4th June 2010 B737-800 rejected takeoff after V1 Report is out
Its better to have rejected and and wish you had not - Than to have not and wished you had!
But it does miss the bigger picture and that is more accidents occur by rejecting than by continuing a takeoff with a badly damaged plane.
It boils down to decision making in seconds. We can't tell you ahead of time what's right and wrong all we can do is provide you training to make decisions. You have to decide what's right and wrong. And after you make your decision the rest of us will analyise it for days
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For a flying pilot to have a "feeling," seconds after V1, that the airplane won't fly is imaginary. . . and to discontinue the takeoff after rotation is suicidal.
A 'feeling' or 'hunch' or an 'intuition' is one of the ways our imperfect brains make decisions. Research shows it to be a pretty accurate one.
At the time of rotating the aircraft to takeoff, the pilot flying decided to reject the takeoff because he believed the aircraft was unsafe to fly.
Twice in my career I have had 'hunches' and acted on them as though they had been confirmed by hard data. Many of us will have had experiences like this. In both cases the 'hunches' proved correct.
Checkboard, crew might also believe in the old adage:
Two thing that do you little good are
The Runway behind you (when on the ground)
The Altitude above you (when in the air)
Crew's decision seems a prudent move: use as much runway as you can (runway in front of you) whenever you can. More pavement in front of you adds to safety margin on takeoff, doesn't it?
Two thing that do you little good are
The Runway behind you (when on the ground)
The Altitude above you (when in the air)
Crew's decision seems a prudent move: use as much runway as you can (runway in front of you) whenever you can. More pavement in front of you adds to safety margin on takeoff, doesn't it?
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RTO? Or EMERGENCY landing?
Perhaps coincidentally, today the NTSB released this "final" about DCA08IA019
Another high-spd FLT CONTROLS abnormal:
"... During takeoff, the flightcrew performed an emergency high-speed aborted takeoff because the captain felt a control anomaly during rotation.... inspection of the elevator control system components revealed that both left and right elevator control rods had fractured completely, rendering the elevator system inoperable. The elevator control rods fractured when the elevator surfaces repeatedly moved off the rear elevator stops due to wind gusts [overnight]...."
Another post V1- investigation was CHI01FA104Another high-spd FLT CONTROLS abnormal:
AAR 71-12 JFK TIA / 8Sep70 DC8-63CF N4863T. Shortly after takeoff aircraft pitched up 60 to 90 degrees then crashed. Chunk of concrete had jammed/lodged in the junction of the horizontal stabilizer and elevator--adversely affecting the pitch controls.
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YouTube - ‪RTO Considerations/Reasons To Abort - Boeing‬‏
Quote:
IF YOU HAVE NOT APPLIED THE BRAKES BY V1 YOU HAVE MADE THE GO DECISION
Quote:
IF YOU HAVE NOT APPLIED THE BRAKES BY V1 YOU HAVE MADE THE GO DECISION
More pavement in front of you adds to safety margin on takeoff, doesn't it?
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First of all, I strongly support the "Commander" (PIC) makes the go/no go decision...input from the F/O or F/E is fine but in the final result it is his/her decision...
Second, and I speak of the 727 specifically, but I'm sure there are other A/C as well, the reason V1 is equal to or less than Vr is because of FAA certification regs, dating back to the "Golden Era" of the propliners...i.e. V1 HAD to be less than Vr...
In other words, an aircraft could possibly attain Vr+5 and still reject safely...I speak of the 727 again...
As for the fully fuelled "jumbo" heading off over the Atlantic, I'm surprised no one has yet mentioned the TWA L-1011 at JFK many years ago that actually got AIRBORNE and then rejected...The jet was totalled, but everyone lived...And the report found the Captain's decision to put it back down "reasonable" under the circumstances...
Second, and I speak of the 727 specifically, but I'm sure there are other A/C as well, the reason V1 is equal to or less than Vr is because of FAA certification regs, dating back to the "Golden Era" of the propliners...i.e. V1 HAD to be less than Vr...
In other words, an aircraft could possibly attain Vr+5 and still reject safely...I speak of the 727 again...
As for the fully fuelled "jumbo" heading off over the Atlantic, I'm surprised no one has yet mentioned the TWA L-1011 at JFK many years ago that actually got AIRBORNE and then rejected...The jet was totalled, but everyone lived...And the report found the Captain's decision to put it back down "reasonable" under the circumstances...
Last edited by DownIn3Green; 28th Jun 2011 at 23:47.
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reasonable?
I'm surprised no one has yet mentioned the TWA L-1011 at JFK many years ago that actually got AIRBORNE and then rejected...The jet was totalled, but everyone lived...And the report found the Captain's decision to put it back down "reasonable" under the circumstances...
I read on page 67 as probable cause:
" ...and inadequate crew coordination between the captain and the first officer that resulted in their inappropriate response to a false stall warning."
