Airblue down near Islamabad
PJ2, Aterpster, et al “ … mistaken for a runway at some distance in poor vis.”
See incidents 4 and 5.
http://www.icao.int/fsix/_Library%5C...plus%20add.pdf
See incidents 4 and 5.
http://www.icao.int/fsix/_Library%5C...plus%20add.pdf
I made this very crudely-done graphic at the same time I did the others which showed a possible location of the crash site.
This view is looking southwest, (out the captain's side/rear window on a track about 30 - 40deg offset to the "right" of the approach to 30, (track of about 330 - 340deg), just approaching the hills, about 2nm east of the crash site. The street barely seen is Abdul Rashead Rd or 7th Avenue.
A turn radius which would take the aircraft to the crash site may indicate an earlier "sighting" of "the runway" than this, given the visibility at the time.
This IS a theory, not a suggestion or a plot of the track the aircraft may have taken.
As we all know, regardless of a reported visibility of "2nm", visibility is never suddenly fully obscured at 2nm - local rain showers, scud and all sorts of illusions will vary visibility and local features and "a willingness to fill in the obscurities", can play tricks on a mind set on "finding the runway" once lost.
I suspect that there are a set circumstances in which each of us may be similarly deceived by our senses even though some may believe otherwise. Looking inside and interpreting the NAV display map and trying to then make sense of what is seen outside is a tenuous endeavour.
Again - this is most certainly just a thought. Who knows what happened?
Regarding interim reporting, release of information, invitation/participation of other countries who will have recognized legitimate interests and representations here, I very much hope the Pakistani authorities adhere to the ICAO Annex 13 requirements. They are signatory, after all.
PJ2
This view is looking southwest, (out the captain's side/rear window on a track about 30 - 40deg offset to the "right" of the approach to 30, (track of about 330 - 340deg), just approaching the hills, about 2nm east of the crash site. The street barely seen is Abdul Rashead Rd or 7th Avenue.
A turn radius which would take the aircraft to the crash site may indicate an earlier "sighting" of "the runway" than this, given the visibility at the time.
This IS a theory, not a suggestion or a plot of the track the aircraft may have taken.
As we all know, regardless of a reported visibility of "2nm", visibility is never suddenly fully obscured at 2nm - local rain showers, scud and all sorts of illusions will vary visibility and local features and "a willingness to fill in the obscurities", can play tricks on a mind set on "finding the runway" once lost.
I suspect that there are a set circumstances in which each of us may be similarly deceived by our senses even though some may believe otherwise. Looking inside and interpreting the NAV display map and trying to then make sense of what is seen outside is a tenuous endeavour.
Again - this is most certainly just a thought. Who knows what happened?
Regarding interim reporting, release of information, invitation/participation of other countries who will have recognized legitimate interests and representations here, I very much hope the Pakistani authorities adhere to the ICAO Annex 13 requirements. They are signatory, after all.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 1st Aug 2010 at 02:30. Reason: correct the runway & headings I first posted
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There is just too much risk involved in flying a circle in low weather. We've all heard about good landings being preceded by stable approaches. Well, a circle is anything but a stable approach. It is something we do very infrequently, therefore it is very hard to keep it stable. Not to mention that you will most likely be flying manually while trying to keep visual with the airport, often taking configuration changes at non-standard times. Today's airline procedures and cockpits are just not designed to be "circle friendly".
411A
Can you please expand on your comment above. Was it related to the preceding post? Or?
As a stand alone comment it doesn't make sense (at least to my small brain) without giving some context.
Can you please expand on your comment above. Was it related to the preceding post? Or?
As a stand alone comment it doesn't make sense (at least to my small brain) without giving some context.
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PJ - I think that image would be of great interest but I fear the 'obscuration' you have applied is a bit too effective
Do I take it from your 'theory' that we have a definite crash location and direction of travel at impact? It is the '330-340' track I cannot understand, having (supposition) terminated the ILS at around 2 1/2 - 3 nm, continued towards the field and then turned right (330-340?), presumably aiming to fly a visual downwind on a track of 300. You are 'permitted' under circling rules to 'lose sight' of the airfield during the turn, but in the prevailing vis it would have needed to be a reasonably tight downwind to keep the airfield in sight in the reported vis with probable heavy showers dotted around too. Not ideal to say the least. Any ideas? As GG has said, loads of 'runway like' roads but unless spatially disorientated the heading should give it away immediately. Also an ex-mil F/O would surely have been getting the hairs on his neck standing up a bit?
