Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo
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PJ2
my company has more than 5000 pilots. Saying: no more cowboy flying and you would still have a few cowboys out there.
Saying: we fired a guy for flying cowboy like without a good reason...is it worth it? Now that gets someone's attention.
All the research in the world only looks good in books. Dealing with real people with real emotions, problems and pride...that is what flying is all about.
my company has more than 5000 pilots. Saying: no more cowboy flying and you would still have a few cowboys out there.
Saying: we fired a guy for flying cowboy like without a good reason...is it worth it? Now that gets someone's attention.
All the research in the world only looks good in books. Dealing with real people with real emotions, problems and pride...that is what flying is all about.
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PJ2 – I agree with your statement here as far as it goes. But I wouldn't be prepared to give any standards and training department "a reprieve" based solely upon presumptions of compliance or non-compliance.
Well, I’m not giving them a “reprieve,” as such, I’m just not ready to jump off the bridge screaming that they were at fault – at least until I know a few more facts.
PJ2 – Check rides and sim sessions were intended to provide that feedback but the data from such is highly granular. Also, simulator sessions especially, are largely driven by legal, (licensing and minimum regulatory competency standards), not larger safety concerns. With today's data capabilities and much lower costs to do FOQA, standards and training now have very fine-grained information from which to trend their operation and know about and respond to individual events which may have a "precursor" element to them.
Again, I don’t disagree … but the “mindset” behind check rides and simulator training sessions are driven by the regulatory standards (i.e., teach the test and the student should be able to pass the test) and are not driven by the way the airplane should be flown. I keep asking “What’s wrong with teaching the pilot to fly the airplane the way we want it flown” and then testing that pilot on his/her ability to do what we’ve asked them to do?
PJ2 -- That some managements may prefer not to know thus apparently granting themselves plausible deniability (although not knowing in the face of inexpensive capability is becoming a legal issue itself), is an ongoing issue.
Unfortunately, it not merely “plausible deniability” that is used, it is up front, in your face “it ain’t my fault – because that is what the regulations require.” Unfortunately, that is mostly true – and, as such, isn’t it time we changed the regulatory requirements?
PJ2 -- If one sat down with someone who knew FOQA well and seen just about all there is to see in the data except an accident, one would discover that one's attitudes and understandings of a daily operation and a pilot culture might be quite different after the discussion. The program, when engaged robustly and used as intended, jointly by an airline's management and pilots' representatives, is a remarkable tool for daily as well as historical examination of trends. The other undeniable element of an active data program is indeed cultural. It is so because it extends the expectation of professionalism to every flight, such that where something doesn't go as the crew or the airline expected, it can be examined and incorporated into training if a trend, or discussed with the crew using pilot, not management, representatives using the data rather than relying upon mere opinion.
Without dislocating my arm, I believe I’m reasonably familiar with the FOQA program and its results – and, again, I don’t disagree with your comments. But, it is also true that some, probably mostly in the government, but not all of them are, but some recognize the rare, but existing events that were deliberately undertaken, didn’t turn out too well, and then use the FOQA program (and other, similar programs) as a pre-punched “get out of jail free” card. Admittedly, in the extreme minority … but you know what they say about a small amount of “leven”…
Well, I’m not giving them a “reprieve,” as such, I’m just not ready to jump off the bridge screaming that they were at fault – at least until I know a few more facts.
PJ2 – Check rides and sim sessions were intended to provide that feedback but the data from such is highly granular. Also, simulator sessions especially, are largely driven by legal, (licensing and minimum regulatory competency standards), not larger safety concerns. With today's data capabilities and much lower costs to do FOQA, standards and training now have very fine-grained information from which to trend their operation and know about and respond to individual events which may have a "precursor" element to them.
Again, I don’t disagree … but the “mindset” behind check rides and simulator training sessions are driven by the regulatory standards (i.e., teach the test and the student should be able to pass the test) and are not driven by the way the airplane should be flown. I keep asking “What’s wrong with teaching the pilot to fly the airplane the way we want it flown” and then testing that pilot on his/her ability to do what we’ve asked them to do?
PJ2 -- That some managements may prefer not to know thus apparently granting themselves plausible deniability (although not knowing in the face of inexpensive capability is becoming a legal issue itself), is an ongoing issue.
Unfortunately, it not merely “plausible deniability” that is used, it is up front, in your face “it ain’t my fault – because that is what the regulations require.” Unfortunately, that is mostly true – and, as such, isn’t it time we changed the regulatory requirements?
PJ2 -- If one sat down with someone who knew FOQA well and seen just about all there is to see in the data except an accident, one would discover that one's attitudes and understandings of a daily operation and a pilot culture might be quite different after the discussion. The program, when engaged robustly and used as intended, jointly by an airline's management and pilots' representatives, is a remarkable tool for daily as well as historical examination of trends. The other undeniable element of an active data program is indeed cultural. It is so because it extends the expectation of professionalism to every flight, such that where something doesn't go as the crew or the airline expected, it can be examined and incorporated into training if a trend, or discussed with the crew using pilot, not management, representatives using the data rather than relying upon mere opinion.
Without dislocating my arm, I believe I’m reasonably familiar with the FOQA program and its results – and, again, I don’t disagree with your comments. But, it is also true that some, probably mostly in the government, but not all of them are, but some recognize the rare, but existing events that were deliberately undertaken, didn’t turn out too well, and then use the FOQA program (and other, similar programs) as a pre-punched “get out of jail free” card. Admittedly, in the extreme minority … but you know what they say about a small amount of “leven”…
PTH:
So, if I understand your post correctly then, you set aside flight safety work such as FOQA, ASRs etc as "academic research" to be placed in opposition to "dealing with real people with real emotions, problems and pride" with the latter favoured over the former, and that is what flying is all about?
What part of FOQA does not deal with these very elements and facts? Are you suggesting that "research" does not accomodate or acknowledge these factors?
The approach I discuss is part of the very processes you describe. I fully concur with acknowledging the very real human factors issues and operational problems of running an airiine at a profit. None of this precludes the factors which you highlight but the obvious problem, as we see here, is there remain many who don't understand this important aspect of airline work yet.
Interesting solution for, "Dealing with real people with real emotions, problems and pride..."
Thanks for the discussion.
Air Rabbit;
Yes, and not as a result of kicking tin as the recent FAA changes are responding to. Changing legislation is very difficult, demanding and time-consuming given special interests focussed solely on short-term cost-savings and quartery profit statements.
Yep. Wise statement. Re familiarity with FOQA, sorry, don't mean to ever "preach" - just unfamiliar with others' familiarity with the program.
Re the outliers and the "possibly-intentionals" - there are a number of solutions which address the issues which arise and I'm sure you're familiar with them. One is, the pilot safety representatives deal with such matters and have the power to intervene with training, displacement or whatever is required to address the event(s) in question. The ASR program is not seen as a get-out-of-jail card and even if there is an element of such, that is the price paid for greater knowledge and awareness. At some point the buck stops with the pilot however and if an event is serious enough to warrant a safety investigation, these kinds of questions enter the arena.
