Crash-Cork Airport

[sevenstrokeroll]

jazzykex...I do take some exception as I have earned a living flying the metroliner (albeit 23plus years ago...jets now thank God). Some of the comments here show an understanding of flying ...granted some are a little too conclusive assuming that the crew feathered the engine/prop is a bit too much of a leap just yet.

I think it is useful for pilots to think about what might have happened...it is like going for a run...are you practicing to run away from a bear? no...but if it happens that you run into a bear, it might help.


It is interesting to note the comments about the RAF instructor and roll control. AS I mentioned the wing was extended...but the ailerons were not. The shorter wing Metro 2/2A was much crisper in roll control.

It is simply very easy to over control an airplane with limited visual reference. I've also wondered what the fuel state and position of one ''crossflow'' valve is/was.

The metro does not have powered ailerons and feels a bit stiff. I've also flown the BAE146 (briefly thank God) and it feels much lighter on the controls.

I wrote an article about transitioning to visual, and if you google: transitioning to visual, you might find it on the avweb site.

If the crash was caused by visual miscues, losing sight of the runway in the flare, or any of the problems in the last few seconds of landing, it should be a wakeup call for more training.

It is quite foggy in the central valley of California, where I flew the metroliner. Also flew a great deal into the one airport selected for ''blind landing'' experiements due to is fog (arcata/eureka). Things can get dicey and the only way to learn is by experience, flying with someone who has ''been there and done that''.

[IslandPilot]

judge11, the qualifying word is "appear" - the full story will not emerge until the FDR/CVR data has been analysed

[IslandPilot]

well said sevenstrokeroll, we learn by others experiences

[BALLSOUT]

gudge11.
I am not suggesting there was an engine failure, in fact I thought my statement was suggesting there wasn't.
Anyone considered the possability that the left engine simply ran down due to fuel starvation as the aircraft rolled to the right and the fuel pick ups in the left tank ran dry?

[On_The_Top_Bunk]

Originally Posted by sevenstrokeroll

wide69

if the plane was off the runway to the left while making its approach and at the last second the pilots over reacted and went ''hard right'' to bring the plane to the middle of the runway, then the right wingtip might hit...and as I mentioned it, the tip, is just bolted on with no spar and it might have collapsed

of course all of this is just guessing...I would like to think that there will be a very honest report shortly

Are you serious or have you just come back from daycare classes?

[SATCOS WHIPPING BOY]

This particular incident has brought me back to PPrune.

I am no longer an ATCO - (I retired a long while back) but the Cork crash had an effect in my current job, staff at work were interested in what had happened...and why.

Anyway , long story short we skimmed through the online articles and I was amazed at the amount of crap that was being spouted by the media ie, the aircraft made an approach from the south to runway 17 ..and the crew made several attempts to land even though this was illegal etc etc


so i suggested we log in to pprune to see what the pros had to say..

I must admit I was embarrassed ...within hours of the incident it had been stated on here that the crew were "cowboys"...the airline (virtual-airline) were known for bad practices and it was decided that a 3rd approach was in some way or other totally against all rules.

The upshot of all of this is simple..if tomorrow the Daily Star reports that it has found another B-17 on the moon and "professionals" on here say that they haven't..we would be more inclined to believe the journalists.

as far as I remember ( and i'm sure things won't have changed that much)

Decision Height: The height by which a decision to continue an approach or execute a missed approach has to be made. If DH = 200ft then on approach

at 250ft can you see the required references? yes= land, no=continue approach

at 205ft can you see the required references? yes= land, no=continue (but get ready for MA.....

at 200 can you see the required references? yes=land, no = execute missed approach.

therefore Decision is made AT decision height but preparations to execute MA are made prior to that point. The MA procedure does cater for a/c dipping below DH. simple really.


Multiple approaches in bad weather..OK i'm ex-military and civil rules / company SOPs may be different in this modern "blame" riddled society but as far as I recall the ultimate responsibility lay with the a/c captain - if he wanted to make 20 attempts then so be it, so long as he had enough fuel to make his diversion (and allow for one MA there) IIRC.
All fine and dandy in a mil a/c but paying passengers might get a tad upset after maybe the nth attempt and so a company SOP of a limit on attempted approaches. There is also the cost implication, why waste £10,000 on fuel trying to land at airport X when it will cost just £3000 to ferry the passenger by coach from airport Y and you can blame the "inconvenience" on the weather.

As for making approaches to reciprocal runway (no hassle in this incident as the wind (on the METARs) was negligible) that is not unusual - it saves time and money and effort but one MUST remember to switch the runway lighting to the one that is being used . I remember doing a PAR at Boscombe down. the weather was abysmal and visibility from the tower was awful. a/c broke off the approach at his 200ft minima and started his MA , next call I got was "c/s switching stud 2" he then did a quick tear-drop and made a safe landing on the reciprocal runway. It transpired we had a massive fog bank running north to south and out to the west but the conditions to the east of the a/f were fantastic and as he flew through into clear air he went visual.

but i digress

please chaps, let the enquiry take its course and lets stop feeding the media mis-information, red-herrings and non-facts...they are quite good at making it up without our (your) help.

