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Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

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Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore

Old 15th Nov 2015, 16:02
  #3381 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Machinbird View Post
. . . The longer these things take to publish, the more I worry about special interests having a sway in the report.

. . . .
Machinbird, agree with you but, (and I know you know this, but for the sake of the discussion), there's a difference between the expertise required of all parties, and their particular "interests" in a "favourable-to-them" outcome.

Also, I think the requirement that everyone must agree prior to the release of the report, (which may have contributed to the new release date), is not prime requisite for a good report. In reality, there is never full concurrence in such matters, and dissent is important for understanding.

Dissent always exists of course but how it is handled differs between cultures. I think in such work dissent should be assessed for what it offers, (assuming it comes from equal levels of expertise and not mere politics or 'face').

I agree with you also that the human factors will be of interest, particularly, as you say, how the crew was interacting. IIRC, I believe it was the F/O who was flying?
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Old 19th Nov 2015, 14:50
  #3382 (permalink)  
 
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NTSC now says the Final Report will not be released until December 1, 2pm Jakarta time.
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Old 19th Nov 2015, 16:05
  #3383 (permalink)  
 
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PACTA SUNT SERVANDA]...:-(
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Old 26th Nov 2015, 06:22
  #3384 (permalink)  
 
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Is EASA AD 2014-0217R1 Relevant ??

“EASA Airworthiness Directive 2014-0217R1, dated February 26, 2015 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or ''the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition.The MCAI states: During design reviews that were conducted following safety recommendations related to in-service incidents and one accident on another aircraft type, it has been determined that, in specific flight conditions, the allowable load limits on the vertical tail plane could be reached and possibly exceeded.This condition, if not corrected, could lead, in the worst case, to detachment of the vertical tail plane in flight and consequent loss of the aeroplane.To prevent such a possibility, Airbus has developed modifications within the flight augmentation computer (FAC) to reduce the vertical tail plane stress and to activate a conditional aural warning within the flight warning computer (FWC) to further protect against pilot induced rudder doublets.”
“Consequently, EASA issued AD 2014-0217to require installation and activation of the stop rudder input warning (SRIW) logic. In addition, that [EASA] AD required, prior to or concurrent with modification of an aeroplane with the activation of the SRIW, upgrades of the FAC and FWC, to introduce the SRIW logic and SRIW aural capability, respectively. After modification, the [EASA] AD prohibited installation of certain Part Number (P/N) FWC and FAC.”
“Since that [EASA] AD was issued, an additional previously-published Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) was identified, and a new SB was published, for the concurrent requirement to replace the FAC with a unit having a P/N as listed in Table 3 of Appendix 1 of the AD.”
Source; Referenced in FAA AD 2015-23-13.All A-318, 319, 320, and A321 series airplanes.Allowable load limits on the vertical tail plane could be reached and possibly exceeded. Exceeding allowable load could result in detachment of the vertical tail plane.
SUMMARY:“This AD was prompted by a determination that, in specific flight conditions, the allowable load limits on the vertical tail plane could be reached and possibly exceeded. Exceeding allowable load could result in detachment of the vertical tail plane. This AD requires modification of the pin programming flight warning computer (FWC) to activate the stop rudder input warning (SRIW) logic; and an inspection to determine the part numbers of the FWC and the flight augmentation computer (FAC), and replacement of the FWC and FAC if necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent detachment of the vertical tail plane and consequent loss of control of the airplane.Effective December 29, 2015.”Compliance within 48 months.
“We estimate that this AD affects 953 airplanes of U.S. registry.We also estimate that it will take about 3 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD on U.S. operators to be $243,015, or $255 per product.”
FAA ADLink >http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/41103a24e0131b2286257f0700529ecf/$FILE/2015-23-13.pdf
ALSO REFERENCED IN THIS FAA AD.
NTSB SAFETY RECCOMMENDATIONS A-04-56 through -62.Letterto FAA Administrator Marion C. Blakey, dated November 10, 2004 addressed the loss of American Airlines Flight 587 on Nov 12, 2001.NTSB Letter Link> http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A04_56_62.pdf
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Old 26th Nov 2015, 13:11
  #3385 (permalink)  
 
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Thank you Data guy : very important posts in both threads ! (Singapore ans Sinaï)
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Old 26th Nov 2015, 14:39
  #3386 (permalink)  
 
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It is possibly relevant, but as a background, AD 2014-0217 was originally issued in mid-2014 (before the AirAsia accident) in response to the AA587 A300-600 accident in Queens -- referred to in the AD as "one accident on another aircraft type" -- and a second incident on an A319. The AD added logic to reduce tail plane stress and to activate a Stop Rudder Input Warning (SRIW) function.

