Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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Rainboe:
On the contrary. I'm fine with automation as long as it doesn't violate the KISS principle by making things more complex than they need to be for a given operation and as long as the specifics of any configuration doesn't inadvertently lead to the opening up of more holes in the cheese than the automation is intended to eliminate.
Your second para indicates that perhaps you may be guilty of the very thing you have roundly been castigating others over - namely not reading what people post.
As to the example you relate. If the Learjet was cleared to an altitude or FL above you then I would blame ATC for bad separation, if cleared to an altitude below you then I would respectfully suggest that we not promote the idea of A/T as a crutch for those who are incapable of managing their thrust manually.
you don't 'like' automation.
Your second para indicates that perhaps you may be guilty of the very thing you have roundly been castigating others over - namely not reading what people post.
As to the example you relate. If the Learjet was cleared to an altitude or FL above you then I would blame ATC for bad separation, if cleared to an altitude below you then I would respectfully suggest that we not promote the idea of A/T as a crutch for those who are incapable of managing their thrust manually.
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AOA indications available to the pilots would be very useful in some situations like wrong weights or in this case pilots not increasing power on the glide slope and getting slow not being aware of it until stick shaker. Forgetting speed brakes out at night in a tight descending turn in a 727 is the only time in over 20,000 hrs I could have used it. Paying attention to flying the airplane at all times would make it not required.
We are entering an automated flight era that probably requires it along with idiot lights to bring attention to it like cars with oil pressure low lights in the 70's.
We are entering an automated flight era that probably requires it along with idiot lights to bring attention to it like cars with oil pressure low lights in the 70's.
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Quoting Rananim:
I haven't been able to find this info yet. Can you reference the section? I've looked at the differences between the Smiths Autothrottle Computer (which is what the accident aircraft had installed by line number) and the integrated Collins autothrottle card (line numbers 1270, 1272, 1278 and on have the autothrottle computer integrated into the FCC - FCC A is used for autothrottle).
Could you possibly be seeing the difference in rad alt connection to the FCC's? The Honeywell FCC's are not dually fed (directly) rad alt. The Collins FCC's are. There is a Honeywell FCC software change that prevents one radio altimeter failure from causing an FCC to default to the 8 degree bank angle limit during an LNAV takeoff. This was standard ops with the Collins FCC's from the get go.
737AvEng,
AT computer is fed by RA#1 or both RA#1 and RA#2 depending on software update.There are diagrams in the AMM showing this.
AT computer is fed by RA#1 or both RA#1 and RA#2 depending on software update.There are diagrams in the AMM showing this.
I haven't been able to find this info yet. Can you reference the section? I've looked at the differences between the Smiths Autothrottle Computer (which is what the accident aircraft had installed by line number) and the integrated Collins autothrottle card (line numbers 1270, 1272, 1278 and on have the autothrottle computer integrated into the FCC - FCC A is used for autothrottle).Could you possibly be seeing the difference in rad alt connection to the FCC's? The Honeywell FCC's are not dually fed (directly) rad alt. The Collins FCC's are. There is a Honeywell FCC software change that prevents one radio altimeter failure from causing an FCC to default to the 8 degree bank angle limit during an LNAV takeoff. This was standard ops with the Collins FCC's from the get go.
Last edited by 737AvEng; 8th Mar 2009 at 23:24.
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BOAC - I thought they did notice it was giving a false reading? This was mentioned in the first briefing wasn't it?
3001A: it means "one" does not "like" automation FGS!! Please read between the lines just a little.
3001A: it means "one" does not "like" automation FGS!! Please read between the lines just a little.
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737AvEng,
Section 22-31-00 pages 28,29,30 dated 10/10/06
3 schematics entitled AT SYSTEM-DIGITAL INPUT INTERFACE
One shows RA#2 having a direct(not via FCC b)input interface with AT CMPTR.
Effectivity is:
GEF 002, 003, 006, 007, 009, 011, 012, 028, 030, 301-305, 309-399, 713, 714, 717, 719, 721-726, 728, 729, 733, 735, 737, 805, 810, 811, 817, 821, 826-829, 833, 834, 837, 839, 840, 843,848, 859-861; GEF 812, 825 POST SB 737-34-1758; GEF 815 POST SB 737-34-1941
Other two schematics show input to FCC B.
Hope you can make more sense of it than I can.
Yes,I see AoA indicator is an option.I have not seen one installed myself.
