Lufthansa cargo plane crash
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Surprised by the continuing MD-11 thrashing/questioning. It's not a voodo airplane.
It's just an airplane. Like all the others. Remember the basics, prioritize the killer items, and all will be well.
It's just an airplane. Like all the others. Remember the basics, prioritize the killer items, and all will be well.
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Surprised by the continuing MD-11 thrashing/questioning.
Unfortunately, PPRuNe these days seems to be dominated by non-pilots and very junior pilots, who, upon closer examination...don't know very much about large heavy jet transport airplanes and their successful operation.
Surprised by the continuing MD-11 thrashing/questioning.
Just check the stats against the largely comparable 777/A340 or the 744 and draw your own conclusions.
It's surely not voodoo. It has its shortcomings like all technical objects do. The only question is what effects the shortcomings have. Unfortunately it appears that the effects of its not so good aspects tend to be more severe/less forgiving than for most other contemporary types.
To put it in perspective:
In a world where accidents of large transport aircraft are not considered acceptable at any rate any more an aircraft with an accident statistic which is in absolute terms still quite good (compare it to B707/DC-8 or even propliners) will be quickly considered 'unsafe'.
Last edited by henra; 19th Sep 2010 at 13:50.
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casablanca
I don't think suggesting you add power after a bounce to reduce the sink rate is wise. Adding power to salvage a bad landing will only increase the landing distance and could set you up for another surprise when your thought process is already fuctup following the bounce.
Who taught you that?
Try reviewing the DC-10 overrun in KBOS in the 70s. We learned long ago, Go Around! Simpler, safer and one of the most practiced maneuvers in our pilot careers second only to the senseless V1 cut.
If you fly it, you already know the MD-11 has some nasty, nasty CofG landing habits.
I don't think suggesting you add power after a bounce to reduce the sink rate is wise. Adding power to salvage a bad landing will only increase the landing distance and could set you up for another surprise when your thought process is already fuctup following the bounce.
Who taught you that?
Try reviewing the DC-10 overrun in KBOS in the 70s. We learned long ago, Go Around! Simpler, safer and one of the most practiced maneuvers in our pilot careers second only to the senseless V1 cut.
If you fly it, you already know the MD-11 has some nasty, nasty CofG landing habits.
Last edited by Willie Everlearn; 19th Sep 2010 at 13:59.
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HENRA, Willie Everlearn.
Just curious. have either of you ever flown the MD-11?
I spent many happy years on this airplane and I never experienced any quirky handling traits.
Just curious. have either of you ever flown the MD-11?
I spent many happy years on this airplane and I never experienced any quirky handling traits.
Last edited by protect essential; 19th Sep 2010 at 13:58. Reason: added to header
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I have flown the airplane for 10 years now....not really suggesting the add power vs going around either...that airplane makes most runways look small or minimal. My main point was "dont unload the wing" by pushing the nose down.
The BOS overrun? Are you referring to the World DC-10 that went out into the harbor? That was primarily due to braking action nil....which was not reported beforehand.
The BOS overrun? Are you referring to the World DC-10 that went out into the harbor? That was primarily due to braking action nil....which was not reported beforehand.
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casablanca
I think I've misunderstood your comment and so I do apologize if you took it as an afront. My having only just read that the LH MD11 hit the runway hard on initial touchdown, and the following three successive touchdowns were progressively harder resulting in...well we know the rest.
It is recommended by Boeing that following a hard landing the crew should execute a go-around. I don't believe this is "the revelation", but believing all MD11 crews would be aware of that, my first reaction was who's teaching the addition of power to reduce sink rate following a hard landing? Yikes!!
I didn't mean to come across as the prophet of aviation. I'm anything but.
The first time I landed an MD11, I pulled all three into reverse and was surprised by the sudden and immediate raising of the nose despite being warned. From that day onward I've held the belief that this tendancy could easily lead to disaster. Why? Because you have to work around the tendancy.
Is that something we as pilots like to see in our aircraft?
I personally don't think it is.
Otherwise, it's a fantastic machine.
I recall vaguely the World one, but it seems to me there was another speed related incident at KBOS. Alitalia? SAS? I'll have to do some more research.
I think I've misunderstood your comment and so I do apologize if you took it as an afront. My having only just read that the LH MD11 hit the runway hard on initial touchdown, and the following three successive touchdowns were progressively harder resulting in...well we know the rest.
It is recommended by Boeing that following a hard landing the crew should execute a go-around. I don't believe this is "the revelation", but believing all MD11 crews would be aware of that, my first reaction was who's teaching the addition of power to reduce sink rate following a hard landing? Yikes!!
