Previous messages mentioned the role of CHECKAIRMAN / Jumpseater ("Chuck Sisto" upset 8Oct47), and mentioned cockpit experimentation (pull Circuit Breaker aboard National DC10).
There are many instances where
working-pilots were affected by the actions -- or the mere presence -- of a
"jumpeater" (Additional Crew Member) riding along in their Cockpit, for example:
-- Aero Mexico / 19Jan61 DC-8, Reg = XA-XAX, wintery night T/O accident at at NY Int'l A/P; 2017 EST; though the 97 pax survived, four of the nine crew were killed. PIC=AeroMexico ATP; F/O = Aero Mexico ATP; fwd Jumpseater = EAL designated checkairman (only cockpit survivor); Joint trng agreement AeroMexico/EAL DAC. \\ Wx: quarter-mile vis, light snow and fog, wind NE 18G24 kts, Rwy 4R. \\ First 6200' of T/O roll seen by Twr. Survivor described F/O's call "100 knot", and then at 130 kts "V1" and Vr; rotation was quick and and excessive; IAS decreased to 110 kts, Capt spoke and pointed to his A/S indicator. The EAL jumpseater sensed that they just would not get airborne, he unfastened his belts, stood forward and shoved the throttles forward while observing the EPRs respond in the expected range of 2.52-2.54 EPR; then he pulled the throttles to Idle. PIC then selected Reverse Thrust, Brakes; the EAL jumpseater deployed the Spoilers. \\ A/c traveled through the end blast fence (caught fire), continued through the boundary fence, across boulevard, hit car, finally stopped (in flames) 830' beyond rwy end. \\ Rwy 4R surface condition ... P.C. = unnecessary discontinuing of T/O as a result of checkpilot (not in either pilot seat) reaching forward and pulling throttles back (power decrease). Contributing: marginal poor wx, snow on Rwy, possible Pitot Heat _not_ ON....
-- British United Airways 14Jan69 BAC 1-11 G-ASJJ T/O phase at S. Donato Milanese, Italy. (Report not dated, Director General of CA-Italy.) Three captains in cockpit: a Pilot-in-Charge occupied left seat (Capt A); a "Capt B" served as co-pilot in the right seat; and a Pilot-In-Command occupied center seat (Capt C). Aircraft and crew had WX diverted to Milan after try to get from Gatwick to Genoa, landed Milan/Linate Airport at 1430 hrs. Spent five hours on ground. De-iced & inspected aircraft; Engine TAI on for taxi and T/O; Ignitors ON for T/O; ... normal airspeed indications during T/O roll. After V1 and VR rotated crew heard "dull non-metallic thud." Witnesses saw sparks. Capt C looked at TGT gauges, observed #1 Engine TGT indicated 20˚C higher than #2 Engine: Capt C spoke, "I think it's #1 . . . throttle it." Capt A (PF) then closed #1 Power Lever, lowered pitch attitude from 12˚ to 6˚; Capt B (NFP) raised the LG. Climbed to 250' AGL, lost momentum: from 140 to 145 KIAS after Rotate, airspeed fell to 127 KIAS after #1 Engine throttle-back. Stick-Shaker activated three times as speed slowed between 125 and 115 KIAS. Ground contact seemed inevitable and imminent; aircraft touched-down on snow cover, slid 470 m. Both Fire Ext shot by co-pilot. "Capt C" ordered pilots to evacuate through sliding windows -- during ground slide an orange glow illuminated the cockpit windows (however there later proved NO fire). TESTS: #1 Eng found normal. #2 Eng revealed damage (aside from ingestion during the emergency landing): all 16 (HP 1 & 2) turbine Dowel BOLTS had failed in fatigue at the nut end, then jammed under the Connecting Flange. [Previously many engines were found with similar condition during overhaul -- undesirable, but unrelated to power loss.] #2 Eng damage = one of the 16-HP2 Turbine Labyrinth Seal segments displaced from slot, fouled HP2 Sealing Ring; 3 previous instances, in 2 cases that defect caused "Bang" during grnd runs. RR's test-bed run concluded defect would cause only momentary compressor stall, with recovery; effort to re-create or simulate defect on test-bed: "could not provide a simulation of the dynamic condition existing at the moment of displacement of the seal." RR conducted testing of surged on #2 Eng. Report Summary: 1) there was a compressor Bang/Serge of #2 Eng; 2) intervention of "Capt C"; 3) erroneous diagnosis of malfunction/wrong engine; 4) prompt execution of an "order" by "Capt A"; 5) crew didn't recognize mistake. Analysts suspect crew had inadvertently displaced the #2 Thrust Lever while they pulled #1 to Closed (further reducing thrust); Company instructions for engine malfunctions during T/O: do nothing until safe height. Analysts said "Presence of a pilot of a superior grade on the flight deck tends to disrupt the even tenor of the activities of the crew . . ."
Just the presence (proximity) of extra-humans on the Flight Deck was generally regarded as a DISTRACTION after the mid-air collision of 25Sep78 (PSA B727 collided with Cessna 172) near San Diego. (See Mac Job, Vol 2, pgs 23- 35.) However, AAR 79-05's "Findings" nor PC state nothing about excessive conversation, nor extra cockpit-jumpseaters' chatter (deadhead PSA Captain's comments are recorded as "-4" in the CVR transcript, and mentioned on AAR pgs 32-33). Safety pro's insisted that any extra-pilots not ride in cockpit if seat is available in cabin. From the AAR79-05:
“While extra persons may aid in the scan, the pilot must manage his cockpit to insure that the extra person either assists in the scan, or does not interfere with it. In this instance, although the captain and first officer saw the aircraft, there is no evidence to indicate that it was pointed out to any other cockpit occupant. Although company procedures urge the flight engineer to plan "routine paperwork and radio contacts . . . to be accomplished ataltitudes above 10,000 ft," he was involved with radio contacts with the company … extraneous conversation within the cockpit … cannot be considered a contributing factor. However, this conversation persisted until the flight descended to 3,200 ft and while a checklist was being accomplished. … CVR, at 0857:44, while the extraneous conversation was in progress, a company flight preceding … was advised of the presence of the Cessna and its future flightpath…. no assumption can be made as to whether or not its flightcrew heard or understood the advisory ... Although the conversation was not causal, it does point out the dangers inherent in this type of cockpit environment during descent and approach to landing." [ CVR transcript (AAR pg 51) “-4 Voice indentified as off-duty PSA Captain.” Then “-4” chatter on AAR pg 59 and 62.]