Qantas A380 uncontained #2 engine failure
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T900
Quote:
"Two hours of dumping and ECAM handling appears to me as way too long for such a failure. Airbus and the companies sops might have to be rewritten for the big busses and big failures."
Totally agree, but did the drivers actually see the damage well through the windows from pax cabin and were they told about the wing hole getting bigger later on?
The perception of the incident from the cockpit could have been totally different.
I would still prefer not to ignore the known issues with this engine:
"Airbus A380 with RR Trent 900 engine. Did QANTAS ignore this directive and nearly have a disaster?
EASA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
AD No.: 2010-0008R1
Date: 04 August 2010
Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with
Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its Member States
and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article
66 of that Regulation.
This AD is issued in accordance with EC 1702/2003, Part 21A.3B. In accordance with EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the
continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may
operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by
the Agency [EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [EC 216/2008, Article
14(4) exemption].
Type Approval Holder’s Name :
ROLLS-ROYCE PLC
Type/Model designation(s) :
RB211 Trent 900 series engines
TCDS Number : EASA.E.012
Foreign AD : Not applicable
Revision : This AD revises EASA AD 2010-0008 dated 15 January 2010
ATA 72 Engine – Intermediate Pressure Shaft Coupling Splines –
Inspection
Manufacturer(s): Rolls-Royce plc
Applicability: RB211 Trent 900 series engines, all marks, all serial numbers.
These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to, Airbus
A380 series aircraft.
Reason: Wear, beyond Engine Manual limits, has been identified on the abutment
faces of the splines on the Trent 900 Intermediate Pressure (IP) shaft rigid
coupling on several engines during strip. The shaft to coupling spline
interface provides the means of controlling the turbine axial setting and
wear through of the splines would permit the IP turbine to move
rearwards.
Rearward movement of the IP turbine would enable contact with static
turbine components and would result in loss of engine performance with
potential for in-flight shut down, oil migration and oil fire below the LP
turbine discs prior to sufficient indication resulting in loss of LP turbine disc
integrity. Some of these conditions present a potential unsafe condition to
the aeroplane.
This AD requires inspection of the IP shaft coupling splines and,
depending on the results, requires further repetitive inspections or
corrective actions."
"Two hours of dumping and ECAM handling appears to me as way too long for such a failure. Airbus and the companies sops might have to be rewritten for the big busses and big failures."
Totally agree, but did the drivers actually see the damage well through the windows from pax cabin and were they told about the wing hole getting bigger later on?
The perception of the incident from the cockpit could have been totally different.
I would still prefer not to ignore the known issues with this engine:
"Airbus A380 with RR Trent 900 engine. Did QANTAS ignore this directive and nearly have a disaster?
EASA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
AD No.: 2010-0008R1
Date: 04 August 2010
Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with
Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its Member States
and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article
66 of that Regulation.
This AD is issued in accordance with EC 1702/2003, Part 21A.3B. In accordance with EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the
continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may
operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by
the Agency [EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [EC 216/2008, Article
14(4) exemption].
Type Approval Holder’s Name :
ROLLS-ROYCE PLC
Type/Model designation(s) :
RB211 Trent 900 series engines
TCDS Number : EASA.E.012
Foreign AD : Not applicable
Revision : This AD revises EASA AD 2010-0008 dated 15 January 2010
ATA 72 Engine – Intermediate Pressure Shaft Coupling Splines –
Inspection
Manufacturer(s): Rolls-Royce plc
Applicability: RB211 Trent 900 series engines, all marks, all serial numbers.
These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to, Airbus
A380 series aircraft.
Reason: Wear, beyond Engine Manual limits, has been identified on the abutment
faces of the splines on the Trent 900 Intermediate Pressure (IP) shaft rigid
coupling on several engines during strip. The shaft to coupling spline
interface provides the means of controlling the turbine axial setting and
wear through of the splines would permit the IP turbine to move
rearwards.
Rearward movement of the IP turbine would enable contact with static
turbine components and would result in loss of engine performance with
potential for in-flight shut down, oil migration and oil fire below the LP
turbine discs prior to sufficient indication resulting in loss of LP turbine disc
integrity. Some of these conditions present a potential unsafe condition to
the aeroplane.
