.
Is it a regular practice on normal flights in flight phases with no stress (weather, hurry, ...) to fly with autopilot off, with the intent to keep the feeling for the airplane handling and the routine checks of AOA, speed, horizon, thrust alive?
It is strongly discouraged by (most) airlines, even prohibited, because A/P can do a better, more efficient job (cheaper) of keeping the airplane stable during this very tight-enveloped phase of flight.
Our safety is being traded-off for bucks. Hope I got this right.
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To state that unconnected yokes (or side-sticks) have no direct relation with this (and with AF447) crash, is to not understand what basic flying is.
In the bus, with unconnected side-sticks, the PM is only able to see aircraft reactions (to the PF inputs), not the actions that led to those reactions, and this fact makes all the difference...
From the (AvHerald) report:
(my highlights at bold)
The NTSC analysed that there initially there had been responses to the upset on the right hand side stick only, later followed by responses on the left side stick and wrote: "The first left side stick input was at 2317:03 UTC for 2 seconds, then 15 seconds later another input for 2 seconds, and at 2317:29 continued in dual input until the end of the recording. The sidestick priority logic, when one pilot operates the sidestick, it will send the control signals to the computers. When both pilots move both sidesticks simultaneously in the same or opposite direction and neither takes priority, the system adds the signals algebraically. When this occurred, the two green Side Stick Priority lights are ON and followed by “DUAL INPUT” voice message activation. If this occurred, the PF or depending on the PIC instruction, should stop provides input on the sidestick or a pilot should stop the „dual input‟ by pressing the priority pushbutton for 40 seconds or more to latch the priority condition. The FDR did not record neither pilots pressed such button for more than 40 seconds. The CVR did not record “DUAL INPUT” voice message as it was supressed by “STALL” voice warning. The FDR recorded at 2317:15 UTC the aircraft pitch reached 24° up. The PIC commanded „pull down...pull down‟ and at 2317:17 UTC the FDR recorded second Stall Warning. Following the command „pull down...pull down‟ the FDR recorded the SIC side stick backward input increased. The aircraft pitch and AOA were increasing. The average of the side stick inputs recorded on the FDR since the A/P and A/THR disengaged until the aircraft encountered the second stall warning indicated that the SIC was pulling almost full back input while the PIC was slightly pushing nose-down. The sum of both side stick inputs commanded nose up pitch. The pitch up input resulted in the AOA reaching a maximum of 48° which was beyond the flight director envelope and the flight director would have been disappeared from the PFD. The pilot would no longer have guidance from the flight director. The pilot training for stall was intended to introduce the indications of approach to stall condition and recover it. While the aircraft system designed to prevent the stall by providing early warning. The pilot training and the aircraft system were intended to avoid stall. The condition of AOA 40° as recorded on the FDR was beyond any airline pilot training competency as they never been trained or experienced. The degraded SIC performance and ambiguous command of the PIC may have decreased the SIC‟s situational awareness. Consequently, the SIC did not react appropriately in this complex emergency situation. This resulted in an aircraft upset from which recovery was beyond the procedures and philosophy of training that was provided to flight crew and the increasing difficulty of aircraft handling as the result of the rudder deflection which provided roll tendency."
In the Amsterdam and S. Francisco cases, no one noticed the developing upset situation. We can not compare, what is not comparable...
In the bus, with unconnected side-sticks, the PM is only able to see aircraft reactions (to the PF inputs), not the actions that led to those reactions, and this fact makes all the difference...
