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AF 447 report out

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Old 6th Jul 2012, 09:58
  #81 (permalink)  
 
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I still vote for the pilots being to blame. The entire point of having pilots in the loop is that they are supposed to sort out the confusing and unexpected. That includes the inputs from your own human failings such as misperception and adrenaline.

Are the techniques to handle unknown/complex/confusing situations understood?
Yes, and it's bloody simple in this case - power, attitude, trim
Are they still taught?
It looks like the answer to this is no, or at least not well enough to be remembered when it counts.
A few hours in the sim will not fix it, but better flight training will. I'm guessing here, as it's 20 years since I last taught commercial pilots, but 50 more hours of hands-on handling and instructing in airmanship should do it. The other point is that a proportion (higher than at present) needs to be taught by hard-nosed grumpy old gits who've seen it all, rather than 19 year olds with 251 hours who are hours building towards a commuter airliner job. But these older guys won't work for peanuts, so the system produces monkeys.

Last edited by Fox3WheresMyBanana; 6th Jul 2012 at 09:59.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 10:05
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Pilot Skills mixtures

I have 40+ years jets with mostly B737 Fkr 100 in the last 25

I have never flown an airbus but have played with the sim a little and thought about it afterwards

It seems to me that all pilots need a mixture of skills and knowledge which varies with their particular situation. We bring the our own set with us when we join a fleet and the trainers adjust it to fill the percieved need.

For the B737 it was mainly watch look act but I think the skill set required with an airbus changes subtly. I think the required skill set inclines much more to listen watch think think think.

The airbus was carefully designed to avoid pilots making stupid errors which most of will given a fair oppportunity under pressure. This results in a falacy that the aircraft can be designed to avoid mistakes.

Pilots then fall for this story, because in the main it is true, and then the one in a million situation strikes when you have fully aquired the "aircraft must be right" habit
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 10:14
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The new, modern, cheap solid state IRS's that come in modern smart phones are not required. Modern jets have 3 or more "Real", no $%#@t certified 3 axis accelerometers and gyroscopes called IRS's or IRU's. On a Scarebus, if you call up the "bird", you have instantaneous AOA info. The pitch difference between your "bird" and you pitch bars is - tada - your AOA. A HUD would be nice, but you have the same exact display on your PFD. On a HUD it is just overlaid on the outside world. Awesome for TO and landing, but at 35K feet the PFD works just as well.

The pilots had everything they needed, including the procedures in FCOM. Most "unreliable speed" crashes have happened on TO. It is VERY diffucult to diagnose in that case. Is it unreliable speed? Windshear? At 35K, level flight, autopilot and autothrust on it is not that difficult, and a trained event on all A320 and above airbus aircraft.

Pilot error and systemic pilot training error. This should not have happened.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 10:28
  #84 (permalink)  
 
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Yep the pilots screwed up because they didn't know how to fly. There are quirks in FBW Airbus aeroplanes that can confuse the issue (I'm an Airbus guy but I'm sure other types have challenging areas as well, most aircraft do). The Thales pitot tube fiasco is a disgrace. The airlines hire cheap inexperienced guys, don't train them properly, continue to drive down T's and C's discouraging experienced guys from joining or remaining.

All true but none of it the root cause. To me that is the certifying and licencing authorities. They set the rules of this game and they have not being doing their job properly for years. Someone asked if we can expect to see accident rates start to rise. You better believe it. It's not going to happen quickly, but as experience and skill trickle out of this industry it is certain to happen. At the moment the effects of inadequate design and training are being masked by the experienced operators still flying the line.

The public think our job is easy (these things fly themselves don't they), and that current safety levels are "normal" or "natural". Flying is inherently unforgiving and risky. We have systems in place to control that risk, and those systems must be continuously reviewed and updated.

It would appear to me that those in charge now don't understand what made saftey improve over the last sixty odd years and are now actively dismantling these systems. Did I mention EASA?
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 10:36
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Did I mention EASA?
The muppet show with its French Director?
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 10:37
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@USMCProbe

The point was not about pilots not having accelerometer derived speed data as part of IRS/INS but about the automatics completely relying on pitot tubes and not being redundant and using accelerometer calculated speed as backup. From engineering point of view, loss of Pitot tubes does not really require disconnecting the automation but someone somewhere made the decision (or formal regulations) that this is what is supposed to happen.

