Jet Airways check pilot pulls CB on finals
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I didn't belittle Graybeard in the post you mention, sabenaboy. I was raising a serious concern with his comments.
What I, and others such as Allocate_on_Arrival, objected to is the fact that some people seem to seek to excuse the actions of the check pilot in this case.
Comments such as
and
are incredibly worrying, from two viewpoints. First, they suggest that there are people who are opposed to a free and open reporting system for incidents which, I would suggest, is a necessity in this industry, if we are to do anything but pay lip service to "safety first" cultures within airlines. Secondly, they seem to suggest that there are those who would willingly break SOPs for a reason unrelated to flight safety, and see no issue with senior captains doing, seemingly to tick off a training item.
Neither of these attitudes, in my opinion, have any place in an aviation (or indeed any safety critical) environment. I, and I would venture a majority of pilots, would find very little "valid" in Graybeard's comments.
I stand by all of my comments in this thread.
What I, and others such as Allocate_on_Arrival, objected to is the fact that some people seem to seek to excuse the actions of the check pilot in this case.
Comments such as
The pilot flying should have been sent back to recurrent to develop flying skills. The crybaby pilot reporting the incident should have been fired.
I don't fault the check pilot at all. He did that in benign conditions.
He may have overestimated the competence of the pilot, however.
He may have overestimated the competence of the pilot, however.
Neither of these attitudes, in my opinion, have any place in an aviation (or indeed any safety critical) environment. I, and I would venture a majority of pilots, would find very little "valid" in Graybeard's comments.
I stand by all of my comments in this thread.
akindofmagic..........
You said at Post#31:
WRONG!
Disregard of a recommendation does NOT make the action illegal! What does seem to make the action illegal though is what appears to be (on the face of it) the idiot's intentional and unlawful interference with the aircraft!
Boeing recommendations for C/Bs (applies to both 737 and 777):
Flight crew reset of a tripped circuit breaker in flight is not recommended unless specifically directed to do so in a non-normal checklist.
Flight crew cycling (pulling and resetting) of circuit breakers to clear non-normal conditions is not recommended.
I don't know about Airbus as I never flew them, but from what I do know about the bus is that loss of radalt would probably have resulted in some unexpected handling differences re transition from flight mode to flare mode. Any bus drivers care to comment?
Irrespective, as Allocate on Arrival says in Post#61
I agree! 
And I also agree with sabenaboy's sentiments in post#63 that:
You said at Post#31:
The training captain in this case has done something that is, on the face of it, illegal; he has wilfully gone against the manufacturer's recommendation...
Disregard of a recommendation does NOT make the action illegal! What does seem to make the action illegal though is what appears to be (on the face of it) the idiot's intentional and unlawful interference with the aircraft!
Boeing recommendations for C/Bs (applies to both 737 and 777):
Flight crew reset of a tripped circuit breaker in flight is not recommended unless specifically directed to do so in a non-normal checklist.
Flight crew cycling (pulling and resetting) of circuit breakers to clear non-normal conditions is not recommended.
I don't know about Airbus as I never flew them, but from what I do know about the bus is that loss of radalt would probably have resulted in some unexpected handling differences re transition from flight mode to flare mode. Any bus drivers care to comment?
Irrespective, as Allocate on Arrival says in Post#61
It's about how to legally/safely operate an aircraft - experimenting with CB's in a serviceable aircraft when travelling as a passenger(!) doesn't even begin to fit into either category.
And I also agree with sabenaboy's sentiments in post#63 that:
...it's not wise to do stuff like that on the flightdeck.
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DB64
The hubris displayed by some of the posters on this thread is quite frankly shocking. Your first responsibility as pilots should be the safety of passengers and crew. Should the actions be true they are indefensible. The berating of junior officers is also telling....it is perhaps your fragile egos that need addressing rather than their flying skills.
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If one does a test, they should be prepared for the failure of what is being tested. Otherwise the test is not needed. The folks who flight-tested low speed automatics in the Airbus (Perpigan sp?) paid dearly for not being properly prepared for the failure of the equipment being tested.
I do not think the check captain had the technical ability to take over the aircraft (from the jumpseat)?