This AD requires inspection of the IP shaft coupling splines and,
depending on the results, requires further repetitive inspections or
corrective actions."
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@Bizman
OK, Biz, then we will never take off. With MTOW and a abortion at V1, no revs calculated, and slats not beeing a issue, we STILL have to be able to stop before the end. Landing with no rev, no slats, with MTOW should never be a problem!!! Or the T/O figures are overly optimistic.
If you read well, I didn't suggest they made a mistake, I said they might get a freeze over after realising what was broke on the bird. What I suggested was to reconsider the sops and ECAM nightmare.
So then let's stop criticising for good. Let the authorities do everything after all the NTSBs and lobbyist went over the accident.
I know the monday morning quarterbacks are pityful and maybe I am guilty of a little bit of that. But we should all be allowed to trickle in our own experience and doubts and fears etc. etc.
I just want to point out my distrust in believing in the holy ECAM and sops in heavy failures. These things need to accept criticism as well and my message is that in this particular case the time issue has not been raised. I believe, allthough the crew did a great job, the time issue was not on the agenda and might have been fatal, as we now start discovering in the aftermath.
... and despite dumping fuel, they only just stopped short of the end of that 4000 m runway.
Hmmmm ... we have no slats, half reverse thrust, wet runway, are over MLW and have a No. 1 that we don't know how much residual thrust may still be generating. ..... But, no, you want to hang the SOPs, just get 'er down Bud, and let's run 'er off the end of the runway; and if we loose a bunch of paxs to broken legs, fractured spines etc as we emergency evac them out the slides, and some walk into the still-running No1, we can explain it all later to the press that we just wanted to get 'er on the deck!
Hmmmm ... we have no slats, half reverse thrust, wet runway, are over MLW and have a No. 1 that we don't know how much residual thrust may still be generating. ..... But, no, you want to hang the SOPs, just get 'er down Bud, and let's run 'er off the end of the runway; and if we loose a bunch of paxs to broken legs, fractured spines etc as we emergency evac them out the slides, and some walk into the still-running No1, we can explain it all later to the press that we just wanted to get 'er on the deck!
I suggest you do a grave disservice to that crew that obviously evaluated the situation as fully as they could, and ensured that every one walked away gracefully from a crippled bird that returned in better shape than expected.
Its easier to criticise a crew from where you are sitting now, than to make a good decision from where they were sitting then.
I know the monday morning quarterbacks are pityful and maybe I am guilty of a little bit of that. But we should all be allowed to trickle in our own experience and doubts and fears etc. etc.
I just want to point out my distrust in believing in the holy ECAM and sops in heavy failures. These things need to accept criticism as well and my message is that in this particular case the time issue has not been raised. I believe, allthough the crew did a great job, the time issue was not on the agenda and might have been fatal, as we now start discovering in the aftermath.
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Airworthiness
I would still prefer not to ignore the known issues with this engine:
"Airbus A380 with RR Trent 900 engine. Did QANTAS ignore this directive and nearly have a disaster?
EASA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
"Airbus A380 with RR Trent 900 engine. Did QANTAS ignore this directive and nearly have a disaster?
EASA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
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"Airbus A380 with RR Trent 900 engine. Did QANTAS ignore this directive and nearly have a disaster?
EASA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
AD No.: 2010-0008R1
Date: 04 August 2010
EASA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
AD No.: 2010-0008R1
Date: 04 August 2010
The A380 involved in the Singapore incident recently underwent its first heavy maintenance check by Lufthansa Technik in Germany. Lufthansa is a leading international airline, a top tier engineering and maintenance provider and an operator of the A380 itself. Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engines are overhauled at Rolls-Royce facilities.
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100% right
Quote:
"I just want to point out my distrust in believing in the holy ECAM and sops in heavy failures. These things need to accept criticism as well and my message is that in this particular case the time issue has not been raised. I believe, allthough the crew did a great job, the time issue was not on the agenda and might have been fatal, as we now start discovering in the aftermath. "
The crew did a great job, no doubt.
The criticism is against the concept of the holy ECAM and sops in heavy failures. Time was certainly a massive issue here: after having seen the damage in those videos we know this for sure, therefore pure luck that the massive "loss of time" in favour of ECAM etc did not kill all.
