Originally Posted by
MU3001A
... I can also disconnect the AP by overpowering it with sufficient break out force on the yoke. Would it not be useful to have a similar capacity in respect to the AT, say based on PL position when manually commanding full power?
The other large manufacturer's design does exactly that. Once TL are advanced beyond normal climb operating range the A/THR trips off. Other features of the design such as non moving throttles are sometimes not accepted with great enthusiasm. Like said above, the design and the time of design has its limits of complexity and reliability and even in the best possible situation will not be 100% proof. For instance the same failure of false RA1 0ft indication inflight would cascade larger effect on Airbus than on 737. Are the cues provided to crew strong enough? Is the crew trained to react? Is the crew proficient enough to execute the advised course of action correctly in timely manner? All valid.
FD (un-real)