From the (AvHerald) report:
(my highlights at bold)
The NTSC analysed that there initially there had been responses to the upset on the right hand side stick only, later followed by responses on the left side stick and wrote: "The first left side stick input was at 2317:03 UTC for 2 seconds, then 15 seconds later another input for 2 seconds, and at 2317:29 continued in dual input until the end of the recording. The sidestick priority logic, when one pilot operates the sidestick, it will send the control signals to the computers. When both pilots move both sidesticks simultaneously in the same or opposite direction and neither takes priority, the system adds the signals algebraically. When this occurred, the two green Side Stick Priority lights are ON and followed by “DUAL INPUT” voice message activation. If this occurred, the PF or depending on the PIC instruction, should stop provides input on the sidestick or a pilot should stop the „dual input‟ by pressing the priority pushbutton for 40 seconds or more to latch the priority condition. The FDR did not record neither pilots pressed such button for more than 40 seconds. The CVR did not record “DUAL INPUT” voice message as it was supressed by “STALL” voice warning. The FDR recorded at 2317:15 UTC the aircraft pitch reached 24° up. The PIC commanded „pull down...pull down‟ and at 2317:17 UTC the FDR recorded second Stall Warning. Following the command „pull down...pull down‟ the FDR recorded the SIC side stick backward input increased. The aircraft pitch and AOA were increasing. The average of the side stick inputs recorded on the FDR since the A/P and A/THR disengaged until the aircraft encountered the second stall warning indicated that the SIC was pulling almost full back input while the PIC was slightly pushing nose-down. The sum of both side stick inputs commanded nose up pitch. The pitch up input resulted in the AOA reaching a maximum of 48° which was beyond the flight director envelope and the flight director would have been disappeared from the PFD. The pilot would no longer have guidance from the flight director. The pilot training for stall was intended to introduce the indications of approach to stall condition and recover it. While the aircraft system designed to prevent the stall by providing early warning. The pilot training and the aircraft system were intended to avoid stall. The condition of AOA 40° as recorded on the FDR was beyond any airline pilot training competency as they never been trained or experienced. The degraded SIC performance and ambiguous command of the PIC may have decreased the SIC‟s situational awareness. Consequently, the SIC did not react appropriately in this complex emergency situation. This resulted in an aircraft upset from which recovery was beyond the procedures and philosophy of training that was provided to flight crew and the increasing difficulty of aircraft handling as the result of the rudder deflection which provided roll tendency."
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@dlen
One reason hand-flying is discouraged today in cruise is due to the congested airspace, with reduced vertical separation available between aircraft at the flight levels (called RVSM airspace).
Procedures in RVSM airspace generally require the autopilot to be engaged except in some circumstances (turbulence, etc.)
Is it a regular practice on normal flights in flight phases with no stress (weather, hurry, ...) to fly with autopilot off, with the intent to keep the feeling for the airplane handling and the routine checks of AOA, speed, horizon, thrust alive?
Procedures in RVSM airspace generally require the autopilot to be engaged except in some circumstances (turbulence, etc.)
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Well if the conversations were largely unintelligible, then I can see why the would leave them out of the CVR transcript. This is different from "censorship".
From page 186, of the official accident report, section 6.13 Accredited Representatives Comments, BEA's comment reference 45:
The CVR transcript is very reduced.
More items identified in the CVR could be added for better understanding of the event. A complete CVR transcript could be put in appendix. If not change the introduction which says: “the transcript is as follows:” into “hearafter is an extract from the CVR.”
More items identified in the CVR could be added for better understanding of the event. A complete CVR transcript could be put in appendix. If not change the introduction which says: “the transcript is as follows:” into “hearafter is an extract from the CVR.”
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Yes but again those additions are not necessarily factual but require subjective interpretation. E.g.,:
BEA Item 12: At 2315:36 UTC ... 3 seconds later, a sound similar to a seat motion is heard.
BEA Item 46: 2319:58 UTC: the PIC said something similar to '"captain three"
These types of interpretations make lively discussions but change nothing in the NTSC conclusions... i.e., recurring maintenance issues not fixed; CBs being pulled in flight contrary to procedures; subsequent mishandling of the aircraft and departure from controlled flight; poor CRM and dual input; inability of the crew to recognize and recover from upset / unusual flight conditions, etc., etc.
BEA Item 12: At 2315:36 UTC ... 3 seconds later, a sound similar to a seat motion is heard.
BEA Item 46: 2319:58 UTC: the PIC said something similar to '"captain three"
These types of interpretations make lively discussions but change nothing in the NTSC conclusions... i.e., recurring maintenance issues not fixed; CBs being pulled in flight contrary to procedures; subsequent mishandling of the aircraft and departure from controlled flight; poor CRM and dual input; inability of the crew to recognize and recover from upset / unusual flight conditions, etc., etc.
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Awful attempt to "not report" the prelude to the upset. As a comparison (the very first one I googled) I just read the following transcript provided in the UPS 1354 accident report (UPS 1354 CVR Transcript) which includes "unintelligible" sounds as well as "sounds like" comments from start to finish of the entire flight.
