Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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I wonder how much of this investigation has political and diplomatic overtures? Incredible that the pilots seem to be blamless and to consider a ATC instrucion as, part of the equation in bringing this A/C down. Seems to me a bit over the top?. I suppose they were expecting ATC to tell them that there airspeed was to low or that the RA was not working, etc.etc! Accidents, I am affraid to say, will always happen but, at least publish the real factors involved in each and every case.That way at least the rest of us can learn and can correct any similar situations and bring the numbers down.
Looking at these declarations I am wondering if, some of the A/C flying around are safe!! Well, we all know they are, just a thought!
Looking at these declarations I am wondering if, some of the A/C flying around are safe!! Well, we all know they are, just a thought!
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NTSB will follow DSB's lead:
The investigation is being conducted by the Dutch Safety Board. The NTSB has appointed a U.S. Accredited Representative to the investigation under the provisions of ICAO Annex 13 as the State of Design and Manufacture for the aircraft and powerplants.
All inquiries should be directed to:
Dutch Safety Board
P.O. Box 95404
2509 CK The Hague
Netherlands
Website: De Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid
All inquiries should be directed to:
Dutch Safety Board
P.O. Box 95404
2509 CK The Hague
Netherlands
Website: De Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid
Originally Posted by vanHorck
... was all the very early criticism about Turkish Pilots.
The first thing one is taught as an ab initio pilot is, Airspeed is Everything. There is simply no plausible reason for professional airmen to lose airspeed and permit a perfectly serviceable airliner to stall on approach. An RA failure with downstream effects on the autothrust is secondary, just as a relay was in the Spanair MD82 at Madrid. Last time I looked, we still employed pilots, not monitors.
We don't have the DSB final report yet and as others have pointed out the FDR and CVR information is still unavailable. Nevertheless if this is how it is to be, then it is the DSB's credibility which is in question, not the credibility of Boeing.
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The first thing one is taught as an ab initio pilot is, Airspeed is Everything. There is simply no plausible reason for professional airmen to lose airspeed and permit a perfectly serviceable airliner to stall on approach.
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If they had maintained a higher airspeed they would have parked it in Hatton Cross tube station.
What is your gripe with the fact that all available energy was used to make it at least onto the airfield if not the R/W ?
What is your gripe with the fact that all available energy was used to make it at least onto the airfield if not the R/W ?
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Whatever you might think about my opinion, you can't just criticize one crew for its lack of speed monitoring and congratulate the other for a similar lack of speed monitoring... 
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No plausible reason?
Well, give it a few days and we can learn the implausible reason then.
"Airspeed is Everything," you say? So, your students tool around staring at the ASI? No, of course not so that I think you are oversimplifying things here to make this accident crew out to be really incompetent when there might be more to it than that.
Don't let this come as a total shock to your preconceptions but many professional crews make really gross errors. That is a fact but why that occurs must often be down to educated guessing.
There is an old Jewish proverb that states that a fool can ask a question that a thousand wise men couldn't answer. Large teams of highly-qualified people can develop a modern aircraft yet we still find ways to crash it, when I suppose they must sit back and ask, "How in the world did they manage to do THAT?"
"Airspeed is Everything," you say? So, your students tool around staring at the ASI? No, of course not so that I think you are oversimplifying things here to make this accident crew out to be really incompetent when there might be more to it than that.
Don't let this come as a total shock to your preconceptions but many professional crews make really gross errors. That is a fact but why that occurs must often be down to educated guessing.
There is an old Jewish proverb that states that a fool can ask a question that a thousand wise men couldn't answer. Large teams of highly-qualified people can develop a modern aircraft yet we still find ways to crash it, when I suppose they must sit back and ask, "How in the world did they manage to do THAT?"
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It is enough to span the frame with endless comment on one accident. Comparing two? Prior to Official conclusions? The mind boggles. Maybe one can apply as critic for accidents that haven't occurred as yet?
Anticipatory Failures Analysis Group
Anticipatory Failures Analysis Group
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Anticipatory Failures Analysis Group
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Capt PlayStation... thank you.
Your reply (post #2492) is one of the most credible, intelligent and coherent posts that I've read in years.
S.L.F.L.Y..... I'm sorry buddy, but your posts suggest that you might consider reducing or changing your medication. Has the time come for you to list your qualifications and experience I wonder?
Just MHO
S.L.F.L.Y..... I'm sorry buddy, but your posts suggest that you might consider reducing or changing your medication. Has the time come for you to list your qualifications and experience I wonder?
Just MHO
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jumping to conclusions..
As somebody else already said the safety board isn't in the blame-game, so it is unlikely that the Telegraaf quoted the report.