Meekal has also 'gone silent' on my requests for these 'procedures' for circling on 12 he spoke of in #93 and #100 and his mention of a 'back course' for R12. Presumably, as I said earlier, 'home grown' and unofficial, but they might cast more light on this.
Lastly, and more of interest than speculation, the projected track' from datum to crash site almost exactly overlays the outbound hold.
Edit: Do we have a crash site elevation?
Do I take it from your 'theory' that we have a definite crash location and direction of travel at impact? It is the '330-340' track I cannot understand, having (supposition) terminated the ILS at around 2 1/2 - 3 nm, continued towards the field and then turned right (330-340?), presumably aiming to fly a visual downwind on a track of 300. You are 'permitted' under circling rules to 'lose sight' of the airfield during the turn, but in the prevailing vis it would have needed to be a reasonably tight downwind to keep the airfield in sight in the reported vis with probable heavy showers dotted around too. Not ideal to say the least. Any ideas? As GG has said, loads of 'runway like' roads but unless spatially disorientated the heading should give it away immediately. Also an ex-mil F/O would surely have been getting the hairs on his neck standing up a bit?
Meekal has also 'gone silent' on my requests for these 'procedures' for circling on 12 he spoke of in #93 and #100 and his mention of a 'back course' for R12. Presumably, as I said earlier, 'home grown' and unofficial, but they might cast more light on this.
Lastly, and more of interest than speculation, the projected track' from datum to crash site almost exactly overlays the outbound hold.
Edit: Do we have a crash site elevation?
Last edited by BOAC; 1st Aug 2010 at 07:59.
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BOAC:
Avherald gives "...impacted the Margalla Hills about 10nm north of the airport at a height of about 1000 feet above the city/aerodrome".
This would mean some 2600 ft ASL, and the highest points of those hills are at 3800 ft ASL.
Reg
Edit: Do we have a crash site elevation?
This would mean some 2600 ft ASL, and the highest points of those hills are at 3800 ft ASL.
Reg
Last edited by RegDep; 1st Aug 2010 at 11:39. Reason: Grammar
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Agreed. Let us not detract from the subject at hand.
So he was not in TOGA before impact? BOAC thinks it is self-evident. I am getting confused.
If he was not in TOGA mode then he got no terrain warning and ran smack into high ground?
For what it is worth, I have urged that the circle-to-land on 12 be banned by the CAA right away.
So he was not in TOGA before impact? BOAC thinks it is self-evident. I am getting confused.
If he was not in TOGA mode then he got no terrain warning and ran smack into high ground?
For what it is worth, I have urged that the circle-to-land on 12 be banned by the CAA right away.
Unnecessary Risk
The safety problem is not necessarily during the procedure, it’s more likely to be the decision to attempt the procedure (or even allow it) – these observations are made in hindsight.
411A suggests that judgement of ability is a factor “if you can’t bear the heat”. I disagree; how your personal performance can vary is a more realistic consideration. “It’s often the best pilots who make the biggest mistakes” (James Reason)
Similarly, the dependence on ‘all available resources’ will not protect against every error, particularly optical effects which can affect both crew similarly, or just the one with visual contact.
A better decision (hindsight) would have been to have held or diverted; preceding traffic appeared to come to this conclusion. Thus, why did this crew decide to make the approach? Complacency, they thought that they were better than they were, familiarity with a local airport, the weather changed, or they were just human – they suffered an error in awareness.
It’s unlikely that any factor in this area will be identified with certainty, or any deeper human reasons behind the decision.
I recall a quote “Don’t ask why the lights could go out; consider what you will do when the lights do go out”, which may relate to this thread where the focus of debate is on why the accident occurred.
An operational ‘technical’ investigation is worthwhile to a point, but the thread conclusions focus on how ‘this’ accident might be avoided by considering how the procedure can be done, as opposed to should it be attempted.
The judgement should consider how to avoid such situations – even if it’s within the charted limits, within the SOP guidelines, within your capabilities, or someone else has done it.
We all require a safety margin, which will vary with each situation, and thus requires our assessment of the situation on that day, at that time, and thence the choice of action.
This choice is not the minimum safe option; it should be the safest option – that which avoids ‘unnecessary’ risk. But what is unnecessary?
