Safety Recommendation (PDF)
Accident narrative
The first officer reported that he sensed that the airplane’s sink rate was increasing at
80 feet, but he retarded the thrust levers at 50 feet, in accordance with Lufthansa Cargo standard
procedure. He did not attempt to advance the thrust levers before touchdown. The first officer
stated that he believed he had started the flare at 30 to 40 feet, but recorded flight data showed
that a pull on the control column was initiated between 15 and 30 feet agl, at which time the sink
rate decreased only slightly, to about 780 feet per minute.
The cockpit voice recorder captured, at 10 foot intervals, automated aural announcements
from 50 feet to initial touchdown that did not decrease in frequency as would be expected during
a normal flare as the airplane approached the ground. The captain, who was the pilot monitoring,
did not call out the high sink rate or call for a go-around, as suggested in the Lufthansa Cargo
Operating Manual. The captain later reported that, for a split second, he thought the first officer
should flare but that he was satisfied when the first officer did flare. The captain said that he
could not take action in time before the touchdown, which was measured at 2.1 G.
Following the initial touchdown, the aircraft bounced about 4.7 feet off the runway and
the nosewheel touched down a second time at 3.0 G. After the second touchdown, the aircraft
reached a pitch attitude of 13°, and a third touchdown, on the main gear, exceeded 4 G. Flight
data indicated that two large forward and aft control column inputs were made between the first
touchdown and the third and final touchdown.
Reporting his recollection of events after the initial touchdown, the first officer described
the nose as “coming up and down” and said he did not have a clear recollection of what
happened after that. The captain stated that “what came after touchdown was shocking” and
“much beyond [his] experience.” He said that strong movement of the nose was unexpected and
that the pitch attitude was higher than the maximum allowable and outside of his comfort zone.
LH "Bounced Landing" Training
According to the captain, he had not completed the company’s “Bounced Landing
Recovery Procedure” training, but he had been trained to maintain 7.5º of pitch when recovering
from a bounced landing. The first officer had completed the bounced landing recovery training
along with his initial training in 2010. A one-time course, Lufthansa Cargo’s bounced landing
recovery training was developed based on the company’s experiences with hard landings, as well
as those of other MD-11 operators. During the simulator session, an instructor demonstrates a
hard landing and the trainee takes control, maintains 7.5º of pitch, and applies go-around thrust
to recover. The company’s MD-11 chief flight instructor stated that the simulator was limited in
its ability to capture the true sensation of a bounced landing, and the head of flight operations
said that, while bounced landing training was positive training, it may still be difficult for a pilot
to recognize a bounce in a real aircraft.
High sink rates & pitch control
Although it is not uncommon for jet transport aircraft to experience a small skip or
bounce during landing, since it was entered into service in 1990, the MD-11 has had at least
14 events of such severity that the aircraft sustained substantial damage, including 4 events that
were complete hull losses (see table). Seven of these events have taken place in the last 2 years.
The number and severity of these events raise concerns that MD-11 flight crews are not
effectively trained to recognize and arrest high sink rates during landing or to properly control
pitch attitude following a hard landing.
Recommendation
Require Boeing to revise its MD-11 Flight Crew Operating Manual to
reemphasize high sink rate awareness during landing, the importance of
momentarily maintaining landing pitch attitude after touchdown and using proper
pitch attitude and power to cushion excess sink rate in the flare, and to go around
in the event of a bounced landing. (A-11-68)
Once Boeing has completed the revision of its MD-11 Flight Crew Operating
Manual as recommended in Safety Recommendation A-11-68, require all MD-11
operators to incorporate the Boeing-recommended bounce recognition and
recovery procedure in their operating manuals and in recurrent simulator training.
(A-11-69)