Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

[philipat]

@Nitpicker330

Apologies, just came back from a long trip and tired. yes, of course, Lion DPS was a 738. But, as you note, the issue is the same. A or B the same actually wrt to TOGA with AT and AP settings/actions.

[NamelessWonder]

Ollie Onion

Yes there will be mitigating factors such as the 'training' taking place, but the fact that there were FOUR pilots on the flightdeck and NOT ONE of then seemed to notice the speed deteriorate to 30 - 50 kts below approach speed (according to ADSB data) is quite frankly gross negligence.

Now, I could very well be wrong here, but having read this whole thread, I do not recall it ever being categorcially stated that all 4 flight crew were on the flight deck. On the aircraft - yes ("2 crews operating in shifts" [NTSB]), but not necessarily in the jump seats.

That doesn't detract from the "gross negligence" (should the presumed situation turn out to be the ACTUAL situation), not least that the PF (albeit new on type) has been flying 747s for a number of years, including into SFO and had a training captain as PNF (as it seems was the case).

Regarding one of the posts from a few pages back that questioned why the approach lights hadn't been "taken out" by the "tail in the water", from the debris track, it would seem the final approach was somewhat right of the centreline, which presumably also explains why the farthest left PAPI support is intact whilst the others are gone.

[philipat]

@NamelessWonder

Great point. However, if YOU were in such a situation as Pilot 3 or 4, would you still be sleeping as the plane landed? Where would you most likely be?

[James7]

NP, I think it is a great call and I not heard it for 20 years now, even in V UK.

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by Montrealguy

That was precisely the Airbus philosophy when it created the Airbus 320.

No it wasn't, or at least guarding against mistakes was only one facet of the philosophy. The press seemed to focus on that to the exclusion of all else at the time though, presumably because the resentment this fostered among some pilots made for good copy and more column inches.

[NamelessWonder]

@Philipat

However, if YOU were in such a situation as Pilot 3 or 4, would you still be sleeping as the plane landed? Where would you most likely be?

There would have to be a very good reason not to be at the "pointy" end if the option was available, which is, I believe, exactly what you were suggesting.

That doesn't mean, however, that the "spare" crew were . . . and, given all the cultural comments that have been made here, with a TC in the RHS, perhaps they would find it preferable to be elsewhere! (though if they WERE in the cabin, I doubt they'll ever do it again . . . if they get the chance!)

[G-HMV]

"Racism"

With regard to all the comments about people being posting racially offensive comments, aviation is not a place for semantics or political correctness. The only thing that should be considered is the truth.
It is absolute fact that social hierarchy and a steep authority gradient played a part in several major accidents in Asia and the middle east. This is NOT to say these accidents are exclusive to these places and do not happen in the west, but for the most part this lesson has already been hard learned here, and use of CRM gives FO's the conviction to challenge the thankfully rare overbearing captain.
When the social settings of a cockpit contribute to an accident you must stand up and make people aware of it. (As you should any other contributing factor) Not because of the colour of their skin or the place they live, but because the communication and teamwork of a safe cockpit does not come naturally in a culture like that. This is not a problem as a culture, but when it comes to having lives sitting behind you this is a problem. You cannot shy away from discussing and addressing and issue of SAFETY just because you don't want to offend people.

It is far too early to determine if this had ANY involvement in this particular accident, but that doesn't seem to have stopped 40 pages of wild speculation and about 3 pages worth of useful contribution. However the message should be; if there is a safety problem, there needs to proactive re-education and retraining in the aviation community. Regardless of the sensitivities of doing so.

[jbsharpe]

Originally Posted by llondel

I'd probably take with me what I had around the seat, given that it's likely to be small, but I certainly wouldn't mess around trying to get something from the overhead bin, and would be likely to be fairly rough with anyone blocking the aisle while trying to do that. I guess this is partly because I do read sites like this one and I'm an engineer by training and so am fully aware of the time-critical nature of evacuation. If someone's got a bag and is moving with the flow then let them keep it, if they're slowing things down then they should be discouraged, quickly and, if necessary, forcefully in order that everyone else can evacuate. Those who wish to take their baggage from the overhead should wait until last, and not expect the cabin crew to wait for them.

