Incident at Heathrow
I just wonder why they continued to climb on the BPK SID when they lost the cowlings right after takeoff
If he hadn't climbed he might have had to deal with a TCAS in addition to everything else
Last edited by MATELO; 26th May 2013 at 13:54.
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Uplinker,
I would agree for 95% of cases but an uncontained engine fire is the one (main) situation where I think you are justified in deviating from standard if your Immediate Actions dont put out the fire.
Onboard Fire would be the other one. In these two occasions, limits especially max landing weights go out the window as history has shown, these scenarios are true fights for survival.
Not that this applies here, of course.
I would agree for 95% of cases but an uncontained engine fire is the one (main) situation where I think you are justified in deviating from standard if your Immediate Actions dont put out the fire.
Onboard Fire would be the other one. In these two occasions, limits especially max landing weights go out the window as history has shown, these scenarios are true fights for survival.
Not that this applies here, of course.
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Am I alone in feeling there is a worrying amount of rigidity being expressed in terms of "what to do if..."
The following stood out as an example;
OK, it's nitpicking but its the word "contradiction" that makes me uncomfortable. It suggests to my ears that the briefing is regarded as a procedure first of all when it surely is only a suggestion or a guideline at best, and furthermore one that requires sticking to and implies that to do otherwise is questionable as it goes against the brief. We need to keep an open mind about what we will do in practice, and surely we should be at pains to make sure this is expressed and understood. It also ignores the fact that the briefing only covered a single engine failure and did not address the total loss of power and so was not applicable in any way at all.
Another example are the numerous suggestions that diverting to one's home base is preferable to going somewhere "unfamiliar" due to the need for a briefing, finding plates, landing performance, and apparently general unfamiliarity whatever that is, etc. Do professional pilots need "familiarity" with a field to land there safely? I ask you, how many of us have the home ILS plates directly to hand on every departure? Many/most won't I suspect. Do professional airmen esp those with modern FMS need plates to shoot an ILS? Why? Do professional airman usually have any trouble shooting an approach at an airfield as "unfamiliar" as STN? Do professional pilots not know how much - ballpark figures - length they need to land in non normal configs? And thus dismiss LTN's 2400m as unsuitable out of hand? To do the same for STN is even more far-fetched. What on earth do you need a plate for if the ILS is self tuning, you've declared a mayday and its a blue sky day? Even if it claggy and you need to get down - and all of these remarks are based on need to do it - you know that 200ft aal is a DA that won't kill you no matter what at fields you know aren't terrain restricted. So you do grab a plate, just how much do you need to brief at a place like STN, even if you do regard it as somewhere in Outer Mongolia? It could probably be done in twenty seconds.
I don't mean these thought to refer specifically to the recent incident, its more some musings on our seemingly ever increasing reliance on procedures that were meant as guidance but morph over time into something far more rigid to the extent that some of them have all but become "law". From this follows a lack of awareness that they can be varied and eventually an inability to consider it. I don't think that is altogether the best way.
We all know why procedures are there and why we stick to them almost all the time, what bothers me is the ever decreasing awareness that sometimes it is better if you vary from them, or even abandon them on rare occasions. The human factors firewall we've built up around "sticking to procedures" could usefully have a few more gates in it I reckon.
I know this involves the development (read re-invention in some companies) of Airmansh*** . Oh B@llox! I nearly said it again, I'll get my coat ...
The following stood out as an example;
acting instinctively and in contradiction with the briefing
Another example are the numerous suggestions that diverting to one's home base is preferable to going somewhere "unfamiliar" due to the need for a briefing, finding plates, landing performance, and apparently general unfamiliarity whatever that is, etc. Do professional pilots need "familiarity" with a field to land there safely? I ask you, how many of us have the home ILS plates directly to hand on every departure? Many/most won't I suspect. Do professional airmen esp those with modern FMS need plates to shoot an ILS? Why? Do professional airman usually have any trouble shooting an approach at an airfield as "unfamiliar" as STN? Do professional pilots not know how much - ballpark figures - length they need to land in non normal configs? And thus dismiss LTN's 2400m as unsuitable out of hand? To do the same for STN is even more far-fetched. What on earth do you need a plate for if the ILS is self tuning, you've declared a mayday and its a blue sky day? Even if it claggy and you need to get down - and all of these remarks are based on need to do it - you know that 200ft aal is a DA that won't kill you no matter what at fields you know aren't terrain restricted. So you do grab a plate, just how much do you need to brief at a place like STN, even if you do regard it as somewhere in Outer Mongolia? It could probably be done in twenty seconds.
I don't mean these thought to refer specifically to the recent incident, its more some musings on our seemingly ever increasing reliance on procedures that were meant as guidance but morph over time into something far more rigid to the extent that some of them have all but become "law". From this follows a lack of awareness that they can be varied and eventually an inability to consider it. I don't think that is altogether the best way.
We all know why procedures are there and why we stick to them almost all the time, what bothers me is the ever decreasing awareness that sometimes it is better if you vary from them, or even abandon them on rare occasions. The human factors firewall we've built up around "sticking to procedures" could usefully have a few more gates in it I reckon.