I do not think the check captain had the technical ability to take over the aircraft (from the jumpseat)?
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Ohh come on, it wasnt a brilliant move, but give me a break, dangerous?!. Where has the aviate, navigate communicate, that was once teached gone here? Lean back, relax and fly the bl...y aircraft, how hard can it be???
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I should probably reply to my previous post here...as an (tech)pilot on the B737NG it´s not very vise to start popping CB´s, since they may enact with other systems, speedbrakes etc, but manual flying, equalls; emergency??? Give me a break!
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Was the check pilot ex military?
Certainly this sort of thing (pulling cb's to create a malfunction) was a military philosophy and unfortunately I have seen over the years that a few people carried such attitudes and behaviour over to civil flying.
Also, (in my experience) this sort of action probably contributed (if not caused) a number of (some fatal) military training accidents that I can recall - yet as far as i am aware the practice continues unabated...
Not with civilian pax onboard - but similar arguments apply - should crews be subjected to potentially life threatening malfunctions outside of the sim? Answer NO!
Certainly this sort of thing (pulling cb's to create a malfunction) was a military philosophy and unfortunately I have seen over the years that a few people carried such attitudes and behaviour over to civil flying.
Also, (in my experience) this sort of action probably contributed (if not caused) a number of (some fatal) military training accidents that I can recall - yet as far as i am aware the practice continues unabated...
Not with civilian pax onboard - but similar arguments apply - should crews be subjected to potentially life threatening malfunctions outside of the sim? Answer NO!
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Playing with CB's. Remember National Airlines Flight 27? DC-10 cruising at 39,000 feet experienced an uncontained failure of the #3 engine fan assembly. The cabin was penetrated by shrapnel from the engine and lost pressure. One seat belted passenger was violently ejected out the cabin through a failed window. The remains of the body were never found. The shrapnel penetrated the #1 engine oil tank which began to leak oil and had about one minute of usable oil left upon landing. Two of the three aircraft hydraulic systems were also inoperative. The #2 engine sustained minor damage from ingested shrapnel. The aircraft made an uneventful landing in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
During the flight, while on autopilot, the flight deck crew decided to experiment with the relationship between the fan speed indicator (N1) and the automatic flight control systems. The engineer disconnected the electrical circuit breakers for all three N1 tachometers while the pilot reduced the airspeed by 5 knots. Once the throttles automatically retarded, the pilot disconnected the autothrottle. The crew then heard the explosion.
The CF6 engines used on the aircraft were designed to be "red-lined" at 111% N1. The #3 engine failed at 99% N1 while the other two engines reached a maximum 107% N1. While the failure mechanism that triggered this event was never reached conclusively, enough was learned to prevent the occurrence of similar events.
During the flight, while on autopilot, the flight deck crew decided to experiment with the relationship between the fan speed indicator (N1) and the automatic flight control systems. The engineer disconnected the electrical circuit breakers for all three N1 tachometers while the pilot reduced the airspeed by 5 knots. Once the throttles automatically retarded, the pilot disconnected the autothrottle. The crew then heard the explosion.
The CF6 engines used on the aircraft were designed to be "red-lined" at 111% N1. The #3 engine failed at 99% N1 while the other two engines reached a maximum 107% N1. While the failure mechanism that triggered this event was never reached conclusively, enough was learned to prevent the occurrence of similar events.
The CF6 engines used on the aircraft were designed to be "red-lined" at 111% N1. The #3 engine failed at 99% N1 while the other two engines reached a maximum 107% N1. While the failure mechanism that triggered this event was never reached conclusively, enough was learned to prevent the occurrence of similar events.
Remember the Runaway Stabiliser drill on the 707 ?
Identify the emergency, stop the wheel - best to grab the one on the other side of the centre console, until they invented and installed a brake lever by the F/O's thigh ( no, grab the brake, not the F/O's thigh ), cut off the two hydraulic switches also on the centre console, then PULL THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS on the overhead panel.