Someone has to make a decision here - either make the automatics more redundant or require the pilots to regularly practice without it.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 10:54
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But I seem to remember reading on one of the other numerous threads that below a certain airspeed, the stall warning stops. If this is the case, then if they pulled up, with very low airspeed and a nasty AoA, then wouldn't the stall warning stop giving the impression that there was no stall? Then when pushing nose down, the stall warning would start again when airspeed increased above the limits 'causing' them to pull up again to wrongly get out of the stall?
This feature is intended to keep the STALL warning from triggering continuously while rolling on the ground. The speed threshold has been set so low (<60 knots) that it can only be exceeded while on the ground, there is no way you can slow down that much while airborne, not with such a plane. This assumes of course that you have reliable airspeed data, if you have a UAS condition than anything goes and such a failsafe can itself become an issue . As has already been suggested by other posters it would make sense to make STALL warning suppression entirely dependent on WoW status and do away completely with any speed threshold. If your wheels are on the ground then a stall condition becomes meaningless as you're not actually flying, if you're still airborne then a STALL warning should never be suppressed, regardless of the (possibly unreliable) IAS readings.

Regardless of the above I find it hard to believe the hypothesis -- because that's all it is, unfortunately we cannot ask the pilots what was actually going through their mind but can only formulate hypothesis -- that they went back to pulling on the stick because when they pushed the previously suppressed STALL warning became active again. To do so would go against basic training principles that are engrained in any pilot, even a lowly PPL, namely that when stalled pulling will only put you deeper into the stall, only pushing can get you out of it. The only situation where this would not be the case is when flying inverted, but I'm pretty sure the AF pilots were not confused to the point of believing that their plane had turned upside down.

Last edited by Dg800; 6th Jul 2012 at 10:57.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 11:36
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The symptoms of a full stall are fourfold viz nose pitch down, heavy buffet, high rate of descent, possible wing drop - one of the big clues other than attitude should have been high rate of descent - have never thought much of efis VSIs - the old display was far more noticeable.

Of course amount of buffet depends on type etc.

But the error chain started the moment the nose pitched up - basic flying says maintain the correct attitude.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 11:41
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I still don't understand something which I hope you airliner pilots can answer, please. For my IMC rating (it's a UK-only qualification with very limited privileges that allows IMC flight), I was taught (over simplifying slightly for discussion) that if you don't know what is happening with the airspeed, set cruise power and put the AI in the middle with the wings level and things will settle to a point where you are in control again. Does that work at M0.8 at FL350?

Last edited by JOE-FBS; 6th Jul 2012 at 11:44.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 12:03
  #90 (permalink)  
 
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A lot of good discussion points here

but

the issue is how to address these conerns whether you assign the causes to the crew or the airplane.

In the long run of time neither will be perfect, ever.

It's impossible to train for every specific malfunction as it is impossible to annunciate every specific malfunction. Somehow there must be a balance.

You simply decide how to minmize against what you think might be the next occurence.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 12:21
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Originally Posted by JOE-FBS
I still don't understand something which I hope you airliner pilots can answer, please. For my IMC rating (it's a UK-only qualification with very limited privileges that allows IMC flight), I was taught (over simplifying slightly for discussion) that if you don't know what is happening with the airspeed, set cruise power and put the AI in the middle with the wings level and things will settle to a point where you are in control again. Does that work at M0.8 at FL350?
Pretty much. First you have to recognise that you have a problem. Then you have to have an idea of an appropriate cruise power setting (years of automated flight and non-moving thrust levers tend to erode that awareness), and you may have to manually trim (not instinctive for some Airbus pilots).

However, in my experience, most Airbus pilots have zero experience of hand flying the aeroplane above about 10k, never mind at high level. This deficit is not compensated for in the simulator, where most excercises are conducted below 10k, hey ho.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 12:48
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did the pilots diagnose "unreliable air speed"? did they comprehend it?

The basis of these points have been with the industry for some time, but perhaps they have not been heeded:- Errors in Aviation Decision Making.
Pilots either don’t understand the situation, or if understood chose an inappropriate course of action.

Hopefully this unfortunate accident will reinvigorate the need to further understand and address many human performance issues in awareness and decision making, and generate an impetus for change.
The task would be to improve skills of situation assessment and judgement, not only for the pilots, but also operators, designers, and regulators.
The aim – perfection, may be unattainable; but achievement of consistent high standards of behaviour which together with safety barriers should help the industry maintain and improve a very good safety record.
The activity is that of change – in the way we think about safety, the role of the human, automation, training, and regulation. With change there is risk, these have to be managed and balanced with cost.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 13:03
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The AF447 accident seems to have more than a few similarities with a lesser recent incident on the London Underground

Rail Accident Investigation: Report 13/2012

Simplistically, a train managed to depart a station into the tunnel with the doors open.

Now of course, that's interlocked multiple different ways to be impossible ...... but a whole range of failures and difficulties over the previous 10 minutes, brand-new, all-electronic, latest-technology train, recent software updates, inadequate and conflicting error messages, misunderstood and rarely used manual overrides, etc, culminated in the driver (who normally does nothing more than oversee the automatics) of several years experience losing situational awareness.

Sound familiar ?

Last edited by WHBM; 6th Jul 2012 at 13:06.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 13:10
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Maybe in some respects we are over training pilots - there seem to be an obsession these days for all sorts of mnemonics and very structured procedures which can in fact obscure priorities.