Peekay, you are on a joy ride with your proclamations that CVR detail may have been omitted because it was not "certain" what may have been stated. In cases such as these much of the information gleaned may not be of a nature that is "black or white" but all data collected will, when combined, form a picture that may paint the reality of the situation, and that may be something that we can all learn from. It is not for the investigators to determine what conclusions must not be relied on, their job is to produce a report that includes all of the evidence and not suppose what weight should be attached to each individual part of it. If "a sound similar to a seat moving" forms part of that evidence I see no reason for that to be excluded. Similarly if there was conversation immediately following XX ECAM alert that was not intelligible, the intelligible parts of the WHOLE transcript should be included with the unintelligible parts- EXACTLY as was the case in the UPS 1354 report.
This report doesn't even give us a clue as to what was going on in the cockpit. It widely circumnavigates the possibility that one of the crew might have left their seat to re-set a CB, and radicates the entire transcript that might otherwise have given the reader how the crew were interacting on a personal or CRM level. This report is one that appears to have been edited to miss out the elephant that might have been in the cockpit before the sh1t hit the fan.
That stated, I agree that they may well be another elephant in the cockpit that the manufacturer does not want to discuss - and one in the shape of an AoA indicator that the authorities might not want to be reminded of.
Peekay, you are on a joy ride with your proclamations that CVR detail may have been omitted because it was not "certain" what may have been stated. In cases such as these much of the information gleaned may not be of a nature that is "black or white" but all data collected will, when combined, form a picture that may paint the reality of the situation, and that may be something that we can all learn from. It is not for the investigators to determine what conclusions must not be relied on, their job is to produce a report that includes all of the evidence and not suppose what weight should be attached to each individual part of it. If "a sound similar to a seat moving" forms part of that evidence I see no reason for that to be excluded. Similarly if there was conversation immediately following XX ECAM alert that was not intelligible, the intelligible parts of the WHOLE transcript should be included with the unintelligible parts- EXACTLY as was the case in the UPS 1354 report.
This report doesn't even give us a clue as to what was going on in the cockpit. It widely circumnavigates the possibility that one of the crew might have left their seat to re-set a CB, and radicates the entire transcript that might otherwise have given the reader how the crew were interacting on a personal or CRM level. This report is one that appears to have been edited to miss out the elephant that might have been in the cockpit before the sh1t hit the fan.
That stated, I agree that they may well be another elephant in the cockpit that the manufacturer does not want to discuss - and one in the shape of an AoA indicator that the authorities might not want to be reminded of.
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@peekay4
I understand the points you make. But would like to stretch the limits a bit.
You want the report to be as factual as it can get. We do not know from the report if an (in my view necessary) extra CVR effort was made here or asked for by the NTSC. Like we have seen in for example Silk Air.
There are multiple techniques to find out if something is speech, even if unintelligible. We can now get an impression that there was no communication at some points. Which makes the report more subjective than required.
The lack of a complete CVR transcript ... Including normal notes on [unintelligible] and such ... also takes away context ..if that is what we are left with.
On other issues the NTSC does speculate. They properly indicate that they do, or give parallel probable options. No reason why they could not do the same on CVR items.
"Mishandling" was a word suggested for insertion by BEA by the way, but rejected by the NTSC. I agree with the removal of the word. The facts speak for themselves. The word is unnecessary and is too close to "apportioning blame".
Interesting that BEA did had the same comment in another report... Where it was rejected too.
Over the years the amount of CVR information appears to be steadily falling. From tapes to transcripts to scraps. This type of accident requires more transcript and voice stress analysis (to help maintain privacy).
I understand the points you make. But would like to stretch the limits a bit.
Yes but again those additions are not necessarily factual but require subjective interpretation. E.g.,:
BEA Item 12: At 2315:36 UTC ... 3 seconds later, a sound similar to a seat motion is heard.
BEA Item 12: At 2315:36 UTC ... 3 seconds later, a sound similar to a seat motion is heard.
There are multiple techniques to find out if something is speech, even if unintelligible. We can now get an impression that there was no communication at some points. Which makes the report more subjective than required.
The lack of a complete CVR transcript ... Including normal notes on [unintelligible] and such ... also takes away context ..if that is what we are left with.
