Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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Right on, 411A (#2473)
If you have the capability, "Don't leave home without one"
If you don't have that capability, initially, wish you did, then by all means use the automatics, BUT DON'T trust it an inch!
The automatics are both dumb and unreliable...
..unreliable, as per the many posts here highlighting the out-of-the-blue failures,
..dumb, an example being if your airline has you setting the A/T switch to ARMED (B737) during the pre-start checks, and either pilot accidentally just touches either TOGA switch during engine start or pushback, both engines will immediately go to the selected takeoff power setting...quite quickly!
BTW..we set the A/T switch to ARMED on approaching the departure runway.
Cheers...FD...
If you have the capability, "Don't leave home without one"
If you don't have that capability, initially, wish you did, then by all means use the automatics, BUT DON'T trust it an inch!
The automatics are both dumb and unreliable...
..unreliable, as per the many posts here highlighting the out-of-the-blue failures,
..dumb, an example being if your airline has you setting the A/T switch to ARMED (B737) during the pre-start checks, and either pilot accidentally just touches either TOGA switch during engine start or pushback, both engines will immediately go to the selected takeoff power setting...quite quickly!
BTW..we set the A/T switch to ARMED on approaching the departure runway.
Cheers...FD...
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BTW..we set the A/T switch to ARMED on approaching the departure runway
I know some pilots who treat the A/T switch as an "Approved for Takeoff" switch.
Even better.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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mickrussom - my personal feeling is that the Turkish folk will be having 'issues' with the findings which will delay it somewhat.
- many years ago I sat resignedly in the RHS as a Captain with his 'own' SOPs' set the switch on before start (and somehow must have clicked the 'TOGA' buttons). As both N1's rose through 50% - with a slightly alarmed ground crew - I disconnected the A/T and closed the thrust levers and said "********""
Originally Posted by FD
both engines will immediately go to the selected takeoff power setting...quite quickly!
Quote:
BTW..we set the A/T switch to ARMED on approaching the departure runway
Good idea.
I know some pilots who treat the A/T switch as an "Approved for Takeoff" switch.
Even better.
BTW..we set the A/T switch to ARMED on approaching the departure runway
Good idea.
I know some pilots who treat the A/T switch as an "Approved for Takeoff" switch.
Even better.
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As both N1's rose through 50% - with a slightly alarmed ground crew - I disconnected the A/T and closed the thrust levers and said "********""
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Maybe something to carry forward from this and other threads .. for anyone actually flying aircraft rather than MS flight sim : You monitor the aircraft with all of your senses... please keep your hands on the appropriate controls at the appropriate times, (below 5000 feet agl. seems an appropriate figure) and keep them off them (for example using flap handles as hand rests) during inappropriate times.
This stuff was drilled into people in school when I went through the system and I don't understand why I am having to correct it flying the line with the products of today's schools.
Even on the Airbus .. where the things only live in detents and are not back driven it is still surely reasonable practice to have a hand close to them in case you need to either move them or disconnect the autothrust !!.
Just my lowly opinion .. but where have the basic training standards gone?
and yeh ... this one is more complex from the CRM point of view but ...
TR
This stuff was drilled into people in school when I went through the system and I don't understand why I am having to correct it flying the line with the products of today's schools.
Even on the Airbus .. where the things only live in detents and are not back driven it is still surely reasonable practice to have a hand close to them in case you need to either move them or disconnect the autothrust !!.
Just my lowly opinion .. but where have the basic training standards gone?
and yeh ... this one is more complex from the CRM point of view but ...
TR
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"Turkish Airlines pilots Schiphol crash not to blame"
'Piloten Turkish Airlines hebben geen schuld' | nu.nl/binnenland | Het laatste nieuws het eerst op nu.nl
Pilots of last year's crash have very little to be blamed for is a conclusion of the Dutch air accident investigation board according to the press article enclosed.
The main blame lies with the plane manufacturer following the inop altitude indicator which was steering the autopilot.
Dutch ATC is also (but to a lesser extent) being blamed for making the aircraft turn to sharply on final approach.
The final report will not be published before February 25, the date of the accident a year ago
Pilots of last year's crash have very little to be blamed for is a conclusion of the Dutch air accident investigation board according to the press article enclosed.
The main blame lies with the plane manufacturer following the inop altitude indicator which was steering the autopilot.
