Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol

[BOAC]

As I said waaayyy back somewhere, it appears that perhaps a more noticeable warning of RA failure would be a good idea in view of the effect this can have on an inattentive crew.

The place where I think Boeing ARE vulnerable is in not mandating the deselection of autothrottle in stall recovery. Something most of us would instinctively do, I'm sure, but this crew did not. It is pretty obvious that the combination of RA fail and autothrottle retention in a stall had not been fully thought out. Even with full and active monitoring of 'max thrust achieved' by PNF (or PF), once those T/Ls closed for the second time.................

[411A]

A lot of younger pilots sit there with the aeroplane behaving odd and mumble 'what's it doing now?', and just watch a situation develop. I have to jog them sometimes with a discrete hint: 'why don't you just disconnect the damn thing and FLY IT? Who cares a flying f what it's doing- it's not doing what YOU WANT, mate!' As automatics become more complex, the 'paralysis' of watching, in a sort of cobra-like trance, automatics misbehave without actually doing anything about it is getting more of a problem.

Yup, couldn't agree more.
Even the 'ole L1011, which was the first airplane with true fail/operational performance with the autoflight/autothrust systems, every once in awhile does a hiccup...that is what the pilots are there for...to FLY the airplane.

What an absolute surprise...

[MU3001A]

BOAC

The equipment I fly does not have an AT but it does have an AP which I can cancel out of in an instant with a handy disconnect switch on the yoke, right beneath my thumb. In addition to this switch I can also disconnect the AP by overpowering it with sufficient break out force on the yoke. Would it not be useful to have a similar capacity in respect to the AT, say based on PL position when manually commanding full power?

[Taxi2parking]

.....mmm not really 411A, a stall recovery is without doubt the time to get rid of the automatics and fly the thing. However, in many other "what is it doing now?" situations the correct response is rarely to click out the automatics and fly the aircraft Usually a far better response is to go down a level of automation....if the LNAV is taking you somewhere strange, then go into heading....but keep the autopilot - it's there to help you in high workload situations.....

[411A]

if the LNAV is taking you somewhere strange, then go into heading....but keep the autopilot - it's there to help you in high workload situations.....

Quite true, however, some less informed folks will just sit there and watch the accident happen.
Not good.

[Rainboe]

However, in many other "what is it doing now?" situations the correct response is rarely to click out the automatics and fly the aircraft Usually a far better response is to go down a level of automation

Don't think so! One I see (and do myself) not infrequently is descending on automatics to capture glideslope, with localiser captured and glideslope armed. Looks good, glideslope coming in, then disaster!- you forgot the altitude window is armed, and because that captures before the glideslope, aeroplane levels off and thrust goes up, glideslope now rapidly falling away. Hands flustered, what to do? To me, the ONLY response is to hit disconnect, change configuration and slam throttles closed, otherwise you have lost glideslope irretrievably. The automatics will not now get you out of that one, so the use of 'rarely' in a not unusual occurrence is not suitable!

Another one- you have been vectored at a large angle to the localiser and passing through it. But you have been dumb and selected LOC arm. Now your heading control is locked into automatics, and you start making bizarre attacks to the Localiser from the other side and not able to control it. What to do? Best answer is to disconnect and fly it sensibly yourself. Then instead of turning out of control back towards the localiser at a stupid attack, you can manually control to a sensible and gentle attack.

There's 2 scenarios that contradict ' you should rarely disconnect, rather move down a stage'. Unless you do it rapidly and sensibly yourself, manually, you will probably not be able to recover the situation satisfactorily. It's the younger pilots who let automatics fly a serviceable aeroplane into the ground while they faff around with the MCP. Us older experienced pilots know when we can do it better!

[411A]

Us older experienced pilots know when we can do it better!

Absolutely, spot on!

[barit1]

Isn't that what we call situational awareness ?

I'll bet sim instructors around the world are duplicating the THY AMS situation now - if for no other reason than to gather statistics on crews' response to subtle system failures.

[Taxi2parking]

Rainboe....the two examples are exactly my point. They both stem from a miss managed situation. You should have spotted the fact that the thing would go into Alt - it's called mode awareness and SA....things which are very important when operating advanced glass. Unfortuanately rather than learning these important skills people would rather just screw up the automation and then click it all out.

Having said that in both cases a step down in automation level works ....you don't want ALT capture....well you can change the Alt sel and you have path or VS...if you had enough SA to see it coming. As for the LOC example ....it's the same argument as the LNAV example - take heading!

