Air Algerie loses contact with its plane leaving Ouagadougou
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CVR
Seen on several French and Belgian media outlets:
The CVR problem is worse than expected. Nevermind that it was damaged, it now appears that it never recorded anything, although it is unclear whether this is due to a manufacturing flaw or some other malfunction.
These media reports all quote Europe1 as their original source.
Can anyone confirm?
The CVR problem is worse than expected. Nevermind that it was damaged, it now appears that it never recorded anything, although it is unclear whether this is due to a manufacturing flaw or some other malfunction.
These media reports all quote Europe1 as their original source.
Can anyone confirm?
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olaesk
I would think you would need to do more research on transport planes then.
There are a number I have flown that don't have pushers but do have shakers.
The DC9 didn't have a pusher. It seems the MD80 does have a pusher but it is needed only when slts are fully extended.
Unlikely that the slats were extended in cruise.
There are simply so many planes now a days we can't all know everything about all of them at short notice.
Funny how the Dash 8 at BUF did have a pusher.
I would think you would need to do more research on transport planes then.
There are a number I have flown that don't have pushers but do have shakers.
The DC9 didn't have a pusher. It seems the MD80 does have a pusher but it is needed only when slts are fully extended.
Unlikely that the slats were extended in cruise.
There are simply so many planes now a days we can't all know everything about all of them at short notice.
Funny how the Dash 8 at BUF did have a pusher.
Last edited by glendalegoon; 8th Aug 2014 at 04:32.
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http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/vene...summary.en.php
Summary
On 16 August 2005, flight WCW 708 took off from Tocumen (MPTO) international airport, Panama, at 05:59 UTC bound for «Le Lamentin Fort de France» (TFFF) international airport, Martinique, in instrument meteorological conditions. At half-distance, there was an area of stratocumulus type cloud formation with heavy precipitation. The aircraft was airworthy and had no mechanical defects. Once it had reached flight level 330, the aircraft’s speed began to decay until it reached stall speed. The aircraft then went into a stall and continued to lose altitude until it struck the ground, in a flat area defined with an altitude of 119 feet above sea level, near the village of Machiques, State of Zulia, Venezuela.
CONCLUSIONS (EXTRACTS)
The use of the anti-icing system caused a drop in the proportion of engine pressure ratio (EPR) that, given the performance conditions linked to the inappropriate configuration of the autothrust system in EPR Limit Cruise mode, affected the aircraft’s energy state, by causing a progressive loss of speed. Consequently, the aircraft was flying behind the power curve, which meant that the thrust required for the aircraft to maintain its speed was greater than that which it was producing.
The facts gathered show that the speed indications were not correctly monitored and, consequently, that the continuous loss of speed was not identified, at the time that the energy drop-off was occurring, leading the aircraft to flying behind the power curve with a high angle of attack.
The crew identified that a decrease in aircraft performance had been reached that required descending to flight level 310. While the aircraft was descending through flight level 317, the engines suffered a loss of thrust and at the same time the stick shaker activated one second before the stall warning.
At the moment the stall warning activated, the horizontal stabilizer trim began to increase its pitch-up action in a progressive manner until it reached the pitch-up stop.
None of the appropriate and necessary actions were taken in order to recover the aircraft’s energy state, the crew’s attention being focused on the engine instrument displays, even when the co-pilot said that he had identified the stall.
CAUSAL FACTOR:
The aerodynamic and performance conditions meant that the aircraft reached the critical condition that led to the stall situation. Subsequently, the crew’s resource management (CRM) and decision-making throughout the crisis were inappropriate. This situation was generated by the following factors:
Inadequate situational and environmental awareness, which meant that the crew were not fully aware of the situation in terms of aircraft performance and behaviour.
The lack of effective communication between the members of the flight crew which, during the decision-making process, reduced the chances of choosing appropriate and well–adapted alternatives and of setting priorities that corresponded to the actions to be taken in a critical or emergency situation (high altitude stall situation).
