DontHangUp, I added the {brackets} for ease of reference
... the fact {A}the crew never recognized they were in a stall and {B}never attempted to remove themselves from the stall.
I'll nitpick slightly here and point out that while {A} looks to be true, {B} may not be so clear cut. Point being, if stall was at any point recognized, by either pilot he may not necessarily have said anything. All that they said is not all that they saw, experienced, and decided. It seems well established that the CRM and crew synergy wasn't at its best in this mishap, nor that the pilots were other than task loaded early on. There is also the impression I get of a frustrated PNF calling the captain back, perhaps thinking " I can't work with this guy!" but I am on thin ice with that.
Early on, you get the PNF asking, in re the crickets, "what's that?"
Is that an indication that at least one of crew was concerned with a stall, or approach to one? We can't be sure. Verbalization of that concern is not recorded, or if recorded was redacted. (<--- very unlikely)
Another tidbit shows us that early in the event, the PF set TOGA and the nose up (12-15deg?). He may have been trying to avoid a stall (crickets chirp finally gets through?) by using a low altitude response to stall warning, or he may have been applying a response to low altitude UAS, which procedure is tailored to landing and approach environment.
We don't know what was going through his mind.
I agree that best estimate is {A}, then {B}.
Given some of the actions taken, we are left in some doubt as to what was actually going on in two brain housing groups in the LH and RH seats.