If actions are truly errant and well outside SOPs, then truly we are dealing with other human issues than just straight competency or operational flight safety issues and that requires a different approach. In an enlightened program, that requires processes employed with employee/pilot health programs which deal with broader issues. Again, extremely rare but not non-existent.
Again, the FAA document regarding ferry flights is instructive: If the data reveals that a pilot (rather, a crew) were "fooling around with the airplane", what then? Is straight firing the solution? I would submit to those who think so that 1) they haven't been involved in such cases on a first-hand basis, and 2) they aren't aware of, or don't believe in, the success rate of any interventionary processes designed to handle such matters. If we wish to be specific, dealing with alcohol abuse or serious but undetected illnesses are two clear examples where abberant behaviours have occurred but firing isn't the answer.
As we know, it's not black and white.
Dealing with real people with real emotions, problems and pride...that is what flying is all about.
What part of FOQA does not deal with these very elements and facts? Are you suggesting that "research" does not accomodate or acknowledge these factors?
The approach I discuss is part of the very processes you describe. I fully concur with acknowledging the very real human factors issues and operational problems of running an airiine at a profit. None of this precludes the factors which you highlight but the obvious problem, as we see here, is there remain many who don't understand this important aspect of airline work yet.
Saying: we fired a guy for flying cowboy like without a good reason...is it worth it? Now that gets someone's attention.
Thanks for the discussion.
Air Rabbit;
as such, isn’t it time we changed the regulatory requirements?
but you know what they say about a small amount of “leven”…
Re the outliers and the "possibly-intentionals" - there are a number of solutions which address the issues which arise and I'm sure you're familiar with them. One is, the pilot safety representatives deal with such matters and have the power to intervene with training, displacement or whatever is required to address the event(s) in question. The ASR program is not seen as a get-out-of-jail card and even if there is an element of such, that is the price paid for greater knowledge and awareness. At some point the buck stops with the pilot however and if an event is serious enough to warrant a safety investigation, these kinds of questions enter the arena.
If actions are truly errant and well outside SOPs, then truly we are dealing with other human issues than just straight competency or operational flight safety issues and that requires a different approach. In an enlightened program, that requires processes employed with employee/pilot health programs which deal with broader issues. Again, extremely rare but not non-existent.
Again, the FAA document regarding ferry flights is instructive: If the data reveals that a pilot (rather, a crew) were "fooling around with the airplane", what then? Is straight firing the solution? I would submit to those who think so that 1) they haven't been involved in such cases on a first-hand basis, and 2) they aren't aware of, or don't believe in, the success rate of any interventionary processes designed to handle such matters. If we wish to be specific, dealing with alcohol abuse or serious but undetected illnesses are two clear examples where abberant behaviours have occurred but firing isn't the answer.
As we know, it's not black and white.
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Gentlemen (and Ladies, if appropriate): This is why I like returning to this forum. Wide diversity of opinions in the details, but major agreements with the fundamental stuff. PJ2 and PTH, its a pleasure reading your posts, even in those rare times when we aren't 100% in agreement - we share enough that I'm convinced I'd share my cockpit with you guys any day! Thanks for the thoughtful discourse! Keep it up.
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air rabbit...what a kind thing to write...thank you. tell me why the name air rabbit?
PJ2 and others. Look, FOQA is great...but it is only one of many ways of dealing with flight safety.
I became a pilot to be good at something. The more I flew, the more I wanted to be better at being a pilot. I wanted to be so far ahead of the game that I was in the hotel two legs before the rest of the crew (joke).
There are pilots out there who wanted the lifestyle, who didn't want to be particularly good at something and learned methods, for lack of a better term I shall call CHEATING.
Think far ahead and plan that approach beautifully and you aren't cheating. Use flaps in the non perscribed way and what are you really doing? Cheating.
You might get away with it...you might not just that one time.
Catch a cheater...fix it. BUT when you have trusted someone to TEACH something and find that the teacher is a cheater, that person doesn't deserve to be a teacher and has slapped the whole industry in the face.
That person shouldn't be kept around.
and there you go.
PJ2 and others. Look, FOQA is great...but it is only one of many ways of dealing with flight safety.
I became a pilot to be good at something. The more I flew, the more I wanted to be better at being a pilot. I wanted to be so far ahead of the game that I was in the hotel two legs before the rest of the crew (joke).
There are pilots out there who wanted the lifestyle, who didn't want to be particularly good at something and learned methods, for lack of a better term I shall call CHEATING.
Think far ahead and plan that approach beautifully and you aren't cheating. Use flaps in the non perscribed way and what are you really doing? Cheating.
You might get away with it...you might not just that one time.
Catch a cheater...fix it. BUT when you have trusted someone to TEACH something and find that the teacher is a cheater, that person doesn't deserve to be a teacher and has slapped the whole industry in the face.
That person shouldn't be kept around.
and there you go.
Air Rabbit;
Yes indeed, a kind thing to offer, thank you. As PTH offered some time ago, its all about learning.
PTH;
Couldn't agree more, especially for reasons to join. I looked at people who for whatever reasons, suddenly decided "they want to be a pilot" at age 26 or something like that which wasn't in their heart but was just in their mind, or their dad was in the airlines and it was "expected", so they went out and spent tons of money on licenses. Some even wanted it all when they got hired but never really understood the smell of kerosene, (or castor oil, in some cases!) But you could tell flying wasn't in their blood but indeed "lifestyle" was.
It's a tough lesson when people find out they climbed the ladder of success up the wrong wall.
We're not far apart at all, but have found different ways to skin the same cat and say the same thing in other words.
Cheers,
PJ2
Yes indeed, a kind thing to offer, thank you. As PTH offered some time ago, its all about learning.
PTH;
Couldn't agree more, especially for reasons to join. I looked at people who for whatever reasons, suddenly decided "they want to be a pilot" at age 26 or something like that which wasn't in their heart but was just in their mind, or their dad was in the airlines and it was "expected", so they went out and spent tons of money on licenses. Some even wanted it all when they got hired but never really understood the smell of kerosene, (or castor oil, in some cases!) But you could tell flying wasn't in their blood but indeed "lifestyle" was.
It's a tough lesson when people find out they climbed the ladder of success up the wrong wall.
We're not far apart at all, but have found different ways to skin the same cat and say the same thing in other words.
Cheers,
PJ2
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I looked at people who for whatever reasons, suddenly decided "they want to be a pilot" at age 26 or something like that which wasn't in their heart but was just in their mind, or their dad was in the airlines and it was "expected", so they went out and spent tons of money on licenses
Preparation is everything...
IF that is true, then it is the fault of the individuals who did not “fly like they were trained.” I say this because if my presumption is false, and the crew was “flying like they were trained,” then we have a completely ignorant training staff and, significantly, a regulatory body whose local office is just as ignorant, or, at best, non-caring – which may be worse!
