Southwest Captain Reduced Power Before NYC Crash Landing

[Spooky 2]

Selective Bidding

I think most US airlines have this option these days. It probably saves a few confrontations each month.

[Airbubba]

I've never heard of this ' wish to avoid ' option in bidding systems - I suppose because I've never worked in a company large enough to need / merit / have bidding systems....

I think most US airlines have this option these days. It probably saves a few confrontations each month.

Another method that some airlines use is having first officer bids close a couple of days after the captains' lines are awarded.

And I blame human resources and other things which keep good pilots out of the cockpit and put marginal pilots into the cockpit.

This. This is the elephant in the room, in a couple of crashes lately

And, in politically correct America, I don't think the NTSB can call for raised hiring and training standards because that would be unfair to people who don't have good flying skills. Remember the late RS's training record before being hired at FedEx?

Similarly, background checks are considered to have a disparate impact against some folks with poor employment and arrest records. Auburn Calloway had been fired by Gulf Air (the one in Biloxi, Mississippi) and Tigers before going to work at FedEx.

Any call for raised standards will be criticized in some quarters as bigoted, unfair and exclusionary.

As Huck says, it is the elephant in the room that you can't mention.

[RAT 5]

They must be related to that flock of pigs I just saw blasting past my house; but I can't mention them either otherwise men in white coats come a knocking.

[AirRabbit]

Arriving a bit "late to the party,” but...

I’ll offer just a couple of opinionated observations, anyway…

It could easily be that the reason the RoD increased without any control column movement is that the throttles were reduced. The factors that makes up an understanding of airplane landings includes both the airspeed (based on 1.3Vs increased by any wind/gust factor), where the 30% increase in this speed is gradually reduced to “zero” by reaching the threshold, while maintaining the other adjustments); power reduction may be started as early as threshold crossing but should be started no later than initiation of the flare, and should be at idle no later than main gear touchdown. Also, the pilot flying should be acutely aware that as elevator back pressure will be required to achieve level flight attitude at the end of the flare (the airplane should be landed in this “level flight attitude”), as the power is reduced, an increase in that back pressure will be necessary, BUT only to the point that keeps the nose from moving downward – to keep that level flight attitude. If that back pressure is not applied, the nose WILL begin to move downward – and depending on where this starts, the airspeed could easily begin to increase.

I haven’t examined the FDR to ferret out the specifics of pitch, elevator position, and airspeeds at appropriate points just prior to the touchdown – but I would suspect that some violation of these precepts, as outlined above, could be found in explanation of what occurred. Also, anytime physical control of the airplane is accomplished in this very “intense” portion of the approach/landing – just prior to initiating the flare through the actual touchdown – there is an increased likelihood of the pilot assuming control not being able to pick up – correct, if or where necessary – and then maintain the proper level flight attitude, through the remainder of the power reduction (if necessary), maintaining the level flight attitude, and maintaining a center-line ground track (not to mention any crosswind correction if or where required).

I suspect that the VASI and the glide slope indication not being exactly aligned is not peculiar to the LGA airport – after all … observation of Red/White lights is not expected to be anywhere near as precise as the electronic indication of the transmitted glide slope – and I would suspect that there aren’t many pilots who devote much, if any, specific attention to the VASI light indications, particularly after crossing the threshold.

As for the apparent absence of flight control inputs for the last couple of seconds prior to “touchdown” (using the term generically), and according to a cursory look at the FDR, it looks like something on the order of 2-4 seconds, and both pilots were very likely focused on what they saw developing with an abnormally low nose position that close to the runway - focusing on what was about to happen, rather than what to do to effect it.

[TowerDog]

[quote].Quote:
This. This is the elephant in the room, in a couple of crashes lately
[/quote

UPS...?

[peekay4]

I would suspect that there aren’t many pilots who devote much, if any, specific attention to the VASI light indications, particularly after crossing the threshold.

In his official statement to the NTSB, the Co-pilot PF stated that during the accident landing he used the PAPI as his "primary reference" and he was "working the PAPI" down to the "25-30 foot range", when the Captain took over.