The paper states that the draftreport is circulating in The Hague and in the aviation community and also has been submitted to Turkish and Boeing.
Personally I don't believe that the Telegraaf has even read it, much less would understand it fully in order to put blame anywhere. They probably picked up some rumours.
So please don't give it too much attention and wait for the (final) report.
The paper states that the draftreport is circulating in The Hague and in the aviation community and also has been submitted to Turkish and Boeing.
Personally I don't believe that the Telegraaf has even read it, much less would understand it fully in order to put blame anywhere. They probably picked up some rumours.
So please don't give it too much attention and wait for the (final) report.
S.L.F.Y.;
It is not your opinion that I am thinking about, it is the logical fallacy you're creating and thereby making a mistake in conclusions in your post, that I have a problem with. I understand you're a pilot, but permit me to discuss it so that it is clear for others who may not be.
The essential difference is, the BA crew reacted immediately to a technical failure and the THY crew did not. But as chuks states, there is more to it, as is the case in any accident sequence and we know there is one aspect which may explain why the THY crew did not respond immediately which I will discuss in a moment.
Regardless of what the BA038 crew did in reacting to the problem at hand, the engines did not respond to movement of the thrust levers - why the engines did not may be the reason for the length of the BA038 thread but is immaterial to the crew's response because they responded out of their situational awareness. They could not have known why the engines failed to respond.
The crew had no time and no procedure to diagnose and rectify the problem but reacted instantly to the degrading airspeed. The airspeed degraded as a result of the lack of thrust but once the airspeed began to degrade, the crew was keenly aware and did all they could. The aircraft did not stall but did touchdown heavily.
We do not have the CVR or DFDR of the THY aircraft so do not know what the crew's actions and conversations were and cannot say why, after the thrust levers were closed by the autothrust in response to faulty RA data, that the airspeed was permitted to decay over a period of 100 seconds to well below Vref. One theory posited is, the airplane was fast (tight turn in, possibly destabilizing the approach) and the thrust levers would naturally close if the speed was well above the bug. This would mask a failure of the autothrust system until such point that the airspeed began to reach the bug and then go below Vref by a subtantial amount.
But the fact is, it did and there is no plausible reason that explains why a crew would permit such a decay below Vref with two functioning engines and thrust levers.
chuks;
Sarcasm towards a fellow professional aside, chuks, I am sure there is more to it but we don't have anything but the comments from the DSB. But the fact remains that the aircraft stalled because of loss of airspeed over a considerable length of time in the approach phase. Loss of airspeed occurred because the thrust levers weren't pushed up to maintain speed, not because the RA failed and the autothrust brought back the thrust levers to idle.
If you disagree with this, I am open to suggestions as to what else plausibly explains stalling the aircraft except for loss of situational awareness for some reason.
To correct your post, I never used the word 'incompetent'. One doesn't fly and live as long as these pilots by being incompetent.
chuks, I am keenly aware that experienced, competent, trained crews can commit gross errors, extremely rare though that may be. Permit me to counter however with, while crews make mistakes all the time, human factors research, CRM techniques, cockpit discipline and SOPs, and (as cited in the Colgan investigation), a sterile cockpit all have reduced the risk of an untoward event but once in a while it happens. We see it in flight data and in other aspects of a healthy safety reporting system. It happens.
What I find enigmatic about the Turkish accident is that it is so profoundly fundamental that there is little else imaginable that would cause the aircraft to lose fourty or fifty knots on approach with nobody of the three pilots in the cockpit aware of it. But I am open to alternate, plausible theories. But if the report stops at Boeing, ATC and other factors without addressing what went on in the cockpit as has been touted, it isn't a report and that's my point.
Whatever you might think about my opinion, you can't just criticize one crew for its lack of speed monitoring and congratulate the other for a similar lack of speed monitoring...
The essential difference is, the BA crew reacted immediately to a technical failure and the THY crew did not. But as chuks states, there is more to it, as is the case in any accident sequence and we know there is one aspect which may explain why the THY crew did not respond immediately which I will discuss in a moment.
Regardless of what the BA038 crew did in reacting to the problem at hand, the engines did not respond to movement of the thrust levers - why the engines did not may be the reason for the length of the BA038 thread but is immaterial to the crew's response because they responded out of their situational awareness. They could not have known why the engines failed to respond.
The crew had no time and no procedure to diagnose and rectify the problem but reacted instantly to the degrading airspeed. The airspeed degraded as a result of the lack of thrust but once the airspeed began to degrade, the crew was keenly aware and did all they could. The aircraft did not stall but did touchdown heavily.