I didn't mean to come across as the prophet of aviation. I'm anything but.
The first time I landed an MD11, I pulled all three into reverse and was surprised by the sudden and immediate raising of the nose despite being warned. From that day onward I've held the belief that this tendancy could easily lead to disaster. Why? Because you have to work around the tendancy.
Is that something we as pilots like to see in our aircraft?
I personally don't think it is.
Otherwise, it's a fantastic machine.
I recall vaguely the World one, but it seems to me there was another speed related incident at KBOS. Alitalia? SAS? I'll have to do some more research.
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imho, pitch handling on landing can be tricky - depending on CG, Weight, spoiler & reverse deployment.
Every once in a while this may produce a suprising pitch up moment. Add to this the fact that the MD11 is -imho- imbalanced in the sense that the pitch axis is starkly more sensitive than roll.
Nothing a regular MD11 Pilot shouldn't be able to handle though.
Every once in a while this may produce a suprising pitch up moment. Add to this the fact that the MD11 is -imho- imbalanced in the sense that the pitch axis is starkly more sensitive than roll.
Nothing a regular MD11 Pilot shouldn't be able to handle though.
I have stayed out of this so far for I do not have a dog in the fight.
However, some of you are dragging up DC-10 happenings which are completely irrelevant to this thread, which I CAN comment upon.
One of my good friends (PL) overran the runway on landing at KBOS in DC-10-30 N113WA on 23 Jan 1982. The cockpit ended up in shallow water but all of the occupants got off with little or no injuries.
My friend was completely exonerated at the subsequent board of inquiry. The braking action on the runway in question was actually 'nil' but no mention of this was ever passed to the crew by ATC or was even mentioned on the ATIS.
What on earth does this have to do with a heavy landing by a LH MD-11 in Saudi Arabia?
Let us fast-forward to February 1984. I was landing at JFK (in a DC-10). It was a foul day with bad weather, lots of turbulence and lots of precipitation. Everyone had been holding for around 40 minutes in pretty miserable conditions.
I landed on a very wet runway 04R. Because of the conditions, I used 50 flap (normally 35 flap) and cancelled auto pilot and auto-throttle (which tended to prolong the flare). I touched down on the numbers at the correct speed and made a normal landing.
The next aircraft to land was an SAS DC-10 (who had been 1,000 feet above us in the hold). Despite the conditions, they elected to make a 35 flap landing with the auto throttles engaged and didn't touch down until halfway down the runway (this I got from our FAA inspector) and they ended up with the cockpit in Jamaica Bay. (The aircraft was bought and rebuilt by FedEx).
What on earth does this have to do with a heavy landing by LH MD-11 in Saudi Arabia?
Absolutely nothing.
So why on earth do you experts keep spouting stuff that is completely irrelevant to the discussion and about which you know less than nothing?
However, some of you are dragging up DC-10 happenings which are completely irrelevant to this thread, which I CAN comment upon.
One of my good friends (PL) overran the runway on landing at KBOS in DC-10-30 N113WA on 23 Jan 1982. The cockpit ended up in shallow water but all of the occupants got off with little or no injuries.
My friend was completely exonerated at the subsequent board of inquiry. The braking action on the runway in question was actually 'nil' but no mention of this was ever passed to the crew by ATC or was even mentioned on the ATIS.
What on earth does this have to do with a heavy landing by a LH MD-11 in Saudi Arabia?
Let us fast-forward to February 1984. I was landing at JFK (in a DC-10). It was a foul day with bad weather, lots of turbulence and lots of precipitation. Everyone had been holding for around 40 minutes in pretty miserable conditions.
I landed on a very wet runway 04R. Because of the conditions, I used 50 flap (normally 35 flap) and cancelled auto pilot and auto-throttle (which tended to prolong the flare). I touched down on the numbers at the correct speed and made a normal landing.
The next aircraft to land was an SAS DC-10 (who had been 1,000 feet above us in the hold). Despite the conditions, they elected to make a 35 flap landing with the auto throttles engaged and didn't touch down until halfway down the runway (this I got from our FAA inspector) and they ended up with the cockpit in Jamaica Bay. (The aircraft was bought and rebuilt by FedEx).
What on earth does this have to do with a heavy landing by LH MD-11 in Saudi Arabia?
Absolutely nothing.
So why on earth do you experts keep spouting stuff that is completely irrelevant to the discussion and about which you know less than nothing?
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JW411,
Agree, any DC-10 incidents are completely irrelevent.