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By the time an outfit such as Colgan hires you, you're far past learning how to fly. An operator will give you the legally required training for their operation but you are expected to be fully-formed, for better or worse. There's no basic training expected to be given in such basics as how to react to a stall; that came way back in Hour 3 or so of your primary training. If it isn't embedded in your way of flying past that point then there is something deeply wrong there. You can see how the panel were a bit lost to explain what both accident crew did there, as if to say, "How does someone get to this point in their career and react in such a basically wrong way to a stall?" That is inexplicable.
Another point is that the training you will get will probably be the legal minimum. If you have a healthy respect for the profession then you really should enhance that with self-study. When you have people saying, "Well, no one ever told Captain Renslow what that little switch was for," I find that a bit lame. Captain Renslow was expected to find that out for himself if no one told him! These modern aircraft can be highly complex with lots of little surprises in their systems and in the way these systems interact so that to jump into one after only having been taught the legally required minimum, not having bothered to enhance and reinforce that by teaching yourself... that comes across to me as being a bit too optimistic, primarily on the part of the pilots but also on the part of the operators.
We are far past the days of Lindbergh and Saint-Exupery so don't expect to be mobbed by jubilant crowds at Le Bourget or to sit out there experiencing "Wind, Sand and Stars." A lot of the job nowadays is simply a grind, as for this unfortunate crew, working for low wages for an uncaring employer, when if you don't like it, there is the door and, "Next!"
To say that flying is in your blood, well... I think you might have a very different sort of flying in mind there! Try gliders for that; this is work. Okay, the view from the office can be wonderful but just look at the life these two had and tell me any sane person gets into aviation for such as that. No, I don't think so!
You can get into situations where you are working for the uncaring, led by the semi-competent, using equipment that is just barely legal to fly a load of airsick whiners through vile weather over unfriendly terrain. Well, boo-hoo! Before Lindbergh go to be the Lone Eagle he had to do just that, I fear. Or was flying air mail and such in the early days all fun and adventure, as presented in those boys' adventure books?
If you end up in such a fix, you still should have enough in you to figure out what you need to know, get out the books and learn that. Initial approach on a dark and stormy night is no time to be caught by surprise by some stupid little switch you never bothered to figure out the exact function of.
I am with PJ2 in the approach taken to enforcing proper flying discipline. I have seen more of the primitive style, "One screw-up and you are out!" with the hope that this will result in zero screw-ups. As if! Everyone makes honest mistakes and a good safety culture brings these out so that they can be analysed and avoided in future by attacking their causes rather than just sacking whoever made one. When you institute a regime of fear then you just invoke that basic human response to hide whatever went wrong even though this is obviously anti-safety.
I am sure most of you have heard of the "Peter Principle," that people in a organisation rise to the level of their incompetence. That holds true for aviation as for anything else, I think, so that you will see people in management positions who have zero interest in learning and applying "best practice." No, they want to do it their way and they are The Boss, so that it can be "My way or the highway!"
I remember one dinosaur who refused to believe that it was correct to fly one wing low on one engine and never mind sketching out the vectors to show why we now were doing this instead of the old-fashioned "wings level, ball in the middle" technique. To use a headset in a DC-3, what sort of a wimp are you anyway? Nah, shouting was the way to go there, of course...
All of this stuff was reinforced by the blunt fact that he was the owner of the operation, when the Golden Rule (He who has the Gold makes the Rules.) applied. That sort of works, oddly enough, for a tiny operation, when my dinosaur there had a floating population of about six pilots, depending on who had burnt out and quit this month or got sacked but for anything larger it can be deadly. Then you need the systematic approach to safety sketched out by PJ2 there.
Just think of me out in my shed repairing motorcycles, say. Doing them one by one I don't really need much of system because I have total control of the end product. How about if I want to repair a hundred motorcycles, though? No more hands-on for me; I need to hire some people I have never met before so that I have to figure out a way to systematically do quality-control. Too, I am not looking for someone with stars in his eyes who tells me that repairing motorcycles in in his blood. That will go after a week of starting work at 0730 in a drafty shed, when it begins to seem very like work. No, I need people who take a professional, workmanlike approach to the job. Go hooning about on your lunchbreak to get your biker's blood boiling but inside my shed it is all about systematic work. Same with flying, I think.
Another point is that the training you will get will probably be the legal minimum. If you have a healthy respect for the profession then you really should enhance that with self-study. When you have people saying, "Well, no one ever told Captain Renslow what that little switch was for," I find that a bit lame. Captain Renslow was expected to find that out for himself if no one told him! These modern aircraft can be highly complex with lots of little surprises in their systems and in the way these systems interact so that to jump into one after only having been taught the legally required minimum, not having bothered to enhance and reinforce that by teaching yourself... that comes across to me as being a bit too optimistic, primarily on the part of the pilots but also on the part of the operators.
We are far past the days of Lindbergh and Saint-Exupery so don't expect to be mobbed by jubilant crowds at Le Bourget or to sit out there experiencing "Wind, Sand and Stars." A lot of the job nowadays is simply a grind, as for this unfortunate crew, working for low wages for an uncaring employer, when if you don't like it, there is the door and, "Next!"
To say that flying is in your blood, well... I think you might have a very different sort of flying in mind there! Try gliders for that; this is work. Okay, the view from the office can be wonderful but just look at the life these two had and tell me any sane person gets into aviation for such as that. No, I don't think so!
You can get into situations where you are working for the uncaring, led by the semi-competent, using equipment that is just barely legal to fly a load of airsick whiners through vile weather over unfriendly terrain. Well, boo-hoo! Before Lindbergh go to be the Lone Eagle he had to do just that, I fear. Or was flying air mail and such in the early days all fun and adventure, as presented in those boys' adventure books?
If you end up in such a fix, you still should have enough in you to figure out what you need to know, get out the books and learn that. Initial approach on a dark and stormy night is no time to be caught by surprise by some stupid little switch you never bothered to figure out the exact function of.
I am with PJ2 in the approach taken to enforcing proper flying discipline. I have seen more of the primitive style, "One screw-up and you are out!" with the hope that this will result in zero screw-ups. As if! Everyone makes honest mistakes and a good safety culture brings these out so that they can be analysed and avoided in future by attacking their causes rather than just sacking whoever made one. When you institute a regime of fear then you just invoke that basic human response to hide whatever went wrong even though this is obviously anti-safety.
I am sure most of you have heard of the "Peter Principle," that people in a organisation rise to the level of their incompetence. That holds true for aviation as for anything else, I think, so that you will see people in management positions who have zero interest in learning and applying "best practice." No, they want to do it their way and they are The Boss, so that it can be "My way or the highway!"
I remember one dinosaur who refused to believe that it was correct to fly one wing low on one engine and never mind sketching out the vectors to show why we now were doing this instead of the old-fashioned "wings level, ball in the middle" technique. To use a headset in a DC-3, what sort of a wimp are you anyway? Nah, shouting was the way to go there, of course...
All of this stuff was reinforced by the blunt fact that he was the owner of the operation, when the Golden Rule (He who has the Gold makes the Rules.) applied. That sort of works, oddly enough, for a tiny operation, when my dinosaur there had a floating population of about six pilots, depending on who had burnt out and quit this month or got sacked but for anything larger it can be deadly. Then you need the systematic approach to safety sketched out by PJ2 there.
