S.L.F.Y.;
Whatever you might think about my opinion, you can't just criticize one crew for its lack of speed monitoring and congratulate the other for a similar lack of speed monitoring...
It is not your opinion that I am thinking about, it is the logical fallacy you're creating and thereby making a mistake in conclusions in your post, that I have a problem with. I understand you're a pilot, but permit me to discuss it so that it is clear for others who may not be.
The essential difference is, the BA crew reacted immediately to a technical failure and the THY crew did not. But as chuks states, there is more to it, as is the case in any accident sequence and we know there is one aspect which may explain why the THY crew did not respond immediately which I will discuss in a moment.
Regardless of what the BA038 crew did in reacting to the problem at hand, the engines did not respond to movement of the thrust levers - why the engines did not may be the reason for the length of the BA038 thread but is immaterial to the crew's response because they responded out of their situational awareness. They could not have known why the engines failed to respond.
The crew had no time and no procedure to diagnose and rectify the problem but reacted instantly to the degrading airspeed. The airspeed degraded as a result of the lack of thrust
but once the airspeed began to degrade, the crew was keenly aware and did all they could. The aircraft did not stall but did touchdown heavily.
We do not have the CVR or DFDR of the THY aircraft so do not know what the crew's actions and conversations were and cannot say why, after the thrust levers were closed by the autothrust in response to faulty RA data, that the airspeed was permitted to decay over a period of 100 seconds to well below Vref. One theory posited is, the airplane was fast (tight turn in, possibly destabilizing the approach) and the thrust levers would naturally close if the speed was well above the bug. This would mask a failure of the autothrust system
until such point that the airspeed began to reach the bug and then go below Vref by a subtantial amount.
But the fact is, it did and there is no plausible reason that explains why a crew would permit such a decay below Vref with two functioning engines and thrust levers.
chuks;
So, your students tool around staring at the ASI? No, of course not so that I think you are oversimplifying things here to make this accident crew out to be really incompetent when there might be more to it than that.
Don't let this come as a total shock to your preconceptions but many professional crews make really gross errors. That is a fact but why that occurs must often be down to educated guessing.
Sarcasm towards a fellow professional aside, chuks, I am sure there is more to it but we don't have anything but the comments from the DSB. But the fact remains that the aircraft stalled because of loss of airspeed over a considerable length of time in the approach phase. Loss of airspeed occurred because the thrust levers weren't pushed up to maintain speed, not because the RA failed and the autothrust brought back the thrust levers to idle.
If you disagree with this, I am open to suggestions as to what else plausibly explains stalling the aircraft except for loss of situational awareness for some reason.
To correct your post, I never used the word 'incompetent'. One doesn't fly and live as long as these pilots by being incompetent.
chuks, I am keenly aware that experienced, competent, trained crews can commit gross errors, extremely rare though that may be. Permit me to counter however with, while crews make mistakes all the time, human factors research, CRM techniques, cockpit discipline and SOPs, and (as cited in the Colgan investigation), a sterile cockpit all have reduced the risk of an untoward event but once in a while it happens. We see it in flight data and in other aspects of a healthy safety reporting system. It happens.
What I find enigmatic about the Turkish accident is that it is so profoundly fundamental that there is little else imaginable that would cause the aircraft to lose fourty or fifty knots on approach with nobody of the three pilots in the cockpit aware of it. But I am open to alternate, plausible theories. But if the report stops at Boeing, ATC and other factors without addressing what went on in the cockpit as has been touted, it isn't a report and that's my point.