It must be said that the cause of the accident is linked to the absence of appropriate actions to prevent the aircraft from going into a stall situation, and, when the emergency situation occurred, and until impact with the ground, inappropriate setting of priorities in carrying out procedures. Subsequently, actions were taken that were outside the limits and parameters established in the manufacturer’s performance manual, along with inappropriate flight planning with no consideration for the meteorological aspects, in addition to the crew’s incorrect and late interpretation of the drop in the aircraft’s energy state. Thus, in terms of classification, the available facts lead to the conclusion that «human factors» were the cause of this accident.
The JIAAC Commission issued ten safety recommendations in its final report: seven to the aviation authorities, one to the aircraft manufacturer Boeing and two to the manufacturers of Flight Data Recorders.
Summary
On 16 August 2005, flight WCW 708 took off from Tocumen (MPTO) international airport, Panama, at 05:59 UTC bound for «Le Lamentin Fort de France» (TFFF) international airport, Martinique, in instrument meteorological conditions. At half-distance, there was an area of stratocumulus type cloud formation with heavy precipitation. The aircraft was airworthy and had no mechanical defects. Once it had reached flight level 330, the aircraft’s speed began to decay until it reached stall speed. The aircraft then went into a stall and continued to lose altitude until it struck the ground, in a flat area defined with an altitude of 119 feet above sea level, near the village of Machiques, State of Zulia, Venezuela.
CONCLUSIONS (EXTRACTS)
The use of the anti-icing system caused a drop in the proportion of engine pressure ratio (EPR) that, given the performance conditions linked to the inappropriate configuration of the autothrust system in EPR Limit Cruise mode, affected the aircraft’s energy state, by causing a progressive loss of speed. Consequently, the aircraft was flying behind the power curve, which meant that the thrust required for the aircraft to maintain its speed was greater than that which it was producing.
The facts gathered show that the speed indications were not correctly monitored and, consequently, that the continuous loss of speed was not identified, at the time that the energy drop-off was occurring, leading the aircraft to flying behind the power curve with a high angle of attack.
The crew identified that a decrease in aircraft performance had been reached that required descending to flight level 310. While the aircraft was descending through flight level 317, the engines suffered a loss of thrust and at the same time the stick shaker activated one second before the stall warning.
At the moment the stall warning activated, the horizontal stabilizer trim began to increase its pitch-up action in a progressive manner until it reached the pitch-up stop.
None of the appropriate and necessary actions were taken in order to recover the aircraft’s energy state, the crew’s attention being focused on the engine instrument displays, even when the co-pilot said that he had identified the stall.
CAUSAL FACTOR:
The aerodynamic and performance conditions meant that the aircraft reached the critical condition that led to the stall situation. Subsequently, the crew’s resource management (CRM) and decision-making throughout the crisis were inappropriate. This situation was generated by the following factors:
Inadequate situational and environmental awareness, which meant that the crew were not fully aware of the situation in terms of aircraft performance and behaviour.
The lack of effective communication between the members of the flight crew which, during the decision-making process, reduced the chances of choosing appropriate and well–adapted alternatives and of setting priorities that corresponded to the actions to be taken in a critical or emergency situation (high altitude stall situation).
It must be said that the cause of the accident is linked to the absence of appropriate actions to prevent the aircraft from going into a stall situation, and, when the emergency situation occurred, and until impact with the ground, inappropriate setting of priorities in carrying out procedures. Subsequently, actions were taken that were outside the limits and parameters established in the manufacturer’s performance manual, along with inappropriate flight planning with no consideration for the meteorological aspects, in addition to the crew’s incorrect and late interpretation of the drop in the aircraft’s energy state. Thus, in terms of classification, the available facts lead to the conclusion that «human factors» were the cause of this accident.
The JIAAC Commission issued ten safety recommendations in its final report: seven to the aviation authorities, one to the aircraft manufacturer Boeing and two to the manufacturers of Flight Data Recorders.
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glendalegoon,
the DC9-30 had a stick-pusher when UK registered/operated, courtesy of a demand from our CAA, as far as I know the only country to mandate it, memories of BAC 1-11 / Trident no doubt in the forefront of their thinking.
the DC9-30 had a stick-pusher when UK registered/operated, courtesy of a demand from our CAA, as far as I know the only country to mandate it, memories of BAC 1-11 / Trident no doubt in the forefront of their thinking.