Meekal, “If he was not in TOGA mode then he got no terrain warning … ”
No, this is not necessarily a logical assumption. See the link in #262; any one of those aircraft could have crashed, they did not.
The key to understanding this accident is to look at how this situation (including crew decisions and action) differed from the non accident situations.
411A suggests that judgement of ability is a factor “if you can’t bear the heat”. I disagree; how your personal performance can vary is a more realistic consideration. “It’s often the best pilots who make the biggest mistakes” (James Reason)
Similarly, the dependence on ‘all available resources’ will not protect against every error, particularly optical effects which can affect both crew similarly, or just the one with visual contact.
A better decision (hindsight) would have been to have held or diverted; preceding traffic appeared to come to this conclusion. Thus, why did this crew decide to make the approach? Complacency, they thought that they were better than they were, familiarity with a local airport, the weather changed, or they were just human – they suffered an error in awareness.
It’s unlikely that any factor in this area will be identified with certainty, or any deeper human reasons behind the decision.
I recall a quote “Don’t ask why the lights could go out; consider what you will do when the lights do go out”, which may relate to this thread where the focus of debate is on why the accident occurred.
An operational ‘technical’ investigation is worthwhile to a point, but the thread conclusions focus on how ‘this’ accident might be avoided by considering how the procedure can be done, as opposed to should it be attempted.
The judgement should consider how to avoid such situations – even if it’s within the charted limits, within the SOP guidelines, within your capabilities, or someone else has done it.
We all require a safety margin, which will vary with each situation, and thus requires our assessment of the situation on that day, at that time, and thence the choice of action.
This choice is not the minimum safe option; it should be the safest option – that which avoids ‘unnecessary’ risk. But what is unnecessary?
Meekal, “If he was not in TOGA mode then he got no terrain warning … ”
No, this is not necessarily a logical assumption. See the link in #262; any one of those aircraft could have crashed, they did not.
The key to understanding this accident is to look at how this situation (including crew decisions and action) differed from the non accident situations.
BOAC;
Yeah, the obscuration is almost total, as it may very well be if one encounters a local rain shower or cloud while maneuvering in poor weather. One can barely make out the roads in this graphic, but of course that is the point.
I don't have a crash elevation or a ground track. On the location, using a lat/long and other info from aterpster and BrooksPA-28, I worked from the photographs that Machaca posted and using Google Earth, came up with an approximation given the mountain profiles, road, city and horizon. It is a very rough approximation, especially the G.E. Terrain feature, and is therefore not reliable - but I think it is close.
On the level of obscuration/road-for-runway, in order to explain the comment from the aircraft published in the Pakistani newspaper as part of the ATC communications, that they, "have the runway in sight", I chose the right turn of about 30 to 40 degrees because of ground witnesses who were in or near the area where, by the chart note aircraft were restricted from flying, (to the NE of the airport), saying they saw the aircraft flying low overhead and heard the crash a few minutes later. A right turn, not straight ahead or a left turn off the approach to 30 made sense.
The theory behind all of this is confirmation bias in mistaking roads for runways, having likely lost sight of the airport for whatever reason. While to me the track made most sense, to my knowledge none of us know what track the aircraft took.
The entire theory could be very wrong.
But we know they were circling for 12 and hit the hills, perhaps even after being warned by ATC and possibly the TAWS. What factors that we all pay close attention to in such circumstances made sense to the crew, (particularly the captain) that permitted acceptance and therefore continuance of their current flight path and altitude for the maneuver they were executing? Why did they consider what they were doing successful in relation to their goal, which was (visually) lining up with 12?
PEI_3721;
Exactly. Let's explore Truman's statement; While I think most of us understand the intent of the statement, ("get stronger..., or let those better than us do the heavy lifting"), I think it is being used here incorrectly to goad rather than teach.
Harry Truman was a politician, not an airline pilot. The phrase was intended to lead others politically, not to describe oneself in a cockpit.
The notions of "heat" and "kitchen" are not fixed nor are they one-dimensional or universally applicable to all at all times. Truman's demand that someone stand aside while another who is deemed "more competent" doesn't have a lot of currency in commercial aviation. In politics one only gets voted out - not so in aviation.
In aviation, one constantly chooses one's "heat" and the kitchens out of which one will stay while making a perfectly reasonable decision regarding more heat and other kitchens one might accept and do very well in, and at different times.