Finally, some sense on this. Especially in bold.

[robertbartsch]

CNN is now reporting that at least one and possibly two door hatches malfunctioned and which caused the inflatable escape ramps to open inside the cabin.

I cannot remember the NTSB making statements on TV this early after a crash and which seems to indict the crew for their poor performance. Apparently, as of Monday morning, the crew has yet to be interviewed by anyone.

YIKES! I suppose if this happened in France and not in the USA, the crew would be immediately arrested and held criminally liable. Maybe that is a good system.

[SgtBundy]

Being outside the industry, how does this sort of scenario fit into simulator time? I can imagine that normally sim time would be spent more on higher complexity procedures diagnosing and reacting to faults as well as more difficult scenarios (IMC etc).

Is a CAVOK manual approach something so mundane as to not be spent time in training, hence allowing for simple things like the AT setting to be in the way, or does it just come down to simply not flying the numbers?

[david1300]

Originally Posted by philipat

So you see no RELEVANT similarities to Lion DPS, perhaps because DPS was a Reef as opposed to a sea wall? Perhaps you might look a little more at the details of DPS? ...

NOT what I said, Phil. There are some very pertinent similarities, but there have been some very inane posts that just waste space and bandwith. My complaint is not about the comparison, per se, but the inane posts that repeat the same info.

Actually, going back and re-reading from the beginning, the mods have done a good (and often thankless) task of deleting a lot of the stuff I have complained about, so maybe I should climb down from my high horse a little.

Originally Posted by philipat

In the meantime, what makes you so omnipotent to accuse other experienced posters of being Muppets? Especially when you can't even beat The Lions at home?

We had a (useless?) Kiwi coach for the past few years. I think he has been deliberately undermining our rugby playing skills by adding ice-slush to our fuel, causing us to come up short at critical times

But they haven't managed to clear it all, like this rubbish at post 462:

Originally Posted by robertbartsch

Has the crew discussed the incident with the media or is this something that will not happen?

[Agaricus bisporus]

Am unsure how the debate about the authority gradient applies when both crew are Captains and the more senior one is an instructor PNF in the RHS. Is there anything culturally that would prevent him from speaking out? Or else he was either maxed out, in the same mental A/T trap or just not wasn't paying attention?

Still, there was a case in a now defunct UK airline a few years back where the Chief Training "Captain" got a stickshaker during an intermediate stage of approach (no autothrottle) because he was beefing his stude so busily the thrust levers weren't advanced and no one noticed the sound and attitude was changing, almost incredible but it can happen.

[jumpseater]

Some European airlines I'm familiar with occasionally ask for PAPI's 'Off' approaches.

These are on training flights, i.e. no passengers on board, and I've seen it done with small/medium/heavy aircraft.

What is interesting is watching the approaches (which are VFR) to a 10000ft runway, some clearly aren't going to work, and you can see them being thrown away early, some get binned later on.

Good practice, both literally and metaphorically.

[Artic flyer]

Dejavu

Non precision approach , with poor airmanship performance. It’s a dejavu :

Aires B737 at San Andres Island on Aug 16th 2010
Accident: Aires B737 at San Andres Island on Aug 16th 2010, landed short of runway and broke up

Lionair B738 at Denpasar on Apr 13th 2013
Accident: Lionair B738 at Denpasar on Apr 13th 2013, landed short of runway and came to stop in sea



Lessons to be learn:


Airports should supply the best instrument landing support .


Airports should supply the best landing aid , such as call outs when pilots fell out of the path.


Air companies and pilots should improve training and sop manuals in order to be prepared for unexpected poor landing aid, so they can use the best/safety instrument resources onboard.