On other issues the NTSC does speculate. They properly indicate that they do, or give parallel probable options. No reason why they could not do the same on CVR items.
NTSC conclusions... subsequent mishandling of the aircraft ...
Interesting that BEA did had the same comment in another report... Where it was rejected too.
Over the years the amount of CVR information appears to be steadily falling. From tapes to transcripts to scraps. This type of accident requires more transcript and voice stress analysis (to help maintain privacy).
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In the Amsterdam and S. Francisco cases, no one noticed the developing upset situation. We can not compare, what is not comparable...
In the bus, with unconnected side-sticks, the PM is only able to see aircraft reactions (to the PF inputs), not the actions that led to those reactions, and this fact makes all the difference...
Is it a regular practice on normal flights in flight phases with no stress (weather, hurry, ...) to fly with autopilot off, with the intent to keep the feeling for the airplane handling and the routine checks of AOA, speed, horizon, thrust alive?
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Worth reading again for those who don't get it. Unconnected sidesticks, startle reaction, not hearing warnings because they are supressed, not knowing what the fcuk the other pilot is doing, and thinking (wrongly, in the heat of the moment) that full aft stick is OK in a Bus...........
To state that unconnected yokes (or side-sticks) have no direct relation with this (and with AF447) crash, is to not understand what basic flying is.
In the bus, with unconnected side-sticks, the PM is only able to see aircraft reactions (to the PF inputs), not the actions that led to those reactions, and this fact makes all the difference...
From the (AvHerald) report:
(my highlights at bold) Quote:
The NTSC analysed that there initially there had been responses to the upset on the right hand side stick only, later followed by responses on the left side stick and wrote: "The first left side stick input was at 2317:03 UTC for 2 seconds, then 15 seconds later another input for 2 seconds, and at 2317:29 continued in dual input until the end of the recording. The sidestick priority logic, when one pilot operates the sidestick, it will send the control signals to the computers. When both pilots move both sidesticks simultaneously in the same or opposite direction and neither takes priority, the system adds the signals algebraically. When this occurred, the two green Side Stick Priority lights are ON and followed by “DUAL INPUT” voice message activation. If this occurred, the PF or depending on the PIC instruction, should stop provides input on the sidestick or a pilot should stop the „dual input‟ by pressing the priority pushbutton for 40 seconds or more to latch the priority condition. The FDR did not record neither pilots pressed such button for more than 40 seconds. The CVR did not record “DUAL INPUT” voice message as it was supressed by “STALL” voice warning. The FDR recorded at 2317:15 UTC the aircraft pitch reached 24° up. The PIC commanded „pull down...pull down‟ and at 2317:17 UTC the FDR recorded second Stall Warning. Following the command „pull down...pull down‟ the FDR recorded the SIC side stick backward input increased. The aircraft pitch and AOA were increasing. The average of the side stick inputs recorded on the FDR since the A/P and A/THR disengaged until the aircraft encountered the second stall warning indicated that the SIC was pulling almost full back input while the PIC was slightly pushing nose-down. The sum of both side stick inputs commanded nose up pitch. The pitch up input resulted in the AOA reaching a maximum of 48° which was beyond the flight director envelope and the flight director would have been disappeared from the PFD. The pilot would no longer have guidance from the flight director. The pilot training for stall was intended to introduce the indications of approach to stall condition and recover it. While the aircraft system designed to prevent the stall by providing early warning. The pilot training and the aircraft system were intended to avoid stall. The condition of AOA 40° as recorded on the FDR was beyond any airline pilot training competency as they never been trained or experienced. The degraded SIC performance and ambiguous command of the PIC may have decreased the SIC‟s situational awareness. Consequently, the SIC did not react appropriately in this complex emergency situation. This resulted in an aircraft upset from which recovery was beyond the procedures and philosophy of training that was provided to flight crew and the increasing difficulty of aircraft handling as the result of the rudder deflection which provided roll tendency."
In the Amsterdam and S. Francisco cases, no one noticed the developing upset situation. We can not compare, what is not comparable...
To state that unconnected yokes (or side-sticks) have no direct relation with this (and with AF447) crash, is to not understand what basic flying is.
In the bus, with unconnected side-sticks, the PM is only able to see aircraft reactions (to the PF inputs), not the actions that led to those reactions, and this fact makes all the difference...