Totally agree with the earlier post above. 100% right.
The real great risk is ECAM etc taking over anything else, including the time issue.
"I just want to point out my distrust in believing in the holy ECAM and sops in heavy failures. These things need to accept criticism as well and my message is that in this particular case the time issue has not been raised. I believe, allthough the crew did a great job, the time issue was not on the agenda and might have been fatal, as we now start discovering in the aftermath. "
The crew did a great job, no doubt.
The criticism is against the concept of the holy ECAM and sops in heavy failures. Time was certainly a massive issue here: after having seen the damage in those videos we know this for sure, therefore pure luck that the massive "loss of time" in favour of ECAM etc did not kill all.
Totally agree with the earlier post above. 100% right.
The real great risk is ECAM etc taking over anything else, including the time issue.
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NAROBS
You are exposed. You know nothing at all about aviation. Why bother posting here?
PS. Please spell QANTAS QANTAS.
You buy a big prestigous new, relatively untried aircraft like that, which presages a substantially new way of organising air travel, with all the potential for opening up new markets and then you put it on a second stringer maintenance regime which has the potential for causing incidents like this. Incompetence !
PS. Please spell QANTAS QANTAS.
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Maybe we could have a new thread where those who are traumatised by the fact that #1 kept running can air their grief?
This incident was not caused by the failure of an engine to quit. Indeed, the unfolding history of aviation has consistently underlined that engines quitting is a far greater hazard than their not doing so. And that if a power unit is going to refuse to play nice, it really is best it only gets that way when on terra firma.
It's #2 which needs a long sit on the naughty step. #1 did everything that was essential under the circumstances and more than it might have done without system logic allowing for contingencies such as... er... stuff exploding.
This incident was not caused by the failure of an engine to quit. Indeed, the unfolding history of aviation has consistently underlined that engines quitting is a far greater hazard than their not doing so. And that if a power unit is going to refuse to play nice, it really is best it only gets that way when on terra firma.
It's #2 which needs a long sit on the naughty step. #1 did everything that was essential under the circumstances and more than it might have done without system logic allowing for contingencies such as... er... stuff exploding.
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Failure modes
This incident was not caused by the failure of an engine to quit. Indeed, the unfolding history of aviation has consistently underlined that engines quitting is a far greater hazard than their not doing so.
Fair point about another thread to discuss this issue, though.
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Information
NAROBS --
Or standards would rise. I don't think any of us here would object to that?
If this information were widely available to the public, travelling numbers would plummet.
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But Lemain, there's been no suggestion of any control issue with #1 until after landing. In fact I believe it's been officially stated that there was no problem with it until that point.
Though I feel bad being so blunt, as frankly, if I recall correctly, you're someone whose posts do tend to be on-topic!
Though I feel bad being so blunt, as frankly, if I recall correctly, you're someone whose posts do tend to be on-topic!
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"So god knows what the second order outfits do. If this information were widely available to the public, travelling numbers would plummet.
Nick"
Really Nick, I think most people buy tickets based on price, then other factors come into play if at all.
At least with Qantas if / when something does go wrong, at least the people up front have been around a bit and seem to be able to bring it down in one piece.
I'll stick with Qantas thanks.
Nick"
Really Nick, I think most people buy tickets based on price, then other factors come into play if at all.
At least with Qantas if / when something does go wrong, at least the people up front have been around a bit and seem to be able to bring it down in one piece.
I'll stick with Qantas thanks.
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@Bolli
Err, I don't think fire crews usually wait for a stricken plane to taxi over to them.
The Fire crew isn't positioned where the plane should stop. They wait where they can get quickest to anywhere the plane does stop.
or they kept rolling because the fire crews were at the end of the runway?
The Fire crew isn't positioned where the plane should stop. They wait where they can get quickest to anywhere the plane does stop.
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Anyone seen landing distance figures published to cater for one of your engines producing significant thrust? Nope me neither
Thats a big unknown on a heavy aircraft and if the aircraft is stable then why not take time and get your weight down, chat to your company/manufacturer etc to get advice. Seems very sensable to me especially if your doing it in a position that allows an expeditious recovery should things deteriorate.
No prizes for rushing in and going off the end of the runway when you don't need to.
