4th June 2010 B737-800 rejected takeoff after V1 Report is out
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I have DC8 and 9 time and I know about V1 procedures and echo just about what everyone here has said. However let's visit the AF Concord situation. IF the fire developed after V1 and IF the crew new about the situation do you think the captain would have continued THAT takeoff and if not do you think the outcome would have been not as bad? What would you have done? Food for though eh?
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Good blanket question/statement. We are all sticking with company SOP's because that is what we do right? However if you think SOP's can cover everything in black and white terms....
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before landing check list:
Many years ago an Old Continental 707 had an engine on the left side (I think #2, have an uncontained engine failure at LAX. They had just rotated. Debris from # 2 bounced off the runway and took out engine #3. It was hairy but they were able to climb out and return for landing.
Then again it was a fan-powered 707.
have DC8 and 9 time and I know about V1 procedures and echo just about what everyone here has said. However let's visit the AF Concord situation. IF the fire developed after V1 and IF the crew new about the situation do you think the captain would have continued THAT takeoff and if not do you think the outcome would have been not as bad? What would you have done? Food for though eh?
Many years ago an Old Continental 707 had an engine on the left side (I think #2, have an uncontained engine failure at LAX. They had just rotated. Debris from # 2 bounced off the runway and took out engine #3. It was hairy but they were able to climb out and return for landing.
Then again it was a fan-powered 707.
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"Good blanket question/statement. We are all sticking with company SOP's because that is what we do right? However if you think SOP's can cover everything in black and white terms...."
...Yes I do...and if you don't, pray tell us what your words of wisdom are to us mere mortals.
What additions would you like to complement our companies SOPs?
What qualifications do you have to make these recommendations?
Are you a Captain?...are you an F/O?
Are you a Chief Pilot?
Do you write the SOPs for your current company?
Do please tell us mere mortal, highly experienced airline captains, whence your superior knowledge comes from!?
...Yes I do...and if you don't, pray tell us what your words of wisdom are to us mere mortals.
What additions would you like to complement our companies SOPs?
What qualifications do you have to make these recommendations?
Are you a Captain?...are you an F/O?
Are you a Chief Pilot?
Do you write the SOPs for your current company?
Do please tell us mere mortal, highly experienced airline captains, whence your superior knowledge comes from!?
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Amos
I do not have "superior knowledge" and never said I did and my apologies if I came across that way. However if you do think SOP's will cover ALL situations and are black and white and you do not think pilot experience does not or will not come into play in those grey situations that most of us have seen then I would venture to say maybe you are slightly naive. However not knowing you one can only speculate. To answer your question I was only an FO on those aircraft. However for what it is worth and it is not worth much I have FAA Dual ATP's, CAA RW ATP and typed in the C550, LRJET, B212/412, S61 and 70. Now chill out dude and take a breath
I do not have "superior knowledge" and never said I did and my apologies if I came across that way. However if you do think SOP's will cover ALL situations and are black and white and you do not think pilot experience does not or will not come into play in those grey situations that most of us have seen then I would venture to say maybe you are slightly naive. However not knowing you one can only speculate. To answer your question I was only an FO on those aircraft. However for what it is worth and it is not worth much I have FAA Dual ATP's, CAA RW ATP and typed in the C550, LRJET, B212/412, S61 and 70. Now chill out dude and take a breath
Re the three issue to consider (#87, #91).
An RTO is an event/time critical situation; some operators may judge that either pilot as PF will have sufficient experience to decide and conduct the reject; others might restrict the decision and action to the Captain. The latter adds risk due to the potential for missed communication, confusion, and delay. The formulation of policy must involve risk assessment and is interlinked with the quality (content) of the SOP and level of training.
2. The V1 concept is primarily concerned with engine failure and aircraft control / performance; thus any discussion on the procedure – the decision and activities of a rejected take off (abort), should be restricted to these matters.
The more recent addition ‘if unable or unsafe to fly’ to RTO training has added considerable scope for confusion.