Section 22-31-00 pages 28,29,30 dated 10/10/06
3 schematics entitled AT SYSTEM-DIGITAL INPUT INTERFACE
One shows RA#2 having a direct(not via FCC b)input interface with AT CMPTR.
Effectivity is:
GEF 002, 003, 006, 007, 009, 011, 012, 028, 030, 301-305, 309-399, 713, 714, 717, 719, 721-726, 728, 729, 733, 735, 737, 805, 810, 811, 817, 821, 826-829, 833, 834, 837, 839, 840, 843,848, 859-861; GEF 812, 825 POST SB 737-34-1758; GEF 815 POST SB 737-34-1941
Other two schematics show input to FCC B.
Hope you can make more sense of it than I can.
Yes,I see AoA indicator is an option.I have not seen one installed myself.
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Thanks 737 AvEng.
So what we could have is speed rolling back and AP trimming nose up until Stick shaker when AP disconnects and If no one has their hands on the controls the aircraft pitches up sharply.
So what we could have is speed rolling back and AP trimming nose up until Stick shaker when AP disconnects and If no one has their hands on the controls the aircraft pitches up sharply.
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I have seen things in the simulator that in real life you would not believe it could happen - especially with experienced pilots. In fact if someone wrote a book about the quite frightening lapses of flying "skill" seen in the simulator it would probably plunge the airline industry into despair as passengers head for other means of transport after reading the book. "Thinks - not a bad idea - might make a buck or two with the book!"
Two examples: Experienced captain fails to notice his ADI had jammed during a reversal turn in a holding pattern. This in a 737-200 sim IMC. He continues to apply wheel pressure in an attempt to "force" the ADI to come good, meanwhile ignoring or not noticing comparitor lights. The aircrft is rolled beyond the vertical and the nose drops until with a startled Asian oath he looks at the correctly functioning standby ADI and calls "Standby ADI failure". He then proceeds to pull the fast erection button to level flight. Needless to say we crashed. All this time the F/O with his 250 hours said exactly nothing while watching open mouthed at his own perfectly functional ADI.
Second. On take off in low vis, the captain failed to rotate at VR and eventually went off the end of the runway at around 190 knots still on the ground. Why? The F/O had been quietly instructed to call 80 knots as per SOP but to "forget" to call V1 and VR.
The object of the exercise was to ensure the captain rotated on his own ASI readings and not to act purely on a VR call from the PNF. Because invariably a VR call coincides with the other pilot also reaching VR, there is an oft seen tendency to rely on the PNF call of "rotate" as the initiation action. If someone omits to call "Rotate" it should make no difference. But here it did and that is not the first time I have observed this blind reliance on a support call before a specific action is taken.
In both examples given, the captains had over 10,000 hours and both F/O's were new with barely 250 hours CPL. And that is only two of hundreds of similar style examples I have seen in many years of simulator instruction on the 737. I can quite see how the Turkish Airlines accident could evolve with a minor problem with an autothrottle, causing jaws to drop and stunned mullet disbelieving looks and finally lack of corrective action in time to stop a crash.
Two examples: Experienced captain fails to notice his ADI had jammed during a reversal turn in a holding pattern. This in a 737-200 sim IMC. He continues to apply wheel pressure in an attempt to "force" the ADI to come good, meanwhile ignoring or not noticing comparitor lights. The aircrft is rolled beyond the vertical and the nose drops until with a startled Asian oath he looks at the correctly functioning standby ADI and calls "Standby ADI failure". He then proceeds to pull the fast erection button to level flight. Needless to say we crashed. All this time the F/O with his 250 hours said exactly nothing while watching open mouthed at his own perfectly functional ADI.
Second. On take off in low vis, the captain failed to rotate at VR and eventually went off the end of the runway at around 190 knots still on the ground. Why? The F/O had been quietly instructed to call 80 knots as per SOP but to "forget" to call V1 and VR.
The object of the exercise was to ensure the captain rotated on his own ASI readings and not to act purely on a VR call from the PNF. Because invariably a VR call coincides with the other pilot also reaching VR, there is an oft seen tendency to rely on the PNF call of "rotate" as the initiation action. If someone omits to call "Rotate" it should make no difference. But here it did and that is not the first time I have observed this blind reliance on a support call before a specific action is taken.
In both examples given, the captains had over 10,000 hours and both F/O's were new with barely 250 hours CPL. And that is only two of hundreds of similar style examples I have seen in many years of simulator instruction on the 737. I can quite see how the Turkish Airlines accident could evolve with a minor problem with an autothrottle, causing jaws to drop and stunned mullet disbelieving looks and finally lack of corrective action in time to stop a crash.
