Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash

[PJ2]

HundredPercentPlease;

A reasonable hypothesis I think. But I wonder if it perhaps assumes poor visibility or nobody watching out the windows? It seems, given the experience of the captain and possibly his F/O, that the latter is less material; - there have been reports of "pockets" of poor visibility.

We have the METARS which indicates VMC but we also have a few comments about "sun", "dust", poor visibility in certain areas, etc.

So one outstanding question among many therefore is, what comments if any were offered by incoming aircraft regarding the approach both before and after the accident? Did any aircraft, a) request a runway change or even specifically comment to others that 09 was questionable, b) go-around, or c) divert? Was the crew of the accident aircraft executing a full-blown NPA (selected-selected) on 09, were they partially visual or, as you observe, is there another reason the aircraft was so low 0.8nm back? Were they executing an approach on a runway others had avoided or gone-around from? - if so, what was the decision-making process?

It is likely, as indicated by many comments from those we would expect to know, that a fully-managed NPA was likely not being conducted but was either being hand-flown or on the autopilot using the selected-selected method. This method is straightforward enough and is perhaps even slightly easier than the managed-approach method; neither are a challenge, however.

To cover off the possibility of the VS/FPA mode confusion, although the issue is well understood by Airbus pilots, the Strasbourg A320 accident was (likely, but not established as) a setting of "3.0" for the FPA but the mode was in "V/S" and resulted in a descent rate of 3000fpm, (roughly).

I hasten to add that I doubt this scenario, but the question has to be asked. The display has been modified and these issues are well-known and trained for and hasn't been an issue.

Regarding impact, I have a slightly different sense of the go-around; I sense that the go-around was very nearly successful and that the only part of the aircraft that 'touched down' was the tail and even then only due to the slightly higher ground near the mosque just at the road.

The wires, in and of themselves, may not have done enough damage to render the aircraft unflyable. We don't know if/how they embedded in the very aft structure.

I agree that the collision between the empennage and the slightly higher ground was sufficient to fracture and separate that section of the aircraft and, with the loss of this structure, the aircraft became unflyable as has already been described, but I don't think anything else, (gear, engines, wingtips) touched the ground until after the tail left the structure, although they may have hit cacti/trees etc.

Especially with a slight rise in ground elevation, (4 to 6 feet is sufficient), the pitch attitude to hit the tail would not have to be beyond ordinary go-around pitch attitudes of, say, 15deg or slightly higher.

In direct response to your hypothesis HPP which I think is possible, hopefully the recorders will tell us what approach method was being used, what autoflight selections were being made, what the aircraft and engine performance was in the moments before impact and during what we may now reasonably conclude was a go-around attempt.

Hopefully too, the CVR will tell us what the discussions were regarding the approach, what their assessment of the visibility was and, through standard analysis techniques, what their state of mind and alertness was. Another primary question to ask/determine the answer to is, therefore, questions regarding this crew's schedule, their crew rest on the layover and their combined duty days; were there any delays and if so were rest periods compromised? These are all a matter of record and thus are easily answered questions but, except for positing the notion of fatigue, so far these details haven't been directly provided or even asked or answered here or in other sources.