Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus

[silverstrata]

Airbus php
Having some decent experience on 737 and A320 on the LHS I don't quite understand the point of this discussion about hand-flying vs. safety. Accidents happen because some stupid pilots ignore world-wide SOPs, don't practice CRM and come in High&Hot with a deep landing on a short wet runway.
Nothing to do with hand-flying.

I would respectfully suggest that in your complacency, you are but one step away from a serious incident/accident. There are many situations where skillful hand-flying is necessary. And they always come just when you don't expect it.

As an observation (hint to trainers), very little sim-work is done at high altitude, and pilots are often surprised at how different the aircraft feels at altitude. It can be very twitchy to hand fly. For example, this f/o completely lost control in the cruise, and the situation was only restored when the captain reappeared from the toilet, with trousers still around ankles.
Air India co-pilot caused passenger jet to plummet 7,000ft by accident | Mail Online

And this is not an isolated incident. I have flown with several f/os who were capable of the same, and the technique was to only go to the toilet when there was no turbulence and no waypoints ahead.


Regards the Air France crew, their actions were unforgivable, as any competent Cessna pilot would have had more immediate reactions to a stall. However, if no training had been given for high altitude stalls, the crew may have been surprised by the aircraft's reactions. With a high altitude, slow speed, partially stalled tail surfaces and underslung engines at full power, a jet can need considerable force to lower the nose. Rather than the nose dropping in the stall, it wants to pitch up, while the aircraft mushes downwards at a high rate of descent. (Not sure how this translates into sidestick pressures, with direct law engaged.) It can be easier to reduce power, to recover from the stall, as the nose will more readily lower.

Clearly, the air France pilots did not understand the symptoms of a high altitude stall, and thus the situation they were in.



.

[nitpicker330]

This comment was from Airbus and as such I was commenting about Airbus FBW.

Airbus FBW flies the a/c for you with reference to G, ie it will keep whatever Attitude you set it at without your assistance . You don't really fly the a/c. The sidestick is just a quicker way of telling the automatics what you want.

Boeing FBW only tries to stop you from envelope excursions ( yes it has auto trim, compensates for Flap operation and back pressure in turns etc ) But you still need to fly the a/c just like a B17…

If you'd flown both Airbus and Boeing FBW like me then you'd already know that.

[Microburst2002]

true

but you still fly the airbus. Pull the stick, aibus pitches up. Push it, airbus pitches down. the more you push or pull, the more it pitches down or up.

That is flying an airplane, isn't it?

It only prevents you from flying if you go out of the envelope (2,5 gs, etc..) but who the hell wants do that?

[nitpicker330]

Nope, close but no Cigar

Try flying downwind in a Boeing at 1500' 210 kts and letting go of the pole for 1 minute and see what happens.

Now try that in an Airbus, hey look it's still where I left it 1 minute ago EVEN after that Turbulence!! Wow.

Nope, it's not flying, its a Computer game

Don't get me wrong, I quite like Airbus, it makes "hand flying" (sic ) quite a lot easier and more accurate.

[Shore Guy]

Perhaps in preparation for next recurrent?

Stick and Rudder - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

[morphmorph]

Try flying downwind in a Boeing at 1500' 210 kts and letting go of the pole for 1 minute and see what happens.

If you'd trimmed it correctly then I assume exactly the same thing would happen - it would carry on as it was. Admittedly it would be different in turns because you wouldn't have re-trimmed.

[Togodumnus]

Airbus has done the most in the whole industry to make pilot flying skills the least relevant skill required to fly an aircraft and then have the sheer brass balls to come out with this sound bite?

Mind boggling.

[Slasher]

"Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus"

What a brilliant deduction. I for one could have told them that years ago!

Ditto!.....

[silverstrata]

"Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus"

What a brilliant deduction. I for one could have told them that years ago!

I did tell ********* that, some years ago, and was told to wind my neck in.