The decision about how much heat one will take on is always on the move depending upon many factors, most of them human, including one's experience, training and innate abilities. Even the best and most iron-clad of us may wisely choose another place, another day. That many did not is not proof that the kitchen was too hot. If it was, Accident Investigation Boards would be redundant. On any one day, it could be "us".
But if the idea behind Truman's statement becomes a fixed, prescriptive formula by which judgement is made either of one's own capabilities or of others' then at some point it will fail oneself and others should they take the statement seriously. As a "lesson", the statement should be set aside.
Would that more had made such a decision according to their own varying levels of training, skills, personal fatigue levels and other continuums which are always changing and of which one must constantly be aware in order to stay alive.
Neither excellence nor competency, which are both required for safe flight, is set aside here. What is set aside here is a peculiar attitude.
PJ2
PJ - I think that image would be of great interest but I fear the 'obscuration' you have applied is a bit too effective
Do I take it from your 'theory' that we have a definite crash location and direction of travel at impact? It is the '330-340' track I cannot understan
Do I take it from your 'theory' that we have a definite crash location and direction of travel at impact? It is the '330-340' track I cannot understan
I don't have a crash elevation or a ground track. On the location, using a lat/long and other info from aterpster and BrooksPA-28, I worked from the photographs that Machaca posted and using Google Earth, came up with an approximation given the mountain profiles, road, city and horizon. It is a very rough approximation, especially the G.E. Terrain feature, and is therefore not reliable - but I think it is close.
On the level of obscuration/road-for-runway, in order to explain the comment from the aircraft published in the Pakistani newspaper as part of the ATC communications, that they, "have the runway in sight", I chose the right turn of about 30 to 40 degrees because of ground witnesses who were in or near the area where, by the chart note aircraft were restricted from flying, (to the NE of the airport), saying they saw the aircraft flying low overhead and heard the crash a few minutes later. A right turn, not straight ahead or a left turn off the approach to 30 made sense.
The theory behind all of this is confirmation bias in mistaking roads for runways, having likely lost sight of the airport for whatever reason. While to me the track made most sense, to my knowledge none of us know what track the aircraft took.
The entire theory could be very wrong.
But we know they were circling for 12 and hit the hills, perhaps even after being warned by ATC and possibly the TAWS. What factors that we all pay close attention to in such circumstances made sense to the crew, (particularly the captain) that permitted acceptance and therefore continuance of their current flight path and altitude for the maneuver they were executing? Why did they consider what they were doing successful in relation to their goal, which was (visually) lining up with 12?
PEI_3721;
411A suggests that judgement of ability is a factor “if you can’t bear the heat”. I disagree; how your personal performance can vary is a more realistic consideration. “It’s often the best pilots who make the biggest mistakes” (James Reason)
Harry Truman was a politician, not an airline pilot. The phrase was intended to lead others politically, not to describe oneself in a cockpit.
The notions of "heat" and "kitchen" are not fixed nor are they one-dimensional or universally applicable to all at all times. Truman's demand that someone stand aside while another who is deemed "more competent" doesn't have a lot of currency in commercial aviation. In politics one only gets voted out - not so in aviation.
In aviation, one constantly chooses one's "heat" and the kitchens out of which one will stay while making a perfectly reasonable decision regarding more heat and other kitchens one might accept and do very well in, and at different times.
The decision about how much heat one will take on is always on the move depending upon many factors, most of them human, including one's experience, training and innate abilities. Even the best and most iron-clad of us may wisely choose another place, another day. That many did not is not proof that the kitchen was too hot. If it was, Accident Investigation Boards would be redundant. On any one day, it could be "us".
But if the idea behind Truman's statement becomes a fixed, prescriptive formula by which judgement is made either of one's own capabilities or of others' then at some point it will fail oneself and others should they take the statement seriously. As a "lesson", the statement should be set aside.
Would that more had made such a decision according to their own varying levels of training, skills, personal fatigue levels and other continuums which are always changing and of which one must constantly be aware in order to stay alive.
Neither excellence nor competency, which are both required for safe flight, is set aside here. What is set aside here is a peculiar attitude.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 1st Aug 2010 at 14:37. Reason: added comment re Truman's epithet
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I'm with BOAC on this, a circle to land is an ILS letdown followed by a visual circuit.
Map shift should have nothing to do with this whatsoever. Unless they have broken the rules and payed the ultimate price for themselves and their pax, ie created a "homemade" FMC based procedure, which would be insane.