Thats a big unknown on a heavy aircraft and if the aircraft is stable then why not take time and get your weight down, chat to your company/manufacturer etc to get advice. Seems very sensable to me especially if your doing it in a position that allows an expeditious recovery should things deteriorate.
No prizes for rushing in and going off the end of the runway when you don't need to.
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robdean
But Lemain, there's been no suggestion of any control issue with #1 until after landing. In fact I believe it's been officially stated that there was no problem with it until that point.
Though I feel bad being so blunt, as frankly, if I recall correctly, you're someone whose posts do tend to be on-topic!
Though I feel bad being so blunt, as frankly, if I recall correctly, you're someone whose posts do tend to be on-topic!
I think the problem potentially goes much deeper than just engine controls. It was my greatest concern when electronics superseded mechanical and hydraulic systems in the first place. I do have a degree in electronics specialising in control and instrumentation with many years of military design experience in the field of things that go up and then bang when they've come down - some with rather big bangs. So the remarks I have made are considered. But I am not an aeronautical engineer.
Still, another thread would be good if anyone is interested and we could rope-in some engineers if anyone would like to start one? I mostly lurk so don't really want to start it off.
Anyone seen landing distance figures published to cater for one of your engines producing significant thrust? Nope me neither
No charts required!
Lemain.
CX had a A330 land at HKG not so long away with a dead engine and the other stuck developing substantial power. From memory it crossed the fence at 200 kts.
CX had a A330 land at HKG not so long away with a dead engine and the other stuck developing substantial power. From memory it crossed the fence at 200 kts.
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Morrissey,
I have a couple of questions:
1. The smoke and the noise happened simultaneously on takeoff or when would you say?
We were at a fair height when this noise happened, a large bang, vibration, and then a slight feeling of plunging down as the power came off the other three engines. Now I've said it was a puff of smoke comng out the back of the engine BUT, it could have been the large section of cowling falling off.
2. Did any passengers express concern over the delay to land?
The calm of the passengers was superb - my feeling is that everyone realised the serious nature of the fix we were in, there was nothing we could do and had to leave it to the professionals. The possible need to dump fuel and need to complete a large set of checklists was conveyed to everyone early on, with regular updates, and the scene was set that this would not be an instant process. Everyone realised this was a mechanical issue, and the guys that counted were now working hard to sort things out for us.
3. There have been pictures and discussion regarding a hole (or holes) in the wing. Did you get an opportunity to view this? If so could you describe, and express whether it was expanding over time?
By craning my neck I could see the holes in the wing (I was sitting in the mid 60's row wise) but did not concentrate on looking at them every few minutes to check the size. Everyone reacts to a situation like this in different ways - I tried to bury my head in a book.
I can confirm one of the flight deck crew came back and checked the situation out of the windows, he looked confident in what he was doing.
4. I don't know your experience, but would you describe the landing as power on, fast etc.?
Sitting two rows back from the emergency aisle one of the senior cabin staff came round and briefed the crew that it would be a fast landing. You could feel the landing gear coming down - this personally was my primary concern - but it sounded all wrong. There was almost a flapping sound and then a gap prior to the gear took an age to clunk into place. One of you more experienced guys can comment if we were sitting directly above the gear , all i can say was the floor was vibrating significantly below our feet, enough for me to lift my feet from the floor.
Once we were on the ground of course my secondary concern was stopping, and you could see this was becoming a problem and we were running a bit short of space, spoilers were bot coming up, tried reverse thrust, couple of bangs- not sure if we lost tyres or not.
Once we were on the ground we had an engine running they could not stop and fuel leaking onto the runway. At that point it's really the fire crews have a far better visual on what they have to deal with. At all times we were ready to evacuate, but bear in mind with an engine running it would have been out of one side of the aircraft. Better to keep us seated, let the situation be dealt with, always ready to evacuate if needed.
I'm being quite careful to only give you the facts based on my experience of events, not make suppositions based on any subsequent discussions. I've deliberately avoided hearing any TV news (though have seen the web and pictures mailed to me) or reading this thread in any detail to avoid any influence on my recollections.
Hope this answers your questions.