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[RAT 5]

There is a book written by a US journalist - I'm sorry but forget the name of both - which tells the story of the Hudson airbus. There were many interviews with senior Airbus development pilots and designers. One of the comments is that the a/c did what it was designed to do, more than the piloting skills. A lesser a/c would have needed much more skill to achieve what this one did. Perhaps true, I don't know. I've always thought that the real skill in that scenario was to make the ditching decision in the first place. I suspect many lesser experienced captains, of which there are a great many, would have followed their homing instinct and tried to make it to a runway with most likely horrific consequences. The point in the book is that Airbus seem to think it was the a/c that saved the day. Hm!?
Moving on to handling skills, and my thoughts that we are the final insurance policy. Let's take a B737. Could have a 30min or 60min battery. Classics & NG might have either, I think; and with total AC failure might have EADI or PFD display on Capt's side for the life of the battery. Let's take the best case and say 60mins and full display. Now, you have total AC failure at cruise FL. and plunge into QRH's and discuss and descend and divert, but you are on the edge of the 1hr circle to an airfield. So, the battery, with no guarantee of 60mins, dies at 45mins. You are left with 2 good engines, normal gear & flaps etc. but only the tiny SBY instruments. You have radar and an airfield ILS, or perhaps only an SRA, with 5km's & 500' ceiling; would the pax expect you to be able to land safely? I think so. How many think they could do it? In one command upgrade conversion I did, from B732 - B757, it was a requirement to do a basic SBY insytrument ILS. In my present enviroment, of 10years, I do not know of any training having been done using the basic SBY's. This is because the battery gives full PFD: yes, but for how long? I even wonder some of them flying a HDG SEL V/S NDB approach. There is no training. SOP's for normal ops is follow the magenta line: Oh yes, but if the approach is not in the FMC then use basic modes, but they still fly the magenta line.
I once trained an OCC for an captain who had been a B727 captain and was now B738 HOT. He was joining us on B733. This is not a GPS a/c and NPA's have to be flown in HDG SEL and fly the needles. He just flew the magenta line, which had map shift, and never looked at the needles. He was nowhere near the centre line; way out of limits. Descending on finals outside centreline. Had no clue. Common type rating. Frightening.

[EW73]

I would have thought that, in the NG at least, with the 150 minutes of internal battery for the standby attitude instrument (ISFD), that one would turn the airplane battery off to save it for when it's really needed, like at the start of the descent, when the PFD, VOR, DME, ILS and VHF1 are really handy!

[Caygill]

Maintaining vs learning

From post #5.

simply because they do not have a basic handling skill background

There is a huge difference between maintaining skills and actually learning the elementary to a degree of instinct and reaction.

I believe we have a big numbers of pilots that are excellent professionals, but have been forced nor had the opportunity to do the amount of repetition to actually truly learn certain basic (yet demanding) skills of flying.

We see the same pattern on our roads as we now start to see in the air. Modern cars safes you 99% of even severe handling errors, making it both unpractical and unnecessary (and many time impossible) to learn basic handling skills.

The original "flying finn" and pioneer in driver training Mr Rauno Aaltonen is quoted saying, "modern drivers need help from their cars, the typical drivers handling skills are totally sub-par".

Rauno: Rauno Aaltonen's driving lessons. - YouTube

[nilcostoptionmyass]

AAAhhhh airbus, brilliant,

The bus course should include a degree in maths in order to calculate the landing distances / speeds required in non normal configs...



Elec DC Emer config
........
........
MAX BRK PR.........1000 PSI
Brake pressure must be limited to approximately 1000psi, since antiskid lost.

note: DC ESS BUS is lost at landing gear extension. Consequently, all means of communications are lost since all ACP's are lost.

DC ESS BUS checklist...............

Other inoperative systems (not displayed to the crew)

BRK PRESS indicator

[bubbers44]

There is a book written by a US journalist - I'm sorry but forget the name of both - which tells the story of the Hudson airbus. There were many interviews with senior Airbus development pilots and designers. One of the comments is that the a/c did what it was designed to do, more than the piloting skills. A lesser a/c would have needed much more skill to achieve what this one did. Perhaps true, I don't know. I've always thought that the real skill in that scenario was to make the ditching decision in the first place. I suspect many lesser experienced captains, of which there are a great many, would have followed their homing instinct and tried to make it to a runway with most likely horrific consequences.

Seems like quite a biased interview with the Airbus guys. Sully could have landed a B737 or 757 just as easily. He flared properly making sure he didn't stall and touched down at the right attitude wings level. That is about all you can do in that situation. Read his book, he never once said the systems helped him and they didn't. The Airbus not stalling in normal law was about the only thing that would help a bad pilot ditch.

[MrBenip]

QUOTE ;The Airbus not stalling in normal law was about the only thing that would help a bad pilot ditch. mmmm... Don't think that would have helped Sully, even the Airbus will stall with two knackered donkeys!

[bubbers44]

I'm not sure what you are trying to say but a bad pilot getting too slow and approaching a stall above the water would set up a significant sink rate impacting the Hudson, Sully knew how to control the energy and zero out his sink rate at touch down. Had nothing to do with Airbus engineering.