I know this involves the development (read re-invention in some companies) of Airmansh*** . Oh B@llox! I nearly said it again, I'll get my coat ...
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can you (or anyone else, for that matter) confirm that the loss of these cowlings was not a life threatening situation
Ham Phisted,
I didn't say there was a dire emergency, but maybe you should re-read the original poster's comments. As I said, they were entirely reasonable on the basis of his whole post, and the sniffy ripost was uncalled for. You and Daft Nigel aren't "children of the magenta line", by any chance??
I well recall a double engine failure in an aircraft on approach to EGLL, fortunately it had two more ---- on the flight deck one reaction was to burn off fuel, as the SOP recommendation was to reduce weight to a minimum for a two engine approach.
However, the command decision was to get on the ground ASAP, given the strange but similar symptoms of two engine failures in quick succession, an emergency was declared, and believe me, the briefings were very brief, almost limited to "what the bug speed?"
It was a good decision, the problem was caused by contaminated fuel in Bahrain, either of the two remaining could have quit at any time. An SQ 747 staggered into EDFF on the same morning, same reason, same fuel source.
In a somewhat similar case, double engine failure on approach, this time already past Stonecutters for RW 13 at the old Hong Kong ---- what would you do there --- no time for the whole two engine approach briefing ---- and would you want to try a two engine missed approach there, with the gear already down.
A B747 almost ran out of fuel (no fault of the crew) going into Newark, diversion from KJFK, the symptoms were two engines quit in quick succession. The Captain short-circuited the normal approach,(and all the preparation and briefings for a two engine out approach) and joined the ILS at the OM, a third engine quit just after touchdown. What do you think the result might have been if they just "followed standard procedures". Could you hand fly and capture the ILS at 1200 feet, and "fly the aeroplane" in IMC.
Sullenberger was able to do what he did, because he could fly the aeroplane, almost instinctively.
An adequate briefing is a statement of intent, unfortunately, in some airlines an departure or approach briefing is more like a student briefing for a flying lesson --- and pilots who are so constrained that they locked into briefing of the latter kind, and are incapable of anything else become a hazard in an emergency.
And, after some 25,000h, I don't think I need somebody like you to teach me how to suck eggs. Fortunately, I come from a training background where SOPs (nice simple ones) are the norm, and thinking "outside the box" when necessary is all part of the training and indoctrination system ---- some people call it airmanship, I call it common sense.
I didn't say there was a dire emergency, but maybe you should re-read the original poster's comments. As I said, they were entirely reasonable on the basis of his whole post, and the sniffy ripost was uncalled for. You and Daft Nigel aren't "children of the magenta line", by any chance??
I well recall a double engine failure in an aircraft on approach to EGLL, fortunately it had two more ---- on the flight deck one reaction was to burn off fuel, as the SOP recommendation was to reduce weight to a minimum for a two engine approach.
However, the command decision was to get on the ground ASAP, given the strange but similar symptoms of two engine failures in quick succession, an emergency was declared, and believe me, the briefings were very brief, almost limited to "what the bug speed?"
It was a good decision, the problem was caused by contaminated fuel in Bahrain, either of the two remaining could have quit at any time. An SQ 747 staggered into EDFF on the same morning, same reason, same fuel source.
In a somewhat similar case, double engine failure on approach, this time already past Stonecutters for RW 13 at the old Hong Kong ---- what would you do there --- no time for the whole two engine approach briefing ---- and would you want to try a two engine missed approach there, with the gear already down.
A B747 almost ran out of fuel (no fault of the crew) going into Newark, diversion from KJFK, the symptoms were two engines quit in quick succession. The Captain short-circuited the normal approach,(and all the preparation and briefings for a two engine out approach) and joined the ILS at the OM, a third engine quit just after touchdown. What do you think the result might have been if they just "followed standard procedures". Could you hand fly and capture the ILS at 1200 feet, and "fly the aeroplane" in IMC.
Sullenberger was able to do what he did, because he could fly the aeroplane, almost instinctively.
An adequate briefing is a statement of intent, unfortunately, in some airlines an departure or approach briefing is more like a student briefing for a flying lesson --- and pilots who are so constrained that they locked into briefing of the latter kind, and are incapable of anything else become a hazard in an emergency.
And, after some 25,000h, I don't think I need somebody like you to teach me how to suck eggs. Fortunately, I come from a training background where SOPs (nice simple ones) are the norm, and thinking "outside the box" when necessary is all part of the training and indoctrination system ---- some people call it airmanship, I call it common sense.
Last edited by LeadSled; 26th May 2013 at 14:56.
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Sillert, V.I. in post #420
Having researched this accident extensively, I rather suspect that had they done that, there would have been a similar result to the onboard fire on an Air Union Blériot 155 in October 1926.
Not familiar with that one?
October 1926 Air Union Blériot 155 crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
And equally with flight 712 you could argue that if they had flown the SID & concentrated on following the briefing, with better CRM they'd have extinguished the engine fire & returned for a more controlled landing, saving 5 lives & the aircraft.
