Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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Well I am surprised! Anybody who 'covers' my controls whilst I am flying will soon get told to 'get lost'! I don't believe those posters are serious!
Rainboe, the idea to cover the controls is to get an idea of what are your partner’s intentions. For the control wheel, no big deal, you naturally get that information visually (as long you don’t fly the Bus …) but for the rudder ???
Don't tell me as a PNF your feet are firmly on the floor during both take off and landing phases ?
I won't believe you, but if they are, may I suggest you to reconsider your position and give it a try. You will see how much more valuable information you can get.
Very easy to place your feet in a strictly damping mode with absolutely no interference to your partner.
Actually, I would think any flying instructor is doing things that way, and I’m not aware of any other better way.
CONF iture:
My feet are firmly on the floor when PNF is flying and my hands are away from the control wheel on take-off and landing.
I got my first instructors rating in 1963 and I'm still teaching in the simulator but what do I know.
I happily bow to your superior knowledge and experience.
My feet are firmly on the floor when PNF is flying and my hands are away from the control wheel on take-off and landing.
I got my first instructors rating in 1963 and I'm still teaching in the simulator but what do I know.
I happily bow to your superior knowledge and experience.
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During a crosswind wing-down landing there's nothing worse than starting to put the rudder in only to find the pedal is much stiffer to push than normal. For a split second you wonder if you have a control problem then quickly realize that it's because the guy sitting next to you has his size 9's firmly planted on them. As there is a lot happening during the wing-down flare there is no time to say 'get your feet off the pedals' - you just have to deal with it.
My feet stay on the floor and my hands off the controls when someone else is flying - as do 'most' that I fly with .
My feet stay on the floor and my hands off the controls when someone else is flying - as do 'most' that I fly with .
In my experience in the RH seat of narrow and wide body jets (5000+ hours) captains who put their feet on the rudder pedals during t/o and ldg compromise my handling a little bit, annoy me a bit more and generally have personality issues.
Just my two pennies' worth
ps there were only two that did on the minibus and one so far on the -400 in nine years
Just my two pennies' worth
ps there were only two that did on the minibus and one so far on the -400 in nine years
Last edited by Locked door; 18th Apr 2009 at 15:17.
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Following on the rudder pedals.
You will understand when you will become a captain one day. No personality issues here whatsover.
Actually when I notice that a FO does not have his feet on the rudder pedals during TO, Ldg and taxi I am indeed annoyed. It actually reflects an attitude, a bad one at that. A nonchalant attitude that leads to oversights in performance calculations, runway alignments etc
And then lenghty pprune threads follow..
Actually when I notice that a FO does not have his feet on the rudder pedals during TO, Ldg and taxi I am indeed annoyed. It actually reflects an attitude, a bad one at that. A nonchalant attitude that leads to oversights in performance calculations, runway alignments etc
And then lenghty pprune threads follow..
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In my experience in the RH seat of narrow and wide body jets (5000+ hours) captains who put their feet on the rudder pedals during t/o and ldg compromise my handling a little bit, annoy me a bit more and generally have personality issues.
BOAC;
Its a sign that the thread has run it's useful life but nobody wants to pronounce.
Sources of information have gone silent, the trail has gone cold. The CVR transcript isn't going to show up anytime soon if ever, nor will anything likely be available from the DFDR, perhaps until the final report, if/when that shows up. In the absence of this information we can surmise that the information is damning to the crew but we will not find out why or what actually occurred.
Same outcome as the EK crew-firing and criminal prosecution/jail for crews involved in incidents/accidents: - A human factors accident occurs and, for political, cultural, legal or economic reasons, the profession and the industry is denied the opportunity to learn and keep the fatal accident rate low and going lower.
In a broader view of this profession, silence when there is crucial safety information available but which is "inconvenient", is not an appropriate nor a responsible approach.
Crew firings, criminal prosecutions and the desecration of the profession by managements which consider airline pilots "expensive" and which knock the stuffing out of the profession are the collateral outcomes of such trends, the justifications for all of which are instrumental and which have nothing to do with flight safety.