[AvMed.IN]

Instead of seeing it as a diktat from Airbus, as well as Boeing versus Airbus debate, probably there is wisdom in learning from the AF 447 accident and the initial impressions from the BEA's third interim report. This report does point towards the probable lacuna in training in recovery from stall at high altitude. Thus there is a need to focus on maintaining Situational Awareness through all phases of flight as well as being proficient in basic/manual flying skills. It may be added here that this may include decision making skills as well.

It is a different question though, as to whether the pilots should practice those basic skills in flight or depend upon their simulator training!

[Centaurus]

Clearly there has always been a strong aversion by airline managements to encourage hand flying and this will only get worse as automation increases in sophistication (as if it can get much better than it is now).

Until this head in the sand mindset, encouraged by aircraft manufacturers, is changed, then automation dependency will steadily increase. It is further exacerbated by the widespread policy of hiring of cadet first officers who will have known nothing but blind reliance on automation since they left flying school.

In Australia back in the late Fifties 200 hour first officers without instrument ratings occasionally got jobs flying DC3's. The autopilot on the DC3 was primitive by today's standards and used mainly for straight and level flight. So pilots hand flew the climb and descent as this was easier than twiddling the knobs of the Sperry autopilot. That way inexperienced first officers gained manipulative skills in all weathers. Captains did not complain of being overloaded in watching the first officer hand flying. Nor did the first officers complain of being overwhelmed from basic cockpit duties from watching the captain hand fly. Of course automation dependency nowadays makes the thought of watching the captain or first officer hand fly, a scary experience

Even allowing for regulatory and airspace restrictions, an airline policy that encourages hand flying practice - especially in IMC - would go a long way to improving situational awareness and pure flying skills of inexperienced first officers. There has been much hand wringing by media flight safety journalists on the issue of the Air France A330 accident and other similar tragedies. And rightly so. But until regulatory authorities bite the bullet and push for effective solutions to the modern problem of automation dependency, there are certain to be occasional repeats of loss of control in IMC.

Low hour first officers are not necessarily the cause of these accidents but one day they will be captains like those involved in many loss of control accidents. It is not too late to give these first officers the chance to keep current on hand flying within the framework of company SOP's.

[CONF iture]

Originally Posted by MrBenip

even the Airbus will stall with two knackered donkeys!

Not supposed to, what makes you think so ?

[safetypee]

Centaurus, re # 447 (a mis / fortunate post number)

Alas, I agree with your concerns and their origins; however, I do not believe that a practical solution can be found either within the manufacturers’ use of technology or necessarily with ‘more training’ in hand flying skills.

History tells us that it is very difficult to turn the clock back; the world always moves on - changing entropy. The changes in the aviation and social systems are now so great that reversion, short of a devastating rebuild, is impractical.
If we conclude at a higher level, that the problem lies in complexity, including automation problems, training, etc, then a solution may be in the manner in which we handle that complexity. Remember that it is a complexity of our making. We certainly don’t need more complexity as part of a solution – not more SOPs, but perhaps rational SOPs, which free the human to operate where they are best placed to ‘create’ safety.

We should not seek raw simplicity as a solution, but instead consider that the current complexity is failed simplicity, i.e. the problem lies with the way in which we design, train, and use current technology.
We should be able to unpick some of ‘failures’, not by redesign, but by limiting its use, or adjusting the operational environment. Do we actually need all of the ‘bells and whistles’ of some systems, thus don’t train for them, inhibit their use and spend more time on the essential basics of flying and operating.

We should try to ease the pressures in the operational environment and thus reduce some of the human factors demand in operations; would an additional 5nm miss distance on Cbs really hurt the industry, we could ease the traffic spacing on the approach, or give regional operators more turn-round time for debriefing/briefing.
We must try to alleviate the tendency rush, to cut corners, to enable time and opportunity for greater awareness.
We have to restore the imbalance that we perceive to have grown with the use of technology between safety and operational effectiveness – subconscious economic pressure.

These solutions are to address operational problems, which appear at the operating level as a reduction of skills. Skills have changed, but it is a response to the world in which they are required and used. Thus we require a balanced focus on skills training and changes in the operational environment.
Solutions as ever will be a compromise, a trade off. We may have made a mess of the initial technological trade off; we cannot afford to mess up the next action – either for safety or commerce.

Why Things That Go Right, Sometimes Go Wrong.