We do not have the CVR or DFDR of the THY aircraft so do not know what the crew's actions and conversations were and cannot say why, after the thrust levers were closed by the autothrust in response to faulty RA data, that the airspeed was permitted to decay over a period of 100 seconds to well below Vref. One theory posited is, the airplane was fast (tight turn in, possibly destabilizing the approach) and the thrust levers would naturally close if the speed was well above the bug. This would mask a failure of the autothrust system until such point that the airspeed began to reach the bug and then go below Vref by a subtantial amount.
But the fact is, it did and there is no plausible reason that explains why a crew would permit such a decay below Vref with two functioning engines and thrust levers.
chuks;
So, your students tool around staring at the ASI? No, of course not so that I think you are oversimplifying things here to make this accident crew out to be really incompetent when there might be more to it than that.
Don't let this come as a total shock to your preconceptions but many professional crews make really gross errors. That is a fact but why that occurs must often be down to educated guessing.
Don't let this come as a total shock to your preconceptions but many professional crews make really gross errors. That is a fact but why that occurs must often be down to educated guessing.
If you disagree with this, I am open to suggestions as to what else plausibly explains stalling the aircraft except for loss of situational awareness for some reason.
To correct your post, I never used the word 'incompetent'. One doesn't fly and live as long as these pilots by being incompetent.
chuks, I am keenly aware that experienced, competent, trained crews can commit gross errors, extremely rare though that may be. Permit me to counter however with, while crews make mistakes all the time, human factors research, CRM techniques, cockpit discipline and SOPs, and (as cited in the Colgan investigation), a sterile cockpit all have reduced the risk of an untoward event but once in a while it happens. We see it in flight data and in other aspects of a healthy safety reporting system. It happens.
What I find enigmatic about the Turkish accident is that it is so profoundly fundamental that there is little else imaginable that would cause the aircraft to lose fourty or fifty knots on approach with nobody of the three pilots in the cockpit aware of it. But I am open to alternate, plausible theories. But if the report stops at Boeing, ATC and other factors without addressing what went on in the cockpit as has been touted, it isn't a report and that's my point.
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The essential difference is, the BA crew reacted immediately to a technical failure and the THY crew did not.
An aircraft doesn't fly because of the thrust levers' position or because the AP tries to keep it on an ILS, it flies because the AOA is appropriately controlled. In both cases AOA reached unacceptable levels while under AP (meaning no appropriate crew reactions in both cases). Is that satisfactory? Do you have any clue of how many degrees separates maximum AOA in both incidents?
In both cases stick shaker activated followed by high Vz. BA038 had enough height to reduce the high Vz befre impact while the Turkish aircraft was already too low and hit the ground nose up/high Vz (which created the momentum causing casualties in the front part)... That's the only difference I can think about.
Last edited by S.F.L.Y; 26th Jan 2010 at 21:25.
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Whatever you might think about my opinion, you can't just criticize one crew for its lack of speed monitoring and congratulate the other for a similar lack of speed monitoring...
The BA crew _was_ monitoring the airspeed. They noticed it dropping and attempted to correct with thrust. How they should of reacted - leaving autopilot in or not, speed, attitude, etc - could be debated. (And to be clear, I am not debating it myself - not qualified to do so). But they certainly were aware of what was happening.
The Turkish crew was _not_ monitoring speed; they did not notice it dropping.
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Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
World Tourism and Aviation News
Ünal Başusta
The pilots of a Turkish Airlines plane, which crashed shortly before landing at Schiphol airport last February killing nine people, were largely not to blame for the accident, the Telegraaf reports on Tuesday.
The paper bases its claim on a report by the Dutch safety council which is currently being circulated in Dutch and US aviation circles.
However, the paper says, there is heavy criticism of aircraft manufacturer Boeing, which built the 737 and was aware of problems with the radio altimeters.
In their preliminary report on the crash last March, accident investigators said a faulty altitude meter had led to the engines going idle power. The plane was being flown on automatic pilot until the troubles start at about 1,950 feet.
Boeing is being sued by crash survivors and the victim's families in the US. two of those killed worked for the Boeing aerospace company.
Dutch safety council already sent their final report to Turkish Airlines and to Boeing for their review and final comments before it is published.
The final report will probably be published at the end of March, a spokesman for the safety council told news agency Novum.
Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 was a passenger flight which crashed near Amsterdam's Schiphol airport on 25 February 2009, killing nine passengers and crew including all three pilots.
During approach for landing a faulty radio altimeter powered down down both engines of the Turkish Airlines flight before it crashed near Amsterdam airport killing nine people. When flying at about 1,950 feet the plane's left radio altimeter indicated minus 8 feet and the auto pilot assumed Boeing 737-800 had already landed, prompting the automatic pilot to power down both engines to idle.