On a training flight - simulators were still new and some checks were carried out on the real aeroplane - the Training Captain quietly ran the stabiliser nose down until the trainee caught on to what was happening, everything went to plan, tho' the aircraft started earthwards, and with the drill complete the crew then attempted to restore the hydraulic systems, which meant that the circuit breakers had first to be pushed in - except that the 'G' force being experienced was too great for the engineer to reach up above his head, and with both pilots pulling hard, and the engineer with both feet on the bottom of the intrument panel and a hand on each control column ( no mean feat in itself ) they managed to level out just above the water.
After that runaway stabiliser drills were only practised in the simulator.
Identify the emergency, stop the wheel - best to grab the one on the other side of the centre console, until they invented and installed a brake lever by the F/O's thigh ( no, grab the brake, not the F/O's thigh ), cut off the two hydraulic switches also on the centre console, then PULL THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS on the overhead panel.
On a training flight - simulators were still new and some checks were carried out on the real aeroplane - the Training Captain quietly ran the stabiliser nose down until the trainee caught on to what was happening, everything went to plan, tho' the aircraft started earthwards, and with the drill complete the crew then attempted to restore the hydraulic systems, which meant that the circuit breakers had first to be pushed in - except that the 'G' force being experienced was too great for the engineer to reach up above his head, and with both pilots pulling hard, and the engineer with both feet on the bottom of the intrument panel and a hand on each control column ( no mean feat in itself ) they managed to level out just above the water.
After that runaway stabiliser drills were only practised in the simulator.
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DB64.........
I have looked and looked and looked and looked at your post to try to work out the message you're trying to convey. 
Hubris = exaggerated pride or self-confidence.
Ummmm........sorry, DB64, but after looking at most of opinions here on this thread which seem to all come to the conclusion that it's not wise to do stuff like that (pull C/Bs) on the flightdeck (particularly on a revenue flight), all I can conclude is that the stuff that you're smoking must be pretty strong!!!
Perhaps you need to rebase and 'moderate' your opinions?
The hubris displayed by some of the posters on this thread is quite frankly shocking. Your first responsibility as pilots should be the safety of passengers and crew. Should the actions be true they are indefensible. The berating of junior officers is also telling....it is perhaps your fragile egos that need addressing rather than their flying skills.
Hubris = exaggerated pride or self-confidence.
Ummmm........sorry, DB64, but after looking at most of opinions here on this thread which seem to all come to the conclusion that it's not wise to do stuff like that (pull C/Bs) on the flightdeck (particularly on a revenue flight), all I can conclude is that the stuff that you're smoking must be pretty strong!!!
Perhaps you need to rebase and 'moderate' your opinions?
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This is not about the ability to fly the aircraft on reduced automation or the ability to hand fly, but rather about some check airman who broke the rules, which in turn clearly falls within the pretext of endangering the safety of the flight.
Here with is the CAR OPS and it is clear: No CB is to be pulled!!!!!!!!!!!
3.2. PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT ABNORMAL OR EMERGENCY
SITUATIONS ARE NOT SIMULATED DURING COMMERCIAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION FLIGHTS
3.2.1. Regulation (CAR OPS 1.965 (2) (ii) Appendix 1)
a. Exercising abnormal and/or emergency situations (including “pilot incapacitation”)
during commercial air transportation flights is not permissible
b. All instruction and checking personnel shall be briefed accordingly.
c. Such training shall only be performed in the simulators. During commercial flights
no simulation of any technical system malfunction whatsoever is allowed which
includes but is not limited to;
(1) No circuit breaker will be pulled or abnormal switching will be used for training
purposes
(2) No artificial limitation of outside visibility is permitted during revenue flights
(3) No simulated failures, stall recovery practise or asymmetric flight training are
authorized
(4) No abnormal situation will be intentionally established
d. Engine-out maneuver training is not permitted.
Here with is the CAR OPS and it is clear: No CB is to be pulled!!!!!!!!!!!