From the (AvHerald) report:
(my highlights at bold) Quote:
The NTSC analysed that there initially there had been responses to the upset on the right hand side stick only, later followed by responses on the left side stick and wrote: "The first left side stick input was at 2317:03 UTC for 2 seconds, then 15 seconds later another input for 2 seconds, and at 2317:29 continued in dual input until the end of the recording. The sidestick priority logic, when one pilot operates the sidestick, it will send the control signals to the computers. When both pilots move both sidesticks simultaneously in the same or opposite direction and neither takes priority, the system adds the signals algebraically. When this occurred, the two green Side Stick Priority lights are ON and followed by “DUAL INPUT” voice message activation. If this occurred, the PF or depending on the PIC instruction, should stop provides input on the sidestick or a pilot should stop the „dual input‟ by pressing the priority pushbutton for 40 seconds or more to latch the priority condition. The FDR did not record neither pilots pressed such button for more than 40 seconds. The CVR did not record “DUAL INPUT” voice message as it was supressed by “STALL” voice warning. The FDR recorded at 2317:15 UTC the aircraft pitch reached 24° up. The PIC commanded „pull down...pull down‟ and at 2317:17 UTC the FDR recorded second Stall Warning. Following the command „pull down...pull down‟ the FDR recorded the SIC side stick backward input increased. The aircraft pitch and AOA were increasing. The average of the side stick inputs recorded on the FDR since the A/P and A/THR disengaged until the aircraft encountered the second stall warning indicated that the SIC was pulling almost full back input while the PIC was slightly pushing nose-down. The sum of both side stick inputs commanded nose up pitch. The pitch up input resulted in the AOA reaching a maximum of 48° which was beyond the flight director envelope and the flight director would have been disappeared from the PFD. The pilot would no longer have guidance from the flight director. The pilot training for stall was intended to introduce the indications of approach to stall condition and recover it. While the aircraft system designed to prevent the stall by providing early warning. The pilot training and the aircraft system were intended to avoid stall. The condition of AOA 40° as recorded on the FDR was beyond any airline pilot training competency as they never been trained or experienced. The degraded SIC performance and ambiguous command of the PIC may have decreased the SIC‟s situational awareness. Consequently, the SIC did not react appropriately in this complex emergency situation. This resulted in an aircraft upset from which recovery was beyond the procedures and philosophy of training that was provided to flight crew and the increasing difficulty of aircraft handling as the result of the rudder deflection which provided roll tendency."
In the Amsterdam and S. Francisco cases, no one noticed the developing upset situation. We can not compare, what is not comparable...
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Unintelligible
"During this period communication between the SIC and PIC recorded on the CVR was unintelligible." [Report]
All of the communication recorded on the CVR during this period was unintelligible, and none of it intelligible? Or . . . SOME of the communication recorded on the CVR during this period was unintelligible? Perhaps I have a too-suspicious mindset, but upon reading the quoted sentence - and assuming that the time period being referenced was a quite important one - I could not help but wonder why the report language was ambiguous.
I especially do not want this post to be construed as commenting upon the side-sticks, or overall flight control architecture, of "the bus."
And I especially do think that the comparison to the UPS 1354 CVR transcript (@ deefer dog) is extremely pertinent - in terms of the transcript's inclusiveness, and the highly relevant and significant imperative for inclusion of all facts in an air accident investigation report.
All of the communication recorded on the CVR during this period was unintelligible, and none of it intelligible? Or . . . SOME of the communication recorded on the CVR during this period was unintelligible? Perhaps I have a too-suspicious mindset, but upon reading the quoted sentence - and assuming that the time period being referenced was a quite important one - I could not help but wonder why the report language was ambiguous.
I especially do not want this post to be construed as commenting upon the side-sticks, or overall flight control architecture, of "the bus."
And I especially do think that the comparison to the UPS 1354 CVR transcript (@ deefer dog) is extremely pertinent - in terms of the transcript's inclusiveness, and the highly relevant and significant imperative for inclusion of all facts in an air accident investigation report.
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Sorry for ranting, but it beggars belief that anyone fit to sit in ANY seat of ANY airplane would consider that 24 degrees pitch up is anything but ABNORMAL unless one was deliberately intending to carry out aerobatics.