Map shift should have nothing to do with this whatsoever. Unless they have broken the rules and payed the ultimate price for themselves and their pax, ie created a "homemade" FMC based procedure, which would be insane.
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Originally Posted by Meerkal
So he was not in TOGA before impact?
PJ - I fully understand what flying in those conditions is like - they are by no means unknown to me - the point was that I can see virtually nothing of the 'road' and thus cannot resolve the puzzle of the location being '2nm EAST' of the crash site as I would surmise they flew into the rocky cliff face on the same track as they were following to the site and hence I cannot understand your comment about a 'turn radius'.
Regarding 'heat and kitchen', I think my views on Arizona's finest's 'unique understanding' of circling procedures are obvious and I have actually had to empty my PM inbox to cope with the number of 'interesting' and supportive PMs I have received (including one FAA chappie!).
Amen to your last sentence.As a final 'bigger picture' thought tacked onto this post - in my opinion, circling areas need to be set between the ludicrous TERPS and the over-expansive PansOps. Do folk agree? I understand the TERPS is being reviewed, but is there any move to reduce the PansOps? Having CatD at 5.6nm is totally unnecessary. With my eyesight I'd be lucky to even see an airfield that far away
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Harry Truman said is best...'can't stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen.
One of the things you should leave out of the cockpit is ego. As someone already pointed out to you, when you are in command of the aircraft it is your choice how much heat you subject yourself to.
You don't go starting fires simply because you have a fire extinguisher, do you?
BOAC;
Sorry, yes I knew you were more than familiar with the scenario...didn't mean to be pedantic...I see what you mean now and didn't explain my thinking very well...
I was considering that a left turn was made towards the west at that point I show in the graphic which is right at the mountains. What I meant by "turn radius" was a turn to the west for the "runway", and that an earlier turn would have missed the hills and a later turn would have placed the point of impact further north given a rate of turn at maneuvering speeds...so again, a SCWAG and I realize what a huge stretch in thinking this is at this point in whatever investigation is going on.
On the impact speed, this has all the hallmarks of "surprise", so if TOGA and a pull-up were used, it is likely only at the last second. I think it is reasonable to assume that the impact speed was close to maneuvering speeds - I recall reading somewhere that a witness in the NNE area stated the gear was down - so, "Config 2, gear down", 180kts +/- ?
I sure hope something is released shortly - any news on the recorders?
PJ2
PJ - I fully understand what flying in those conditions is like - they are by no means unknown to me - the point was that I can see virtually nothing of the 'road' and thus cannot resolve the puzzle of the location being '2nm EAST' of the crash site as I would surmise they flew into the rocky cliff face on the same track as they were following to the site and hence I cannot understand your comment about a 'turn radius'.
I was considering that a left turn was made towards the west at that point I show in the graphic which is right at the mountains. What I meant by "turn radius" was a turn to the west for the "runway", and that an earlier turn would have missed the hills and a later turn would have placed the point of impact further north given a rate of turn at maneuvering speeds...so again, a SCWAG and I realize what a huge stretch in thinking this is at this point in whatever investigation is going on.
On the impact speed, this has all the hallmarks of "surprise", so if TOGA and a pull-up were used, it is likely only at the last second. I think it is reasonable to assume that the impact speed was close to maneuvering speeds - I recall reading somewhere that a witness in the NNE area stated the gear was down - so, "Config 2, gear down", 180kts +/- ?
I sure hope something is released shortly - any news on the recorders?
PJ2
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Airblue down near Isamabad
That was an interesting comment. I am not a pilot but you make a lot of sense, in the way you have applied your logic. After all, I think there is a saying that goes, "hands were made before forks". It goes without saying that, manual operation came before auto operation. What is so wrong if one can save their own life, by applying the latter where possible and when logical to do so.
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I believe that banning circle-to-land from aviation is unrealistic an economically unfeasible. In the airline I work for we fly these approaches a few times (maybe 5 or 6) a year and despite being very demanding they work very well. The problem is that you must stick to the procedures, maintain yourself inside the safety area and ALWAYS keep the runway in sight. Looking for a 10 nm final on a circling approach is bizarre! A normal downwing leg is never more than 25-30 seconds... Unfortunately our egos sometimes don't let us take the right decisions... GO AROUND!!!
PS: problem 2: if some pilots don't know how to circle properly, how can they know the correct go around procedure?