3.2. PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT ABNORMAL OR EMERGENCY
SITUATIONS ARE NOT SIMULATED DURING COMMERCIAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION FLIGHTS
3.2.1. Regulation (CAR OPS 1.965 (2) (ii) Appendix 1)
a. Exercising abnormal and/or emergency situations (including “pilot incapacitation”)
during commercial air transportation flights is not permissible
b. All instruction and checking personnel shall be briefed accordingly.
c. Such training shall only be performed in the simulators. During commercial flights
no simulation of any technical system malfunction whatsoever is allowed which
includes but is not limited to;
(1) No circuit breaker will be pulled or abnormal switching will be used for training
purposes
(2) No artificial limitation of outside visibility is permitted during revenue flights
(3) No simulated failures, stall recovery practise or asymmetric flight training are
authorized
(4) No abnormal situation will be intentionally established
d. Engine-out maneuver training is not permitted.
Last edited by Jetjock330; 5th Dec 2009 at 10:27.
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Yes the 707.
Reminds me of the time the RAAF lost one and the crew a few years ago, playing around in the aircraft, switching off the rudder boost, among other things.
Pulling CB's and switching various systems off in the aircraft, you are looking for a reaction. It may not be the reaction the check pilot is looking for but a reaction none the less.
If you look for trouble often enough, you will find it. Dont try and re invent the wheel, as it's all been done before. Boeing built the the aircraft, not the military, the airlines or the Indian DGCA, so it is complete folly to disregard their recommendations.
Reminds me of the time the RAAF lost one and the crew a few years ago, playing around in the aircraft, switching off the rudder boost, among other things.
Pulling CB's and switching various systems off in the aircraft, you are looking for a reaction. It may not be the reaction the check pilot is looking for but a reaction none the less.
If you look for trouble often enough, you will find it. Dont try and re invent the wheel, as it's all been done before. Boeing built the the aircraft, not the military, the airlines or the Indian DGCA, so it is complete folly to disregard their recommendations.
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If the middle seater was indeed travelling as pax.....(even though a TRE)
If this was in a European airline....(well anywhere who claims to have any form of safety culture)
If the operating Captain was so inclined....
This check airman would be in prison
From the instant just after the c/b was pulled, well that could be the subject of another and I suspect rather long thread!
If this was in a European airline....(well anywhere who claims to have any form of safety culture)
If the operating Captain was so inclined....
This check airman would be in prison
From the instant just after the c/b was pulled, well that could be the subject of another and I suspect rather long thread!
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Extra-Pilot JUMPSEATER as a DISTRACTION
Previous messages mentioned the role of CHECKAIRMAN / Jumpseater ("Chuck Sisto" upset 8Oct47), and mentioned cockpit experimentation (pull Circuit Breaker aboard National DC10).
There are many instances where working-pilots were affected by the actions -- or the mere presence -- of a "jumpeater" (Additional Crew Member) riding along in their Cockpit, for example:
Just the presence (proximity) of extra-humans on the Flight Deck was generally regarded as a DISTRACTION after the mid-air collision of 25Sep78 (PSA B727 collided with Cessna 172) near San Diego. (See Mac Job, Vol 2, pgs 23- 35.) However, AAR 79-05's "Findings" nor PC state nothing about excessive conversation, nor extra cockpit-jumpseaters' chatter (deadhead PSA Captain's comments are recorded as "-4" in the CVR transcript, and mentioned on AAR pgs 32-33). Safety pro's insisted that any extra-pilots not ride in cockpit if seat is available in cabin. From the AAR79-05:
There are many instances where working-pilots were affected by the actions -- or the mere presence -- of a "jumpeater" (Additional Crew Member) riding along in their Cockpit, for example:
-- Aero Mexico / 19Jan61 DC-8, Reg = XA-XAX, wintery night T/O accident at at NY Int'l A/P; 2017 EST; though the 97 pax survived, four of the nine crew were killed. PIC=AeroMexico ATP; F/O = Aero Mexico ATP; fwd Jumpseater = EAL designated checkairman (only cockpit survivor); Joint trng agreement AeroMexico/EAL DAC. \\ Wx: quarter-mile vis, light snow and fog, wind NE 18G24 kts, Rwy 4R. \\ First 6200' of T/O roll seen by Twr. Survivor described F/O's call "100 knot", and then at 130 kts "V1" and Vr; rotation was quick and and excessive; IAS decreased to 110 kts, Capt spoke and pointed to his A/S indicator. The EAL jumpseater sensed that they just would not get airborne, he unfastened his belts, stood forward and shoved the throttles forward while observing the EPRs respond in the expected range of 2.52-2.54 EPR; then he pulled the throttles to Idle. PIC then selected Reverse Thrust, Brakes; the EAL jumpseater deployed the Spoilers. \\ A/c traveled through the end blast fence (caught fire), continued through the boundary fence, across boulevard, hit car, finally stopped (in flames) 830' beyond rwy end. \\ Rwy 4R surface condition ... P.C. = unnecessary discontinuing of T/O as a result of checkpilot (not in either pilot seat) reaching forward and pulling throttles back (power decrease). Contributing: marginal poor wx, snow on Rwy, possible Pitot Heat _not_ ON....