Just think of me out in my shed repairing motorcycles, say. Doing them one by one I don't really need much of system because I have total control of the end product. How about if I want to repair a hundred motorcycles, though? No more hands-on for me; I need to hire some people I have never met before so that I have to figure out a way to systematically do quality-control. Too, I am not looking for someone with stars in his eyes who tells me that repairing motorcycles in in his blood. That will go after a week of starting work at 0730 in a drafty shed, when it begins to seem very like work. No, I need people who take a professional, workmanlike approach to the job. Go hooning about on your lunchbreak to get your biker's blood boiling but inside my shed it is all about systematic work. Same with flying, I think.
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22:11:31.5 HOT-1
but uh as a matter of fact I got hired with about six hundred and twenty five hours here.
22:11:37.6 HOT-2
oh wow.
22:11:39.4 HOT-1
uh.
22:11:39.9 HOT-2
that's not much for uh back when you got hired.
22:11:42.5 HOT-1
no but uh out of that six and a quarter two hundred fifty hours was uh part one twenty one turbine. multi engine turbine.
22:11:50.0 HOT-2
oh that's right yeah.
Oh well, thats allright then.
One thing that sticks in my mind about this guy and his monumental stuff-up is his low time on type at the time of the accident. With a Command on Q400s of less than 200 hours was it?
I don't know about you guys but I scared myself silly a few times - but with half a ton of newspapers or freight in the back of a piston twin. Not with 72 pax in a Q400. 4 minutes after this last bit of wisdom from el capitan, the tape ended.
but uh as a matter of fact I got hired with about six hundred and twenty five hours here.
22:11:37.6 HOT-2
oh wow.
22:11:39.4 HOT-1
uh.
22:11:39.9 HOT-2
that's not much for uh back when you got hired.
22:11:42.5 HOT-1
no but uh out of that six and a quarter two hundred fifty hours was uh part one twenty one turbine. multi engine turbine.
22:11:50.0 HOT-2
oh that's right yeah.
Oh well, thats allright then.
One thing that sticks in my mind about this guy and his monumental stuff-up is his low time on type at the time of the accident. With a Command on Q400s of less than 200 hours was it?
I don't know about you guys but I scared myself silly a few times - but with half a ton of newspapers or freight in the back of a piston twin. Not with 72 pax in a Q400. 4 minutes after this last bit of wisdom from el capitan, the tape ended.
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Most airlines give pilot applicants a sim check to verify their flying ability before they hire them. All fundamentals should be already learned and the training will be primarily SOP's and equipment specific to what they will be flying. My sim check was in a Lockheed Electra which I had never flown or been in. Got to do engine out ILS's and other fun stuff. Of course I didn't know configuration and airspeed data so they gave me that info.
Colgan's standards had to be set very low for the experience new hires had because of the low pay and working conditions.
Colgan's standards had to be set very low for the experience new hires had because of the low pay and working conditions.
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Originally Posted by Razoray
I do not think Colgan trained there pilots to pull up out of a stall, and crash, but I do think they did not hammer home what to do in that situation with that particular aircraft. Good training takes away the guessing game. It prevents individuals from reverting to their initial reactions (good or bad?). The fact that two Colgan pilots failed to understand the situation to me points to poor training.....
My point is that there are two perspectives on training – one is that the pilot is trained on the things that the pilot is going to see on the test – and once trained properly, that pilot should be able to pass the test. And, they usually do.
The other perspective is that the pilot is trained on how to fly the airplane – given instructions on what to do, when to do it, how to do it, and why to do it the way the training has them do it. This is then “hammered home.” If I had my way, there would be a big red stamp on the windscreen of every airplane – “fly the way you were trained!” That should not be “some of the time,” or “when it’s convenient to do so,” or “when there is no other pressing reason to do something different.” It should be ALL THE TIME. Every pilot should fly just exactly the way they were trained. If a pilot desires to do something different for what they believe will save fuel, save time, because it’s just “neat to do,” or any other deviation from what was trained, that pilot should first, discuss it with the chief pilot/training director, and then if they persist in doing whatever it is without some additional training on that particular issue, that pilot should be invited to find a job elsewhere. Note that I’m not advocating dismissing someone for making an error. I'm suggesting that when a pilot knows that what he/she wants to do is contrary to the way the company wants him/her to operate, it may be time for him/her to find an airline that wants to have their airplanes operated the way that pilot wants to operate them. In the mean time, pilots should "fly the way they were trained." We all make errors. Hopefully we all learn from those errors. But it’s hard to know when you’ve made an error when you don’t really know what you are supposed to do or why you’re supposed to do it; and it becomes confusing if you try to find out what is wanted or why it is wanted a particular way and are unsuccessful in getting an answer. As some have said here, it’s important to get the attention of those who are flying for the airline. Just how their attention is gained and retained is a topic for another discussion perhaps, but, gaining that attention is paramount for safe operations. Of course, this PRESUMES that the way the airline wants you to fly the airplane is safe, efficient, within the parameters of the way the airplane was constructed and, dare I say, is a conservative approach to flying.
I’m sure you have probably figured out which of the two perspectives I advocate – and in case you were wondering – it ain’t the first way – at least generally. I will say, however, IF the individual pilot is a self-starter … checks the books on his/her own time … examines the limitations of the airplane … knows and heeds his/her own limitations … takes to heart the training that is received and makes an effort to mentally (at least) apply that training to the tasks he/she is expected to perform in day-to-day operation on the line … then operates the airplane in accordance with that/those application(s) … and does this faithfully … all the time … IF all of that is done … THEN, and ONLY then, would the first perspective be an acceptable way to conduct training. But doing so is awfully risky – because it leaves all the “work” up to the individual.
The second perspective takes all that responsibility and places it on the back of the company … specifically on the back of the instructor staff at the airline. It is the responsibility (in my not-so-humble opinion) of each instructor to “hammer home” each of these issues. In other words, the instructors MUST instruct what to do, when to do it, how to do it, and why to do it the way the training has them do it. And then, they have the responsibility to see that each task the pilots perform during the balance of their training is done exactly the way they were trained to do it. This should be followed up during the Initial Operating Experience every airline pilot has to get. The person conducting the IOE should be acutely aware of what the requirements are and know how the pilot was trained. He/she should expect the "new pilot" to demonstrate exactly what is expected - all the time, every time - and should make note when there is some concern about the "new pilot" understanding his/her role in how to fly the airplane. The entire pilot group should clearly understand what the procedures are and what the intent is for any particular circumstance.
OF course, in those instances where there is an abnormal or emergency condition – the pilot must use his/her own initiative to deal with that particular circumstance. However, if the training was thoughtfully constructed and diligently applied, the pilots should have been exposed to and practiced the performance and handling characteristics of the airplane they are flying to the extent that they would have the best possible opportunity to correctly address ANY unusual, abnormal, or emergency situation – and have the best chance to end the flight successfully – just like they did with the “miracle on the Hudson,” last year.
