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Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

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Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

Old 1st Dec 2015, 09:57
  #3421 (permalink)  
 
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Hierarchy?

It's strange. So many times posters on pprune have pointed out accidents caused by the strictly hierarchical structure of Asian society.

Yet here we have an accident which could have been prevented by the captain telling the FO "I have control", instead of fighting between the two sidesticks.

Why?

Last edited by marchino61; 1st Dec 2015 at 10:17. Reason: Corrected typo: sp -> so
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 10:06
  #3422 (permalink)  
 
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Dual Input

instead of fighting between the two sidesticks.
Of note in the report,

When both pilots move both sidesticks simultaneously in the same or opposite direction and neither takes priority, the system adds the signals algebraically.
When this occurred, the two green Side Stick Priority lights are ON and followed by “DUAL INPUT” voice message activation.
However, the CVR did not record “DUAL INPUT” voice message as it was suppressed by “STALL” voice warning.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 10:09
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But when you consider the ground troubleshooting episode three days earlier that is described on pg. 21, it is understandable why the captain, in his growing frustration, decided to try it.
I have to strongly disagree. He made what was an annoyance into a fatal accident by becoming a test pilot. It would be in the inflight reset list if it was a sensible procedure.

From the QRH
inflight,as a general rule, the crew must restrict computer resets to those listed in the table,or to those in applicable TDUs or OEBs. Before taking any action on other computers, the flight crew must consider and fully understand the consequences.
In this case if it was really annoying emergency cancel the caution then ground the aircraft after landing.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 10:14
  #3424 (permalink)  
 
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Has anyone explored whether the FO in this accident and the FO of AF447 may have trained on the same programme given their nationalities? Unlikely but a slim possibility.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 10:16
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However, the CVR did not record “DUAL INPUT” voice message as it was suppressed by “STALL” voice warning.
Surely that should not be necessary? All the captain has to do is declare he has control of the aircraft. It's fairly obvious that he knew what to do and the FO didn't.

Could there be some unusual dynamic here, e.g. the Indonesian captain somehow feels inferior to the European FO? Surely not.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 10:22
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because...

why did two pilots, qualified to the levels the industry requires, fail to do what they were required to do?
Because of the level of the industry.

Upset recovery training is new to the industry, post-AF447. As is the strong enphasis of the "I have control" magical words (think: proper task sharing and cross-cockpit communication), that may have saved that day.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 10:56
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That's the point.

Is this the time where we have to have a long hard look at where pilots come from and what is "adequate" in terms of ability, training and experience? Or is it a function of the fact that aircraft now are so reliable, that exposure to things going wrong for real is so small that pilots are not able to cope?

In the past, aircraft were less reliable, so we all had exposure (horribly regular) to things going wrong. Now it is common to achieve command without a diversion or a circling approach. Let alone the a/p dumping you into a state with lots of untrimmed yaw.

My thoughts are that this has to be addressed in the sim. More sim time, and most importantly, less of the prescribed statutory "events" and more random stuff with a focus on initial actions. Once the startle is overcome and the initial quick diagnosis and initial actions done correctly, there is a much greater chance of a successful outcome.

Sim, sim, sim. Sadly though, the mantra is cost, cost, cost.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 11:08
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History repeating itself again....

I agree 100% with One Hundred Percent. The Coroner at the Air France 447 Inquest in 2013 highlighted a tendency for over-reliance on automation coupled with insufficient training. Deja vu.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 11:50
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I would bet my last £1 that if put in a briefing classroom and asked the following questions, both pilots would give these answers:

Q. How do you recover from a stall?
A. Reduce the AoA by lowering the nose.

Q. How do you take control?
A. By pushing and holding the takeover pb, and saying "I have control".

Yet the startle, or fear, has resulted in an initial mess. 9 seconds is a long time to intervene when the aircraft banked 53° left. What was the thought process? Was it assumed that this was the a/p? When the a/p dropped out, did the FO read the FMAs? Did he do a micro-diagnosis? Did he see/say "Alternate Law"? Did he see the beta target?

Once in a mess, the fear has escalated (ref the captain's verbal comment) and recovery is 100 times harder.

It's not "recovery from unusual attitudes" that needs training, it's "recovery from an instant and unusual condition" that needs attention. How to approach this, the mental discipline required (as well as the operational discipline).

Curiously, our last sim cycle (A320) included "startle" and unusual attitude recovery. More to be done, industry-wide, I think.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 11:52
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I believe Swiss and 100% are correct. Our modern world which includes cheap flights for all comes at a price - we will kill a few hundred every now and again. No part of the "system" we fly under can be absolved - including ATC with their pathetic noise maximisation procedures and prohibition of visual approaches. Everything we do is driven by cost - cheaper is perceived as being better. Our training is cut to the minimum prescribed, clowns in flight ops. departments prohibit things like manual flight and manual thrust and we spend our entire lives saving pennies. The same rot has moved into our technical departments. The clever little MBA whizz-kids have worked out how few spares we needs to carry and how little time we need to fix things so that engineers are nown under pressure to release aircraft they would prefer not to. And all of this is overseen by imbeciles like EASA (stress on the middle syllable).

