Incident at Heathrow
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As for walk-arounds, look AND see, yes?
Have you read but not assimilated, or have you just spouted your 'opinion' for the benefit of the rest of mankind?
Troll.
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I have always been trained to position a burning aircraft with the fire on the downwind side, not into the wind. I would consider into the wind as a fairly good second, if time is really critical.
I'm a bit puzzeled by all this talk of runway lengths. This was a A320, and I don't see many problems that would warrant checking landing distance if the shortest runway is 2400 m.
I'm also a bit worried as people are talking about EICAM (?) stopping you from landing immediately. What ever happened to gear, flaps and brakes?
It's just an aircraft!
I'm a bit puzzeled by all this talk of runway lengths. This was a A320, and I don't see many problems that would warrant checking landing distance if the shortest runway is 2400 m.
I'm also a bit worried as people are talking about EICAM (?) stopping you from landing immediately. What ever happened to gear, flaps and brakes?
It's just an aircraft!
fireflybob: I used to fly the -436 and my recollection is that at the time of WE when the start switch was moved to OFF it only closed the HP valve. The LP valve was a separate action to be performed. Closure of the LP valve was what was missed and fuel continued to be supplied at pressure to the pylon and hence the subsequent engine/wing fire. The aircraft were modified later such that the HP and the LP valves were activated by the closure of the start lever. There was also a valve transit light fitted. So, in summary, the fire drill was actioned however the fierce fire was fed fuel via the pylon.
fireflybob: I used to fly the -436 and my recollection is that at the time of WE when the start switch was moved to OFF it only closed the HP valve. The LP valve was a separate action to be performed. Closure of the LP valve was what was missed and fuel continued to be supplied at pressure to the pylon and hence the subsequent engine/wing fire. The aircraft were modified later such that the HP and the LP valves were activated by the closure of the start lever. There was also a valve transit light fitted. So, in summary, the fire drill was actioned however the fierce fire was fed fuel via the pylon.
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Perhaps this time Airbus and IAE will quit hiding behind the sticky labels, fluorescent paint and warnings in AMM procedures and actually do something to improve the design??? It's fair to say that the writing is on the wall.
Somehow though I imagine that the last engineer to sign the AML and the pilot who did the WAC will hung out to dry (again), after all scapegoating is a lot cheaper and more expedient than fixing the design.
Deputy heads will roll, and the lesson will be repeated until the student learns.
Somehow though I imagine that the last engineer to sign the AML and the pilot who did the WAC will hung out to dry (again), after all scapegoating is a lot cheaper and more expedient than fixing the design.
Deputy heads will roll, and the lesson will be repeated until the student learns.
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A couple of thoughts:
If it is demonstrated that the latches were not secured, then heads certainly deserve to roll and in our industry their is only one place where the buck stops.
Regarding decision making, I come from a military environment where we predominately reacted to an emergency by doing something, quickly. When I moved into commercial aviation, the process was almost completely reversed - we rarely do anything quickly, we ensure things are safe and then DODAR. Each of these two routines have their place and this is often based upon the equipment we are operating and the environment we are in. In this week's example it would have been easy to hack the aircraft into a quickie visual circuit, bomb burst everyone else and then land without ever having ascertained the nature of the problem. I would suggest that our aircraft are designed such that this should rarely be a reasonable option and the safer thing to do is to adopt a considered approach.
It would seem to me that our flight crew on the one hand may deserve some form of admonishment for sub-standard pre-flght but on the other handled an aircraft emergency in an admirable and entirely correct fashion.
If it is demonstrated that the latches were not secured, then heads certainly deserve to roll and in our industry their is only one place where the buck stops.
Regarding decision making, I come from a military environment where we predominately reacted to an emergency by doing something, quickly. When I moved into commercial aviation, the process was almost completely reversed - we rarely do anything quickly, we ensure things are safe and then DODAR. Each of these two routines have their place and this is often based upon the equipment we are operating and the environment we are in. In this week's example it would have been easy to hack the aircraft into a quickie visual circuit, bomb burst everyone else and then land without ever having ascertained the nature of the problem. I would suggest that our aircraft are designed such that this should rarely be a reasonable option and the safer thing to do is to adopt a considered approach.