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CVR
Going back to the press conference of the BEA (which was below all .. as usual!) It's fun to hear that following the setbacks encountered with the analysis of the CVR ... investigators will learn the possible communications from the accident aircraft with other aircraft !!
It should have already done .. more if such communications (containing essential things) took place .. the pilots would have already reported !!
And any ways .. all CVR that would be affected are already cleared
Too bad the BEA considers people (and especially the families of the victims) like retards !!
Going back to the press conference of the BEA (which was below all .. as usual!) It's fun to hear that following the setbacks encountered with the analysis of the CVR ... investigators will learn the possible communications from the accident aircraft with other aircraft !!
It should have already done .. more if such communications (containing essential things) took place .. the pilots would have already reported !!
And any ways .. all CVR that would be affected are already cleared
Too bad the BEA considers people (and especially the families of the victims) like retards !!
jc, I am not sure what BEA ever did to you on a personal level, but this axe grinding (revived from the AF 447 mega threads) seems to me out of place.
They are trying to figure out what happened.
They are trying to figure out what happened.
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They are trying to figure out what happened.
I have no doubt they are trying to figure out what happened .. the question is how they explained their actions to find what happened !
And why show this sat meteo map with the route of the aircraft .. ?
This is nothing to do with what the pilots seen on their radar screen ....
This is misleading the general public
The public will just retain that the aircraft was in the red zone .. so in full storm .. and that is maybe not the case ...
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Why shouldn't they show whatever data they have available? As far as I'm aware the point of an accident investigation is to find out what happened, not to show the general public what the flight crew would see.
So you're saying that the sat is wrong? Red zone is a red zone, no matter what the source of the data.
The public will just retain that the aircraft was in the red zone .. so in full storm .. and that is maybe not the case ...
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So you're saying that the sat is wrong? Red zone is a red zone, no matter what the source of the data.
That's not what see the radar of the aircraft ..
MTO satellite, shows in red the coldest temperatures of the cloud tops, while the MTO airborne radar indicates the density of the ice or congestive clouds. It is more dense and the cloud is active, the more dangerous it is and of course it will be shown in red on the radar screen meaning the green opposite the only water detection.
As far as I'm aware the point of an accident investigation is to find out what happened, not to show the general public what the flight crew would see
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captplaystation
that is interesting. ours didn't have the pusher.
I always thought it was funny that I didn't see too many DC9s in England!
As you know, the 9 had vortillons installed to counter certain stall situations.
IF you get to the pusher, you probably have screwed up pretty badly!
;-)
that is interesting. ours didn't have the pusher.
I always thought it was funny that I didn't see too many DC9s in England!
As you know, the 9 had vortillons installed to counter certain stall situations.
IF you get to the pusher, you probably have screwed up pretty badly!
;-)
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Reading the report posted earlier posted by threemiles, I came to the shocking realisation that something very similar happened not too long ago with Asiana 214. The only difference between this flight and Asiana 214 is that Asiana 214 was on finals and landing where as this flight had just entered cruise.
What astonishes me is that in both cases, neither pilot was monitoring their instruments, most importantly airspeed, without which we should all know, the plane can not fly, and it brings me to ask these 2 questions:
1. What had both pilots so occupied that neither one of them were monitoring their airspeed attitude and altitude? The weather radar?? Come on!!!! There are the 3 instruments my eyes are always on when I fly. Theirs is on one screen. It takes 1 second for me to look at, read and understand what my airspeed, attitude and altitude is, and I read them in that order, from left to right.
2. How on earth did they not notice the nose pitching up as they started loosing airspeed?
Now it has also come out that not only is the CVR unreadable, it seems to be that it never recorded anything in the first place. That brings me to question the maintenance by Air Algerie of their aircraft, who supposedly have an impeccable maintenance record, until now.
The last time I looked, an inoperative/malfunctioning CVR was a no go item on any commercial plane. Could somebody please tell us how often the CVR is checked or should be checked to see that it is working properly and recording?
I disagree with porterhouse in saying, “So what?? Even if CVR is totally useless FDR is still much more important of the two for investigators.” Sure, the FDR will tell us what the plane was doing, but I think it is just as important, if not more important to know what was happening in the cockpit and what the pilots were talking about and doing about the situation, which also also gives us an idea to what they were thinking at the time. The FDR can never tell you that.