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One shows RA#2 having a direct(not via FCC b)input interface with AT CMPTR.
Effectivity is:
GEF 002, 003, 006, 007, 009, 011, 012, 028, 030, 301-305, 309-399, 713, 714, 717, 719, 721-726, 728, 729, 733, 735, 737, 805, 810, 811, 817, 821, 826-829, 833, 834, 837, 839, 840, 843,848, 859-861; GEF 812, 825 POST SB 737-34-1758; GEF 815 POST SB 737-34-1941
Effectivity is:
GEF 002, 003, 006, 007, 009, 011, 012, 028, 030, 301-305, 309-399, 713, 714, 717, 719, 721-726, 728, 729, 733, 735, 737, 805, 810, 811, 817, 821, 826-829, 833, 834, 837, 839, 840, 843,848, 859-861; GEF 812, 825 POST SB 737-34-1758; GEF 815 POST SB 737-34-1941
On the diagrams where you see with the #2 Rad Alt going to the right FCC, the next item to the right should not be the authrottle computer, it should say FCC-A underneath it as that's the Collins setup.
The SB's noted are for installation of the second FMC, so that's the change for GEF 812, 825 and 815.
What we've know is that the Smiths Autothrottle computer has both radio alitimeters wired to it. What we don't know is how the software inside uses the right radio altimeter input. I am still looking for absolute confirmation that my opinion is that the A/T computer looks at the left until it sends out NCD (Fail) and then switches to the right is correct.
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So what we could have is speed rolling back and AP trimming nose up until Stick shaker when AP disconnects and If no one has their hands on the controls the aircraft pitches up sharply.
The autopilot (A/P), flight director (F/D), and autothrottle (A/T) alpha floor limit is the minimum speed available for airspeed control that will override manual speed selection or FMC commands. The limit is approximately 1.3 times the stall speed.
It would be interesting to know that autothrottle alpha protection is only based on one radio altimeter. When stating A/P above, it almost leads you to believe that the aircraft would abandon the G/S and pitch down to gain speed.
But the speed trim is more interesting:
The speed trim system gives automatic stabilizer trim for positive speed stability during low-speed high-thrust conditions. The speed trim is only operational when the autopilot is not engaged.
The stall detection circuit monitors the flap position and the angle of airflow. Near stall, the speed trim function trims the stabilizer to a nose down condition to allow for trim above the stickshaker AOA and idle thrust. The trim continues until the stabilizer gets to its limits or the aft column cutout position is exceeded.
If the roll angle from the ADIRU is more than 40 degrees, it opens an electronic switch and stops the speed trim signals.
So if we didn't have alpha here on the FCC, i.e. it kept trimming nose up to maintain G/S, when the stick shaker activated, the A/P should have disconnected and based on the above, speed trim should have started pitching the nose down. Correct?
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Rainboe,
you didn't understand TM:s post did you?
The captain had 10000 hours so it's not a training issue, it's a complete lack of basic airmanship. No trainer can give him that during a conversion training.
Or where you just stirring the pot?
you didn't understand TM:s post did you?
The captain had 10000 hours so it's not a training issue, it's a complete lack of basic airmanship. No trainer can give him that during a conversion training.
Or where you just stirring the pot?
Tee Emm
Great stories and lessons. Please send me notice when your book comes out. 
maybe I can add a couple or two.
The stuff that can be blamed on the PNF is unending
I have seen things in the simulator that in real life you would not believe it could happen - especially with experienced pilots. In fact if someone wrote a book about the quite frightening lapses of flying "skill" seen in the simulator it would probably plunge the airline industry into despair as passengers head for other means of transport after reading the book. "Thinks - not a bad idea - might make a buck or two with the book!"
maybe I can add a couple or two.
The stuff that can be blamed on the PNF is unending
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Hello "737AvEng . . .
Question for 737AvEng: In case you didn't have the time to read the entire thread, one of the questions hotly debated earlier was: Why would RA1 logic be programmed to send a Retard signal (flare mode?) to the A/T upon indicating -8 feet when auto land was not selected and the approach was flown only on one coupled A/P in GS capture mode? I'm not a 737 jock, but several contributors had mentioned, just for the record, that 1 A/P can in fact do a full coupled CAT-III landing. OK, but in this case, the engaged A/P was not in A/L auto land mode.
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Sorry if I seem a bit behind things, but reading 100 pages of technical bable is a bit too much.
I understand the throttle retarded ? How about disconnecting it and pushing it foward ?