Of course the pilots make mistakes, they are human.

Of course the pilots where tired, they where flying for 10 h and they are human.

[tasmin]

nitpicker330

I believe the back-up crew in ASIANA does not occupy the jump seats during Take Off and Landing

[NigelOnDraft]

Some European airlines I'm familiar with occasionally ask for PAPI's 'Off' approaches.

Pretty sure my Base Training involved that? NCE 22R had no G/S or PAPIs ~12yrs ago and we landed 767s there with a Vis Cct. 22L had PAPIs, but rarely bright enough to be any use >100'.

I've re-read Banglaore A320:
1. OPDES Mode (like FLCH) so idle, descend throught Glidepath, speed coming below VRef.
2. As PF "realises" going low applies full back stick (starts :08s)
3. This in turn triggers rise in Alpha and further IAS decreasing which then triggers Alpha Floor (at :11s) at 135'agl.
4. Pilots select TOGA 2s later (~:13s) [meaningless in Thrust terms in that Alpha Floor had done same]
5. Spool up too long to prevent accident
6. Report reckons had they selected TOGA at :08s (with start of back stick) they would have made it.

IF speculation is correct here then the sequence is similar to Bangalore, but maybe without the Alpha Floor aspect (or equivalent), but even if an Alpha Floor had been installed, it might not have been enough. Also shows that maybe with ATHR "wakeup" and Alpha Floor not operating <100R, this is not just for landing reasons, but would usually be too late anyway?

Whether Lion DPS 738 fits in we shall see?

[nitpicker330]

Well from now on maybe they should sit in the Jump seats for landing and be an active part of the crew. Who knows maybe one might have seen the thrust at idle and the speed decaying in time to alert the bozo "flying" the thing..

In our mob generally speaking all crew members sit in the cockpit for T/O and LDG unless other circumstances are needed. Indeed the relief crew take an active part in both pre flight and post flight setups.

Yes I know it's a 2 crew Aircraft but many hands make light work and the safety implications are blindingly obvious

[TheChitterneFlyer]

So, has the advancement of technology really made significant inroads into the monitoring of the basics i.e. speed? In my day there was a Flight Engineer and that he was the King-Pin in the monitoring of airspeed, attitude, and height; especially during the final approach phase to touchdown... even more-so during a visual approach! What was the EGPWS telling the crew to do? Was it another case of "Shut-up Gringo"?

[DavidHoul52]

With regard to all the comments about people being posting racially offensive comments, aviation is not a place for semantics or political correctness. The only thing that should be considered is the truth.
It is absolute fact that social hierarchy and a steep authority gradient played a part in several major accidents in Asia and the middle east. This is NOT to say these accidents are exclusive to these places and do not happen in the west, but for the most part this lesson has already been hard learned here, and use of CRM gives FO's the conviction to challenge the thankfully rare overbearing captain.

Sorry but I don't buy this. The only reason people started talking about "cultural" issues was that it was an Asian airline with (presumably) Asian crew. There is absolutely NO evidence at this stage that so called "cultural" factors played any kind of role at all. So why mention it? I tell you why - it's because certain people haven't yet understood that it is puerile, stupid and offensive to categorise people according to stereotypes. Recent accidents due in part to cabin seniority issues have not taken place notably with Asian crews - Polish, Russian spring to mind - there are others.

"Political correctness" is a politically loaded word, and is in fact archaic. It just means being careful to show respect to others who are different to ourselves - something most of us started learning when we were two years old. I'm not saying that cultural factors are NEVER relevant, or that accident investigators don't take them into account. But you don't "celebrate cultural diversity" by using it as stick to hit those you don't like, still less haul it out as a possible cause of an accident. Aviation is not a place for prejudiced viewpoints.

If you don't think your comments are offensive why not ask a Korean?

[philipat]

And, of course, such an incident could NEVER happen in The USA?

That's American exceptionism??