Additionally, and finally, the instructors must be diligent enough to determine that the pilots really do understand “why” they are expected to do it the way they were trained to do it. If truth be known, I’m not terribly concerned about the “check ride.” I recognize that a “check ride” is a requirement (and I can certainly make the argument for having one), but any check ride should be a “no brainer – no strainer” for any pilot – and it will be if they have been trained, and have practiced, correctly.
I wish I could say that in doing all the above we would never have airplane accidents. Rubbish. As long as we do something that involves human involvement, there is going to be the chance of errors cropping up – in the design, the construction, the application, the interpretation, the training, and/or the skills. Humans are not perfect … but that should not prevent us from attempting to get completely and correctly trained and then standardized in the application of that training. It may be that Mom was right after all ... do what you're told to do and you'll stay out of trouble.
Originally Posted by PTH
tell me why the name air rabbit?
Last edited by AirRabbit; 19th Feb 2010 at 19:45.
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Yet there is another goal of training, other than competence and training to the checkride. It has more to do with the line than the pilot. Inherent in the commonly accepted regime of training is the authority to bust out one who is not getting the picture. The Captain here (and his F/O) have at the very least created a mystery. All the signs leading up to this crash and its aftermath, to include the investigation, were present for all to see. A spotty training and performance record, conditions that prevented rest and sharpness of mind, training that at the very least permitted low performance, if not actually encouraging it, etc. Pilot error is just the tip of a very large iceberg.
Air Rabbit;
Superb post, well worth reading and absorbing.
bearfoil;
Yes, it is.
One aspect of this iceberg is, oddly enough, record-keeping and legal mandate of of unions to protect members against untoward events and legal actions in the conduct of their work.
I am a long-time supporter of pilot unions and strong representation because in this business especially, it is absolutely, demonstrably needed.
However there are exceedingly difficult and often very delicate circumstances when competency versus mere "helmet fire" issues arise and the union or pilot representative group in the case of a non-union airline, must act.
As with the legal and medical professions, competency levels, with extremely rare exceptions, are very high and fall within a tight band. But those exceptions must be acknowledged and procedures/processes must be in place to deal with such cases. Because such difficult-to-replace personnel, which are highly-trained resources with great time investments, come at a very high cost, simply "getting rid" of a pilot is not the first option and in practise it rarely is even the right response. I have discussed one such response with regard to flight data analysis results, in this thread. There are others as the issue is triaged.
In aviation as with no other profession, the truly incompetent who choose to carry on are sadly dealt with by aviation's own harsh lessons.
Failure
As liability issues grew, the issue of checkride failure, seen as a black-mark on a pilot's record, gradually became softened such that "pass or incomplete" was the outcome and then it was "pass with repeat". Comments regarding quality of the ride such as 'excellent', 'good standard', 'acceptable performance' and 'needs work' were substituted with box-ticks that the exercise was completed but with little other comment. Failure wasn't hidden and was still a matter of record as we know from the Colgan accident. But detailed remarks were reduced as to reasons and quality.
In terms of ride failures, pilot associations would be required to defend the candidate because a few failures meant the loss of one's job. We may argue the merits and problems of such outcomes but the fact remains that that is how it was done. Many here may have been involved in such cases where "retirement" was the best option; I have seen companies spent large amounts of money doing this very thing.
That said, it is rarely simple, involving as it does, human emotions, senses of worth, a family's future, a temporary period in one's life in which things are coming apart and so on, as PTH has alluded to. The legal and industrial issues can be substantial for all concerned if it gets to that stage.
Airlines have a probationary period but that usually doesn't last longer than six months. The other probationary period is during an upgrade to captain wherein if a candidate doesn't make the grade he/she is usually placed as a permanent First Officer.
Record-keeping
The other issue is legal and is complex because it involves the regulator, training standards and record-keeping.
When I (and many here) joined an airline (nearly fourty years ago now), checkride comments were blunt, clear and business-like which left no doubt in the candidate's mind as to what went wrong and what was done correctly. It was a pretty honest assessment of how one was doing; check pilots "knew" and weren't shy about letting the candidate know.
Today, that is quite different. Eventually such records became evidence in prosecutions after investigations were complete. Airlines naturally began requiring "less detail" of such ride reports. That left less information and fewer meaningful comments for future check pilots on how a pilot was actually doing. Such information was sometimes verbally communicated but in a large organization that process is not assured.
In other words, as described above, liability issues would slowly begin to drive meaningful comments either off the record entirely, or underground. That is the reason why sometimes we will see very strong reactions from pilots on using information which rightly belongs to safety processes, for prosecutions or enforcement of discipline against pilots and why safety reporting policies are so important in maintaining open, honest communications. Unfortunately, our society is not built upon these principles and a legal blame-culture is preferenced over "finding out" what really occured in order to prevent another occurrence.
Yes, there may be an extremely rare case where true, wilful negligence occurs but 99.9% of flight crews are capable, skilled, fly with integrity and do not set out to have an accident, nor does the organization they work for.
So discovering what happened and why so prevention is possible, is preferred over prosecution but again, that is not how our society works.
"Pilot Error" is indeed the tiniest tip of a very large iceberg, (Frank Bird triangle model, revisited). The issues are substantive just as they are in the legal and medical professions with the very important distinction that aviation is much, much further down the road of honest discovery and dealing with these problems than either of the other two but there is much to share while still maintaining a viable industry. Medicine is learning from aviation but very slowly.
Just some thoughts.
PJ2
Superb post, well worth reading and absorbing.
bearfoil;
Pilot error is just the tip of a very large iceberg.
One aspect of this iceberg is, oddly enough, record-keeping and legal mandate of of unions to protect members against untoward events and legal actions in the conduct of their work.
I am a long-time supporter of pilot unions and strong representation because in this business especially, it is absolutely, demonstrably needed.
However there are exceedingly difficult and often very delicate circumstances when competency versus mere "helmet fire" issues arise and the union or pilot representative group in the case of a non-union airline, must act.
As with the legal and medical professions, competency levels, with extremely rare exceptions, are very high and fall within a tight band. But those exceptions must be acknowledged and procedures/processes must be in place to deal with such cases. Because such difficult-to-replace personnel, which are highly-trained resources with great time investments, come at a very high cost, simply "getting rid" of a pilot is not the first option and in practise it rarely is even the right response. I have discussed one such response with regard to flight data analysis results, in this thread. There are others as the issue is triaged.
In aviation as with no other profession, the truly incompetent who choose to carry on are sadly dealt with by aviation's own harsh lessons.
Failure
As liability issues grew, the issue of checkride failure, seen as a black-mark on a pilot's record, gradually became softened such that "pass or incomplete" was the outcome and then it was "pass with repeat". Comments regarding quality of the ride such as 'excellent', 'good standard', 'acceptable performance' and 'needs work' were substituted with box-ticks that the exercise was completed but with little other comment. Failure wasn't hidden and was still a matter of record as we know from the Colgan accident. But detailed remarks were reduced as to reasons and quality.
In terms of ride failures, pilot associations would be required to defend the candidate because a few failures meant the loss of one's job. We may argue the merits and problems of such outcomes but the fact remains that that is how it was done. Many here may have been involved in such cases where "retirement" was the best option; I have seen companies spent large amounts of money doing this very thing.