The AD quoted above (2014-0217R1) was a revision to update the minimum FAC part numbers required to support SRIW. This revision was requested by Airbus because the original AD had left out a couple Service Bulletins. (The updated SBs were also issued before the AirAsia accident).

Now according to rumors... on the accident aircraft both FACs were shut-off simultaneously, possibly via circuit breakers. If true, then the above AD is a moot point really. The FACs can't provide protections if they are turned off.

So although the AirAsia accident might have involved rudder limits, the above AD was not released in response to this accident, and the promulgated changes even if implemented wouldn't have had any bearing on the accident's outcome.
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Old 26th Nov 2015, 16:39
  #3387 (permalink)  
 
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and to activate a conditional aural warning within the flight warning computer (FWC) to further protect against pilot induced rudder doublets.”
Great.
Another sound that the pilot has to respond to immediately, probably under conditions of great stress.
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Old 26th Nov 2015, 17:17
  #3388 (permalink)  
 
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It's "only" a warning... the FAC should automatically limit rudder loads regardless of pilot response.
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Old 27th Nov 2015, 12:45
  #3389 (permalink)  
 
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From the BBC, 27 November 2015:

AirAsia shares slide on poor earnings results - BBC News

Next week, Indonesia's national transport safety board is expected to announce the findings of AirAsia's deadly crash that occurred in December 2014 ...
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Old 28th Nov 2015, 06:55
  #3390 (permalink)  
 
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Some FAC Rudder Faults

Just *Some FAC computer failure SDRs.


(*Data is limited because SDR non-reporting is still running at over 60 % for this year).

12 A-300 Series SDRs /Problem Descriptions / (Cause) FAC Computer / Part Number (P/N).

Briefs Only.See SDR Full Texts at FAA Query, Link > http://av-info.faa.gov/sdrx/Query.aspxJust enter SDR Number, and Hit Query.

3/20/14.SDR # and Link > USAA2014032100017 “Tail kicked, bumped multible times”. P/N B397BAM0513.
6/30/13.SDR # and Link > USAA2013070100015 “Banked, Felt in Rudder Pedals”. P/N B397BAM0513.
6/3/13. SDR # and Link > USAA2013060400023 “Uncommandedmomentary input”. P/N B397BAM0513.
12/7/12. SDR # and Link > USAA2012121000012 “Yawed – 5 seconds”.P/N B397BAM0513.
8/10/12. SDR # and Link > USAA2012081300019 “Fast uncommanded movement”. P/N B397BAM0513.
7/25/12. SDR # and Link > UALA2012072704071 “Uncommanded movement”. P/N B397BAM0513.
4/19/10. SDR # and Link > UALA2010041901293 “Substantial yaw”.P/N 3945128206.
3/19/11. SDR # and Link > UALA2011032101332 “Sudden yaw movement’. P/N B397BAM0513.
2/2/10.SDR # and Link > UALA2010020300427 “Yaw felt in cockpit”.P/N B397BAM0513.
4/14/09.SDR # and Link > CA090421011“Rudder kick, veered on runway”. P/N B397BAM0513.
5/13/07.SDR # and Link > NWAA071863251“Hard rudder kick”.P/NB397BAM0515.
12/3/02.SDR # and Link > AALA20021725 “Yawed Several Times”. P/NB471AAM7.Also see ASRS Report # 567765, - “61 PRIOR EVENTS”.