However, since you bought up that SAS incident at JFK, the airframe is now N311FE, now converted to an MD-10 and was affectionately known in the company as "The Salty Dog" after it's entry into the bay!
Agree, any DC-10 incidents are completely irrelevent.
However, since you bought up that SAS incident at JFK, the airframe is now N311FE, now converted to an MD-10 and was affectionately known in the company as "The Salty Dog" after it's entry into the bay!
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NTSB Safety Recommendation July 12, 2011
Safety Recommendation (PDF)
Accident narrative
LH "Bounced Landing" Training
High sink rates & pitch control
Recommendation
Accident narrative
The first officer reported that he sensed that the airplane’s sink rate was increasing at
80 feet, but he retarded the thrust levers at 50 feet, in accordance with Lufthansa Cargo standard
procedure. He did not attempt to advance the thrust levers before touchdown. The first officer
stated that he believed he had started the flare at 30 to 40 feet, but recorded flight data showed
that a pull on the control column was initiated between 15 and 30 feet agl, at which time the sink
rate decreased only slightly, to about 780 feet per minute.
The cockpit voice recorder captured, at 10 foot intervals, automated aural announcements
from 50 feet to initial touchdown that did not decrease in frequency as would be expected during
a normal flare as the airplane approached the ground. The captain, who was the pilot monitoring,
did not call out the high sink rate or call for a go-around, as suggested in the Lufthansa Cargo
Operating Manual. The captain later reported that, for a split second, he thought the first officer
should flare but that he was satisfied when the first officer did flare. The captain said that he
could not take action in time before the touchdown, which was measured at 2.1 G.
Following the initial touchdown, the aircraft bounced about 4.7 feet off the runway and
the nosewheel touched down a second time at 3.0 G. After the second touchdown, the aircraft
reached a pitch attitude of 13°, and a third touchdown, on the main gear, exceeded 4 G. Flight
data indicated that two large forward and aft control column inputs were made between the first
touchdown and the third and final touchdown.
Reporting his recollection of events after the initial touchdown, the first officer described
the nose as “coming up and down” and said he did not have a clear recollection of what
happened after that. The captain stated that “what came after touchdown was shocking” and
“much beyond [his] experience.” He said that strong movement of the nose was unexpected and
that the pitch attitude was higher than the maximum allowable and outside of his comfort zone.
80 feet, but he retarded the thrust levers at 50 feet, in accordance with Lufthansa Cargo standard
procedure. He did not attempt to advance the thrust levers before touchdown. The first officer
stated that he believed he had started the flare at 30 to 40 feet, but recorded flight data showed
that a pull on the control column was initiated between 15 and 30 feet agl, at which time the sink
rate decreased only slightly, to about 780 feet per minute.
The cockpit voice recorder captured, at 10 foot intervals, automated aural announcements
from 50 feet to initial touchdown that did not decrease in frequency as would be expected during
a normal flare as the airplane approached the ground. The captain, who was the pilot monitoring,
did not call out the high sink rate or call for a go-around, as suggested in the Lufthansa Cargo
Operating Manual. The captain later reported that, for a split second, he thought the first officer
should flare but that he was satisfied when the first officer did flare. The captain said that he
could not take action in time before the touchdown, which was measured at 2.1 G.
Following the initial touchdown, the aircraft bounced about 4.7 feet off the runway and
the nosewheel touched down a second time at 3.0 G. After the second touchdown, the aircraft
reached a pitch attitude of 13°, and a third touchdown, on the main gear, exceeded 4 G. Flight
data indicated that two large forward and aft control column inputs were made between the first
touchdown and the third and final touchdown.
Reporting his recollection of events after the initial touchdown, the first officer described
the nose as “coming up and down” and said he did not have a clear recollection of what
happened after that. The captain stated that “what came after touchdown was shocking” and
“much beyond [his] experience.” He said that strong movement of the nose was unexpected and
that the pitch attitude was higher than the maximum allowable and outside of his comfort zone.
According to the captain, he had not completed the company’s “Bounced Landing
Recovery Procedure” training, but he had been trained to maintain 7.5º of pitch when recovering
from a bounced landing. The first officer had completed the bounced landing recovery training
along with his initial training in 2010. A one-time course, Lufthansa Cargo’s bounced landing
recovery training was developed based on the company’s experiences with hard landings, as well
as those of other MD-11 operators. During the simulator session, an instructor demonstrates a
hard landing and the trainee takes control, maintains 7.5º of pitch, and applies go-around thrust
to recover. The company’s MD-11 chief flight instructor stated that the simulator was limited in
its ability to capture the true sensation of a bounced landing, and the head of flight operations
said that, while bounced landing training was positive training, it may still be difficult for a pilot
to recognize a bounce in a real aircraft.