-- British United Airways 14Jan69 BAC 1-11 G-ASJJ T/O phase at S. Donato Milanese, Italy. (Report not dated, Director General of CA-Italy.) Three captains in cockpit: a Pilot-in-Charge occupied left seat (Capt A); a "Capt B" served as co-pilot in the right seat; and a Pilot-In-Command occupied center seat (Capt C). Aircraft and crew had WX diverted to Milan after try to get from Gatwick to Genoa, landed Milan/Linate Airport at 1430 hrs. Spent five hours on ground. De-iced & inspected aircraft; Engine TAI on for taxi and T/O; Ignitors ON for T/O; ... normal airspeed indications during T/O roll. After V1 and VR rotated crew heard "dull non-metallic thud." Witnesses saw sparks. Capt C looked at TGT gauges, observed #1 Engine TGT indicated 20˚C higher than #2 Engine: Capt C spoke, "I think it's #1 . . . throttle it." Capt A (PF) then closed #1 Power Lever, lowered pitch attitude from 12˚ to 6˚; Capt B (NFP) raised the LG. Climbed to 250' AGL, lost momentum: from 140 to 145 KIAS after Rotate, airspeed fell to 127 KIAS after #1 Engine throttle-back. Stick-Shaker activated three times as speed slowed between 125 and 115 KIAS. Ground contact seemed inevitable and imminent; aircraft touched-down on snow cover, slid 470 m. Both Fire Ext shot by co-pilot. "Capt C" ordered pilots to evacuate through sliding windows -- during ground slide an orange glow illuminated the cockpit windows (however there later proved NO fire). TESTS: #1 Eng found normal. #2 Eng revealed damage (aside from ingestion during the emergency landing): all 16 (HP 1 & 2) turbine Dowel BOLTS had failed in fatigue at the nut end, then jammed under the Connecting Flange. [Previously many engines were found with similar condition during overhaul -- undesirable, but unrelated to power loss.] #2 Eng damage = one of the 16-HP2 Turbine Labyrinth Seal segments displaced from slot, fouled HP2 Sealing Ring; 3 previous instances, in 2 cases that defect caused "Bang" during grnd runs. RR's test-bed run concluded defect would cause only momentary compressor stall, with recovery; effort to re-create or simulate defect on test-bed: "could not provide a simulation of the dynamic condition existing at the moment of displacement of the seal." RR conducted testing of surged on #2 Eng. Report Summary: 1) there was a compressor Bang/Serge of #2 Eng; 2) intervention of "Capt C"; 3) erroneous diagnosis of malfunction/wrong engine; 4) prompt execution of an "order" by "Capt A"; 5) crew didn't recognize mistake. Analysts suspect crew had inadvertently displaced the #2 Thrust Lever while they pulled #1 to Closed (further reducing thrust); Company instructions for engine malfunctions during T/O: do nothing until safe height. Analysts said "Presence of a pilot of a superior grade on the flight deck tends to disrupt the even tenor of the activities of the crew . . ."