Dutch ATC is also (but to a lesser extent) being blamed for making the aircraft turn to sharply on final approach.
The final report will not be published before February 25, the date of the accident a year ago
Last edited by vanHorck; 26th Jan 2010 at 08:32. Reason: typo
I wonder why there are pilots in the cockpit then? If pilots are no longer supposed to monitor and overide the AP, why bother? 
I can not help recalling the verse of the poem "More pricks than kicks", written by obscure Dutch poet BJ Stulic:
I really doubt that Onderzoeksraad Voor Veiligheid really completely exonerated the THY crew, more likely we have the case of licentia journalistica.
Ignorance is bliss
Last edited by Clandestino; 26th Jan 2010 at 09:11.
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I could not find the relevant press release on which this article is blamed, which is why I put the title between parentheses.
The article body actually states as i translated : "VERY LITTLE to blame" which is different from "NOT to blame".
The reason I did post was all the very early criticism about Turkish Pilots.
Perhaps the strong early defense from Turkish quarters was not so wrong....
The article body actually states as i translated : "VERY LITTLE to blame" which is different from "NOT to blame".
The reason I did post was all the very early criticism about Turkish Pilots.
Perhaps the strong early defense from Turkish quarters was not so wrong....
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Not To blame !This is why investigations like this should be left to the professionals,
Sure they where not to blame when the IAS came back to 80kts on final apch
Or that they failed to see a defective RADIO ALTIMETER with a -4 reading on Final..
80KTS FOR A 737-800 ON FINAL APPCH CAN YOU BELIEVE THAT ?
Sure they where not to blame when the IAS came back to 80kts on final apch
Or that they failed to see a defective RADIO ALTIMETER with a -4 reading on Final..
80KTS FOR A 737-800 ON FINAL APPCH CAN YOU BELIEVE THAT ?
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I've been told a few months ago that there was quite a bit more than just pilot error going on. It seemed that more crews have gotten confused during simulator sessions with the same problems. Although they did not crash, it was imaginable why it had gotten so out of hand on the turkish flight.
I'm still annoyed that the CVR recordings haven't been released yet though. They'd be highly informative.
I'm still annoyed that the CVR recordings haven't been released yet though. They'd be highly informative.
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Lawyers' field day if most blame goes to Boeing. I wonder if there is an appeal process by the 'blamee' in such matters as air crash investigations? After all, the respective AIIB's & NTSB's are not the only experts. But let's wait and see before speculation rockets away into the stratosphere. I know this is a rumour forum, but the truth will soon be available and save many the wasted energy.
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Blame, in a crash report?
These crash reports try to establish probable causes but they explicitly avoid putting blame on this or that.
From what I have read we might see something along the lines of one probable cause being the interaction between the defective radar altimeter and the autothrottle. Given that if the systems had been working free of fault and as designed then there's no way you should see the engines pulled back to idle by the autothrottle system with the aircraft nowhere close to touchdown; that is rather obvious.
It seems to be the autothrottle system being "told" by the radar altimeter to pull the power off because the aircraft was at touchdown height that set off this fatal chain of events but we will have to read the full report to see if that is correct. Too, this was a "chain" made up of multiple links that ended in a crash. You might well argue that if the throttles went to idle with the aircraft still a long way from landing then it must be up to the crew to push them back up again so that this inaction was the next link in the chain. It's too simplistic to say that either the autothrottle or the crew was to blame for the crash; you can only say what helped to cause the crash.
What a layman wants or expects to read, that the "blame" for the crash lies with this defect, won't be there. At the most you might see that as a "cause" or a "contributing factor." I think people watch too many episodes of Miss Marple and expect something similar from a crash investigation, someone in a white lab coat holding up a mangled gadget to tell us, "This is the thronomister valve that was to blame for XYZ Airlines fatal crash." ICAO doesn't work that way so that you will only see "This is a thronomister valve that did not operate as designed because of..." It is pretty boring stuff when you get right down to it but that might be because a crash investigation, a real one and not the bastard child of one you see on R&N or some TV program, is not entertainment but a safety tool. It is meant to educate aviation professionals so that we can avoid the next accident.
"Blame" will come into play in the court cases that are sure to follow. If you have any knowledge of those you will know that it's often so that the blame goes to the entity with the deepest pockets and has little or nothing to do with the cause of the accident.