In the absence of the CVR, at this point in time, I am beginning to think that both pilots fell asleep thinking that the automation would take care of it all and only woke up after it was too late to prevent the accident.
What astonishes me is that in both cases, neither pilot was monitoring their instruments, most importantly airspeed, without which we should all know, the plane can not fly, and it brings me to ask these 2 questions:
1. What had both pilots so occupied that neither one of them were monitoring their airspeed attitude and altitude? The weather radar?? Come on!!!! There are the 3 instruments my eyes are always on when I fly. Theirs is on one screen. It takes 1 second for me to look at, read and understand what my airspeed, attitude and altitude is, and I read them in that order, from left to right.
2. How on earth did they not notice the nose pitching up as they started loosing airspeed?
Now it has also come out that not only is the CVR unreadable, it seems to be that it never recorded anything in the first place. That brings me to question the maintenance by Air Algerie of their aircraft, who supposedly have an impeccable maintenance record, until now.
The last time I looked, an inoperative/malfunctioning CVR was a no go item on any commercial plane. Could somebody please tell us how often the CVR is checked or should be checked to see that it is working properly and recording?
I disagree with porterhouse in saying, “So what?? Even if CVR is totally useless FDR is still much more important of the two for investigators.” Sure, the FDR will tell us what the plane was doing, but I think it is just as important, if not more important to know what was happening in the cockpit and what the pilots were talking about and doing about the situation, which also also gives us an idea to what they were thinking at the time. The FDR can never tell you that.
In the absence of the CVR, at this point in time, I am beginning to think that both pilots fell asleep thinking that the automation would take care of it all and only woke up after it was too late to prevent the accident.
That brings me to question the maintenance by Air Algerie of their aircraft, who supposedly have an impeccable maintenance record, until now.
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The red zone show in a sat map is the temperature .. no more
while the MTO airborne radar indicates the density of the ice or congestive clouds.
It is more dense and the cloud is active, the more dangerous it is and of course it will be shown in red on the radar screen meaning the green opposite the only water detection.
So what the point to show what the flight crew can not seen ??
The CAA required a DC-9 stick pusher after the Staines accident
Captain Playstation:
I don't think so. The Trident at Staines had a stick pusher which performed its designed function, as the accident analysis revealed:
The truth is, the 'automatics' do not replace Situational Awareness!
I don't think so. The Trident at Staines had a stick pusher which performed its designed function, as the accident analysis revealed:
Directly the stick-pusher operated all
concentration was directed on the ASI, the attitude
indicator and the startling movement of the control
column. "To someone who was not expecting such an
event the combination of audio-warning and stick-push
would be overwhelming."
concentration was directed on the ASI, the attitude
indicator and the startling movement of the control
column. "To someone who was not expecting such an
event the combination of audio-warning and stick-push
would be overwhelming."
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If this graphic helps by showing something that could be relevant then I don't see the problem.
It's indicated in the caption ...
Temperature of the top of the clouds by satellite mesure
What is needed or relevant is this (for the AF747) from Tim Vasquez
Air France 447 - AFR447 - A detailed meteorological analysis - Satellite and weather data
Tim Vasquez's webpage
Last edited by jcjeant; 8th Aug 2014 at 23:44.
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What is needed or relevant is this (for the AF747) from Tim Vasquez
Also bear in mind that it is usually advised to examine the shapes of the radar returns, not just their colour. The satellite data does just as good a job of showing the shapes as the radar will, quite often a better job as it doesn't suffer from attenuation. For the Vasquez radar scene to be correct you'd need quite a steep radar tilt anyway.
Nevertheless, it's the work of five minutes to come up with something similar for AH5017. When I have some time I'll do that.
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Sounds like a repeat of the MD-80 in or near Venezuela. That one killed a bunch of French nationals as well from Martinique.
Let their airspeed bleed off and get too low and stall while in cruise perhaps at an altitude higher than was optimal. I think the earlier one had turned on anti-ice reducing available thrust.
Most Boeing's don't seem to have stickpusher's it seems. Not the 72, 3, or 4.