"The crew initially did not react to these events," because the aircraft was already too fast for the approach to land and when it become too slow an alarm went off that the plane's speed would drop below the minimum, the pilots reacted and increased power both engines but it was too late and too close to the ground.
The weather was misty with low clouds and the runway was not yet visible at the height at which the descent started and the pilots were busy looking for the runways besides other duties. The airplane stalled at 150 meters and crashed 1 kilometer before the runway.
The aircraft initially hit the ground in a field with its tail followed by its undercarriage, with a forward speed of 175 km per hour on impact. An aircraft should normally have a speed of 260 km per hour for landing.
After the accident, instead of correcting the faulty radio altimeter system Boeing issued a reminder to all 737 operators to carefully monitor primary flight instruments during critical phases of flight.
The plane's black box -- which can register 25 hours of flying time and in this case had covered 8 flights-- showed the problem had occurred twice previously during landings but for a too short duration for anyone to be concerned.
Five Turks and four Americans were killed when the plane plunged into a boggy field 1 kilometer from the runways of Amsterdam's Schiphol airport. Passengers said the plane suddenly dropped to the ground during landing. When the plane hit the ground the aircraft broke into two pieces, the tail and the engines broke off.
Most of the fatally wounded were near the rupture, in business class and in the cockpit in which the three crew members died. The section that remained most intact was situated around the plane's wings.
Ünal Başusta
The pilots of a Turkish Airlines plane, which crashed shortly before landing at Schiphol airport last February killing nine people, were largely not to blame for the accident, the Telegraaf reports on Tuesday.
The paper bases its claim on a report by the Dutch safety council which is currently being circulated in Dutch and US aviation circles.
However, the paper says, there is heavy criticism of aircraft manufacturer Boeing, which built the 737 and was aware of problems with the radio altimeters.
In their preliminary report on the crash last March, accident investigators said a faulty altitude meter had led to the engines going idle power. The plane was being flown on automatic pilot until the troubles start at about 1,950 feet.
Boeing is being sued by crash survivors and the victim's families in the US. two of those killed worked for the Boeing aerospace company.
Dutch safety council already sent their final report to Turkish Airlines and to Boeing for their review and final comments before it is published.
The final report will probably be published at the end of March, a spokesman for the safety council told news agency Novum.
Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 was a passenger flight which crashed near Amsterdam's Schiphol airport on 25 February 2009, killing nine passengers and crew including all three pilots.
During approach for landing a faulty radio altimeter powered down down both engines of the Turkish Airlines flight before it crashed near Amsterdam airport killing nine people. When flying at about 1,950 feet the plane's left radio altimeter indicated minus 8 feet and the auto pilot assumed Boeing 737-800 had already landed, prompting the automatic pilot to power down both engines to idle.
"The crew initially did not react to these events," because the aircraft was already too fast for the approach to land and when it become too slow an alarm went off that the plane's speed would drop below the minimum, the pilots reacted and increased power both engines but it was too late and too close to the ground.
The weather was misty with low clouds and the runway was not yet visible at the height at which the descent started and the pilots were busy looking for the runways besides other duties. The airplane stalled at 150 meters and crashed 1 kilometer before the runway.
The aircraft initially hit the ground in a field with its tail followed by its undercarriage, with a forward speed of 175 km per hour on impact. An aircraft should normally have a speed of 260 km per hour for landing.
After the accident, instead of correcting the faulty radio altimeter system Boeing issued a reminder to all 737 operators to carefully monitor primary flight instruments during critical phases of flight.
The plane's black box -- which can register 25 hours of flying time and in this case had covered 8 flights-- showed the problem had occurred twice previously during landings but for a too short duration for anyone to be concerned.
Five Turks and four Americans were killed when the plane plunged into a boggy field 1 kilometer from the runways of Amsterdam's Schiphol airport. Passengers said the plane suddenly dropped to the ground during landing. When the plane hit the ground the aircraft broke into two pieces, the tail and the engines broke off.
Most of the fatally wounded were near the rupture, in business class and in the cockpit in which the three crew members died. The section that remained most intact was situated around the plane's wings.
Last edited by noelbaba; 27th Jan 2010 at 07:45.
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The BA crew _was_ monitoring the airspeed. They noticed it dropping and attempted to correct with thrust. But they certainly were aware of what was happening.
The Turkish crew was _not_ monitoring speed; they did not notice it dropping.
The Turkish crew was _not_ monitoring speed; they did not notice it dropping.