For the purposes of safety blame is useless. If I am told that a certain crash was 100% down to Joe Bloggs totally making a mess of things, what should I do about that? Joe Bloggs messed it up and Joe Bloggs is dead, end of story! If I am told that poor old Joe did something that proved fatal because of the following factors, then that is completely different and gives me something to work with to achieve improved safety.
For the purposes of winning a fat settlement from 12 good men and true who often hardly know how to spell "airplane" blame will do quite nicely. I was struck by reading an account of an undershoot on an instrument approach with the wreckage consumed by fire when the plaintiff's attorney successfully argued that the blame lay with the aircraft, that it was on fire before the CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain), when the jury bought this seemingly specious argument. The odds were that it was a perfectly good airplane that was mishandled but, yes, it could have been on fire on final; you couldn't prove that one way or the other thanks to the fire that consumed the evidence. The clever attorney managed to persuade the jury where the blame lay and that was that! Of course the NTSB had a very different probable cause in their crash report but that had nothing to do with assigning blame. Just as they will not assign blame they will not absolve anyone of blame. They are not in the "blame game."
From what I have read we might see something along the lines of one probable cause being the interaction between the defective radar altimeter and the autothrottle. Given that if the systems had been working free of fault and as designed then there's no way you should see the engines pulled back to idle by the autothrottle system with the aircraft nowhere close to touchdown; that is rather obvious.
It seems to be the autothrottle system being "told" by the radar altimeter to pull the power off because the aircraft was at touchdown height that set off this fatal chain of events but we will have to read the full report to see if that is correct. Too, this was a "chain" made up of multiple links that ended in a crash. You might well argue that if the throttles went to idle with the aircraft still a long way from landing then it must be up to the crew to push them back up again so that this inaction was the next link in the chain. It's too simplistic to say that either the autothrottle or the crew was to blame for the crash; you can only say what helped to cause the crash.
What a layman wants or expects to read, that the "blame" for the crash lies with this defect, won't be there. At the most you might see that as a "cause" or a "contributing factor." I think people watch too many episodes of Miss Marple and expect something similar from a crash investigation, someone in a white lab coat holding up a mangled gadget to tell us, "This is the thronomister valve that was to blame for XYZ Airlines fatal crash." ICAO doesn't work that way so that you will only see "This is a thronomister valve that did not operate as designed because of..." It is pretty boring stuff when you get right down to it but that might be because a crash investigation, a real one and not the bastard child of one you see on R&N or some TV program, is not entertainment but a safety tool. It is meant to educate aviation professionals so that we can avoid the next accident.
"Blame" will come into play in the court cases that are sure to follow. If you have any knowledge of those you will know that it's often so that the blame goes to the entity with the deepest pockets and has little or nothing to do with the cause of the accident.
For the purposes of safety blame is useless. If I am told that a certain crash was 100% down to Joe Bloggs totally making a mess of things, what should I do about that? Joe Bloggs messed it up and Joe Bloggs is dead, end of story! If I am told that poor old Joe did something that proved fatal because of the following factors, then that is completely different and gives me something to work with to achieve improved safety.
For the purposes of winning a fat settlement from 12 good men and true who often hardly know how to spell "airplane" blame will do quite nicely. I was struck by reading an account of an undershoot on an instrument approach with the wreckage consumed by fire when the plaintiff's attorney successfully argued that the blame lay with the aircraft, that it was on fire before the CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain), when the jury bought this seemingly specious argument. The odds were that it was a perfectly good airplane that was mishandled but, yes, it could have been on fire on final; you couldn't prove that one way or the other thanks to the fire that consumed the evidence. The clever attorney managed to persuade the jury where the blame lay and that was that! Of course the NTSB had a very different probable cause in their crash report but that had nothing to do with assigning blame. Just as they will not assign blame they will not absolve anyone of blame. They are not in the "blame game."
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Originally Posted by chuks
Given that if the systems had been working free of fault and as designed then there's no way you should see the engines pulled back to idle by the autothrottle system with the aircraft nowhere close to touchdown; that is rather obvious.
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At the risk of repeating the same things ad infinitum, the technical fault merely gave them the opportunity to cock it up, but didn't cause the crash.
As BOAC said, earlier reports suggest the approach was a little hot & high, & it seems that ATC will be rightly criticised at least a little for this scenario, sometimes you can be just a little "too clever" & my experience of AMS is that this is not unheard of.