As I say "Flying is very simple but there are a lot of people around trying to make it as complicated as possible".

As part of the act of "dumbing down" of the profession maybe we are relying too much on the procedural aspects (slavish adherence to SOPs etc - yes, I know, we need them!) - almost like "painting by numbers" so much so that when pilots are faced with something "unusual" they become lost.

Dare I say those of us who were brought up on basic a/c with basic autopilots (no autothrust or FMC or EFIS) were "hard wired" for manual flight. We may be a bit rusty but it's no big deal if we have to hand fly. The modern generation of pilots have not got this framework to fall back on when it's all falling apart.

Am reminded something my father (who was a veteran light a/c instructor) said to me "Masters practice fundamentals every single day - look at an accomplished concert pianist who will practice scales every day". If we want pilots to be masters of their trade then they have to be given the opportunity to practice basics on a regular basis.

Last edited by fireflybob; 6th Jul 2012 at 13:11.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 13:33
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nine minutes of dumb.

three brains stopped working for three minutes, nine minutes of dumb.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 13:43
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@soylent green
I would hesitate to say the airplane did not give them the message, the wind noise level at 60kts would be appreciably different to 500kts...? Or is it? - I'm unsure. I think that point was discussed way way back.

But full thrust plus rapid descent is a mushing stall. I think their critical skills froze under pressure of the unfamiliar. I suppose they don't spend enough enroute time rehearsing emergencies. Better than snoozing and keeps boredom away. I want to feel safe up there.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 14:21
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At the end of the day the real problem is frightening...

Flying a functional airplane is inherently simple.

Now landing an airplane (or taking off) is infinitely more complex and challenging. This reality is reflected in the relevant incident and accident rates. An autopilot as originally conceived was designed to minimize pilot workload during the safest part of the flight with the goal of maximizing pilot awareness and efficiency when it counted...during the final phase of the flight.

The AP was never intended to replace the pilot...yet we have the AP flying the aircraft for 99% of most flights. In this particular instance we finally reached a point where the PF & PM were collectively unable to fly a functional airplane with a completely manageable technical issue that had occurred on type numerous times and was well documented.

The complete lack of professionalism demonstrated via the transcripts clearly indicates a systemic problem in the training/CRM for AF. The reality that the problem is widespread enough to place to completely unqualified individuals in the wrong place at the same time is a clear warning sign that the entire training and screening process needs to be reviewed.

Last edited by SLFinAZ; 6th Jul 2012 at 14:24.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 14:21
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@nine minutes of dumb

The transcript is a riot. No wonder it was claimed to be such an offense for it to be leaked. Almost as "good" as the one from (my favorite) Smolensk:

02:11:03 (Bonin) Je suis en TOGA, hein?
I'm in TOGA, huh?

02:13:40 (Robert) Remonte... remonte... remonte... remonte...
Climb... climb... climb... climb...

02:13:40 (Bonin) Mais je suis ā fond ā cabrer depuis tout ā l'heure!
But I've had the stick back the whole time!

At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself.
However, the dumb dumb dumb idea of ("dual input") averaging the stick inputs without even providing the feedback to the other pilot is stupid. How come force-feedback is almost expected for good computer game console but not for a giant jet? I would argue that both Airbus and AirFrance should pay through the nose for this adventure. Airbus for designing a plane that allowed one pilot to do something completely stupid without the other knowing about it, AirFrance for the "performance" of the pilots.

The second screwup is designing a jet where everyone almost assumes (they should not assume that) is going to be flown almost entirely on automatics and then dropping off automatics at the slightest problem (in this case iced up pitot tubes) as if it required the same drastic response as say collision warning, thus forcing pilots into the situation they obviously have not been trained for.

Complete FUBAR.

Air France 447 Flight-Data Recorder Transcript - What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447 - Popular Mechanics

Last edited by SadPole; 6th Jul 2012 at 16:23. Reason: added transcript link
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 14:38
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@fireflybob

Dumbing down pilots is the result of a fashion in all technology nowadays which is about "idiot proofing" everything according to dreams of marketeers and not engineers.

I am not a pilot but I am an engineer and I have spent good part of my life opposing this concept. It's not about automatics or no automatics but about who designs it. The true goals of automation are rarely simplicity and sense and more often stupidity of short-sighted profit. Meaning it is mostly designed by idiot marketeers and not engineers.

To adapt a joke about the issue:
Marketeer: This plane is by far our most pilot-friendly. It has only one button and we push it for you at the factory.

This is all industry-wide problem. In automotive industry, for example, they specifically designed all car automatics in a way that only the dealer can service even the simplest problem. The goal is profit not safety or sense.
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Old 6th Jul 2012, 14:58
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But the error chain started the moment the nose pitched up - basic flying says maintain the correct attitude.
Sorry, i donīt agree.
Why were they at that position at that time?
Other flights, e.g. IB, diverted miles to the east.

Thatīs when/where it started!!
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