Have I missed something about the crash? How on earth have we got to 'covering the controls', 'visual circuits' and circling'????
and,
Yup - you've got it! While you are changing those lightbulbs WE are wondering why a 737 smashed into the ground, stalled, from an ILS.
and,
Yup - you've got it! While you are changing those lightbulbs WE are wondering why a 737 smashed into the ground, stalled, from an ILS.
Sources of information have gone silent, the trail has gone cold. The CVR transcript isn't going to show up anytime soon if ever, nor will anything likely be available from the DFDR, perhaps until the final report, if/when that shows up. In the absence of this information we can surmise that the information is damning to the crew but we will not find out why or what actually occurred.
Same outcome as the EK crew-firing and criminal prosecution/jail for crews involved in incidents/accidents: - A human factors accident occurs and, for political, cultural, legal or economic reasons, the profession and the industry is denied the opportunity to learn and keep the fatal accident rate low and going lower.
In a broader view of this profession, silence when there is crucial safety information available but which is "inconvenient", is not an appropriate nor a responsible approach.
Crew firings, criminal prosecutions and the desecration of the profession by managements which consider airline pilots "expensive" and which knock the stuffing out of the profession are the collateral outcomes of such trends, the justifications for all of which are instrumental and which have nothing to do with flight safety.
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You can't do it at all without affecting the other person- they will feel you there. What is 'damping mode'? The mere fact you are 'damping' means you are affecting his feel! You can't do it anyway on a Bus, so I just don't see it as a possibility. So what do you fly?
I appreciate working on a dual crew flight deck. Always try to share as much information as possible with my partner, and control inputs are part of it. That information is readily available, I just take it, much better if my partner does the same, he will be just more in the loop if anything happens.
Won't say again here what I think of the Airbus sidestick philosophy ...
JW411, no superior knowledge here but enough experience to know that I will always need more.
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Hello again,
What I had meant in my last posting from a week ago was that, the pilots, after the first warning went off for the failed captain's side altimeter, BEFORE even getting to the stage of engine thrust going to idle, should not have taken a chance and just disengaged autothrottle. If I understand what happened correctly, the pilots first had a warning (visual and/or auditory) that the captain's side altimeter had failed, yet they chose to silence and ignore this warning and shut it off. Perhaps at this point, they should have disengaged the ATHR as I had mentioned...
John
What I had meant in my last posting from a week ago was that, the pilots, after the first warning went off for the failed captain's side altimeter, BEFORE even getting to the stage of engine thrust going to idle, should not have taken a chance and just disengaged autothrottle. If I understand what happened correctly, the pilots first had a warning (visual and/or auditory) that the captain's side altimeter had failed, yet they chose to silence and ignore this warning and shut it off. Perhaps at this point, they should have disengaged the ATHR as I had mentioned...
John
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Originally Posted by PJ2
Crew firings, criminal prosecutions and the desecration of the profession by managements which consider airline pilots "expensive" and which knock the stuffing out of the profession are the collateral outcomes of such trends, the justifications for all of which are instrumental and which have nothing to do with flight safety.
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Question to engineers/system designers/knowledgeable 73NG pilots:
- Is there no redundancy for the radar altimeter? If yes, why does the FMGC not use it?
- Why is rad alt the only source of truth? What about 'classical' alt (and it's five redundancies), GPS alt, DME distance (should be on any ILS no?), IRS alt etc. etc.??
Shouldn't the A/P and A/T disconnect if any of these sources do not reconcile??
If the autopilot only relies on rad alt without considering any other parameters, this accident shows quite a shocking design weakness, no? I would understand it on the 737 prototype, but the NG?
Please enlighten the rest of us...
B737/200/300/400 were part of my school, specially the /200. As I remember it, they had FCC's, which is problably what you were referring too, but I may be mistaken.