The Captain on the other hand said that she referenced the HUD, that she "loved the HUD" and considered herself a "HUD cripple" (dependent on the HUD). She stated that at lower altitudes the HUD would be in "instrument mode". And just before landing she would still "look through the HUD" though not necessarily reading the numbers on the HUD.

[Oakape]

Sounds like they both had problems then.

[Oakape]

and should be at idle no later than main gear touchdown

The problem with some is that they believe that once the thrust levers hit the idle stop that the power is immediately at idle. To get idle thrust at touchdown the trust levers need to hit the idle stops before the main wheels hit the pavement.

This is also observed when coming out of reverse. I see many going through to the full down position while the engines are still winding down, giving a burst of forward thrust when you really don't need it.

The thrust lever position indicates commanded thrust & the N1 gauges indicate actual thrust.

[FlightlessParrot]

Quote:
And I blame human resources and other things which keep good pilots out of the cockpit and put marginal pilots into the cockpit.

This. This is the elephant in the room, in a couple of crashes lately.

Not being from the USA, I'm not sure that I understand this fully. Are you saying that women can't fly as well as men, or that there is a quota for women that has to be filled irrespective of ability?

Or is it something quite different, that makes sense?

[bubbers44]

The elephant in the room is a yankee way of saying that everyone in the room sees it but is hesitant to be the one to bring it up.

[Capn Bloggs]

Bubbers, I thought you were blowing your bags but you are right! TEITR is Yank-originated...

The Elephant in the Room

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by peekay4

In his official statement to the NTSB, the Co-pilot PF stated that during the accident landing he used the PAPI as his "primary reference" and he was "working the PAPI" down to the "25-30 foot range", when the Captain took over.

The Captain on the other hand said that she referenced the HUD, that she "loved the HUD" and considered herself a "HUD cripple" (dependent on the HUD). She stated that at lower altitudes the HUD would be in "instrument mode". And just before landing she would still "look through the HUD" though not necessarily reading the numbers on the HUD.

Hi peekay4 … and I say again “I would suspect that there aren’t many pilots who devote much, if any, specific attention to the VASI light indications, particularly after crossing the threshold.” I would wonder if the instructor who trained this pilot was ever aware of his tendencies to “rivet” his attention to one particular reference … apparently to the exclusion of all the others that should remain an active part of his scan? And, based on her comment, I think there is at least a possibility that the Captain had tendencies along the same lines. Too me, this “wrong-headed attention riveting” is characteristic of those who learn a particular “habit pattern” while training in a simulator, where whatever the characteristic happens to be (and sometimes it is a contrived sequence or procedure – essentially a “cheat sheet”), it also tends to produce a reasonable result – in the simulator - but, in the airplane, it could lead to a less than satisfactory result!

It is the instructor’s job to be aware of any such developing tendencies and STOP them before they become HABIT. We want pilots to fly their simulators the way they fly (or the way we want them to fly) their airplanes … and this won't happen by allowing the pilot to flail about in a simulator, determining what works and what doesn't work "for him/her" outside of DIRECT instructor involvement and understanding. To do this, we have to ensure that during initial, and ALL follow-on, simulator training, the INSTRUCTOR will step in and ensure that the student does not make these kinds of incorrect assumptions or incorrectly rivet his/her attention on something that could easily lead that pilot astray when piloting the real airplane. This is not an easy task - instructing is not easy - and not every pilot (even every good pilot) will make a good instructor!

I don’t have a particular problem with the Captain’s statement that “before landing she would still look through the HUD, though not necessarily reading the numbers on the HUD.” A HUD system was developed so that the pilot could do precisely that – “look through the HUD” and see what would normally be seen when looking through the front windscreen. Again, it should have been an instructor’s responsibility to ensure that this pilot was not developing a “crutch” that works in the simulator but could (and perhaps DID??) become a problem if used in the airplane. I don't have any information about any other problems or any other history that this particular Captain may or may not have had ... I'm limiting my comments to this particular statement.

