4th June 2010 B737-800 rejected takeoff after V1 Report is out
Join Date: Jul 2011
Location: LEJ
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[...] actions under stress are a combination of [...] talent levels and the training he/she has received from his/her employer(s).
without talent, you should not have wasted your money for ATPL training.
BTW, what talent do you need if you want to prevent loss of crew communication, misinterpretation and misjudgement of priorities combined with a "bare-ar+ed" breach of safe practices and law
It was either that or a simple brainfart.
[...]Assuming the recruitment process at FR is robust questions need to be asked of the training department, not the individual.
Removing the mistake maker may be cheaper, but not fairer. With good training this sort of incident need not happen so in this case I would hope a few sim details were the solution, not termination.
Sorry brother, but when's the last time you have experienced genuine fairness in aviation for the last time? You try to obey all the rules and not step on anyones toes. I was grateful for the time when the overall resposibility was not mine. The sim training he received seems sufficient for most others. The captain had the wits not to fight this wrong decision with the remaining runway being long enough. He was not trained for naughty things like that, either. And he "only" had 1000 h or so more experience.
In all "fairness" I can at least understand the removal.
Está servira para distraerle.
Not a very experienced crew then but not that inexperienced on the B737.
The captain, at the time of the event, had 3628 hours total flying experience with 2061 flying hours on type (B737).
The first officer, at the time of the event, had 2300 hours total flying experience and 1170 hours on type (B737).
The nine recommendations that might have been mentioned before can be found in here.
http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/ra...EI-DPX_ENG.pdf
The captain, at the time of the event, had 3628 hours total flying experience with 2061 flying hours on type (B737).
The first officer, at the time of the event, had 2300 hours total flying experience and 1170 hours on type (B737).
The nine recommendations that might have been mentioned before can be found in here.
http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/ra...EI-DPX_ENG.pdf
Join Date: Aug 2005
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Even though after V1 aborts are not recomended because of no data to support stopping distance it is still allowed if in the pilots opinion the aircraft may not be flyable. We don't know what would have happened if the Concorde had aborted after hitting debris on the runway. We saw what happened by continuing the takeoff. Who knows what those pilots knew about what was happening. Sometimes you know why things are going wrong, sometimes you don't.
It is hard to fault a pilot who in a split second has to decide which way to go. Blindly following the after V1 go vs I still have over a mile of runway left and do I really want to be in the air with this fire burning my right wing off decision.
Sometimes V1, if used, blindly as a go, no go speed can hurt you.
Once in a B727 I was over 10 knots below V1 when I lost a generator on #1 engine on a wet rainy morning out of Barbados with about 1,000 overcast at max TO wt. I told the engineer to take care of it hoping he would download a pack. He selected essential to #1 and of course we lost all essential power. I told the FO flying to keep going, he would fix it. Now we were at V1 and rotating at Vr. I'm sure our story would have been a lot more interesting if we had aborted at the time we lost #1 generator. I'm sure somewhere in that abort on a wet runway with no essential power we would have lost our antiskid.
As it was he switched essential back to #3, shut a pack off until we got our flaps up and put it back on, just as we could have dispatched with two generators.
It is hard to fault a pilot who in a split second has to decide which way to go. Blindly following the after V1 go vs I still have over a mile of runway left and do I really want to be in the air with this fire burning my right wing off decision.
Sometimes V1, if used, blindly as a go, no go speed can hurt you.
Once in a B727 I was over 10 knots below V1 when I lost a generator on #1 engine on a wet rainy morning out of Barbados with about 1,000 overcast at max TO wt. I told the engineer to take care of it hoping he would download a pack. He selected essential to #1 and of course we lost all essential power. I told the FO flying to keep going, he would fix it. Now we were at V1 and rotating at Vr. I'm sure our story would have been a lot more interesting if we had aborted at the time we lost #1 generator. I'm sure somewhere in that abort on a wet runway with no essential power we would have lost our antiskid.
As it was he switched essential back to #3, shut a pack off until we got our flaps up and put it back on, just as we could have dispatched with two generators.