"The INTRODUCER"
EMB-145 incident
IgH´s link to DCA08IA019 is extremely interesting I think. (Though surely that report was not issued yesterday, three and a half years after the incident???)
More to the point, what a strange document it is. Another Vr RTO, but with a narrative lasting exactly two sentences! But then a lengthy description of the regulatory process and who issued which SBs, when, with what result. I may well be wrong, but to me this is entirely consistent with the outbreak of AD/SB compliance obsession, over safety commonsense, in the US over the last two years.
Not for one moment suggesting that they´re not crucial mechanisms of course but, as this thread demonstrates, there is huge interest in the lessons to be learned from this other incident, and it seems to me that this report does not help air them.
More to the point, what a strange document it is. Another Vr RTO, but with a narrative lasting exactly two sentences! But then a lengthy description of the regulatory process and who issued which SBs, when, with what result. I may well be wrong, but to me this is entirely consistent with the outbreak of AD/SB compliance obsession, over safety commonsense, in the US over the last two years.
Not for one moment suggesting that they´re not crucial mechanisms of course but, as this thread demonstrates, there is huge interest in the lessons to be learned from this other incident, and it seems to me that this report does not help air them.
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Saskatoon
Ops manuals the world over outline what is an "abortable" offence. It can't be exhaustive, of course.
The fact remains, that far more fatalities have occurred as a result of aborting a take-off than taking the problem into the air.
In this instance, there thought shouldn't have even crossed the crew's minds...
The fact remains, that far more fatalities have occurred as a result of aborting a take-off than taking the problem into the air.
In this instance, there thought shouldn't have even crossed the crew's minds...
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Interesting stuff but FWIW this reminds me of an incident many years ago when the twotter just "felt wrong" as soon as the wheels left the ground.
Turned out that the CofG was way out of limits due to a loading problem. [*]
Cutting the power and landing straight ahead was a no brainer in that case with a STOL aircraft at FVHA which has one of the world's longest runways. In other circumstances the result could have been very nasty.
Would it have been safe to take off and go around ?, I will never know if I did the right thing. Some memories are the stuff of nightmares.
[*] Yes I know, I should have paid more attention and not trusted the local idiots to do their job.
Turned out that the CofG was way out of limits due to a loading problem. [*]
Cutting the power and landing straight ahead was a no brainer in that case with a STOL aircraft at FVHA which has one of the world's longest runways. In other circumstances the result could have been very nasty.
Would it have been safe to take off and go around ?, I will never know if I did the right thing. Some memories are the stuff of nightmares.
[*] Yes I know, I should have paid more attention and not trusted the local idiots to do their job.
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What would be interesting to know is how that actual stopping distance in this very high speed RTO compared with the numbers in the book. i.e. given the actual field conditions, dry runway, good braking action, wind direction, ac loading etc. The calculated accelerate-stop distance for an RTO at V1 was probably a ground roll of less than 2,000m. (An educated guess on my part.)
If this is the case then the crew might then have felt that an aborted take-off even 5 knots over V1 could still be achieved safely even if the figures were not "in the book".
This incident shows that there was still plenty of runway left (500m) when the ac stopped and so it was not even close to being an over-run. All this means that the crew probably knew that there was a safe margin and so had the confidence to do what they did knowing that, whilst not being the normal course of action, it was also not a totally reckless decision either. 20:20 hindsight is great of course but sometimes the rules can be "bent" though had this been a different field, different ac, different weather then it might have been a different story.
The moral? Don't even think about an abort above V1 if operating close to the limits (eg Gibraltar
) but don't rule it out in more "favorable" situations...
MB
If this is the case then the crew might then have felt that an aborted take-off even 5 knots over V1 could still be achieved safely even if the figures were not "in the book".
This incident shows that there was still plenty of runway left (500m) when the ac stopped and so it was not even close to being an over-run. All this means that the crew probably knew that there was a safe margin and so had the confidence to do what they did knowing that, whilst not being the normal course of action, it was also not a totally reckless decision either. 20:20 hindsight is great of course but sometimes the rules can be "bent" though had this been a different field, different ac, different weather then it might have been a different story.
The moral? Don't even think about an abort above V1 if operating close to the limits (eg Gibraltar
) but don't rule it out in more "favorable" situations...MB
Originally Posted by RevMan2
Has anyone looked at the Boeing chart on Page 5 of the report.
It's a shocker
It's a shocker
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Originally Posted by madbob
the crew probably knew that there was a safe margin
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But in thoses events, how was V1 calculated ?
For me, V1 was the speed over which you cannot RTO without overrunning at the end of the RWY... Methink that if you didn't overrun (good for you), then your V1 was not really a V1.
For me, V1 was the speed over which you cannot RTO without overrunning at the end of the RWY... Methink that if you didn't overrun (good for you), then your V1 was not really a V1.