VASI lights were never intended to be, and are not an acceptable source of, glide path indication all the way to touchdown. This "approach aid" was merely intended to provide a night time visual reference to a pilot to help orient him/her with a visible, when visibility allows, and if it does, a vertically acceptable approach path to the runway. While I wasn’t standing next to those who developed the system when they were making the final adjustments to their product, I can imagine they well knew that if a pilot was going to make a vertical error, they would have preferred that pilot to be “too high” rather than “too low” during the approach. I would also expect that these folks were also well aware of the fact that their product was NOT able, and they did not build it to be interpreted as able, to provide "electronic instrument accuracy" for glide path indications all the way to touchdown.

As you can probably tell, my focus is instructors – as I fervently believe it is the instructor’s proper use of proper training tools – and the best and most complete tool available today is the flight simulator – that will ensure that the student learns what is necessary for that pilot to competently and safely operate the airplane for which that pilot is in training to learn to fly. I have come to learn that far too many instructors have allowed the simulator to teach their students, instead of that instructor, himself or herself, teaching those students to accurately and competently fly the airplane, using the simulator as a tool to accomplish that end.

[West Coast]

VASI lights were never intended to be, and are not an acceptable source of glide path indication all the way to touchdown.

Can you provide supporting documentation? I've not seen this explained quite like that.

[silverstrata]

CRM the issue?

I see the captain was given more CRM training, after many f/os refused to fly with her. I wonder if these f/os were asked why they were requesting to be excused. Was it cockpit manners they were worried about, or cockpit skills?

In my experience as both f/o and captain, I was always far less concerned with a grumpy partner, than an incompetent partner. If an awkward colleague could be trusted to perform a safe flight, I was more than happy.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by Oakape

The problem with some is that they believe that once the thrust levers hit the idle stop that the power is immediately at idle. To get idle thrust at touchdown the trust levers need to hit the idle stops before the main wheels hit the pavement.

I would agree … and the way I have always taught is that the pilot may initiate thrust reduction toward idle as soon as crossing over the runway threshold, and should be initiated no later than when the flare is initiated, and the power levers must be in the idle detent no later than upon main gear touchdown. I am not a big believer in sequential power reduction (i.e., “pull slightly back, stop, further back, stop again, further back, stop again, all the way to idle”) – while I don’t have any problem in a slow and deliberate power reduction, once the reduction is initiated, I prefer to keep the retardation movement until the idle position is reached. And, again, I say if the throttles are not AT idle upon main gear touchdown, they should be reduced all the way at that time.

ALSO, and importantly, if, at any time, the pilot feels it necessary to advance the power levers - ANY amount - THAT would initiate an immediate GO AROUND.

[Amadis of Gaul]

Originally Posted by FlightlessParrot

Not being from the USA, I'm not sure that I understand this fully. Are you saying that women can't fly as well as men, or that there is a quota for women that has to be filled irrespective of ability?

I suppose, it depends on your definition of "quota"...

[silverstrata]

Flightless parrot

Not being from the USA, I'm not sure that I understand this fully. Are you saying that women can't fly as well as men, or that there is a quota for women that has to be filled irrespective of ability?

There is a quota system in all large airlines, across the Western world. No company, let alone an airline, can afford to have a roll-call of employees that does not tick most of the required employee types. And since there may be only one or two applicants within each required type, standards may well have to be sacrificed to make up the numbers.

The UK health and police have suffered greatly from this policy, with numerous cases of substandard employees rising much higher within these organisations than they should have done.

For instance, 75% of UK doctors who are banned, were trained abroad. And this is not 'discrimination' as the GMC is a pro-diversity organisation. It is simply a case of bad doctors and the GMC being unwilling to admit that overseas training is simply not as good as UK or European training. So the GMC is putting UK patients at risk, so they can tick all the required boxes.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...ed-abroad.html

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/he...truck-off.html

[silverstrata]

Quote:
VASI lights were never intended to be, and are not an acceptable source of glide path indication all the way to touchdown.