That said, it is rarely simple, involving as it does, human emotions, senses of worth, a family's future, a temporary period in one's life in which things are coming apart and so on, as PTH has alluded to. The legal and industrial issues can be substantial for all concerned if it gets to that stage.
Airlines have a probationary period but that usually doesn't last longer than six months. The other probationary period is during an upgrade to captain wherein if a candidate doesn't make the grade he/she is usually placed as a permanent First Officer.
Record-keeping
The other issue is legal and is complex because it involves the regulator, training standards and record-keeping.
When I (and many here) joined an airline (nearly fourty years ago now), checkride comments were blunt, clear and business-like which left no doubt in the candidate's mind as to what went wrong and what was done correctly. It was a pretty honest assessment of how one was doing; check pilots "knew" and weren't shy about letting the candidate know.
Today, that is quite different. Eventually such records became evidence in prosecutions after investigations were complete. Airlines naturally began requiring "less detail" of such ride reports. That left less information and fewer meaningful comments for future check pilots on how a pilot was actually doing. Such information was sometimes verbally communicated but in a large organization that process is not assured.
In other words, as described above, liability issues would slowly begin to drive meaningful comments either off the record entirely, or underground. That is the reason why sometimes we will see very strong reactions from pilots on using information which rightly belongs to safety processes, for prosecutions or enforcement of discipline against pilots and why safety reporting policies are so important in maintaining open, honest communications. Unfortunately, our society is not built upon these principles and a legal blame-culture is preferenced over "finding out" what really occured in order to prevent another occurrence.
Yes, there may be an extremely rare case where true, wilful negligence occurs but 99.9% of flight crews are capable, skilled, fly with integrity and do not set out to have an accident, nor does the organization they work for.
So discovering what happened and why so prevention is possible, is preferred over prosecution but again, that is not how our society works.
"Pilot Error" is indeed the tiniest tip of a very large iceberg, (Frank Bird triangle model, revisited). The issues are substantive just as they are in the legal and medical professions with the very important distinction that aviation is much, much further down the road of honest discovery and dealing with these problems than either of the other two but there is much to share while still maintaining a viable industry. Medicine is learning from aviation but very slowly.
Just some thoughts.
PJ2
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PJ2 – thanks for the kind words – just the ramblings of a mature member of the industry.
Your comments on “failure” and the relationship you mentioned with pilot associations caught my interest. While my own personal feelings about labor organizations are probably not in alignment with yours, what I can say – with what may appear to be some inconsistency, is that the safety programs of the pilot associations with whom I am most familiar are probably THE most important reason that aviation safety is where it is today. That said – I am more than willing to “put up with” the labor aspects of some organizations (though that sounds highly prejudicial – I certainly don’t mean it that way) in order to reap the benefits to safety that those organizations provide. Would that I could magnify the positive results achieved by these organizations, with little, if any, assistance from outside their own organizations!
Along those lines, as anyone who’s been in this business for the length of time some of us here have been, it’s not unusual to have developed “eyes” and “ears” around the system, to the extent that not many things go unnoticed or unrecognized. Because of some things I have read over the past couple of years, I have developed an interest in some of the actions taken by our sometimes not-so-favorite participant in the aviation industry … that being the sometimes “nasty” regulator.
Living in the US, I’m naturally concerned with what our friendly FAA is up to … and recently (actually, it’s been infrequently over the past several years) I’ve been reading about some research that the FAA has undertaken with regards to the use of full flight simulators – namely that motion might just be an unnecessary expense for a large portion of what a pilot has to learn and then be checked on. Some of the publication references have enough data points that make it difficult to determine specifically what it is that should or should not be considered relevant to the point or points being made, but suffice it to say that some of the decisions that follow give rise to concerns that should be of interest to many, if not most, in the aviation business – particularly those in the training end of the business. Early last year the FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking – they call it an “NPRM” – in which they proposed a sweeping change to the training and qualification rules in the US. They also hosted a public meeting that I understand drew a sizeable audience of persons with various views on what it is the FAA had proposed. After reading through the rule changes and the comments submitted by the public – including those various pilot associations – I understand the FAA is going to publish a “revised” version of those proposals later this year.
Very recently, within the past several weeks actually, I have heard that some within the FAA are proposing that recurrent proficiency training sessions and proficiency checks (or at least a large portion of the tasks required during those recurrent activities) should be allowed to be accomplished in non-motion simulators – they call these devices Flight Training Devices as opposed to Flight Simulators. I also know that the pilot associations in the US have always advocated that recurrent training and checks be accomplished in the highest level of simulator available. I tend to agree with that position – and would only argue that when and where there are simulators, they should be used to their maximum extent … as long as they are not used beyond their capabilities … and that specific issue is cause for a whole other set of comments, which I’ll refrain from getting into at the moment. Because this is an issue that is near and dear to me, I’ve sought out additional information on this particular subject … and I’ve come to realize that the ‘reason’ this position is being adopted by the FAA is that non-motion devices are alleged to be less expensive, and therefore more affordable to airlines without the financial resources to purchase the bigger, more capable, more realistic, and more expensive simulation devices. This, according to some, would allow those airlines, who could not afford the more expensive simulation, the opportunity to have their crews become involved in simulation, even if it meant not having the motion cueing afforded by the more expensive devices.
To more fully understand this position and it’s counter position, I admit I had to spend what could be considered a LOT of time researching the issue. The bit of information that I’ve found is eye-opening to say the least. Apparently motion cueing systems – provided by a 6-degrees-of-freedom (6DOF) motion system accounts for somewhere between 5 and 12 percent of the total cost of a Level D full flight simulator – and full flight simulators are in the 8 to 10 million dollar range. This means the motion systems would cost between 400K and 1.4 million – depending on the “bells and whistles” and the company from whom it is purchased. I’ve also learned that the future of this business, motion systems for simulators, is rapidly going “electric” and the cost to maintain an electric system is a mere 20% of what hydraulic systems cost.
Given this information and knowing what pilots use to fly airplanes, I hope that the more sane among us will come to the rescue of pilots everywhere and put an end to this “safety is too expensive” mantra that the FAA seems to be preparing. Of course we won’t know for sure until the new rule proposals from the FAA hit the streets … but I’m told that there is an undercurrent of interest in slicing out a major portion of the realism that flight simulation can, and should provide … heck, has already provided. Are we really ready to take this kind of a step backwards for the as yet unproven cost savings of a motion system on full flight simulators? Who is trying to kid whom?
Stay tuned for the unveiling of what may be a significant turning point in the existence of pilot training activities – at least in the US … and if here, can the rest of the world be far behind???
Your comments on “failure” and the relationship you mentioned with pilot associations caught my interest. While my own personal feelings about labor organizations are probably not in alignment with yours, what I can say – with what may appear to be some inconsistency, is that the safety programs of the pilot associations with whom I am most familiar are probably THE most important reason that aviation safety is where it is today. That said – I am more than willing to “put up with” the labor aspects of some organizations (though that sounds highly prejudicial – I certainly don’t mean it that way) in order to reap the benefits to safety that those organizations provide. Would that I could magnify the positive results achieved by these organizations, with little, if any, assistance from outside their own organizations!