I did my 1500 hours of rudder and stick flying before I got to even look at a jet or anything with more than 1 engine, but nowadays costs are factoring in pilots with sweet FA in the way of handling experience, and are training them to progamme and point an automatic pilot for 99 pec cent of every leg, and hand fly 1 per cent of it......and none of the hand flying when it might be tricky, or at at altitude.
Get the muppets out of the cockpit, and let's all get back to having experienced pilots who know how to HANDLE an airplane who can then be taught how to HANDLE the automatics.
Right now we have the cart in front of the horse.
I did my 1500 hours of rudder and stick flying before I got to even look at a jet or anything with more than 1 engine, but nowadays costs are factoring in pilots with sweet FA in the way of handling experience, and are training them to progamme and point an automatic pilot for 99 pec cent of every leg, and hand fly 1 per cent of it......and none of the hand flying when it might be tricky, or at at altitude.
Get the muppets out of the cockpit, and let's all get back to having experienced pilots who know how to HANDLE an airplane who can then be taught how to HANDLE the automatics.
Right now we have the cart in front of the horse.
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@A0283
Actually we do know that BEA performed spectral analysis of the CVR. For example, the utterance "Oh my God" (in English) on the CVR was initially attributed to the FO. However, BEA spectral analysis showed that it was the Captain who uttered this phrase. BEA Item 52, p. 187.
That word was rejected in the Synopsis 3rd bullet point but was already used by NTSC in the 5th bullet point. See the original NTSC wording in BEA Item 10 (Accepted): "Subsequent mishandling resulted in the aircraft departing the flight envelope..."
In the Final Report the 5th bullet point was again rephrased to "Subsequent flight crew action leading to inability to control the aircraft in the Alternate Law resulted in the aircraft departing from the normal flight envelope..."
(The rephrasing was mainly to avoid discussion of "deep stalls" which as we've seen is another can of worms).
We do not know from the report if an (in my view necessary) extra CVR effort was made here or asked for by the NTSC. Like we have seen in for example Silk Air.
"Mishandling" was a word suggested for insertion by BEA by the way, but rejected by the NTSC.
In the Final Report the 5th bullet point was again rephrased to "Subsequent flight crew action leading to inability to control the aircraft in the Alternate Law resulted in the aircraft departing from the normal flight envelope..."
(The rephrasing was mainly to avoid discussion of "deep stalls" which as we've seen is another can of worms).
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@deefer dog
The reality of the situation is already very clear to anyone reading the entire report.
Anyone here think the CBs were not pulled?
Anyone here think it wasn't the Captain who pulled the CBs?
Anyone here think it's possible for the Captain to pull both CBs without leaving his seat?
Anyone who says the situation isn't clear because the CVR transcript omitted subjective determinations e.g. that a sound "similar to seat motion" (but might not actually be seat motion) is being dishonest. The report in its entirety paints a clear picture of what happened aboard QZ8501.
In cases such as these much of the information gleaned may not be of a nature that is "black or white" but all data collected will, when combined, form a picture that may paint the reality of the situation
Anyone here think the CBs were not pulled?
Anyone here think it wasn't the Captain who pulled the CBs?
Anyone here think it's possible for the Captain to pull both CBs without leaving his seat?
Anyone who says the situation isn't clear because the CVR transcript omitted subjective determinations e.g. that a sound "similar to seat motion" (but might not actually be seat motion) is being dishonest. The report in its entirety paints a clear picture of what happened aboard QZ8501.
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Anyone here think it wasn't the Captain who pulled the CBs?
I know this topic is not funny, but peekay4 makes a good point: there is little doubt what happened here.
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Are the rudder peddles on Airbus's interconnected between the two pilots in a conventional manner?
Does a pilot get sensory feed back through the peddles as aircraft speed changes? I assume there is a rudder load limiter of some sort.
Does a pilot get sensory feed back through the peddles as aircraft speed changes? I assume there is a rudder load limiter of some sort.
Only half a speed-brake
a) yes, convetionally interconnected incl. the brakes
b) do not know, I do not touch them above 150 kts
c) unless you have RTLU 1+2 fault, ironically.
FD.
b) do not know, I do not touch them above 150 kts
c) unless you have RTLU 1+2 fault, ironically.
FD.