AF 447 report out
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Breaking Story:
Below is Roger Rapoport's latest response to Air France 447 developments making headlines around the world.
The Rio Paris Crash: Air France 447
And:
Pilot briefing 'could have prevented Air France tragedy' - World news, News - Belfasttelegraph.co.uk
Below is Roger Rapoport's latest response to Air France 447 developments making headlines around the world.
The Rio Paris Crash: Air France 447
And:
Pilot briefing 'could have prevented Air France tragedy' - World news, News - Belfasttelegraph.co.uk
Last edited by jcjeant; 24th Jul 2012 at 22:37.
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I read the first line of the first paragraph of the first chapter (the introduction, actually) of the book, and it alone is such buehlchit that I went no farther. Totally misinterprets what fly-by-wire means.
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I read the first line of the first paragraph of the first chapter (the introduction, actually) of the book, and it alone is such buehlchit that I went no farther. Totally misinterprets what fly-by-wire means.
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Ya think? As a literary "criticism"--which I actually do for a living, thank you, since you can read my reviews at Air & Space Smithsonian and Aviation History Magazines--it saves me a lot of time.
jcj;
In the available text, (Introduction), the author seems confused and even misinformed about technical fly-by-wire control solutions, the notion of "automation" and the concept of "protections", (or as gums puts it, "limits").
I think that that is a major fault in a book claiming to present to readers an informed discussion on this accident specifically, and an explanation regarding these very different ideas generally. From the introduction alone, I couldn't take the book seriously as a technical explication.
Whether the author is able to clarify the differences between these three things for his readers in the rest of the book is unclear from what is available.
In the available text, (Introduction), the author seems confused and even misinformed about technical fly-by-wire control solutions, the notion of "automation" and the concept of "protections", (or as gums puts it, "limits").
I think that that is a major fault in a book claiming to present to readers an informed discussion on this accident specifically, and an explanation regarding these very different ideas generally. From the introduction alone, I couldn't take the book seriously as a technical explication.
Whether the author is able to clarify the differences between these three things for his readers in the rest of the book is unclear from what is available.
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In the available text, (Introduction), the author seems confused and even misinformed about technical fly-by-wire control solutions, the notion of "automation" and the concept of "protections", (or as gums puts it, "limits").
If you read the article by the author (on the blog) you have to wonder if the purpose of his book is to be an explanation of what the FBW is .. or another subject
Personally I do not believe that his book have aimed to explain what is the FBW .. but rather to highlight deficiencies (from many parties) that would have made the AF447 accident happen
Last edited by jcjeant; 25th Jul 2012 at 02:01.
A couple of thoughts
Roger is an aviation expert?
OK, so both crews had trouble implementing procedures, or recognizing what the malfunction was.
Sorry, but I find this to be deliberate ignorance.
Professional pilots know how to fly on instruments, using reference to attitude indications displayed on their primary flight instruments.
You can refer to the artificial horizon and fly with reference to it, just as the captain on the other flight flew with reference to the real horizon.
The other link has the above.
Sorry, a malfunction is not by definition a crisis.
For people who write for a living, they sure go out of their way to get words and meanings wrong ... if they are selling themselves as aviation experts.
Roger is an aviation expert?
Except for the fact that they were flying during daylight, the pilots of the August 2008 Paris-Madagascar Airbus 340 faced identical problems to those that later confronted flight 447 to Paris.
When the captain lost reliable airspeed due to pitot tube icing, he did not set power and pitch according to flight procedures or maintain level flight as prescribed by the Air France emergency procedure checklist.
When the captain lost reliable airspeed due to pitot tube icing, he did not set power and pitch according to flight procedures or maintain level flight as prescribed by the Air France emergency procedure checklist.
In the midst of heavy turbulence, he immediately descended 4,000 feet, ignoring both the flight director and a brief stall warning.
“Because he could see the horizon he had a major advantage over the Air France pilots who were blindsided in a storm at night,” says a technical expert who has read the investigator’s summary of the previously undisclosed Madagascar flight report.
“Because he could see the horizon he had a major advantage over the Air France pilots who were blindsided in a storm at night,” says a technical expert who has read the investigator’s summary of the previously undisclosed Madagascar flight report.
Professional pilots know how to fly on instruments, using reference to attitude indications displayed on their primary flight instruments.
You can refer to the artificial horizon and fly with reference to it, just as the captain on the other flight flew with reference to the real horizon.
According to an online update to a book on the crash, Air France and Airbus failed to notify pilots about a crisis aboard a Paris to Madagascar flight on August 16, 2008, that bore striking resemblances to the calamities which befell flight AF447 over the south Atlantic nine months later.
Sorry, a malfunction is not by definition a crisis.
For people who write for a living, they sure go out of their way to get words and meanings wrong ... if they are selling themselves as aviation experts.
Personally I do not believe that his book have aimed to explain what is the FBW .. but rather to highlight deficiencies (from many parties) that would have made the AF447 accident happen
Lonewolf_50;
Good examples. The research and the writing is Reader's Digest quality.
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I have read most of the posts with regard to this accident. Many people pontificating about this law or that law etc etc. Does the AB have standby instruments? If so are the crew trained to use these in times of uncertanty.
If not why not?
They have been a big help to me in times past. Maybe the whole accident is down to poor training.
If not why not?