Updated:
Swiftair speed decay echoes previous MD-80 episodes
By: David Kaminski-Morrow
While investigators have yet to ascertain the reason for the loss of control of the Swiftair Boeing MD-83 over Mali, the accident shares several parallels with earlier events in which speed decay in early cruise led MD-80s into a high-altitude stall.
Boeing has previously warned that MD-80s can be vulnerable to speed decay under certain conditions – particularly those in the vicinity of convective weather in warm temperature regions, where thinner air combines with a need for anti-ice protection.
Warm air reduces the lift efficiency of the wing and the ability of aircraft to maintain higher altitudes – especially early in the cruise when the aircraft is heaviest.
Use of engine and airframe anti-ice, to defend against icing phenomena near storm cells, also carries an altitude penalty. Boeing has previously indicated that, for the MD-80's Pratt & Whitney JT8D engine, this penalty can amount to 3,000ft.
Boeing highlighted in a flight operations bulletin in 2002 that, if the selected altitude is unsuitable, the MD-80 might not be able to generate sufficient thrust to maintain the chosen height.
If the airspeed is not monitored carefully, it can bleed away to the point of a stall onset as the autopilot attempts to keep the aircraft at altitude by increasing the angle of attack.
“If the thrust required to maintain level flight is greater than the thrust available, the airplane could decelerate to stall warning before the autopilot disconnects,” says the bulletin, which points out the subtlety of the effect.
Boeing issued the bulletin in response to an incident in which an MD-80 experienced speed decay to the point of stick-shaker activation.
Several similar events have been recorded and the airframer reiterated the risk of high-altitude stall after the fatal loss of a West Caribbean Airways MD-82 over Venezuela in August 2005.
Like the Swiftair jet, the West Caribbean aircraft had been operating a night flight within the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone, an equatorial area characterised by strong thunderstorm activity.
Venezuelan investigators found that the aircraft, which had its anti-ice protection active, fell “behind the power curve” and was not generating the thrust needed to maintain its altitude of 33,000ft. Over the course of 10min its airspeed decayed and the aircraft entered a stall, and a rapid descent, from which the crew was unable to recover.
Early stall recovery is crucial for the MD-80 because its T-tail and rear-engine design carries the risk of a deep stall, in which the turbulence over a stalled wing renders the elevator ineffective and disrupts the engine airflow.
After the crash of the West Caribbean flight Boeing’s then-chief pilot for flight operations safety, John Spencer, underlined common elements between similar incidents, including the presence of warm, moist air typical of thunderstorms, and aircraft operation at cruise altitudes close to those defined by weight limits.
Crews had not noticed any abnormality beforehand, having not recognised the slow decay of airspeed, and in some cases had mistaken a thrust roll-back, from airflow interruption, for a flame-out.
Investigators have not released the weight details of the Swiftair MD-83 but the 165-seat aircraft, operating for Air Algerie, was transporting 110 passengers and six crew, according to the carrier, and was fuelled for a 1,500nm service from Ouagadougou to Algiers.
French investigation authority BEA has confirmed that the aircraft suffered a gradual decay of airspeed over the space of about 10min, shortly after reaching its cruising altitude of 31,000ft and having skirted around a storm cell.
The inquiry has not confirmed whether the crew activated the anti-ice system, nor has it given much detail on the performance of the powerplants, although BEA chief Remi Jouty briefly mentioned “engine fluctuations”.
BEA has not stated whether the crew received a stall warning as the airspeed dropped to around 160kt, but the cockpit-voice recorder failed to function correctly and is yet to yield any readable information. None of those on board survived the 24 July accident.
Let their airspeed bleed off and get too low and stall while in cruise perhaps at an altitude higher than was optimal. I think the earlier one had turned on anti-ice reducing available thrust.
Most Boeing's don't seem to have stickpusher's it seems. Not the 72, 3, or 4.
Updated:
Swiftair speed decay echoes previous MD-80 episodes
By: David Kaminski-Morrow
While investigators have yet to ascertain the reason for the loss of control of the Swiftair Boeing MD-83 over Mali, the accident shares several parallels with earlier events in which speed decay in early cruise led MD-80s into a high-altitude stall.
Boeing has previously warned that MD-80s can be vulnerable to speed decay under certain conditions – particularly those in the vicinity of convective weather in warm temperature regions, where thinner air combines with a need for anti-ice protection.