The LRRA antennas, mainly due to the position they must be installed, have a way shorter reliability than the computers. One can install that kind of redundacy, but than you would have to make it compatible "inter-systems", meaning AP1 would have to be able to use either RA signal. Given the usual complexity of an LRRA functional test (usually requires ramp testers), that would very much enlarge the amount of time needed to troubleshooot any AP failure (because you would have to check that), Airlines and their associations (e.g. AEA) tend to see that as not necessary and lobbie as such. (meanwhile, lifes are lost)
And no, the LRRA signal is not the only one, and any of the others would kill the AP also.
I guess we will have to wait for more conclusions, for example, was the GPWS working? The Bar ALT ALERT should also give some sort of warning...
These things usually happen when a series of factors are saidly combined.
Mercy on their souls
- Is there no redundancy for the radar altimeter? If yes, why does the FMGC not use it?
- Why is rad alt the only source of truth? What about 'classical' alt (and it's five redundancies), GPS alt, DME distance (should be on any ILS no?), IRS alt etc. etc.??
Shouldn't the A/P and A/T disconnect if any of these sources do not reconcile??
If the autopilot only relies on rad alt without considering any other parameters, this accident shows quite a shocking design weakness, no? I would understand it on the 737 prototype, but the NG?
Please enlighten the rest of us...
B737/200/300/400 were part of my school, specially the /200. As I remember it, they had FCC's, which is problably what you were referring too, but I may be mistaken.
The LRRA antennas, mainly due to the position they must be installed, have a way shorter reliability than the computers. One can install that kind of redundacy, but than you would have to make it compatible "inter-systems", meaning AP1 would have to be able to use either RA signal. Given the usual complexity of an LRRA functional test (usually requires ramp testers), that would very much enlarge the amount of time needed to troubleshooot any AP failure (because you would have to check that), Airlines and their associations (e.g. AEA) tend to see that as not necessary and lobbie as such. (meanwhile, lifes are lost)
And no, the LRRA signal is not the only one, and any of the others would kill the AP also.
I guess we will have to wait for more conclusions, for example, was the GPWS working? The Bar ALT ALERT should also give some sort of warning...
These things usually happen when a series of factors are saidly combined.
Mercy on their souls
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Originally Posted by studi
It has nothing to do with interference but with safety. Leave your egos at home.
Obviously some guys around would rather fly their airliner single pilot ... maybe the 797 one day ?
No wonder SOP never stop inflating when what seems to be only common sense needs to be specified black on white.
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Rainboe,
Regardless of HOW it should have been done, my point was actually a more general point that many pilots have made before in this forum -that the pilots should concentrate on flying the plane, not flicking switches and letting the computer control their fates! While we should wait for the final results of the official investigation to get all the facts, all I am really trying to say is this: Does a pilot fly the plane or will he/she let the computer fly it? If there is a malfunction, the pilots should have reacted by flying either partial or fully manual. Surely, by this time, the runway was visible (in the low visibility) that they could have even attempted a manual landing, or at least a landing with auto-throttle disengaged.
I fly NOT the default "toys" in MSFS but the payware by PMDG, the 737NG series so the cockpit is quite well simulated. In any case, your tone suggests that you should stick with flying rather than communicating with people as you are much too arrogant to get anyones respect with that attitude.
Regardless of HOW it should have been done, my point was actually a more general point that many pilots have made before in this forum -that the pilots should concentrate on flying the plane, not flicking switches and letting the computer control their fates! While we should wait for the final results of the official investigation to get all the facts, all I am really trying to say is this: Does a pilot fly the plane or will he/she let the computer fly it? If there is a malfunction, the pilots should have reacted by flying either partial or fully manual. Surely, by this time, the runway was visible (in the low visibility) that they could have even attempted a manual landing, or at least a landing with auto-throttle disengaged.
I fly NOT the default "toys" in MSFS but the payware by PMDG, the 737NG series so the cockpit is quite well simulated. In any case, your tone suggests that you should stick with flying rather than communicating with people as you are much too arrogant to get anyones respect with that attitude.
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CRM, etc.
