4th June 2010 B737-800 rejected takeoff after V1 Report is out
Advice we used to give new pilots on a 4-engined type was that the only occasion which would merit an attempted abort above V1 would be if there was genuine doubt that the aircraft would successfully become airborne. Such as a massive loss of thrust following a multiple birdstrike or some form of structural failure. In other words, if the consequence of the high speed abort would be more likely to be survivable than an attempt to continue with the take-off.
But there were absolutely no guarantees.
A colleague had a co-pilot suddenly do the unexpected on him during take-off in a Vulcan. Fortunately before 'decision speed' (as we termed it then) had been reached. At around 100KIAS, the co-pilot suddenly whipped the throttles to idle and yelled 'aborting'! They carried out the drill instinctively, streamed the chute and came to a safe stop on the runway, whereupon he asked the co-pilot:
"Would you care to share the reason for the abort with us, co.?"
"I left my DV window open"
A voice from the lower deck then asked "Will you hit him, captain, or shall I?"
It was perfectly possible to close the DV window in flight at normal speeds, unless the seal was knackered.
The days before CRM, TEM or whatever huggy-fluffy terminology is currently in vogue!
But there were absolutely no guarantees.
A colleague had a co-pilot suddenly do the unexpected on him during take-off in a Vulcan. Fortunately before 'decision speed' (as we termed it then) had been reached. At around 100KIAS, the co-pilot suddenly whipped the throttles to idle and yelled 'aborting'! They carried out the drill instinctively, streamed the chute and came to a safe stop on the runway, whereupon he asked the co-pilot:
"Would you care to share the reason for the abort with us, co.?"
"I left my DV window open"
A voice from the lower deck then asked "Will you hit him, captain, or shall I?"
It was perfectly possible to close the DV window in flight at normal speeds, unless the seal was knackered.
The days before CRM, TEM or whatever huggy-fluffy terminology is currently in vogue!
The days before CRM, TEM or whatever huggy-fluffy terminology is currently in vogue!
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My company learned the hard way with a F/O 707 abort in the late 1960s to have the captain always handle the throttles on takeoff.
A colleague had a co-pilot suddenly do the unexpected on him during take-off in a Vulcan. Fortunately before 'decision speed' (as we termed it then) had been reached. At around 100KIAS, the co-pilot suddenly whipped the throttles to idle and yelled 'aborting'! They carried out the drill instinctively...
The whole discussion is down to two points:
To the first point - V1 is the speed which ensures that you have enough performance to either stop, or continue with a single engine failure. Any time you are not talking about a single engine failure V1 has limited use.
Double engine failure, control problems, incorrect flap settings, greatly out-of-balance and greatly out-of-trim situations are all valid reasons to stop after V1, the trim/balance/flap situations often only become apparent when you attempt to rotate the aircraft[/i] - ie. they are almost always decisions to be made after V1.
The only use V1 is, in considering if you have sufficient ability to stop, is that after V1 you may, provided the performance calculation hasn't been annotated "brake energy limited" or "runway limited". However in situations requiring a stop after V1, the point is moot - you are stopping because the GO option is unacceptable, even considering a likely overrun.
So, stopping after V1 is a valid decision, in some circumstances.
Item two - did the FO have solid, material information pertinent to a stop decision? Yes, he did. Was it a "reasonably sufficient" amount of information - it's a subjective, professional decision. You may make a different one, the Captain may have made a different one - but it wasn't "wrong" for the FO to make the decision, given no training guidance on the matter, and insufficient experience.
- Is it ever appropriate to abort after v1?, and
- If so, did this event provide enough indications to justify the decision?
To the first point - V1 is the speed which ensures that you have enough performance to either stop, or continue with a single engine failure. Any time you are not talking about a single engine failure V1 has limited use.
Double engine failure, control problems, incorrect flap settings, greatly out-of-balance and greatly out-of-trim situations are all valid reasons to stop after V1, the trim/balance/flap situations often only become apparent when you attempt to rotate the aircraft[/i] - ie. they are almost always decisions to be made after V1.