Finally the 3 guys sitting there either collectively, or perhaps more likely the most senior guy alone, but with no prompting from the "lower ranks" (and we can write a whole thread on that
) failed to notice that the A/T was not participating as it should have as the speed reduced to VRef and subsequently failed to apply the thrust manually in a timely fashion.
The subsequent stall recovery was greatly hindered by the A/T still being in "retard" mode, but unfortunately it is the "retard" mode of the crew that finalised the outcome here.
It gives me no joy to criticise fellow professionals, but whatever the (in all honesty very minor) tech problem they had, or stress/distractions caused by line training/rushed approach, one of the most basic parameters of flying an approach was ignored.
No amount of whitewash can excuse this, and anyone who is a professional pilot will agree, unless there is some national pride taking precedence in their judgement of this situation.
Aforementioned "pride" may well be an unspoken contributor to lack of intervention earlier on P2's part, but that won't be mentioned.
Still no mention either at this stage of the duties worked by the crew in the preceding days, but when I see the roster currently being offered to applicants to Turkish Airlines it is not impossible the guys were a bit knackered as well. That surely will be looked at, although there are rumours of a cover up of these facts already circulating among Turkish pilots.
As BOAC said, earlier reports suggest the approach was a little hot & high, & it seems that ATC will be rightly criticised at least a little for this scenario, sometimes you can be just a little "too clever" & my experience of AMS is that this is not unheard of.
Finally the 3 guys sitting there either collectively, or perhaps more likely the most senior guy alone, but with no prompting from the "lower ranks" (and we can write a whole thread on that
) failed to notice that the A/T was not participating as it should have as the speed reduced to VRef and subsequently failed to apply the thrust manually in a timely fashion.The subsequent stall recovery was greatly hindered by the A/T still being in "retard" mode, but unfortunately it is the "retard" mode of the crew that finalised the outcome here.
It gives me no joy to criticise fellow professionals, but whatever the (in all honesty very minor) tech problem they had, or stress/distractions caused by line training/rushed approach, one of the most basic parameters of flying an approach was ignored.
No amount of whitewash can excuse this, and anyone who is a professional pilot will agree, unless there is some national pride taking precedence in their judgement of this situation.
Aforementioned "pride" may well be an unspoken contributor to lack of intervention earlier on P2's part, but that won't be mentioned.
Still no mention either at this stage of the duties worked by the crew in the preceding days, but when I see the roster currently being offered to applicants to Turkish Airlines it is not impossible the guys were a bit knackered as well. That surely will be looked at, although there are rumours of a cover up of these facts already circulating among Turkish pilots.
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Originally Posted by chuks
Given that if the systems had been working free of fault and as designed then there's no way you should see the engines pulled back to idle by the autothrottle system with the aircraft nowhere close to touchdown; that is rather obvious.
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Sorry if I misunderstood the chain of events, when I assumed a stabilised approach there with the radalt starting things off by giving a low altitude that triggered the power reduction.
Even so, normal CRM should see the PNF calling "Check Speed" as it dips below VRef, yes? To get to 80 knots IAS, if that is so, well, that is one very long way from Vref so that crew inattention must come into it to some degree.
You would assume that being given some sort of "rushed approach" would see you sat up, paying close attention to make that work. The distractions should be balanced by extra awareness. Or, if things aren't working out, I guess that must be your cue to do a missed approach and try again with something more within your capabilities "on the day."
It will be interesting to read the official report and see what exactly did happen there.
Even so, normal CRM should see the PNF calling "Check Speed" as it dips below VRef, yes? To get to 80 knots IAS, if that is so, well, that is one very long way from Vref so that crew inattention must come into it to some degree.
You would assume that being given some sort of "rushed approach" would see you sat up, paying close attention to make that work. The distractions should be balanced by extra awareness. Or, if things aren't working out, I guess that must be your cue to do a missed approach and try again with something more within your capabilities "on the day."
It will be interesting to read the official report and see what exactly did happen there.
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I wonder why there are pilots in the cockpit then? If pilots are no longer supposed to monitor and overide the AP, why bother?
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It all looks like politics to me. I cannot believe this. Pilots have landed aircraft with a lot less information, systems, engines that are working etc. This has a total other reason where everyone has touched i guess. When being a student pilot you learn, fly the plane first, the others check. This basic thing was not done. What is still strange is that the CVR is not released, whilst by other crahses that is on internet within days. It stinks.