A lot has been said about Airbus throttle not moving and how dangerous it is. Well, it happened to a Boeing.
This is just basic airmanship, period.
The fact that no basic action was taken is in my view both cultural and compagny ( training ) culture related.
Maybe it's not all that easy to scream " speed " when a turkish captain is screwing the pooch.
And no, you are not only the product of your compagny culture but also the product of your culture of origin.
Korean airlines has been extensively discussed on this site and in terms far less PC that didn't lead to the termination of the thread.
Cultural factor IS a factor. If I recall correctly, some Newcastle ( Australia ) university professor wrote a paper on the subject some years ago.
Pulling a C/B ??? .............no comment !
I understand the throttle retarded ? How about disconnecting it and pushing it foward ?
A lot has been said about Airbus throttle not moving and how dangerous it is. Well, it happened to a Boeing.
This is just basic airmanship, period.
The fact that no basic action was taken is in my view both cultural and compagny ( training ) culture related.
Maybe it's not all that easy to scream " speed " when a turkish captain is screwing the pooch.
And no, you are not only the product of your compagny culture but also the product of your culture of origin.
Korean airlines has been extensively discussed on this site and in terms far less PC that didn't lead to the termination of the thread.
Cultural factor IS a factor. If I recall correctly, some Newcastle ( Australia ) university professor wrote a paper on the subject some years ago.
Pulling a C/B ??? .............no comment !
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100 pages, nearly 2000 posts - and you are no further on than saying that on the balance of probability -
1) no.1 LRRA failed, and ...
2) no-one was properly flying the aircraft, and therefore ...
3) tragically, the incident was almost certainly avoidable ...
JD
This thread is boring ... very boring ...
1) no.1 LRRA failed, and ...
2) no-one was properly flying the aircraft, and therefore ...
3) tragically, the incident was almost certainly avoidable ...
JD
This thread is boring ... very boring ...
Last edited by Jumbo Driver; 9th Mar 2009 at 09:56. Reason: ... because its boring ...
I understand the throttle retarded ? How about disconnecting it and pushing it forward ?
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Late logging parttly responsible?
An article in the Danish Magazine "Ingeniøren" (The Engineer) claims that the Dutch secretary general of the AEI (Aircraft Engineers International) Fred Bruggemann has said that the Investigation Board has spoken to several Turkish pilots who have flown the crashed plane in the days before the accident. They admitted that they had not reported the defect altimeter as they should have. He added that the AEI has contacted the plane mechanics in Turkey who confirmed that the log book did not contain anything about a defective altimeter.
The article describes the course of the accident as it is already mentioned here in several posts.
It says also that the plane crashed while the pilots were having a conversation. They noticed the critical situation and gave full power but it was too late.
It further says that the black boxes contained data and audio from the last 25 hours. That is several flights over several days. During the last 8 flights, the altimeter was defect a total of three times in the same way and in the same situation, including the last time, where the plane crashed. The pilots in those cases also noticed the defect altimeter but did not do anything about it.
Fred Bruggemann said that AEI has warned often about late logging.
(link to article in Danish only)
Groft sjusk med fly-logbøger var årsag til flystyrt i Amsterdam*| Ingeniøren
The article describes the course of the accident as it is already mentioned here in several posts.
It says also that the plane crashed while the pilots were having a conversation. They noticed the critical situation and gave full power but it was too late.
It further says that the black boxes contained data and audio from the last 25 hours. That is several flights over several days. During the last 8 flights, the altimeter was defect a total of three times in the same way and in the same situation, including the last time, where the plane crashed. The pilots in those cases also noticed the defect altimeter but did not do anything about it.
Fred Bruggemann said that AEI has warned often about late logging.
(link to article in Danish only)
Groft sjusk med fly-logbøger var årsag til flystyrt i Amsterdam*| Ingeniøren
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Could the plane have crashed because the captain just needed three arms?
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hands on TL
boeing drivers (a.o.) often have complained the airbus TL's are not moving but if your hands are not on them or you are not responding to their abnormal movement then what's the use?
RA's fail all the time, equipment is prone to faillure, that's why we are on board and will be for the foreseeable future. but if we don't respond to faillures or simply take too much time because we were not prepaired ... the GA switches are on the TL ... there is a reason for that.
RA's fail all the time, equipment is prone to faillure, that's why we are on board and will be for the foreseeable future. but if we don't respond to faillures or simply take too much time because we were not prepaired ... the GA switches are on the TL ... there is a reason for that.