Warm air reduces the lift efficiency of the wing and the ability of aircraft to maintain higher altitudes – especially early in the cruise when the aircraft is heaviest.
Use of engine and airframe anti-ice, to defend against icing phenomena near storm cells, also carries an altitude penalty. Boeing has previously indicated that, for the MD-80's Pratt & Whitney JT8D engine, this penalty can amount to 3,000ft.
Boeing highlighted in a flight operations bulletin in 2002 that, if the selected altitude is unsuitable, the MD-80 might not be able to generate sufficient thrust to maintain the chosen height.
If the airspeed is not monitored carefully, it can bleed away to the point of a stall onset as the autopilot attempts to keep the aircraft at altitude by increasing the angle of attack.
“If the thrust required to maintain level flight is greater than the thrust available, the airplane could decelerate to stall warning before the autopilot disconnects,” says the bulletin, which points out the subtlety of the effect.
Boeing issued the bulletin in response to an incident in which an MD-80 experienced speed decay to the point of stick-shaker activation.
Several similar events have been recorded and the airframer reiterated the risk of high-altitude stall after the fatal loss of a West Caribbean Airways MD-82 over Venezuela in August 2005.
Like the Swiftair jet, the West Caribbean aircraft had been operating a night flight within the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone, an equatorial area characterised by strong thunderstorm activity.
Venezuelan investigators found that the aircraft, which had its anti-ice protection active, fell “behind the power curve” and was not generating the thrust needed to maintain its altitude of 33,000ft. Over the course of 10min its airspeed decayed and the aircraft entered a stall, and a rapid descent, from which the crew was unable to recover.
Early stall recovery is crucial for the MD-80 because its T-tail and rear-engine design carries the risk of a deep stall, in which the turbulence over a stalled wing renders the elevator ineffective and disrupts the engine airflow.
After the crash of the West Caribbean flight Boeing’s then-chief pilot for flight operations safety, John Spencer, underlined common elements between similar incidents, including the presence of warm, moist air typical of thunderstorms, and aircraft operation at cruise altitudes close to those defined by weight limits.
Crews had not noticed any abnormality beforehand, having not recognised the slow decay of airspeed, and in some cases had mistaken a thrust roll-back, from airflow interruption, for a flame-out.
Investigators have not released the weight details of the Swiftair MD-83 but the 165-seat aircraft, operating for Air Algerie, was transporting 110 passengers and six crew, according to the carrier, and was fuelled for a 1,500nm service from Ouagadougou to Algiers.
French investigation authority BEA has confirmed that the aircraft suffered a gradual decay of airspeed over the space of about 10min, shortly after reaching its cruising altitude of 31,000ft and having skirted around a storm cell.
The inquiry has not confirmed whether the crew activated the anti-ice system, nor has it given much detail on the performance of the powerplants, although BEA chief Remi Jouty briefly mentioned “engine fluctuations”.
BEA has not stated whether the crew received a stall warning as the airspeed dropped to around 160kt, but the cockpit-voice recorder failed to function correctly and is yet to yield any readable information. None of those on board survived the 24 July accident.
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The aircraft may have entered a stall at altitude, but it is not reasonable to assume it was still in a stall when it impacted. The airspeed was too high.
Something else prevented the PF from leveling the wings and pulling to the nearest horizon.
Was it an instrument problem caused by unusual attitudes, or was it a case of massive crew disorientation?
The spiral dive indicates that g was available but that the lift vector was pointed in the wrong direction.
From the BEA note on the flight recorder readout:
Something else prevented the PF from leveling the wings and pulling to the nearest horizon.
Was it an instrument problem caused by unusual attitudes, or was it a case of massive crew disorientation?
The spiral dive indicates that g was available but that the lift vector was pointed in the wrong direction.
From the BEA note on the flight recorder readout:
The aeroplane then turned left and quickly lost altitude, with large changes in pitch and bank. The rotation to the left continued until the end of the recording. The last recorded point, 1h47mn15s, corresponds to an altitude of 1,600ft, a speed of about 380 kt and an extremely high descent speed.
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Originally Posted by BEA
with large changes in pitch and bank
Thank you Machinbird for your comment