Outstanding post Sir/Madam. If I may be so bold my experience in Medicine (in the operating theatre for the most part) and study of analogous situations in the cockpit have shown that the safest routines are those which are repeated most of the time: an experienced, mature crew doing a standard route or procedure over and over again. Throw a trainee or re-cert into the mix (especially if it is a relatively rare experience, e.g. in private practice or PPL experiences) then sometimes we all can get too pedantic or enthusiastic about a minor teaching point whilst the airspeed dramatically declines as the academic points are rammed home to the trainee. Chaos then ensues. I suspect that the CVR and perhaps a recreation will bear this out. Thanks for listening...my profeesion (anesthesiology) has learned a lot from the study of CRM and cockpit discipline in general and accident or mishap reviews in particular.
Last edited by averow; 22nd Apr 2009 at 04:38. Reason: spelling
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An excellent point Averow. It takes an astute trainer to keep an eye on the overall operation when teaching, particularly when concentrating on a point that the student is having difficulty understanding. It also takes an astute trainer to know what situations require him or her to drop the teaching & get on with the operation. Of course, we don't know whether or not this was the situation during this particular approach.
I agree generally, that the safest routines are those performed by a mature crew doing a standard procedure over & over again. The aviation industry also agrees on this point, which is why we have SOP's to adhere to. However, this can be a two edged sword in that it often tends to reduce an individual's understanding & remembered knowledge of the underlying fundamentals, that were hopefully learned at the very begining of their entry into the field of aviation. This problem then lies dormant until a departure for the norm is either inadvertantly initiated by the crew or forced upon them by things outside their control. The problem is then often revealed in a situation that some recent events have proved can lead to tradgedy. Unfortunately, the very nature of aviation is such that departures from the norm will continue to occur & I believe that it will prove impossible to remove them completely.
I don't profess to have the answer, but I believe that there needs to be a better balance between SOP's & a pilot's experience & initiative, as well as between the use of automation & manual flying skills as a starting point.
I agree generally, that the safest routines are those performed by a mature crew doing a standard procedure over & over again. The aviation industry also agrees on this point, which is why we have SOP's to adhere to. However, this can be a two edged sword in that it often tends to reduce an individual's understanding & remembered knowledge of the underlying fundamentals, that were hopefully learned at the very begining of their entry into the field of aviation. This problem then lies dormant until a departure for the norm is either inadvertantly initiated by the crew or forced upon them by things outside their control. The problem is then often revealed in a situation that some recent events have proved can lead to tradgedy. Unfortunately, the very nature of aviation is such that departures from the norm will continue to occur & I believe that it will prove impossible to remove them completely.
I don't profess to have the answer, but I believe that there needs to be a better balance between SOP's & a pilot's experience & initiative, as well as between the use of automation & manual flying skills as a starting point.
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Byrna
Although Rainboe can come across as quite blunt, I've got to say, I agree with him on this one.
My background is a limited rotary wing one, now I'm in avionics systems engineering, so my experience of two man fixed wing commercial ops is purely theoretical, plus knowledge built from the last 12-13 years of engineering with the obvious contact with still current flight crew.
My main interest is not what they should or shouldn't have done, this will hopefully become factual at the end of the accident report, but why they did they take that particular course of action. Upto to what point did everything seem ok, what cues were missed, why were they missed and what eventually made them aware of the dire situation.
These answers, if they can be accurately reported without political persuasions coming into play, MAY help future systems, training and attitudes become a little safer.
Although Rainboe can come across as quite blunt, I've got to say, I agree with him on this one.
My background is a limited rotary wing one, now I'm in avionics systems engineering, so my experience of two man fixed wing commercial ops is purely theoretical, plus knowledge built from the last 12-13 years of engineering with the obvious contact with still current flight crew.
My main interest is not what they should or shouldn't have done, this will hopefully become factual at the end of the accident report, but why they did they take that particular course of action. Upto to what point did everything seem ok, what cues were missed, why were they missed and what eventually made them aware of the dire situation.
These answers, if they can be accurately reported without political persuasions coming into play, MAY help future systems, training and attitudes become a little safer.
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