We will have a kill a few more thousand and get the public really scared of flying cheaply before things will change.

PM
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 11:57
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That the FAA would certify a commercial aircraft designed with duel flight controls which have no tactile feedback between the two pilots is unconscionable!
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 12:12
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Boeing driver here...

Does it really, I mean really.....take 40 bloody seconds to override the other sidestick?
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 12:30
  #3433 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Piltdown Man
Everything we do is driven by cost - cheaper is perceived as being better. Our training is cut to the minimum prescribed, clowns in flight ops. departments prohibit things like manual flight and manual thrust and we spend our entire lives saving pennies. The same rot has moved into our technical departments. The clever little MBA whizz-kids have worked out how few spares we needs to carry and how little time we need to fix things so that engineers are nown under pressure to release aircraft they would prefer not to. And all of this is overseen by imbeciles like EASA (stress on the middle syllable).
From earlier:
The plane's flight control computer had a cracked solder joint that
malfunctioned repeatedly, including four times during the flight, and 23 times the previous year.
Just a question from maintenance/engineering side: what is the trouble shooting tree needed to isolate this fault when doing maintenance, and how long does that diagnostic take? The old "can't replicate it on deck" reply from maintenance is very frustrating for pilots, and for some maintenance folks.

While the switchology, upset training, and CRM issues and responses are germane, to a certain extent it looks like this crew were set up by a corporate culture issue that may not be confined to this airline.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 12:36
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fox niner, here is the extract from the FCOM

A pilot can deactivate the other stick and take full control by pressing and keeping pressed his priority takeover pushbutton.
For latching the priority condition, it is recommended to press the takeover push button for more than 40 s.
This allows the pilot to release his takeover push button without losing priority.
However, a pilot can at any time reactivate a deactivated stick by momentarily pressing the takeover push button on either stick.
If both pilots press their takeover pushbuttons, the pilot that presses last gets priority.

Hope that helps.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 12:50
  #3435 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by fox niner
Boeing driver here...

Does it really, I mean really.....take 40 bloody seconds to override the other sidestick?
No it doesn't, obviously. You push and hold the red button on the sidestick, and this immediately removes the inputs from the other sidestick. Each pilot gets a bright and clear light right in the face, and the voice says "PRIORITY LEFT" (or right). After 40 seconds of holding the button, the other sidestick is locked out and you can release the button - this is designed to deal with a sidestick fault.

Normal takeover: "I have control", PF releases stick, PNF starts using stick and becomes PF. PNF says "you have control".
Both pilots using the stick: "DUAL INPUT" aural warning, lights in face.
Rapid, emergency takeover: PNF pushes and holds pb which immediately disconnects the PF. Aural "PRIORITY LEFT", light in the face. "I have control". If you do this, you have to get confirmation that the former PF has stopped flying. I have been in this situation in a baulked landing, and I had to keep the button pressed for a few seconds until I could assertively instruct the wide eyed FO to get his hand off the stick and say the magic words.

In this accident, both pilots were PF and the aircraft was summing the inputs. Clearly both were overwhelmed by the initial event, and fear/shock had set in. Both will be fully versed and familiar with all of those sidestick modes, disciplines and warnings.

EDIT: quick search on youtube found this:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SKNJ-ABAPuY

Originally Posted by wanabee777
duel flight controls which have no tactile feedback
Maybe you could start a new A vs B thread and you could vent your opinions there.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 12:54
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Where did I mention anything about Airbus vs Boeing?
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 12:58
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.

Have people looked at the section of the report dealing with the Cockpit Voice Recorder ?

See Report ;

NTSC


Pages 54 to 60.

If someone can make sense of that, good luck.

.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 13:28
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Those look like stills from an animation not published.

Note the BEA complaint on page 186 "The CVR transcript is very reduced" - and the fact that this complaint was rejected. Shame.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 13:30
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Anyone that has high-speed broadband can very likely download the report quite a bit faster from my website:

Index of /knkt
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 13:33
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Lead free solder

I am surprised the official report does not tell us what sort of solder it was that cracked. It is well known that lead free solder is brittle and more easily cracks under fatigue loading than the old leaded solder. I have personally repaired many electronic items with cracked lead free solder (although not avionics as it’s not my field).

In space applications lead free solder is banned, although I think that is more to do with tin whisker growth in a vacuum than cracking.

The banning of lead in solder may have saved the odd life from lead poisoning but the loss of life in this accident more than outweighs it and a relaxation of the requirement for safety critical applications like avionics would I am sure hardly affect the rate of lead poisoning, as the volume of avionic products turned out is far less than say consumer electronics. Or do avionics already have such a relaxation?
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