It would seem to me that our flight crew on the one hand may deserve some form of admonishment for sub-standard pre-flght but on the other handled an aircraft emergency in an admirable and entirely correct fashion.
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Cows getting Bigger
"It would seem to me that our flight crew on the one hand may deserve some form of admonishment for sub-standard pre-flght but on the other handled an aircraft emergency in an admirable and entirely correct fashion"
Admonishment? You are joking, right? What's that then, a little slap on the wrist between pals??
Video of a British Airways jet burning in the sky overhead London, trailing a plume of thick black smoke, broadcast all over the planet, causing the company untold reputation damage at a time when it can least afford it, and you think it's okay to praise the way 'OUR CREW' handled an 'aircraft emergency' that even you infer may have been self-induced because of a 'sub-standard' pre-flight (we'll know the truth behind this soon enough).
'Our crew', who are you?
Other pilots have lost their lively-hoods for far less than this and even in situations where flights safety or company reputation wasn't an issue inside and outside of BA. I suppose if the face fits they'll be fine and keep their jobs, because BA pilot management has it's own reputation does it not?
"It would seem to me that our flight crew on the one hand may deserve some form of admonishment for sub-standard pre-flght but on the other handled an aircraft emergency in an admirable and entirely correct fashion"
Admonishment? You are joking, right? What's that then, a little slap on the wrist between pals??
Video of a British Airways jet burning in the sky overhead London, trailing a plume of thick black smoke, broadcast all over the planet, causing the company untold reputation damage at a time when it can least afford it, and you think it's okay to praise the way 'OUR CREW' handled an 'aircraft emergency' that even you infer may have been self-induced because of a 'sub-standard' pre-flight (we'll know the truth behind this soon enough).
'Our crew', who are you?
Other pilots have lost their lively-hoods for far less than this and even in situations where flights safety or company reputation wasn't an issue inside and outside of BA. I suppose if the face fits they'll be fine and keep their jobs, because BA pilot management has it's own reputation does it not?
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Regardless of the rights and wrongs - or even the wrongs and wrongs of what someone may or may not have done by mistake it is truly pathetic, shameful, to see people who really don't sound like pilots at all spouting asinine assumptions about the integrity and honesty of people and organisations they clearly have no clue about. Who do you think you are?
It may well, in our sick and cynical world be trendy and somehow "clever" to voice the opinion that everyone but me is a slimy, twisting dishonest fraudster. It's a line that shows those people up for the shallow, negative and intellectual bankrupts they are. Not to mention raising the question of "takes one to know one". Grow up and shut up, or bugger off back to the world of the gutter where your sleazy gutter "beliefs" belong.
There is, I think, one thing that the Professionals here know will come from this as far as the Airline is concerned. And that is a rigorous, professional and totally dispassionate investigation that will see the correct and appropriate action taken by both the crew involved and the management handling it.
Calling BA's corporate honesty into question over this is simply disgraceful. Unless, of course, you have some evidence to back yourselves up.
No??
I thought not.
It may well, in our sick and cynical world be trendy and somehow "clever" to voice the opinion that everyone but me is a slimy, twisting dishonest fraudster. It's a line that shows those people up for the shallow, negative and intellectual bankrupts they are. Not to mention raising the question of "takes one to know one". Grow up and shut up, or bugger off back to the world of the gutter where your sleazy gutter "beliefs" belong.
There is, I think, one thing that the Professionals here know will come from this as far as the Airline is concerned. And that is a rigorous, professional and totally dispassionate investigation that will see the correct and appropriate action taken by both the crew involved and the management handling it.
Calling BA's corporate honesty into question over this is simply disgraceful. Unless, of course, you have some evidence to back yourselves up.
No??
I thought not.