[Bearcat]

Satcos, all rambling waffle apart from your last paragraph that hits the nail on the head.....let the investigators do their job. I fear the report will be damning.

[SATCOS WHIPPING BOY]

no, not rambling waffle (ok maybe a bit)...just an explanation as to why i have posted after such a long absence and MY views on some of the queries that have been raised ref DH and multiple approaches in bad weather (speaking from experience) plus it's late and i've had aglass or two of vino

[sevenstrokeroll]

on the top bunk:

if the plane was off course and a drastic over correction was made, you might drag a wingtip. what don't you understand?

[sevenstrokeroll]

concerned about misconceptions

I fly in the USA. We use slightly different terms and measures.

Generally speaking:

CAT 1 ILS approaches require 1/2 mile visibility...this can be slightly reduced with better approach and runway lighting. It is against the rules to start an approach if the weather is reported below minimums. I can only imagine that the metroliner had received word that the wx was at or above minimums when they started the approach.

even though some of the published metars might indicate below minimums, fog can change so quickly that values might be reported from the control tower that have not yet reached the media. indeed attempting approaches to opposite ends of the same runway indicates knowledge of local wx phenomenoa and is something I would attempt at many airports.

There is so much talk about 3 approaches. The only thing that really matters is if the fatigue of making so many approaches has taken its toll on the pilots and if the fuel is starting to demand diversion to a safe alternate airport. While some airlines may actually have it in their rules (flight ops manuals), one simply shouldn't read too much into this...

Except when there is a condition known by the slang term: Get There ITIS (as in laryngitis). Sometimes, (and I AM NOT SAYING THIS TIME) you can want to get some place too badly and you try too hard...perhaps ,and I say again PERHAPS, bending the rules slightly. Again, I don't know if that is the case in this situation.

The metroliner most likely is not equipped for coupled autopilot approaches. At least mine were not. Maybe this one was, maybe not. The metroliner is an adequate if not deluxe sort of plane. I would rather drive a rolls royce than a honda civic...but both will probably get you there just fine. Same sort of thing with the metroliner...and it aint' no rolls.

The engines on this type are just fine. While I mentioned the NTS system, its not a big deal, just an interesting thing to pilots who have flown different type engines.

Now, what can go wrong? What caused this crash?

I will say that landing a plane in foggy conditions is very demanding upon the crew. Mistakes can be made. As some have said, it is possible to see an airport's runway 10 miles away, but the last 20 feet it can vanish in fog. I've had this happen and boy, it gets your attention fast. It is also possible to over control or over compensate if you are off the exact centerline of the runway. You've just been ''on instruments'' and now must quickly transition to visual cues, cues that can be obscured by the fog. I still think about some less than perfect maneuvering near the end of an instrument approach in my own flying. And that was over 20 years ago. It never got close to clipping a wing tip, but it wasn't as gentle as I would have liked.

A myriad of mechanical problems could have happend...but probably didn't. There is more than one attitude gyro for example, the plane is flyable on one engine...though engine out ops are demanding, especially at low altitude.

The discipline in the cockpit for an instrument approach is very demanding. I do not have any access to the training methods of this airline. But I've flown for 3 small airlines and one big airline. The big airline did it right, one of the three small airlines did it right (of course they were the first to go out of business...doing it ''right'' costs money) the other two airlines didn't do a good job of training.


So...I think they started each and every approach ''legally''. That the number of approaches, except as outlined above, doesn't matter.

What happened? We need more information and I'm sure the authorities will do an honest job of finding out.

But we should, as pilots and interested observers, continue to have discussions of how to improve our own flying.

[bubbers44]

Landing in foggy conditions as we know is challenging. Sometimes you can see the runway 10 miles out but in the flare all you see is the glow of the runway lights and have to judge your landing by what you see. I don't know what happened to this crew but have been in a similar situation that deteriorated on the final 100 ft and I would not do it again. Later, flying airliners, rules wouldn't allow this to happen.

[Bearcat]

the first thing I would like to ascertain is (a) was the aircraft Cat II approved and (b) were the crew low vis qualified? Once these answers arrive we can then look at the fobiles of EICK 17 Cat II and its threats re undulating terrain, hump on the threshold of the rwy and why a lot operators do a manual landing there from an automated approach to avoid deep landings and possible tail strikes.

The crew/ aircraft query needs to be dealt with first.

[Momoe]

Ballsout,
given the probable timescale of the transition from upright to inverted, the scenario that the engine ran down due to fuel starvation is most unlikely.

[blind pew]

Most of the posts do not mention that occasionally an approach in fog can be the most difficult bit of flying that a pilot can do.