End --
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Old 30th Nov 2015, 18:19
  #3391 (permalink)  
 
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QZ8501 WARMUP

We must be getting close. The local news is in anticipation of the accident report:
AirAsia QZ8501 crash findings expected on Tuesday - Channel NewsAsia
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Old 30th Nov 2015, 18:27
  #3392 (permalink)  
 
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Per earlier report (last page), the NTSC press conference is still scheduled for December 1, 2pm Jakarta time (less than 12 hours from now...)
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 06:10
  #3393 (permalink)  
 
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To sum up the report in three words.

Rubbish Training standards. In all corners of their business.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 06:30
  #3394 (permalink)  
 
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Again, blame the dead - flight crew action resulted in inability to control the aircraft ...
JAKARTA - REUTERS, Indonesian investigators said on Tuesday that crew action caused a loss of control and the stalling of an AirAsia passenger jet that crashed into the Java Sea last year, killing all 162 aboard.
The plane's flight control computer had a cracked solder joint that malfunctioned repeatedly, including four times during the flight, and 23 times the previous year.
"Subsequent flight crew action resulted in inability to control the aircraft ... causing the aircraft to depart from the normal flight envelope and enter a prolonged stall condition that was beyond the capability of the flight crew to recover," the national transport safety committee said in a statement.
Final report is released:
http://kemhubri.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 06:49
  #3395 (permalink)  
 
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Forensics

Wow!

I'm impressed - no joke! - that they can detect a cracked solder joint when a plane crashes into the sea with what was probably very high deceleration.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 07:01
  #3396 (permalink)  
 
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I think this quote from the report sums it up:

The Upset Recovery training was included in the aircraft operators training manual. The aircraft operator advised the KNKT that the flight crew had not been trained for the upset recovery training on Airbus A320, and this referred to FCTM Operational Philosophy: “The effectiveness of fly-by-wire architecture, and the existence of control laws, eliminates the need for upset recovery maneuvers to be trained on protected Airbus”. There was no evidence of DGCA findings for this incompliance of training.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 07:14
  #3397 (permalink)  
 
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Summary:
  • Aircraft had a history of numerous Rudder Travel Limiter Unit faults which were never resolved
  • During the accident flight, the crew received three consecutive Master Cautions related to the RTLUs, which they cleared via ECAM actions
  • After a fourth Master Caution, FAC 1 & 2 were reset by pulling the Circuit Breakers
  • The aircraft went to Alternate Law
  • Aircraft rolled 54 degrees left
  • FO applied sidestick input to roll right and pitch up
  • FO continued to pitch up as the aircraft zoomed to 38,000 ft at 11,000 fpm
  • Aircraft entered a stall
  • FO continued to apply maximum pitch up (until the end of recording)
  • Captain attempted to take over by pressing the left-sidestick priority button for 2 seconds (*)
  • DUAL INPUT activated and the aircraft continued to pitch up
  • Captain attempted another take over by pressing the sidestick priority button for 2 seconds (*)
  • Aircraft recorded lowest speed of 55 kts, 104 degrees left roll, and then descended at up to 20,000 fpm until the end of recording
(*) The sidestick priority button doesn't latch unless it is activated continuously for 40 seconds
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 07:20
  #3398 (permalink)  
 
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"Push" vs "pull" seems to have contributed to the obvious confusion
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 07:28
  #3399 (permalink)  
 
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"Issues such as flight approval considered did not contribute to the accident and was not investigated. The FDR data did not show any indication of the weather condition affecting the aircraft."

In the earlier discussion in this thread there was a feeling that bad weather was a significant factor.
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Old 1st Dec 2015, 07:28
  #3400 (permalink)  
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wheels down

To sum up the report in three words.

Rubbish Training standards. In all corners of their business.
If we are honest, I don't think anyone has done a particularly good job with UPRT or extended stall envelope so far, whether it be regulators, OEMs, Training Organisations, TDMs or Airlines. Lots of talk , many committees etc these past years but not much concrete action.

Organisations such as ICATEE have been around for a long, long time now yet there is very limited progress at the delivered end of the training business.

How many crews today could really state they have received comprehensive UPRT or stall training? I would hazard a guess that not that many.
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