Not familiar with that one?
October 1926 Air Union Blériot 155 crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Last edited by Super VC-10; 26th May 2013 at 15:08. Reason: spelling
LeadSled
Ummmm this could be fun.......I'll grab some popcorn, pull up a chair and await with interest NOD's reply.......(or maybe he'll be too polite to rise to the bait)
You and Daft Nigel aren't "children of the magenta line", by any chance??
Last edited by wiggy; 26th May 2013 at 17:26.
In the case of the BOAC 707 GARWE - I recall the fire handle was never pulled which, amongst other things, arms the fire extinguishers hence the reason why the fire continued.
From wiki:-
This was a long time before CRM etc - the correct accomplishment of the fire drill was entirely on the shoulders of the Flight Engineer who was, I believe, on his first trip not under supervision.
One result of the inquiry was that when the fire drill was read after the memory items the Captain was required to also check that the fire handle had been pulled.
One aspect which I don't think has been mentioned in all suggestions of urgency to land that, in the event of various parts departing the aircraft, it might be prudent to do a low speed handling check at height - you don't really want to find the aircraft departing in roll (say) when you extend flaps on the approach with less height available for correction and recovery.
There are very few cases (like -WE) where you need to get back down on the ground ASAP. If you are not sure what to do it's often better to sit on your hands and do nothing (other than safe aircraft control) before regretting hasty action.
Well done to all crew, ATC and emergency services.
From wiki:-
The crew's omitting to shut off the fuel to the engine was blamed for the rapid growth of the fire and the loss of the aircraft.
One result of the inquiry was that when the fire drill was read after the memory items the Captain was required to also check that the fire handle had been pulled.
One aspect which I don't think has been mentioned in all suggestions of urgency to land that, in the event of various parts departing the aircraft, it might be prudent to do a low speed handling check at height - you don't really want to find the aircraft departing in roll (say) when you extend flaps on the approach with less height available for correction and recovery.
There are very few cases (like -WE) where you need to get back down on the ground ASAP. If you are not sure what to do it's often better to sit on your hands and do nothing (other than safe aircraft control) before regretting hasty action.
Well done to all crew, ATC and emergency services.
Last edited by fireflybob; 26th May 2013 at 18:20.
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No good having a fire extinguisher on the engine if the engine has fallen off and it's the actual wing that is on fire. Had they not got Whiskey Echo back on the deck, the wing would almost certainly have failed. I can't see that there would have been any survivors in that scenario.
N4790P
It’s a long time ago but IIRC the ex British Eagle aircraft had the Fire Handles located on the forward glareshield whereas the standard BOAC aircraft had them located on the overhead P5 panel. It was very difficult for the FE to reach and see them from his position.
Interestingly, all other non standard aircraft that had the Fire Handles located on the glareshield were modified after this accident.
Interestingly, all other non standard aircraft that had the Fire Handles located on the glareshield were modified after this accident.
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And in the current incident, with all the cowls gone & one engine trailing smoke, just how far away were they from an uncontrollable fire?
Following the SID buys time & space to assess the problem, but equally this could have ended in disaster if it had caught fire when they were at BPK @ FL110 with no effective means of extinguishing it.
I don't see this as a clear cut decision, but of course I have no idea what information was being presented to the crew at the time.
Last edited by Sillert,V.I.; 26th May 2013 at 18:29.
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The engine fell off because of the fire. But the wing continued to burn after the engine had fallen off. I'd recommend a read of Fire Over Heathrow by Susan Otway, Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2008; ISBN 184415739-3 for the full story behind that accident.
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Has any airline ever considered a new flying position, let's say "Captain" for arguments sake? Maybe on those days when you can't get throught to Ops or Dispatch to solve your immediate crisis this "Captain" person could make a decision on the flight deck based on experience and judgement while remaining responsible for the safety of the aircraft and its occupants? Bit radical I know, and I don't think it'll ever catch on but it's a hell of an idea.
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CRM is great and I'm all for it. However that does not mean the cockpit a democracy. Only one person's decision counts in the final analysis. There is no substute for years and hours of experience.
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As for 'real world' Vs 'legal world', sorry numpties, there is no difference.
As for walk-arounds, look AND see, yes?
If the Captain signed for an aircraft that was unsafe to fly irrespective of engineering shortfalls, then he should be dismissed without notice, he/she would be only too aware of their responsibilties under PART A(1) and this is why salaries are substantial. End of.
As for walk-arounds, look AND see, yes?
If the Captain signed for an aircraft that was unsafe to fly irrespective of engineering shortfalls, then he should be dismissed without notice, he/she would be only too aware of their responsibilties under PART A(1) and this is why salaries are substantial. End of.
Last edited by hyatt_1_alpha; 26th May 2013 at 19:43.
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If the Captain signed for an aircraft that was unsafe to fly then he should be dismissed without notice, he/she would be only too aware of their responsibilties under PART A(1). End of.
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Ayroplain, if there have been multiple previous occurancies even more reason to dismiss the Captain if it is found he/she failed in their responsibilities under Part A(1).