Recovery Procedure” training, but he had been trained to maintain 7.5º of pitch when recovering
from a bounced landing. The first officer had completed the bounced landing recovery training
along with his initial training in 2010. A one-time course, Lufthansa Cargo’s bounced landing
recovery training was developed based on the company’s experiences with hard landings, as well
as those of other MD-11 operators. During the simulator session, an instructor demonstrates a
hard landing and the trainee takes control, maintains 7.5º of pitch, and applies go-around thrust
to recover. The company’s MD-11 chief flight instructor stated that the simulator was limited in
its ability to capture the true sensation of a bounced landing, and the head of flight operations
said that, while bounced landing training was positive training, it may still be difficult for a pilot
to recognize a bounce in a real aircraft.
Although it is not uncommon for jet transport aircraft to experience a small skip or
bounce during landing, since it was entered into service in 1990, the MD-11 has had at least
14 events of such severity that the aircraft sustained substantial damage, including 4 events that
were complete hull losses (see table). Seven of these events have taken place in the last 2 years.
The number and severity of these events raise concerns that MD-11 flight crews are not
effectively trained to recognize and arrest high sink rates during landing or to properly control
pitch attitude following a hard landing.
bounce during landing, since it was entered into service in 1990, the MD-11 has had at least
14 events of such severity that the aircraft sustained substantial damage, including 4 events that
were complete hull losses (see table). Seven of these events have taken place in the last 2 years.
The number and severity of these events raise concerns that MD-11 flight crews are not
effectively trained to recognize and arrest high sink rates during landing or to properly control
pitch attitude following a hard landing.
Require Boeing to revise its MD-11 Flight Crew Operating Manual to
reemphasize high sink rate awareness during landing, the importance of
momentarily maintaining landing pitch attitude after touchdown and using proper
pitch attitude and power to cushion excess sink rate in the flare, and to go around
in the event of a bounced landing. (A-11-68)
Once Boeing has completed the revision of its MD-11 Flight Crew Operating
Manual as recommended in Safety Recommendation A-11-68, require all MD-11
operators to incorporate the Boeing-recommended bounce recognition and
recovery procedure in their operating manuals and in recurrent simulator training.
(A-11-69)
reemphasize high sink rate awareness during landing, the importance of
momentarily maintaining landing pitch attitude after touchdown and using proper
pitch attitude and power to cushion excess sink rate in the flare, and to go around
in the event of a bounced landing. (A-11-68)
Once Boeing has completed the revision of its MD-11 Flight Crew Operating
Manual as recommended in Safety Recommendation A-11-68, require all MD-11
operators to incorporate the Boeing-recommended bounce recognition and
recovery procedure in their operating manuals and in recurrent simulator training.
(A-11-69)
In essence: FO late on the round out, a 2.0G hard landing startles the skipper who - sitting in a descending cockpit - made a large FWD control input, but the main-gear had already bounced and the aircraft was climbing aft of CoG. Spoilers up at 30deg following wheel spin-up. Second flat bounce at 3.0G, main- and nose-gears, spoilers deploy to 60deg due gear compression. Both pilots pull back and after reaching a ridiculous AoA the last 4.0G impact results in structural failure aft of the wings. Skids off, crew evacuates - FO with back injuries.
Uncharactaristic for an MD-11, in such a situation, not to have a main-gear plow through a wing with catastrophic spar failure as a result. They're lucky to have walked away.
Report suggest, among other things of course, Boeing rewrite the manual on recovery from bounced landing.
Uncharactaristic for an MD-11, in such a situation, not to have a main-gear plow through a wing with catastrophic spar failure as a result. They're lucky to have walked away.
Report suggest, among other things of course, Boeing rewrite the manual on recovery from bounced landing.
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Really lucky they did not end up like FDX at Narita, just pure luck.
I can't believe that 10ft difference in flare height is enough to total an airframe. Most jets only give you a firm landing if you flare a bit late. And if you carry a bit extra speed crossing the threshold, many will give you a greaser.
I wonder what else is behind the trickiness in the MD-11. It can't just be the crews when so many have made the same mistake with similar consequences.
I can't believe that 10ft difference in flare height is enough to total an airframe. Most jets only give you a firm landing if you flare a bit late. And if you carry a bit extra speed crossing the threshold, many will give you a greaser.
I wonder what else is behind the trickiness in the MD-11. It can't just be the crews when so many have made the same mistake with similar consequences.