-- British United Airways 14Jan69 BAC 1-11 G-ASJJ T/O phase at S. Donato Milanese, Italy. (Report not dated, Director General of CA-Italy.) Three captains in cockpit: a Pilot-in-Charge occupied left seat (Capt A); a "Capt B" served as co-pilot in the right seat; and a Pilot-In-Command occupied center seat (Capt C). Aircraft and crew had WX diverted to Milan after try to get from Gatwick to Genoa, landed Milan/Linate Airport at 1430 hrs. Spent five hours on ground. De-iced & inspected aircraft; Engine TAI on for taxi and T/O; Ignitors ON for T/O; ... normal airspeed indications during T/O roll. After V1 and VR rotated crew heard "dull non-metallic thud." Witnesses saw sparks. Capt C looked at TGT gauges, observed #1 Engine TGT indicated 20˚C higher than #2 Engine: Capt C spoke, "I think it's #1 . . . throttle it." Capt A (PF) then closed #1 Power Lever, lowered pitch attitude from 12˚ to 6˚; Capt B (NFP) raised the LG. Climbed to 250' AGL, lost momentum: from 140 to 145 KIAS after Rotate, airspeed fell to 127 KIAS after #1 Engine throttle-back. Stick-Shaker activated three times as speed slowed between 125 and 115 KIAS. Ground contact seemed inevitable and imminent; aircraft touched-down on snow cover, slid 470 m. Both Fire Ext shot by co-pilot. "Capt C" ordered pilots to evacuate through sliding windows -- during ground slide an orange glow illuminated the cockpit windows (however there later proved NO fire). TESTS: #1 Eng found normal. #2 Eng revealed damage (aside from ingestion during the emergency landing): all 16 (HP 1 & 2) turbine Dowel BOLTS had failed in fatigue at the nut end, then jammed under the Connecting Flange. [Previously many engines were found with similar condition during overhaul -- undesirable, but unrelated to power loss.] #2 Eng damage = one of the 16-HP2 Turbine Labyrinth Seal segments displaced from slot, fouled HP2 Sealing Ring; 3 previous instances, in 2 cases that defect caused "Bang" during grnd runs. RR's test-bed run concluded defect would cause only momentary compressor stall, with recovery; effort to re-create or simulate defect on test-bed: "could not provide a simulation of the dynamic condition existing at the moment of displacement of the seal." RR conducted testing of surged on #2 Eng. Report Summary: 1) there was a compressor Bang/Serge of #2 Eng; 2) intervention of "Capt C"; 3) erroneous diagnosis of malfunction/wrong engine; 4) prompt execution of an "order" by "Capt A"; 5) crew didn't recognize mistake. Analysts suspect crew had inadvertently displaced the #2 Thrust Lever while they pulled #1 to Closed (further reducing thrust); Company instructions for engine malfunctions during T/O: do nothing until safe height. Analysts said "Presence of a pilot of a superior grade on the flight deck tends to disrupt the even tenor of the activities of the crew . . ."
Just the presence (proximity) of extra-humans on the Flight Deck was generally regarded as a DISTRACTION after the mid-air collision of 25Sep78 (PSA B727 collided with Cessna 172) near San Diego. (See Mac Job, Vol 2, pgs 23- 35.) However, AAR 79-05's "Findings" nor PC state nothing about excessive conversation, nor extra cockpit-jumpseaters' chatter (deadhead PSA Captain's comments are recorded as "-4" in the CVR transcript, and mentioned on AAR pgs 32-33). Safety pro's insisted that any extra-pilots not ride in cockpit if seat is available in cabin. From the AAR79-05:
“While extra persons may aid in the scan, the pilot must manage his cockpit to insure that the extra person either assists in the scan, or does not interfere with it. In this instance, although the captain and first officer saw the aircraft, there is no evidence to indicate that it was pointed out to any other cockpit occupant. Although company procedures urge the flight engineer to plan "routine paperwork and radio contacts . . . to be accomplished ataltitudes above 10,000 ft," he was involved with radio contacts with the company … extraneous conversation within the cockpit … cannot be considered a contributing factor. However, this conversation persisted until the flight descended to 3,200 ft and while a checklist was being accomplished. … CVR, at 0857:44, while the extraneous conversation was in progress, a company flight preceding … was advised of the presence of the Cessna and its future flightpath…. no assumption can be made as to whether or not its flightcrew heard or understood the advisory ... Although the conversation was not causal, it does point out the dangers inherent in this type of cockpit environment during descent and approach to landing." [ CVR transcript (AAR pg 51) “-4 Voice indentified as off-duty PSA Captain.” Then “-4” chatter on AAR pg 59 and 62.]