Can you provide supporting documentation? I've not seen this explained quite like that.

The VASI is not an acceptable guide, while the PAPI is. Not sure why anyone uses VASI any more.

The VASI gives a different touchdown point, depending if you are high or low on glide. The PAPI will always endevour to bring you to the same point on the runway, no matter how high or low you are.

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by West Coast

Quote:
VASI lights were never intended to be, and are not an acceptable source of glide path indication all the way to touchdown.
Can you provide supporting documentation? I've not seen this explained quite like that.

As I said, I wasn’t there when the concept and the design stages were envisioned; commission, and completed – and I can’t provide any “supporting documentation,” other than what can be logically understood by how those systems are defined and described in official documents published by the FAA and their Airports Division – with particular focus on these specific systems. That language goes into some minor detail regarding what a pilot may expect from the use of and the dependence upon the use of, these systems – whether discussing the Visual Approach Slope Indictor (VASI) system or the Precision Approach Path Indicator System (PAPI).

Those descriptions are as follows:

Visual Glide Slope Indicator (VGSI) Systems
VGSI(s) provide vertical guidance for a VFR approach or for the visual portion of an instrument approach. The angle established by the VGSI(s) is referred to as the visual glidepath angle. The signal formats used to establish the visual glidepath angle can vary from a single light source, two or three light sources in a longitudinal array, and four or more light sources in a lateral and/or longitudinal array. Setting the required visual angle is a function of ground installation personnel.
VASI
The VASI is a system of lights so arranged to provide visual descent guidance information during the approach to a runway. These lights are visible from 3-5 miles during the day and up to 20 miles or more at night. The visual glide path of the VASI provides safe obstruction clearance within plus or minus 10 degrees of the extended runway centerline and to 4 NM from the runway threshold. Descent, using the VASI, should not be initiated until the aircraft is visually aligned with the runway. Lateral course guidance is provided by the runway or runway lights. In certain circumstances, the safe obstruction clearance area may be reduced due to local limitations, or the VASI may be offset from the extended runway centerline. This will be noted in the Airport/ Facility Directory.
PAPI
The precision approach path indicator (PAPI) uses light units similar to the VASI but are installed in a single row of either two or four light units. These lights are visible from about 5 miles during the day and up to 20 miles at night. The visual glide path of the PAPI typically provides safe obstruction clearance within plus or minus 10 degrees of the extended runway centerline and to 4 SM from the runway threshold. Descent, using the PAPI, should not be initiated until the aircraft is visually aligned with the runway. The row of light units is normally installed on the left side of the runway and the glide path indications are as depicted. Lateral course guidance is provided by the runway or runway lights. In certain circumstances, the safe obstruction clearance area may be reduced due to local limitations, or the PAPI may be offset from the extended runway centerline. This will be noted in the Airport/ Facility Directory.

Nowhere in any of these descriptions is there any reference to any Visual Glide Slope Indicator (VGSI) system being able to, or that it should be relied upon for, accurate glide path indication to the actual touchdown – and, to the contrary, describes these systems providing vertical guidance for a VFR approach or for the visual portion of an instrument approach, neither of which relies upon or references accuracy to touchdown or touchdown position.

Additionally, it should be noted that even the most accurate precision Instrument Landing System does not provide accurate vertical guidance all the way to a safe touchdown. All ILS approaches to and including touchdown are predicated on an autopilot interface with the airplane’s radar altimeter – and is not related to the ILS glide slope information – as touchdown would occur some distance past the glide slope transmitter - and a visual touchdown would also be well beyond the VASI or PAPI indicators.

[formulaben]

Trying to find the ICAO/AC/PL documentation where it explicitly says it, but from what I recall, VASI is good to 200ft, PAPI to 50 ft. Common sense says looking sideways at a VASI/PAPI while in the flair is a bad idea...

Concurs with the manufacturer:
Research Engineers PAPI