They have been a big help to me in times past. Maybe the whole accident is down to poor training.
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Airline pilots are trained professionals, and the planes are safe machines.
This is what is pounding in public for years .. as an advertising slogan
Is that this slogan has to undergo some corrections after the accident of AF447?
This is what is pounding in public for years .. as an advertising slogan
Is that this slogan has to undergo some corrections after the accident of AF447?
As an adjunct to your post, Lyman, the statistical probability of you or I getting on to a commercial air transport and arriving safely at our chosen destination is in the 99% + range.
That doesn't make 100% a valid expectation, or reality, nor does it make the tragic exception, like AF 447, any easier to swallow.
BOAC: to be fair, rogerg cuts to the meat of the matter, in terms of what one would expect as a standard means to deal with an instrument problem during IFR flight. Yes, it may be a bit reductionist in scope.
That said, when all of the Airspeed indications are Tangu Uniform, one is forced to use cross check and secondary scan for performance, getting out the checklists, and follow that with a methodical and sound crew response ... gee, we are back to a core point of his, that of training.
A well trained crew does these things.
That doesn't make 100% a valid expectation, or reality, nor does it make the tragic exception, like AF 447, any easier to swallow.
BOAC: to be fair, rogerg cuts to the meat of the matter, in terms of what one would expect as a standard means to deal with an instrument problem during IFR flight. Yes, it may be a bit reductionist in scope.
That said, when all of the Airspeed indications are Tangu Uniform, one is forced to use cross check and secondary scan for performance, getting out the checklists, and follow that with a methodical and sound crew response ... gee, we are back to a core point of his, that of training.
A well trained crew does these things.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 27th Jul 2012 at 15:59.
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf
BOAC: to be fair, rogerg cuts to the meat of the matter,
1) There was no need for 'Standby Instruments' for attitude.- unless you or Rogerg know differently to the BEA, the primaries were fully functional.
2) There were no 'standby' ASIs fitted
..and as for "Maybe the whole accident is down to poor training.?"
Oozlum time?
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the primaries were fully functional.
Flying should not be that complicated.
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Lonewolf50, BOAC
If the primary displays were reputed fully functional, why are video recorders the new clamor? Displayed information is not recorded? Puzzle...
If the primary displays were reputed fully functional, why are video recorders the new clamor? Displayed information is not recorded? Puzzle...
Another ..
I read in the TV programs that on PpruneTV was programed the documentary "the whole truth about the crash of AF447" on Tuesday 7:45 p.m.
When I looked PpruneTV at 7:45 p.m. ... I saw an ad for a flying school ... and after .. apologies for the delay for the documentary
Sometimes .. what is written in the book is not what one sees on the screen
Last edited by jcjeant; 27th Jul 2012 at 22:56.
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What we have is no proof of what pilots were seeing on the panel. I have seen. "What the ECAM would have looked like...." but we do have proof from the CVR: "we have no indications..."
Let's say Bonin survived, bloody but alive, 227 dead, and he is up for manslaughter. Is the jury PPRuNe? Do we ignore his protests of "We had no indications..." in that case, his testimony would have to be allowed, why is the CVR being ignored?
Way back, because the displays are not saved on DFDR, new guidelines are in place to record the PFD.
Other Airbus wide bodies have had incidents of loss of displays with loss of speeds.
Read the CVR with a synthetic bias toward pilots who were flying an upset jet without instrumentation, and see if the story starts to answer more questions....
Why did Dubois not intervene? If the screens were black, everybody's experience is at par; replacing either pilot in a seat would be bad, they were at the start, Dubois had no clue.
With even a minimum of trust in these three guys, one has got to allow for some mitigating evidence that actually is available, but disregarded?
" I have no vario..." " I don't even have vario?"
Further, it explains the lack of comment, with black screens, what's to discuss?
What could Dubois have been after, "Wait, Autopilot ! ....click....."
I've heard the standard reply, what else could he be wanting from auto?
Mod: this is written by a pilot, to pilots, about pilots, and the report; what say you let this one remain?
Let's say Bonin survived, bloody but alive, 227 dead, and he is up for manslaughter. Is the jury PPRuNe? Do we ignore his protests of "We had no indications..." in that case, his testimony would have to be allowed, why is the CVR being ignored?
Way back, because the displays are not saved on DFDR, new guidelines are in place to record the PFD.
Other Airbus wide bodies have had incidents of loss of displays with loss of speeds.
Read the CVR with a synthetic bias toward pilots who were flying an upset jet without instrumentation, and see if the story starts to answer more questions....
Why did Dubois not intervene? If the screens were black, everybody's experience is at par; replacing either pilot in a seat would be bad, they were at the start, Dubois had no clue.
With even a minimum of trust in these three guys, one has got to allow for some mitigating evidence that actually is available, but disregarded?
" I have no vario..." " I don't even have vario?"
Further, it explains the lack of comment, with black screens, what's to discuss?
What could Dubois have been after, "Wait, Autopilot ! ....click....."
I've heard the standard reply, what else could he be wanting from auto?
Mod: this is written by a pilot, to pilots, about pilots, and the report; what say you let this one remain?
Last edited by Lyman; 27th Jul 2012 at 23:50.
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We know that the PF kept pulling back on the SS. He was approaching a stall and forced the aircraft to continue to go into a full stall. Then he continued back pressure for about 39,000 ft to impact. End of story.