Along those lines, as anyone who’s been in this business for the length of time some of us here have been, it’s not unusual to have developed “eyes” and “ears” around the system, to the extent that not many things go unnoticed or unrecognized. Because of some things I have read over the past couple of years, I have developed an interest in some of the actions taken by our sometimes not-so-favorite participant in the aviation industry … that being the sometimes “nasty” regulator.
Living in the US, I’m naturally concerned with what our friendly FAA is up to … and recently (actually, it’s been infrequently over the past several years) I’ve been reading about some research that the FAA has undertaken with regards to the use of full flight simulators – namely that motion might just be an unnecessary expense for a large portion of what a pilot has to learn and then be checked on. Some of the publication references have enough data points that make it difficult to determine specifically what it is that should or should not be considered relevant to the point or points being made, but suffice it to say that some of the decisions that follow give rise to concerns that should be of interest to many, if not most, in the aviation business – particularly those in the training end of the business. Early last year the FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking – they call it an “NPRM” – in which they proposed a sweeping change to the training and qualification rules in the US. They also hosted a public meeting that I understand drew a sizeable audience of persons with various views on what it is the FAA had proposed. After reading through the rule changes and the comments submitted by the public – including those various pilot associations – I understand the FAA is going to publish a “revised” version of those proposals later this year.
Very recently, within the past several weeks actually, I have heard that some within the FAA are proposing that recurrent proficiency training sessions and proficiency checks (or at least a large portion of the tasks required during those recurrent activities) should be allowed to be accomplished in non-motion simulators – they call these devices Flight Training Devices as opposed to Flight Simulators. I also know that the pilot associations in the US have always advocated that recurrent training and checks be accomplished in the highest level of simulator available. I tend to agree with that position – and would only argue that when and where there are simulators, they should be used to their maximum extent … as long as they are not used beyond their capabilities … and that specific issue is cause for a whole other set of comments, which I’ll refrain from getting into at the moment. Because this is an issue that is near and dear to me, I’ve sought out additional information on this particular subject … and I’ve come to realize that the ‘reason’ this position is being adopted by the FAA is that non-motion devices are alleged to be less expensive, and therefore more affordable to airlines without the financial resources to purchase the bigger, more capable, more realistic, and more expensive simulation devices. This, according to some, would allow those airlines, who could not afford the more expensive simulation, the opportunity to have their crews become involved in simulation, even if it meant not having the motion cueing afforded by the more expensive devices.
To more fully understand this position and it’s counter position, I admit I had to spend what could be considered a LOT of time researching the issue. The bit of information that I’ve found is eye-opening to say the least. Apparently motion cueing systems – provided by a 6-degrees-of-freedom (6DOF) motion system accounts for somewhere between 5 and 12 percent of the total cost of a Level D full flight simulator – and full flight simulators are in the 8 to 10 million dollar range. This means the motion systems would cost between 400K and 1.4 million – depending on the “bells and whistles” and the company from whom it is purchased. I’ve also learned that the future of this business, motion systems for simulators, is rapidly going “electric” and the cost to maintain an electric system is a mere 20% of what hydraulic systems cost.
Given this information and knowing what pilots use to fly airplanes, I hope that the more sane among us will come to the rescue of pilots everywhere and put an end to this “safety is too expensive” mantra that the FAA seems to be preparing. Of course we won’t know for sure until the new rule proposals from the FAA hit the streets … but I’m told that there is an undercurrent of interest in slicing out a major portion of the realism that flight simulation can, and should provide … heck, has already provided. Are we really ready to take this kind of a step backwards for the as yet unproven cost savings of a motion system on full flight simulators? Who is trying to kid whom?
Stay tuned for the unveiling of what may be a significant turning point in the existence of pilot training activities – at least in the US … and if here, can the rest of the world be far behind???
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To say that flying is in your blood, well... I think you might have a very different sort of flying in mind there! Try gliders for that; this is work. Okay, the view from the office can be wonderful but just look at the life these two had and tell me any sane person gets into aviation for such as that. No, I don't think so!
Stay tuned for the unveiling of what may be a significant turning point in the existence of pilot training activities – at least in the US … and if here, can the rest of the world be far behind???
Last edited by Razoray; 20th Feb 2010 at 00:10.
N4790P
AirRabbit,
The regulatory ‘drift’ towards the FTT is in my opinion far worse than just the motion cuing issue and it isn’t just the FAA.
Existing regulations state that a Level C/D FFS must have a faithful replica of the flightdeck environment. Current interpretation of this has been to use, where practical aircraft parts so that the appearance and tactile feel experienced by the pilot is identical to that of the aircraft.
The FFT uses no (or very few?) aircraft parts. Instrument panels are LCD screens with panel fascia masks to represent the instrument faces, AFCS, FMS, WX controllers etc. are all simulated boxes which do not give the same tactile feel as the real item. Any deviation from reality will always be negative training.
I found the FFT seat cuing to be actually quite effective BUT whilst 6 axis motion systems LD FFSs certainly are not perfect, the equations of motion programmes have been refined over the past 30 years or so and the resultant cues are at least representative in most conditions and provide, in conjunction with the vast improvements with the latest generation of visual systems, a tool for the trainers to use to develop a level of training that will prepare crews for safe operation.
I’ve lost count of the number of times at training conferences pilots have demanded more vigorous motion cues, especially vibration to accurately simulate events such as catastrophic engine malfunctions. To dumb down motion cuing is ludicrous.
The FFT concept was actually driven by a European Turboprop manufacturer in conjunction with the French DGAC who has approved this devise for both Initial and recurrent training!
IMHO this was quite irresponsible for a number of reasons:-
·TP pilots ‘tend’ to be at the lower end of the experience ladder (no disrespect intended).
·TP aircraft ‘tend’ to operate into more challenging airfields, especially in the developing world.
·TP aircraft ‘tend’ to operate into areas will limited or poor Nav Aids and ATC
I’m of the firm belief that simulation requirements at this bottom end actually need to be far BETTER than those at the top end. The typical (or perhaps traditional) highly experienced jet P1 at least has experience to fall back on to supplement/complement his training in times of need, the low hour TP pilot only has training. Therefore that training MUST be of the highest possible quality and for that you need to best possible tools. An FFT as opposed to an FFS is not the best, it is a cost saving compromise.
That is not to say that the FFT doesn’t have a place in the training suite because it does. It is a truly superb type specific FNPTII and could and should find a niche in the training curriculum.
The issue with electric motion systems is or should be transparent to the end user. The response times of the system I’m familiar with (the Thales hybrid 6 DOF electric system) is actually better than the hydraulic system). Energy savings are 80% but the advantages are even greater. Building requirements are reduced, insurance issues with 400 gallons of oil per sim are resolved etc. Without a doubt this is the way forward. Significant cost savings without any detrimental impact to fidelity. A win, win situation.