I have a couple of questions:
1. The smoke and the noise happened simultaneously on takeoff or when would you say?
We were at a fair height when this noise happened, a large bang, vibration, and then a slight feeling of plunging down as the power came off the other three engines. Now I've said it was a puff of smoke comng out the back of the engine BUT, it could have been the large section of cowling falling off.
2. Did any passengers express concern over the delay to land?
The calm of the passengers was superb - my feeling is that everyone realised the serious nature of the fix we were in, there was nothing we could do and had to leave it to the professionals. The possible need to dump fuel and need to complete a large set of checklists was conveyed to everyone early on, with regular updates, and the scene was set that this would not be an instant process. Everyone realised this was a mechanical issue, and the guys that counted were now working hard to sort things out for us.
3. There have been pictures and discussion regarding a hole (or holes) in the wing. Did you get an opportunity to view this? If so could you describe, and express whether it was expanding over time?
By craning my neck I could see the holes in the wing (I was sitting in the mid 60's row wise) but did not concentrate on looking at them every few minutes to check the size. Everyone reacts to a situation like this in different ways - I tried to bury my head in a book.
I can confirm one of the flight deck crew came back and checked the situation out of the windows, he looked confident in what he was doing.
4. I don't know your experience, but would you describe the landing as power on, fast etc.?
Sitting two rows back from the emergency aisle one of the senior cabin staff came round and briefed the crew that it would be a fast landing. You could feel the landing gear coming down - this personally was my primary concern - but it sounded all wrong. There was almost a flapping sound and then a gap prior to the gear took an age to clunk into place. One of you more experienced guys can comment if we were sitting directly above the gear , all i can say was the floor was vibrating significantly below our feet, enough for me to lift my feet from the floor.
Once we were on the ground of course my secondary concern was stopping, and you could see this was becoming a problem and we were running a bit short of space, spoilers were bot coming up, tried reverse thrust, couple of bangs- not sure if we lost tyres or not.
Once we were on the ground we had an engine running they could not stop and fuel leaking onto the runway. At that point it's really the fire crews have a far better visual on what they have to deal with. At all times we were ready to evacuate, but bear in mind with an engine running it would have been out of one side of the aircraft. Better to keep us seated, let the situation be dealt with, always ready to evacuate if needed.
I'm being quite careful to only give you the facts based on my experience of events, not make suppositions based on any subsequent discussions. I've deliberately avoided hearing any TV news (though have seen the web and pictures mailed to me) or reading this thread in any detail to avoid any influence on my recollections.
Hope this answers your questions.
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Risk of recurrence is the major issue, or am I going to be accused of being an armchair captain? I'd ask you professionals to assess the risk of hull loss from this event ***once it had occurred***, punctured wing and all: 0.01%? 0.1% 1% 10% ??? I've no opinion on this judgement but plainly it needs to be made, and the higher up the scale of risk the sooner it needs to be made. If the assessment is that it is a 0.01% risk and a "one off" then fine, but hope should not triumph over experience. PS Well done Qantas crew and Singapore ground staff.
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Capt Fathom
Its traditional when you land one of these things to select reverse thrust. If the crew realised that they had no control over No 1 when they were still airborne then it would be reasonable to question whether they would be able to get reverse thrust on it when they landed or would it still pump out significant forward thrust? If the later was the case then it could have a very significant impact on landing distance.
No abnormal landing distance factors that I have ever seen cater for that scenario.
So thankyou for correcting my little technical inaccuracy although I rather suspect that most knew what I meant.
Its traditional when you land one of these things to select reverse thrust. If the crew realised that they had no control over No 1 when they were still airborne then it would be reasonable to question whether they would be able to get reverse thrust on it when they landed or would it still pump out significant forward thrust? If the later was the case then it could have a very significant impact on landing distance.
No abnormal landing distance factors that I have ever seen cater for that scenario.
So thankyou for correcting my little technical inaccuracy although I rather suspect that most knew what I meant.
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B772 - Vef
CX had a A330 land at HKG not so long away with a dead engine and the other stuck developing substantial power. From memory it crossed the fence at 200 kts.
You simply cannot have a design in which it is impossible to shut down all power. It is conceptually wrong. It must be possible to shut down all power units, preferably from the cockpit, by some means that does not rely on a data bus.