Making such an assessment before V1 (as originally envisaged) is an evaluative process, opposed to the more general if-then assessment of an engine / system failure. Thus this requires considerable knowledge and experience; it may increase decision time, and potentially involve higher risk.
Some operations even make this evaluation after V1 (in an RTO context) with significant increase in risk and almost inevitably with an accident outcome.
After V1 it should not be necessary to differentiate between unable or unsafe to fly, the latter implies that flight is possible but the circumstances questionable (unsafe). Yet these circumstances should have been identifiable beforehand – a few seconds before at V1, and logically, a few more seconds earlier at low speed / before take off.
Thus the extremely unlikely situation requiring the aircraft to stop after V1, is because the aircraft will not fly. Any evaluation at this point is whether to stop from VR or attempt to rotate at a higher speed. This is a judgement issue dependent on how the circumstances of the situation are perceived.
In other circumstances above V1 the certification risk-probability assumes that the aircraft will be safe enough to fly and the crew can evaluate any problem in flight.
Before the ‘what if’ replies are posted; consider what the operational and certification aspects assume to be detectable and avoided before take off, and those which the aircraft can withstand. Few if any RTO procedures can accommodate double failures, particularly those involving earlier human (mis) judgement or irrational thought.
3. In the vast majority of RTOs the decision has been correct for the situation as perceived by the human operator at that time. Judgement of these decisions in hindsight adds little to safety unless the circumstances are fully understood and evaluated.
This event appears to have been complicated by a poorly considered SOP with respect to the issues above, and where weaknesses in industry-wide training and ill advised use of modern technology (speed trend) added further complexity.
Operators (industry) could consider why ASIs are crosschecked – what could be detected (does the aircraft have a comparator system); what is the relative importance of speed / speed-trend miscompare towards continued safe flight in a commercial aircraft with dual and St-By systems (http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ml#post6550181).
Re #93 You can not stop someone acting on impulse.
But you might be able prevent the human being in a situation or having to evaluate circumstances where impulse should be avoided.
Philosophy, Policy, Procedure, Practice.
“We cannot change the human condition. But we can change the conditions under which humans work”, Professor James Reason.
- Should the FO elect to initiate a STOP when the SOPs say this is only to conducted by the Captain?
- Is it ever appropriate to abort after v1?, and
- If so, did this event provide enough indications to justify the decision?
An RTO is an event/time critical situation; some operators may judge that either pilot as PF will have sufficient experience to decide and conduct the reject; others might restrict the decision and action to the Captain. The latter adds risk due to the potential for missed communication, confusion, and delay. The formulation of policy must involve risk assessment and is interlinked with the quality (content) of the SOP and level of training.
2. The V1 concept is primarily concerned with engine failure and aircraft control / performance; thus any discussion on the procedure – the decision and activities of a rejected take off (abort), should be restricted to these matters.
The more recent addition ‘if unable or unsafe to fly’ to RTO training has added considerable scope for confusion.
Making such an assessment before V1 (as originally envisaged) is an evaluative process, opposed to the more general if-then assessment of an engine / system failure. Thus this requires considerable knowledge and experience; it may increase decision time, and potentially involve higher risk.
Some operations even make this evaluation after V1 (in an RTO context) with significant increase in risk and almost inevitably with an accident outcome.
After V1 it should not be necessary to differentiate between unable or unsafe to fly, the latter implies that flight is possible but the circumstances questionable (unsafe). Yet these circumstances should have been identifiable beforehand – a few seconds before at V1, and logically, a few more seconds earlier at low speed / before take off.
Thus the extremely unlikely situation requiring the aircraft to stop after V1, is because the aircraft will not fly. Any evaluation at this point is whether to stop from VR or attempt to rotate at a higher speed. This is a judgement issue dependent on how the circumstances of the situation are perceived.
In other circumstances above V1 the certification risk-probability assumes that the aircraft will be safe enough to fly and the crew can evaluate any problem in flight.