Last edited by IGh; 5th Dec 2009 at 20:17.
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Check pilot in jump seat
I see that we are moving to the opinion that the third man is a distraction and has caused accidents.
Ok pulling the cb and so on is pretty dodgy even when you are test flying (planned, considered , briefed, no pax)
BUT how many more times has the third man saved a situation, or been slagged off for NOT acting?
I reckon 3 heads are better than two
Ok pulling the cb and so on is pretty dodgy even when you are test flying (planned, considered , briefed, no pax)
BUT how many more times has the third man saved a situation, or been slagged off for NOT acting?
I reckon 3 heads are better than two
BSD - ATSB report
One of my earliest pals in aviation lost his life in a Westwind that plunged into the water after departing Sydney in the late 70s.
The reason: a circuit breaker pulled by the training Capt. on a line check. A subsequent further failure rendered the situation irrecoverable.
Google it and read it for yourself. The real tragedy was that the trainer had a history of such stunts, was known for it, and was left to his own (stupid) devices. If he'd been "given correct guidance" my mate O*** would b e here today
The reason: a circuit breaker pulled by the training Capt. on a line check. A subsequent further failure rendered the situation irrecoverable.
Google it and read it for yourself. The real tragedy was that the trainer had a history of such stunts, was known for it, and was left to his own (stupid) devices. If he'd been "given correct guidance" my mate O*** would b e here today
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I find it astonishing that any checker would, knowingly, degrade the systems on the aircraft, without telling the people actually flying the aeroplane. If it had been my check flight, I would have been hard-pushed not to punch the guy in the face. I'm still in charge of the aircraft, when I get checked, in my airline, and I would strongly object to this kind of meddling.
Regardless of the skills, or lack thereof of the pilots being checked, no one deserves that to happen to them on a route check. IMHO, the guy who did it is a moron.
Beware the Law of Unintended Consequences; you only have to look at the consequences on this thread. Not exactly good publicity, is it? Never mind the fact that said moron, would never be able to predict the end-result of his little "trick".
Regardless of the skills, or lack thereof of the pilots being checked, no one deserves that to happen to them on a route check. IMHO, the guy who did it is a moron.
Beware the Law of Unintended Consequences; you only have to look at the consequences on this thread. Not exactly good publicity, is it? Never mind the fact that said moron, would never be able to predict the end-result of his little "trick".
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Originally Posted by ExSp33db1rd
Remember the Runaway Stabiliser drill on the 707 ?
Identify the emergency, stop the wheel - best to grab the one on the other side of the centre console, until they invented and installed a brake lever by the F/O's thigh ( no, grab the brake, not the F/O's thigh ), cut off the two hydraulic switches also on the centre console, then PULL THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS on the overhead panel.
Identify the emergency, stop the wheel - best to grab the one on the other side of the centre console, until they invented and installed a brake lever by the F/O's thigh ( no, grab the brake, not the F/O's thigh ), cut off the two hydraulic switches also on the centre console, then PULL THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS on the overhead panel.
An example from my own limited experience: As F/O of an Embraer 170 on the taxiway in Philadelphia, I heard the Captain announce the nosewheel steering had failed. As the plane came to a stop, I was under the impression that we would be stuck waiting for a tow. Instead, when the Captain called maintenance control, they directed me to pull three separate circuit breakers on my side of the cockpit. Sure enough, when I pulled and reset them, the control computers reset, and we regained control of the nosewheel. After a long review of the CB panel, I could see nothing that would have led me to believe that those three particular breakers would interact to lead to a reset of that particular system. There was clearly more going on in the workings of those systems than the manufacturer had deemed necessary to tell the lowly pilots. Take that for what you will.
Anyway, the wisdom of such a design philosophy is beyond the scope of this thread. The fact is, for a check airman to fabricate a system failure on a revenue flight with a load of passengers on board is not acceptable. What if the pulled breaker just happened to interact with a real failure that had yet to be noticed? What if the company's training had indeed been so poor that the crew had been unable to complete the flight within safe parameters? These are NEVER questions that should be addressed with an unsuspecting load of paying customers in the back of the airplane.