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hyatt_1_alpha - you may or may not have 23,000 hours, but you are certainly the Monday Morning Quarterback. I too have been round the aviation industry many years and have found that those most judgemental are those who receive the least grace when they mess up - which humans have the propensity to do. I do not work for BA and indeed have much to gain from any loss to their reputation. I nonetheless can guarantee that the crew involved only ever wanted to be the best professionals they could, but appear to have made a mistake on the walkround. I am used to CFMs, but I am told that V2500 doors are very difficult to spot as to whether they are latched or not. The problem would be compounded if both sides looked identical - as appears to have been the case here. I do not recall ever seeing the engine doors unlocked by way of a demo - I daresay that is now about to change for us all! To me this is systemic and boils down to training, so sacking pilots would really be counterproductive. These guys may indeed have blown the preflight inspection, despite sincerely wanting to do it well. The answer is to retrain all Airbus pilots to ensure they can identify when the cowling doors are closed or not - the absolutely wrong response would be to fire someone.
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Ah! The AAIB are not usually as quick as this to publish the whys and wherefore's of an incident.
"What? They haven't reported? But surely all the knowledgable people here on Prune are in receipt of all the facts? It sounds like they know it all!"
"What? They haven't reported? But surely all the knowledgable people here on Prune are in receipt of all the facts? It sounds like they know it all!"
There's some disappointing nonsense on here, but in between there are some notable questions, which I am sure the AAIB will address. Some have already dismissed them, but lets summarise.
1. As the IAE latches are a known "gotcha" from previous incidents, do they feature as a specific attention item in the BA walkaround SOP ?
2. As ATC reported to the crew on liftoff that they had dropped engine parts, did they really need to get as far as Lambourne/Brentwood before returning. Does the BA departure briefing SOP include a brief on immediate return ? Does that route via Brentwood ?
3. Is it really so difficult by then to divert then to Stansted, as some are saying here, rather than come all the way back to Heathrow. If I were the crew I'd be a bit insulted at people saying here that such a diversion for me was "too difficult". Bear in mind that they would have been visual with the Stansted runway at this point.
4. There have been AAIB/ATC reports before about the inadvisibility of diverting into Heathrow when on westerlies with known significant problems (and I would count problems with both engines as significant). Why has this not been actioned ?
5. If we really are relaxed about diverting all the way back to Heathrow, why the evacuation by slides on arrival rather than using steps ? It's well known that a slide evacuation regularly leads to injuries, and is a last-ditch thing to do. And in this case we did get injuries, fortunately minor.
1. As the IAE latches are a known "gotcha" from previous incidents, do they feature as a specific attention item in the BA walkaround SOP ?
2. As ATC reported to the crew on liftoff that they had dropped engine parts, did they really need to get as far as Lambourne/Brentwood before returning. Does the BA departure briefing SOP include a brief on immediate return ? Does that route via Brentwood ?
3. Is it really so difficult by then to divert then to Stansted, as some are saying here, rather than come all the way back to Heathrow. If I were the crew I'd be a bit insulted at people saying here that such a diversion for me was "too difficult". Bear in mind that they would have been visual with the Stansted runway at this point.
4. There have been AAIB/ATC reports before about the inadvisibility of diverting into Heathrow when on westerlies with known significant problems (and I would count problems with both engines as significant). Why has this not been actioned ?
5. If we really are relaxed about diverting all the way back to Heathrow, why the evacuation by slides on arrival rather than using steps ? It's well known that a slide evacuation regularly leads to injuries, and is a last-ditch thing to do. And in this case we did get injuries, fortunately minor.
Last edited by WHBM; 26th May 2013 at 23:34.
I recall that these cowls have come off before and the engines were not actioned to be shutdown.
Why are we presuming that to this crew there was a double engine failure that should have affected their actions
We really do need to wait for more factual data before we carry our presumptions all the way thorough a Failure effects analysis to a near crash.
I'm not sure that what the passengers or people on the ground think they see should override what the pilot sees in their instruments regarding engines. I prefer the pilots fly the plane as trained and only when it doesn't fly move to other considerations.
And lets keep this blame and punishment talk out of R&N and let the AAIB professionals assign some causal factors and recommendations to prevent another incident first.
Why are we presuming that to this crew there was a double engine failure that should have affected their actions
We really do need to wait for more factual data before we carry our presumptions all the way thorough a Failure effects analysis to a near crash.