Before the ‘what if’ replies are posted; consider what the operational and certification aspects assume to be detectable and avoided before take off, and those which the aircraft can withstand. Few if any RTO procedures can accommodate double failures, particularly those involving earlier human (mis) judgement or irrational thought.
3. In the vast majority of RTOs the decision has been correct for the situation as perceived by the human operator at that time. Judgement of these decisions in hindsight adds little to safety unless the circumstances are fully understood and evaluated.
This event appears to have been complicated by a poorly considered SOP with respect to the issues above, and where weaknesses in industry-wide training and ill advised use of modern technology (speed trend) added further complexity.
Operators (industry) could consider why ASIs are crosschecked – what could be detected (does the aircraft have a comparator system); what is the relative importance of speed / speed-trend miscompare towards continued safe flight in a commercial aircraft with dual and St-By systems (http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ml#post6550181).
Re #93 You can not stop someone acting on impulse.
But you might be able prevent the human being in a situation or having to evaluate circumstances where impulse should be avoided.
Philosophy, Policy, Procedure, Practice.
“We cannot change the human condition. But we can change the conditions under which humans work”, Professor James Reason.
SOPs cover most known happenings. However, they simply do not, nor can they ever cover everything.
The closest that I (and my crew and the contents of the aeroplane) ever got to dying was in a situation which was neither covered by SOPs, nor was there a procedure in the Emergency Checklist (I think you call it the FCOM nowadays), nor did I have time to do extensive reading, nor was there a precedent to fall back upon.
Fortunately, I was trained to think outside the box and so it was that we all survived.
SOPs simply cannot ever cover every eventuality.
The closest that I (and my crew and the contents of the aeroplane) ever got to dying was in a situation which was neither covered by SOPs, nor was there a procedure in the Emergency Checklist (I think you call it the FCOM nowadays), nor did I have time to do extensive reading, nor was there a precedent to fall back upon.
Fortunately, I was trained to think outside the box and so it was that we all survived.
SOPs simply cannot ever cover every eventuality.
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The Concorde crashed after a pity tyre failure - the engineer's dream and a pilot's nightmare.
The B737 can become airborne to 500' and still land on the same runway, within 4000m; V1 is no factor for non-beancounters.
(Been there, done that.)
The B737 can become airborne to 500' and still land on the same runway, within 4000m
; V1 is no factor for non-beancounters.(Been there, done that.)
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4000 m ?
Luxury ! (said in a flat Yorkshire accent, for those who remember the Pythons)
Take Belfast City for instance - 1829 m !
You need to be quite "go minded" for that one ....
Luxury ! (said in a flat Yorkshire accent, for those who remember the Pythons)
Take Belfast City for instance - 1829 m !
You need to be quite "go minded" for that one ....
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"Amos
I do not have "superior knowledge" and never said I did and my apologies if I came across that way. However if you do think SOP's will cover ALL situations and are black and white and you do not think pilot experience does not or will not come into play in those grey situations that most of us have seen then I would venture to say maybe you are slightly naive. However not knowing you one can only speculate. To answer your question I was only an FO on those aircraft. However for what it is worth and it is not worth much I have FAA Dual ATP's, CAA RW ATP and typed in the C550, LRJET, B212/412, S61 and 70. Now chill out dude and take a breath"
You're right, your experience is not worth much! Actually, it's worth nothing!
Go away! Play with your toy aeroplanes and come back when you're a grown up!!
I do not have "superior knowledge" and never said I did and my apologies if I came across that way. However if you do think SOP's will cover ALL situations and are black and white and you do not think pilot experience does not or will not come into play in those grey situations that most of us have seen then I would venture to say maybe you are slightly naive. However not knowing you one can only speculate. To answer your question I was only an FO on those aircraft. However for what it is worth and it is not worth much I have FAA Dual ATP's, CAA RW ATP and typed in the C550, LRJET, B212/412, S61 and 70. Now chill out dude and take a breath"
You're right, your experience is not worth much! Actually, it's worth nothing!
Go away! Play with your toy aeroplanes and come back when you're a grown up!!