The only use V1 is, in considering if you have sufficient ability to stop, is that after V1 you may, provided the performance calculation hasn't been annotated "brake energy limited" or "runway limited". However in situations requiring a stop after V1, the point is moot - you are stopping because the GO option is unacceptable, even considering a likely overrun.
So, stopping after V1 is a valid decision, in some circumstances.
Item two - did the FO have solid, material information pertinent to a stop decision? Yes, he did. Was it a "reasonably sufficient" amount of information - it's a subjective, professional decision. You may make a different one, the Captain may have made a different one - but it wasn't "wrong" for the FO to make the decision, given no training guidance on the matter, and insufficient experience.
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In the dutch report the only state on page 11 that: "De (CVR) was niet beschikbaar voor het onderzoek."
Which would translate into: The CVR was not available for the investigation.
No reason is given why, something I'm curious about.
Which would translate into: The CVR was not available for the investigation.
No reason is given why, something I'm curious about.
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Double engine failure, control problems, incorrect flap settings, greatly out-of-balance and greatly out-of-trim situations are all valid reasons to stop after V1, the trim/balance/flap situations often only become apparent when you attempt to rotate the aircraft[/i] - ie. they are almost always decisions to be made after V1.
You are around halfway down the runway at around 130 knots feeling relaxed for another routine flight when it all goes suddenly wormy.
Buttucks clench, sphinctor pulses, adrenalin floods in.
The remaining runway is getting shorter very quickly, you have maybe a second to choose stop or go. You might die. Decide now.
The whole discussion is down to two points:
1. Is it ever appropriate to abort after v1?, and
2. If so, did this event provide enough indications to justify the decision?
1. Is it ever appropriate to abort after v1?, and
2. If so, did this event provide enough indications to justify the decision?
3. Should the FO elect to initiate a STOP when the SOPs say this is only to conducted by the Captain?
The Dutch report stated that the CVR was not operating.
Last edited by fireflybob; 2nd Jul 2011 at 12:35.
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[quote The CVR was not available for the investigation.
No reason is given why, something I'm curious about. ][/quote]
Some pilots unions do not permit the regulator in that State to download a CVR if there were no fatalities. While the union is there to protect the interests of the crew by fair means or foul, any flight safety lessons learned from the incident are lost to other pilots.
No reason is given why, something I'm curious about. ][/quote]
Some pilots unions do not permit the regulator in that State to download a CVR if there were no fatalities. While the union is there to protect the interests of the crew by fair means or foul, any flight safety lessons learned from the incident are lost to other pilots.
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Locked door
I have to say this is quite possibly the most stupid thing I have ever heard.
.
You can not stop someone acting on impulse. It is called "fight or flight". It is just how that person reacts. It can be trained for and you can condition yourself, but just as when you fall over, the first instinct is to put your hands out to try and stop the fall.
My point being, if this person has done it once, it will most likely happen again because that is his natural reaction.
Unfortunately it is not possible for anyone to know how they will react to a situation. People spend years in the Armed Forces working with people that they consider will protect them and look after them, and then in the heat of battle when bullets are flying all over the place, that person you thought you could rely on might just freeze, and become a liability to themselves and everyone in the section or unit. It has happened before, and it will happen for the rest of time. That is why we are human.
Again, I would like to agree with you. You can train someone to do what they are supposed to do in a tin box when your life is not at risk, but when it becomes real, I think that person might well react the same way again. As far as I am concerned, the MANDATORY rejection brief you have to do at the start of EVERY DAY should have been enough to drill into that FOs head that he is not to reject the takeoff, and NEVER AFTER V1, regardless of whether his curry from the other night was making his ring-piece twitch.
The fairest thing to do for the safety of the whole operation and the 189 PAX and 5 other crew on board the next potential aircraft is to seriously look at the training history and, if there are other issues consider removing the person who might well not be suited for the job.
I know it is a harsh thing to say, but if your wife and young children were on a plane that you knew the pilot had almost killed 190 odd a few weeks previously because he did not do his job properly or do what he had been trained to do, would you be happy to wave them off at the airport.........?