The regulatory ‘drift’ towards the FTT is in my opinion far worse than just the motion cuing issue and it isn’t just the FAA.
Existing regulations state that a Level C/D FFS must have a faithful replica of the flightdeck environment. Current interpretation of this has been to use, where practical aircraft parts so that the appearance and tactile feel experienced by the pilot is identical to that of the aircraft.
The FFT uses no (or very few?) aircraft parts. Instrument panels are LCD screens with panel fascia masks to represent the instrument faces, AFCS, FMS, WX controllers etc. are all simulated boxes which do not give the same tactile feel as the real item. Any deviation from reality will always be negative training.
I found the FFT seat cuing to be actually quite effective BUT whilst 6 axis motion systems LD FFSs certainly are not perfect, the equations of motion programmes have been refined over the past 30 years or so and the resultant cues are at least representative in most conditions and provide, in conjunction with the vast improvements with the latest generation of visual systems, a tool for the trainers to use to develop a level of training that will prepare crews for safe operation.
I’ve lost count of the number of times at training conferences pilots have demanded more vigorous motion cues, especially vibration to accurately simulate events such as catastrophic engine malfunctions. To dumb down motion cuing is ludicrous.
The FFT concept was actually driven by a European Turboprop manufacturer in conjunction with the French DGAC who has approved this devise for both Initial and recurrent training!
IMHO this was quite irresponsible for a number of reasons:-
·TP pilots ‘tend’ to be at the lower end of the experience ladder (no disrespect intended).
·TP aircraft ‘tend’ to operate into more challenging airfields, especially in the developing world.
·TP aircraft ‘tend’ to operate into areas will limited or poor Nav Aids and ATC
I’m of the firm belief that simulation requirements at this bottom end actually need to be far BETTER than those at the top end. The typical (or perhaps traditional) highly experienced jet P1 at least has experience to fall back on to supplement/complement his training in times of need, the low hour TP pilot only has training. Therefore that training MUST be of the highest possible quality and for that you need to best possible tools. An FFT as opposed to an FFS is not the best, it is a cost saving compromise.
That is not to say that the FFT doesn’t have a place in the training suite because it does. It is a truly superb type specific FNPTII and could and should find a niche in the training curriculum.
The issue with electric motion systems is or should be transparent to the end user. The response times of the system I’m familiar with (the Thales hybrid 6 DOF electric system) is actually better than the hydraulic system). Energy savings are 80% but the advantages are even greater. Building requirements are reduced, insurance issues with 400 gallons of oil per sim are resolved etc. Without a doubt this is the way forward. Significant cost savings without any detrimental impact to fidelity. A win, win situation.
ZFT;
An excellent, rare post on the importance of flight simulation. I hope we hear more from you.
Air Rabbit;
I have never heard of such a thing and if true, (no reason to disbelieve your work), and if the intention is to dumb down flight simulation due to cost, it is pure lunacy and precisely in the wrong direction.
And...it is certainly an ironic twist to their present expressed 'concerns' over the level of training and experience, isn't it?
FFTs and FTDs do have their place in terms of initial procedures training even for new types which experienced pilots are moving onto. They do reduce expensive FFS time when the motion is not initially used and the sim is used for FMS/autoflight programming/training.
I hope I am not drawing too long a bow here but it seems an important piece of information appears to be missing from the FAA's communication to the industry regarding any downgrading of FFS requirements:
What do they plan to replace ZFT (Zero Flight Time) training/transition technical capability and regulatory authority with if Level D simulators are to be downgraded to a Level C or an FFT/FTD state?
Perhaps I am mistaken and FFS is not to be set aside but the use narrowed and requirements reduced. Nevertheless, I think there is a strong connection between cognitive skill and accomplished psychomotor skills. The importance of simulating, as closely as possible, aircraft movement under normal and abnormal conditions is important not only for cognitive, (conscious) skills but "teaching the body" (psychomotor) familiarity. "Seat of the pants" still means something in aviation regardless of what the bean-counters think or opin.
Current certification for Level D ZFT transitions require motion, sound and all sorts of specified fidelity including real instruments and panels, (for others, search 14 CFR 60, appendices A,B,C,D as described). Otherwise I believe it is back to doing training and licensing in the real aircraft.
For others reading this section of the thread who may not understand this important issue, I can probably speak for a lot of us here when we actually did circuits in an airliner for our final licensing endorsement. My own last "live" ride was on the L1011 in 1984. While the five or so hours was a lot of fun for all, I can't imagine how much it cost the airline. Also did it in the DC9, DC8 and B727. When we got the B767 Level D sim certified, the first time I saw the airplane was with passengers on board and a check pilot sitting beside. It was comfortable and a non-event due to the capabilities of a Level D simulator. But without such simulator capability how will airlines train pilots onto new equipment without using the aircraft again?
I'm sure the FAA has thought of this but do we know what their plan is?
An excellent, rare post on the importance of flight simulation. I hope we hear more from you.
Air Rabbit;
I have never heard of such a thing and if true, (no reason to disbelieve your work), and if the intention is to dumb down flight simulation due to cost, it is pure lunacy and precisely in the wrong direction.
And...it is certainly an ironic twist to their present expressed 'concerns' over the level of training and experience, isn't it?
FFTs and FTDs do have their place in terms of initial procedures training even for new types which experienced pilots are moving onto. They do reduce expensive FFS time when the motion is not initially used and the sim is used for FMS/autoflight programming/training.
I hope I am not drawing too long a bow here but it seems an important piece of information appears to be missing from the FAA's communication to the industry regarding any downgrading of FFS requirements:
What do they plan to replace ZFT (Zero Flight Time) training/transition technical capability and regulatory authority with if Level D simulators are to be downgraded to a Level C or an FFT/FTD state?
Perhaps I am mistaken and FFS is not to be set aside but the use narrowed and requirements reduced. Nevertheless, I think there is a strong connection between cognitive skill and accomplished psychomotor skills. The importance of simulating, as closely as possible, aircraft movement under normal and abnormal conditions is important not only for cognitive, (conscious) skills but "teaching the body" (psychomotor) familiarity. "Seat of the pants" still means something in aviation regardless of what the bean-counters think or opin.
Current certification for Level D ZFT transitions require motion, sound and all sorts of specified fidelity including real instruments and panels, (for others, search 14 CFR 60, appendices A,B,C,D as described). Otherwise I believe it is back to doing training and licensing in the real aircraft.
For others reading this section of the thread who may not understand this important issue, I can probably speak for a lot of us here when we actually did circuits in an airliner for our final licensing endorsement. My own last "live" ride was on the L1011 in 1984. While the five or so hours was a lot of fun for all, I can't imagine how much it cost the airline. Also did it in the DC9, DC8 and B727. When we got the B767 Level D sim certified, the first time I saw the airplane was with passengers on board and a check pilot sitting beside. It was comfortable and a non-event due to the capabilities of a Level D simulator. But without such simulator capability how will airlines train pilots onto new equipment without using the aircraft again?
I'm sure the FAA has thought of this but do we know what their plan is?
Last edited by PJ2; 20th Feb 2010 at 18:36.