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Purely out of interest, are there any stats available for successful (Cat A) aborts above V1 where the aircraft would not have been able to fly and re-land safely? I think the only one I am aware of is the 748 at Stansted where I believe the Captain was told 'unofficially' by the investigators that in their opinion his wing would probably have burnt through downwind.
I suggest we leave out any '100% engine failures' where the decision is made for you.
I suggest we leave out any '100% engine failures' where the decision is made for you.
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The B737 can become airborne to 500' and still land on the same runway, within 4000m
@alf5071h re you point 3. Boeing posted us an advise that any IAS disagree message in the high speed phase of the take off run (past 80kts) is no reason for a take off abort. Take it in the air, deal with it and come back if needed. It was given again after a V1 reject caused a runway overrun.
And that was about a real IAS DISAGREE message, not some perceived speed trend vector anomaly during rotation.
As you are probably aware boeing, the same as airbus by the way, advises pilots to be go-minded and only a very small list of reasons for a high speed reject.
Last edited by Denti; 4th Jul 2011 at 08:35.
BOAC: Perhaps you can remind me but with the 748 incident do I not recall correctly that the damaged engine was NEVER in fact shutdown therefore the fire damage was possibly the worse for it?
PS shades of `WE at LHR when the LP valve was never closed. The B707s were later modified I think.
PS shades of `WE at LHR when the LP valve was never closed. The B707s were later modified I think.
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However if you think SOP's can cover everything in black and white terms...."
...Yes I do...and if you don't, pray tell us what your words of wisdom are to us mere mortals.
Do please tell us mere mortal, highly experienced airline captains, whence your superior knowledge comes from!?
...Yes I do...and if you don't, pray tell us what your words of wisdom are to us mere mortals.
Do please tell us mere mortal, highly experienced airline captains, whence your superior knowledge comes from!?
I take it in your experience that you have never encountered a situation that has not been covered by either SOPs, the normal checklist or the ECL?
Well, one day you will. Please tell us other mere mortals and relatively experienced airline captains what you are going to do then?
I would also suggest that having had to think and act beyond the protection of SOPs etc. is a more useful experience than never having had to do such a thing. The same hour a thousand times...
What qualifications do you have to make these recommendations?
Your shot.
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Meikle - not sure, but that is not relevant to what I understood. It was the intensity of the fire that was the concern and I'm not sure the fire could have been extinguished in the air - I think once the disc had gone into the tank it was fuel burning, not the engine..
As LSM says, a situation 'outside SOPS'.
As LSM says, a situation 'outside SOPS'.
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You're right, your experience is not worth much! Actually, it's worth nothing!
Go away! Play with your toy aeroplanes and come back when you're a grown up!!
Go away! Play with your toy aeroplanes and come back when you're a grown up!!
Anyway enough of this, let us press on with the discussion shall we? I would suggest some note taking.
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Remember the AA DC10 at KORD? They were fine at V2+15 when their engine fell off taking out the hydraulics to the LED's. What killed everybody is the crew followed AA SOP at the time and slowed to V2. Now their SOP is if they are at V2 to V2+15 hold the higher speed, don't slow to V2.
What would you have done? Follow SOP and slow to V2 or stick with what was working at V2+15? Reading some responses here I see some who wouldn't be with us any more if they had been on that crew.
What would you have done? Follow SOP and slow to V2 or stick with what was working at V2+15? Reading some responses here I see some who wouldn't be with us any more if they had been on that crew.
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Why not simply adhere to your companies SOPs?
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Originally Posted by amos2
...Yes I do...and if you don't, pray tell us what your words of wisdom are to us mere mortals.
SOP's aren't a recipe to cope with any situation, this is NOT what they are there for. This is however a common misconception, especially in management circles, as turning us into robots blindingly following the SOP program is a recurring wet dream. Some situations require action outside of the SOP framework, in extreme cases deliberately ignoring SOP's is the only course of action in order to ensure a succesful outcome. What's left then is common sense applied to aviation, ie airmanship. I think a certain Quantas crew would agree.