PS: problem 2: if some pilots don't know how to circle properly, how can they know the correct go around procedure?
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Ex Cargo Clown:
But, we don't know whether he flew the ILS correctly to the circling MDA before he departed the electronic guidance. If he did so, then the map would be (should have been) unimportant at that point.
There is always so much for the industry to learn from this type of accident. Sadly, it appears politics (national false pride) will trump safety this time around.
I'm with BOAC on this, a circle to land is an ILS letdown followed by a visual circuit.
Map shift should have nothing to do with this whatsoever. Unless they have broken the rules and payed the ultimate price for themselves and their pax, ie created a "homemade" FMC based procedure, which would be insane.
Map shift should have nothing to do with this whatsoever. Unless they have broken the rules and payed the ultimate price for themselves and their pax, ie created a "homemade" FMC based procedure, which would be insane.
There is always so much for the industry to learn from this type of accident. Sadly, it appears politics (national false pride) will trump safety this time around.
Fuel Dump;
If I may, I don't think "banning circling approaches" is either being considered, or is the point here. I think competency in flying them is, which is the point you are also making.
Regarding economically-feasible, I think this is the main reason why many major carriers have as a matter of policy, essentially stopped doing them.
The cost of the sim time necessary to train crews to do them safely and then regularly check them to ensure the standard is being maintained, is high, and, given that they are generally rarely-used and that sim time is already at a premium, crowded with other training items of higher priority, (bear in mind that at some carriers, sim times have been reduced to 3.5hrs, and under AQP, time between recurrent sims/PPCs can be as high as 8 months vice the normal six months), I think that for most carriers it was less expensive to accept the occasional diversion than to spend the money on training.
I say this with some experience; I know airlines which, for example, do not teach the Managed Approach procedures for the A320 based upon the fact that they do not use or teach use of the Bird (and Mustache) - the Flight Path Vector and Flight Path Director - too expensive to train in the sim when they can use heading and vertical speed.
I think the safety of the circling maneuver was a lesser consideration primarily because we know that the maneuver, though of higher risk, can still be done safely under the correct training and checking regimes. I did many Canarsie approaches onto 13R at JFK in the DC9, DC8 and L1011 and loved flying every one of them but that was a time when we trained for and did circling approaches regularly. No longer.
PJ2
I believe that banning circle-to-land from aviation is unrealistic an economically unfeasible.
Regarding economically-feasible, I think this is the main reason why many major carriers have as a matter of policy, essentially stopped doing them.
The cost of the sim time necessary to train crews to do them safely and then regularly check them to ensure the standard is being maintained, is high, and, given that they are generally rarely-used and that sim time is already at a premium, crowded with other training items of higher priority, (bear in mind that at some carriers, sim times have been reduced to 3.5hrs, and under AQP, time between recurrent sims/PPCs can be as high as 8 months vice the normal six months), I think that for most carriers it was less expensive to accept the occasional diversion than to spend the money on training.
I say this with some experience; I know airlines which, for example, do not teach the Managed Approach procedures for the A320 based upon the fact that they do not use or teach use of the Bird (and Mustache) - the Flight Path Vector and Flight Path Director - too expensive to train in the sim when they can use heading and vertical speed.
I think the safety of the circling maneuver was a lesser consideration primarily because we know that the maneuver, though of higher risk, can still be done safely under the correct training and checking regimes. I did many Canarsie approaches onto 13R at JFK in the DC9, DC8 and L1011 and loved flying every one of them but that was a time when we trained for and did circling approaches regularly. No longer.
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PJ2, I agree with you.
My questions now are:
1- Are the Airblue crews trained for circling approaches?
2- Were they rushed into one due to a late wind change without proper briefing this complex procedure?
My questions now are:
1- Are the Airblue crews trained for circling approaches?
2- Were they rushed into one due to a late wind change without proper briefing this complex procedure?
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PJ2:
Canarsie = late base to final while descending along a well-marked path with the lead-in lights and probably runways in sight at MDA. Not remotely close to a CTL to the reciprocal runway, such as with the accident at issue.
I think the safety of the circling maneuver was a lesser consideration primarily because we know that the maneuver, though of higher risk, can still be done safely under the correct training and checking regimes. I did many Canarsie approaches onto 13R at JFK in the DC9, DC8 and L1011 and loved flying every one of them but that was a time when we trained for and did circling approaches regularly. No longer.