...and I think you'll find that when it comes to flying servicable jets into the ground it's statistically the experienced PIC who is flying at the time. Also having trained a large number of people moving from a 1960s explosion in a dial factory to state of the art EFIS flight deck, I would take issue with your assertion that the young wizz kids are less safe..quite the opposite in fact.

This is all thread drift of course....but I wonder if a lack of mode awareness and poor SA were contributing factors in this accident ... and how much was this emphasised in the crews training...

[BitMoreRightRudder]

It's the younger pilots who let automatics fly a serviceable aeroplane into the ground while they faff around with the MCP. Us older experienced pilots know when we can do it better!

How old and experienced was the LTC commanding the 737 in question?

If it happens to one crew it could happen to many others - maybe even you Rainbow

No matter what your ego is telling you.

I agree with the considered thoughts of Taxi2parking.

[FlightDetent]

Originally Posted by MU3001A

... I can also disconnect the AP by overpowering it with sufficient break out force on the yoke. Would it not be useful to have a similar capacity in respect to the AT, say based on PL position when manually commanding full power?

The other large manufacturer's design does exactly that. Once TL are advanced beyond normal climb operating range the A/THR trips off. Other features of the design such as non moving throttles are sometimes not accepted with great enthusiasm. Like said above, the design and the time of design has its limits of complexity and reliability and even in the best possible situation will not be 100% proof. For instance the same failure of false RA1 0ft indication inflight would cascade larger effect on Airbus than on 737. Are the cues provided to crew strong enough? Is the crew trained to react? Is the crew proficient enough to execute the advised course of action correctly in timely manner? All valid.

FD (un-real)

[rogerg]

Have we had the voice recorder readout yet or did I miss it?

[arba]

how come "old experienced pilot" let ALT HOLD captured way above G/S ?

too much admiring his own left-hand on the yoke, failed to glance at the FMA?

[RAT 5]

In the days when training was not based on cost minimum, but on a quality minimum, I used to introduce these scenarios in the sim at the end of the official syllabus. Another way was to re-enforce it on line-training; i.e. show what can happen, but with pre-patter to avoid any hairy events. There are so many "what's it doing now?", and "AGH, how do I get out of this?" moments. Why not show these to new pilots in advance rather than sit back and say, "you jack ass. How did you let that happen." Where's the training and preventative action in that. Sadly, training, especially self funded, is driven down to bare minimum = lowest cost. There is not much time for this, certainly not in the sim. I wonder if the LTC's are even aware that this type of training is a good idea. They have a syllabus to sign off. Nothing more, nothing less. Captains can be processed out of a new airline with 3000hrs in the same pilot factory. They may never have seen these occurances, or been pre-warned of them. They then become LTC's. The knowledge base is diluted. Sh#t will continue to happen, and they will continue to wonder why. All so unavoidable, but sadly it will continue. Hopefully the automatics will save the day and none will be any the wiser, and everything will be cool until the next time. However, they may have been the root cause, and playing piano on the MCP ain't gonna make it better, probably worse. Then there will be a smoking hole and the questions will be asked again. And the answers will be the same; Pilot error! Hm?????

[411A]

And the answers will be the same; Pilot error! Hm?????

Not necessarily error...more like...never told nor shown.

A real shame.

[SaturnV]

Bealzebub, what say you regarding families of deceseed passengers on SilkAir successfully suing Parker Hannifin for the crash of SilkAir 185, in a Los Angeles County court no less. IMO, American jurisprudence at its worst.

For a citation, see:
Jones Day-Experience-Parker Hannifin settles during appeal claims filed in wake of SilkAir crash

None of the three successful plaintiffs were U.S. citizens. See:
http://www.kreindler.com/publication...aulEdelman.pdf

Also here:
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/1...itigation.html

[TheOptimist]

I'm sorry to butt in, but could someone link me to the report of the accident? Or even just tell me where I could find it.

I'm only a low hours PPL student so I don't know where these things are yet. Still learning.

[Graybeard]

I heard once that Eastern Airlines (US) had 13 major accidents in its lifetime. In each case, the FO was flying. They concluded the FOs were not so much to blame as the Captains who were lousy at the PNF duties.

GB

[411A]

.... as the Captains who were lousy at the PNF duties.

Ergo, for the First Officer, sitting on hands, is the safer alternative.
Makes perfect sense to me...

[iqit]

....and then you promote that f/o ,and now he is still doing what he has learned as a f/o. sitting on his hands.