Originally Posted by ExSp33db1rd
Remember the Runaway Stabiliser drill on the 707 ?
Identify the emergency, stop the wheel - best to grab the one on the other side of the centre console, until they invented and installed a brake lever by the F/O's thigh ( no, grab the brake, not the F/O's thigh ), cut off the two hydraulic switches also on the centre console, then PULL THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS on the overhead panel.
I'm afraid manufacturers' attitude toward CBs has changed greatly since the heyday of the 707. The P-Panels on the 707 are as clear-cut as things get. Each CB is clearly labeled and it is assured for the most part that, when they are pulled, power will be cut off to only those components depicted on the label. That is why the manufacturer set "pull the circuit breakers" as SOP for so many emergency and abnormal procedures on that aircraft. The problem with glass aircraft in this respect is that so many systems are now so interdependent, and the CBs so poorly labeled (in my opinion), even the manufacturer cannot always assure the crew of what can happen if CBs are pulled carelessly. This is why "pull the circuit breakers" is no longer SOP for Boeing in most cases.
An example from my own limited experience: As F/O of an Embraer 170 on the taxiway in Philadelphia, I heard the Captain announce the nosewheel steering had failed. As the plane came to a stop, I was under the impression that we would be stuck waiting for a tow. Instead, when the Captain called maintenance control, they directed me to pull three separate circuit breakers on my side of the cockpit. Sure enough, when I pulled and reset them, the control computers reset, and we regained control of the nosewheel. After a long review of the CB panel, I could see nothing that would have led me to believe that those three particular breakers would interact to lead to a reset of that particular system. There was clearly more going on in the workings of those systems than the manufacturer had deemed necessary to tell the lowly pilots. Take that for what you will.
Anyway, the wisdom of such a design philosophy is beyond the scope of this thread. The fact is, for a check airman to fabricate a system failure on a revenue flight with a load of passengers on board is not acceptable. What if the pulled breaker just happened to interact with a real failure that had yet to be noticed? What if the company's training had indeed been so poor that the crew had been unable to complete the flight within safe parameters? These are NEVER questions that should be addressed with an unsuspecting load of paying customers in the back of the airplane.