I have to say this is quite possibly the most stupid thing I have ever heard.
Assuming the recruitment process at FR is robust questions need to be asked of the training department, not the individua
You can not stop someone acting on impulse. It is called "fight or flight". It is just how that person reacts. It can be trained for and you can condition yourself, but just as when you fall over, the first instinct is to put your hands out to try and stop the fall.
My point being, if this person has done it once, it will most likely happen again because that is his natural reaction.
Unfortunately it is not possible for anyone to know how they will react to a situation. People spend years in the Armed Forces working with people that they consider will protect them and look after them, and then in the heat of battle when bullets are flying all over the place, that person you thought you could rely on might just freeze, and become a liability to themselves and everyone in the section or unit. It has happened before, and it will happen for the rest of time. That is why we are human.
Removing the mistake maker may be cheaper, but not fairer. With good training this sort of incident need not happen so in this case I would hope a few sim details were the solution, not termination.
The fairest thing to do for the safety of the whole operation and the 189 PAX and 5 other crew on board the next potential aircraft is to seriously look at the training history and, if there are other issues consider removing the person who might well not be suited for the job.
I know it is a harsh thing to say, but if your wife and young children were on a plane that you knew the pilot had almost killed 190 odd a few weeks previously because he did not do his job properly or do what he had been trained to do, would you be happy to wave them off at the airport.........?
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Tee Emm
Have I missed something? Ryanair now has a Union??
Some pilots unions do not permit the regulator in that State to download a CVR if there were no fatalities. While the union is there to protect the interests of the crew by fair means or foul, any flight safety lessons learned from the incident are lost to other pilots.
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The aircraft was perfectly flyable so either stop the aircraft at the beginning of the take off roll and before v1 (if you feel the aircraft is unsafe, captain would of noticed something no?) or continue with the take off after v1 but do not make your decision at rotation!
The airspeed disagree might of been unsafe but passed v1 you have to deal with it in the air, the aircraft had no elevator or flight control problem it seems so it was a wrong decision...
The airspeed disagree might of been unsafe but passed v1 you have to deal with it in the air, the aircraft had no elevator or flight control problem it seems so it was a wrong decision...
Nonetheless, it may result in the end of your life.
"The CVR was unavailable."
When CVRs where first proposed for aviation cockpits, in order to better understand accidents and how to prevent them, there was a great concern in the pilot community about having a constant "big brother" monitoring their workplace.
There were concerns that management would routinely monitor cockpit conversations, and more or less private comments made "off the cuff" in a casual workplace setting could be used in industrial actions against individuals. There was also concern in the right (in the US at least) not to incriminate yourself, certainly in misdemeanours. Balanced against that was the pilot's understanding of the immense benefits to understand why some accidents occur.
The solution (formalised in Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention) was that the pilots would allow the cockpit to be recorded, however in return legislation would be enacted to ensure the CVR would never be available for less than the most serious accidents. Thus in incidents without injury, the standard line "the CVR was not available" always appears.
Have I missed something? Ryanair now has a Union??
Most countries around the world are signatories to the Chicago convention, and thus CVR tapes are not released for incidents like these.
[quote The CVR was not available for the investigation.
No reason is given why, something I'm curious about. ]
No reason is given why, something I'm curious about. ]
Some pilots unions do not permit the regulator in that State to download a CVR if there were no fatalities. While the union is there to protect the interests of the crew by fair means or foul, any flight safety lessons learned from the incident are lost to other pilots.
Typically unavailability refers to a CVR that was overwritten by continuing to leave the power on in continued operation. This often happens where the incident is not necessarily immediately reportable to the investigatng authorities albeit might be reported to the regulator. It's a fine line and usually not an offence although there might be some hard feelings
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If all is properly attented to before takeoff, and if everything is normal at 80 knots, I believe becoming airborne is far less likely to end your life than aborting above V1 in typical circumstances.
Of course - those are the decisions pilots are paid for. Sometimes getting airborne will end your life.