I'm not sure that what the passengers or people on the ground think they see should override what the pilot sees in their instruments regarding engines. I prefer the pilots fly the plane as trained and only when it doesn't fly move to other considerations.
And lets keep this blame and punishment talk out of R&N and let the AAIB professionals assign some causal factors and recommendations to prevent another incident first.
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1. Good question
2. We don't yet know what indications were being shown on the flight deck. The crew MAY have seen engines operating normally or with minor damage. What's the rush?
3. See above
4. See above
5. See above - with addition that fire crew MAY have recommended evacuation rather than indications on the flight deck.
AAIB report will probably give us the answers - there is nowhere near enough information yet.
2. We don't yet know what indications were being shown on the flight deck. The crew MAY have seen engines operating normally or with minor damage. What's the rush?
3. See above
4. See above
5. See above - with addition that fire crew MAY have recommended evacuation rather than indications on the flight deck.
AAIB report will probably give us the answers - there is nowhere near enough information yet.
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The more I read on this thread the fewer people I have respect for, now just who above has had command of a jet airliner or has opened and closed the cowlings on an A320 ?
Oh while I'm about is who knows the difference between the fan cowl and the C duct ?
Perhaps when we have sorted the sheep from the goats we can return to a reasonable debate based on real knowledge and experience, not on hours of Microsoft flight sim or half baked ideas of how an engine is constructed and maintained.
Oh while I'm about is who knows the difference between the fan cowl and the C duct ?
Perhaps when we have sorted the sheep from the goats we can return to a reasonable debate based on real knowledge and experience, not on hours of Microsoft flight sim or half baked ideas of how an engine is constructed and maintained.
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The problem would be compounded if both sides looked identical - as appears to have been the case here. I do not recall ever seeing the engine doors unlocked by way of a demo - I daresay that is now about to change for us all! To me this is systemic and boils down to training, so sacking pilots would really be counterproductive.
I work for the same outfit as you ADM and I think it would be really beneficially to have some sort of an 'engineering' day where we get taken around the aircraft and shown so of these things.
It is interesting at the least and may have the potential benefit of preventing a incident.
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Got to say, if I had looked out of the window and seen a large piece of metal flapping around, I would be extremely vocal about it.
I would expect my crew to get me back on terra firma ASAP.
As has been mentioned umpteen times on here,...the crew are expected to diverge from standard operating procedures, if those same procedures are deemed to be inappropriate,given the current circumstances.
Modern glass cockpit has soo many aides to situational awareness.
A worst case scenario briefing regarding lowest safe altitude, and shortest track miles to touchdown in case of emergency,reflected on Fix page with simple range/altitude arc....should be included in everyone's brief!
Autopilot in,....Vref for required flap setting....Max Autobrake,(if evacuation expected)..brief PA informs both cabin staff and passengers...whilst pilot monitoring completes as much as possible of emergency checklist..Quick review on finals....Down in minutes,tea and sandwiches on the lawn... 6 or 7...even at 250 tonnes!
I assume that the flight time in this incident was due to flying at lowest speed possible in order to retain the cowls...??
I would expect my crew to get me back on terra firma ASAP.
As has been mentioned umpteen times on here,...the crew are expected to diverge from standard operating procedures, if those same procedures are deemed to be inappropriate,given the current circumstances.
Modern glass cockpit has soo many aides to situational awareness.
A worst case scenario briefing regarding lowest safe altitude, and shortest track miles to touchdown in case of emergency,reflected on Fix page with simple range/altitude arc....should be included in everyone's brief!
Autopilot in,....Vref for required flap setting....Max Autobrake,(if evacuation expected)..brief PA informs both cabin staff and passengers...whilst pilot monitoring completes as much as possible of emergency checklist..Quick review on finals....Down in minutes,tea and sandwiches on the lawn... 6 or 7...even at 250 tonnes!
I assume that the flight time in this incident was due to flying at lowest speed possible in order to retain the cowls...??
Last edited by Yaw String; 27th May 2013 at 02:57.