Firstly the top of the fog bank/orographic cloud is the boundary between airmasses.
Sometimes it is just a small temperature inversion, but occasionally there is a large shift of temperature and a massive change of wind direction and strength - I've witnessed 160 degrees and 25 knots.
This can lead to a destabilization of the aircraft.
At this time of the year the sun is still low on the horizon and the added effects of early morning and the sun at ninety degrees to the approach path can give severe optical illusions.
Added to this is the disorientating effect of the fog accelerating around the cockpit windows.
Finally there is the sudden transition from bright sunlight into comparative darkness.

Without the above factors a monitored approach with either an experienced flying pilot or autopilot is a challenge in itself.

But trying to fly the old one man band approach with a barely qualified first officer and non fail safe autopilot is poor risk management.

If this is the case - obviously speculation - then those to blame are those in the industry who make the laws and administer them(?).

Unfortunately the industry has pockets that reek of nepotism - those that retire from some of the national carriers find them policing their old mates who happen to be members of the same "club".

We have an accident with two barely qualified young men who were trying their best for their passengers and company and who probably will carry the can.

Will the Europeans change the system as the FAA are trying to do after the Buffalo accident -( minimum 1500hrs to carry pax)?

Or will they blame the pilots who were operating (legally) into probably unknown territories?

Is there anything we can do to enhance safety and change the system?

Yes, sensible discussions which exchange knowledge and highlight the deficiencies in the training, operation and regulation of civil aviation.

[langleybaston]

"Firstly the top of the fog bank/orographic cloud is the boundary between airmasses.
Sometimes it is just a small temperature inversion, but occasionally there is a large shift of temperature and a massive change of wind direction and strength - I've witnessed 160 degrees and 25 knots.
This can lead to a destabilization of the aircraft".


But the obs. have several chunks of low St at various heights: not a typical fog top inversion situation.

[aterpster]

Satcos Whipping Boy:

therefore Decision is made AT decision height but preparations to execute MA are made prior to that point. The MA procedure does cater for a/c dipping below DH. simple really.

That is not quite correct and not so simple, actually. The decision is not an instantaneous event, rather a process of assessments that must be completed by Decision Altitude. The pull-up must be commenced not later than DA. Provision indeed is made in the procedure for a momentary dip below DA, which in fact may or may not occur.

The concept is not infrequently applied incorrectly.

[BALLSOUT]

Momoe.
I hear what you say, but something seems to have saved the left prop from much damage and both engines did stop at some time during the accident, possibly just to fuel starvation from being inverted. As the aircraft rolled to the right, the left engine would be the most likely one to be starved of fuel first, hence the right still turning and burning when it contacted the ground. If the left engine had started to run down, then the damage to the prop would be minimal. I accept that broken fuel lines or props simply dug into the ground would also stop the engies, but then there would be much more damage to the left prop.
There is also the slim chance that one of the crew was quick thinking and they shut down the left engine in an attempt to arrest the uncontrolled roll to the right.
Anyway, enough of this conjecture from me, the authorities will tell us in good time what realy did happen.

[Right Way Up]

For the issue regarding DA about which Aterpster is quite correct can I quote Pans-Ops definition of decision-height.

Decision altitude (DA) or decision height (DH). A specified altitude or height in the precision approach or approach with vertical guidance at which a missed approach must be initiated if the required visual reference to continue the approach has not been established.

Note the term initiated.

The allowance for dipping below the DA is to account for the change of aircraft path which takes a little time to change from descent to climb.
If you hear "minimums", decide then initiate the g/a your margins will be significantly reduced.

Best way of thinking about it is to immediately go-around at the minimums call unless you have evidence to the contrary.

p.s. apologies for thread creep.

[blind pew]

Right Way up
I spent ten years operating with the interpretation that it was not acceptable to go through the decision height unless one had enough visual reference to land.
I then transferred to the best European company of that era who used the criteria that it was a decision height and that it is acceptable to descend through it during a missed approach and not breach any of the calculated safety criteria.
(which used to include aircraft inertia/obstacle clearance as well as altimeter errors)
The philosophy probably originated on the other side of the Atlantic and I personally believe it to be the correct one.
We also had a continue phase during approach - which could also result in a landing or missed approach.
And a look and see if you suspected an inaccuracy in the RVRs.
I once taxied out at heathrow in cat 3 conditions with the fog enveloping the transmissometers but from the cockpit the visibility was 30 Km+

[rabcnesbitt]

Cause

I believe the Flight Operations department must take major responsibility for this accident. They knew what the weather was at ORK before departure. Given that they could have (taking into account the crews in-experience) delayed the flight until the weather was improving or as they also knew there were only 12 souls on board put more fuel on to give the captain a chance of diverting to well outside the area. By the looks of things they chose to take none of these choices but to take the bean counters way.

Granted in order to make a profit it is prudent to do things a certain way but when you know it is going to be difficult you don't tie your crew's hand behind their backs. This is going to cost a lot more than a delay of a couple of hours or the cost of a couple of hours fuel.

So lets not be too quick to blame the pilots perhaps flight ops and the management need to be re-educated. Flight ops gave the go ahead for the flight knowing the crew's experience.