Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo
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Basic Airmanship
Precept said at 0255Z on 3 Feb:
"The pilots of this flight never intended to crash and be killed when their aircraft impacted the ground. I believe they were most likely proficient aviators; and, they had good intentions”
I have followed this thread since the initial event, and am appalled at the frequency of posts suggesting that the crew, particularly the Captain, were generally competent.
Many of the posts refer to “procedures”, as if a pilot’s job were to be an unthinking autopilot.
The NTSB has now clearly shown the appalling unprofessionalism of the captain. He was not paying attention to the flight, was chatting continually with his copilot in a time generally intended to be “sterile”, i.e. focused on the task at hand, allowed the speed to decay dangerously, and then pulled back on the yoke when the aircraft tried to tell him he was in danger of stalling.
As someone said to me many years ago “Pull back to go up. Pull all the way back to go down.” Before any beginning pilot can solo, he/she must demonstrate that he/she understands the basic concept of maintaining flying speed, and recovery from excursions towards low speed.
While I am retired and no longer fly, I would in the old days never have allowed into the system, either private or commercial, a student pilot who did not understand the basic concept of flying speed and stalls. Nor would any of my compatriots.
Has the current state of the industry degraded to the point that failure to comprehend the most basic concepts of flight can be rationalized in a supposedly professional pilot?
"The pilots of this flight never intended to crash and be killed when their aircraft impacted the ground. I believe they were most likely proficient aviators; and, they had good intentions”
I have followed this thread since the initial event, and am appalled at the frequency of posts suggesting that the crew, particularly the Captain, were generally competent.
Many of the posts refer to “procedures”, as if a pilot’s job were to be an unthinking autopilot.
The NTSB has now clearly shown the appalling unprofessionalism of the captain. He was not paying attention to the flight, was chatting continually with his copilot in a time generally intended to be “sterile”, i.e. focused on the task at hand, allowed the speed to decay dangerously, and then pulled back on the yoke when the aircraft tried to tell him he was in danger of stalling.
As someone said to me many years ago “Pull back to go up. Pull all the way back to go down.” Before any beginning pilot can solo, he/she must demonstrate that he/she understands the basic concept of maintaining flying speed, and recovery from excursions towards low speed.
While I am retired and no longer fly, I would in the old days never have allowed into the system, either private or commercial, a student pilot who did not understand the basic concept of flying speed and stalls. Nor would any of my compatriots.
Has the current state of the industry degraded to the point that failure to comprehend the most basic concepts of flight can be rationalized in a supposedly professional pilot?
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The concept of controlling speed with the elevator and altitude with power is a vital one to the new pilot. The best book on the subject, "Stick and Rudder" explains this in a fine way.
However, "Stick and Rudder" also make a small reference to the more precise way of controlling altitude with elevator and speed with power...in a limited sense for instrument pilots.
Both concepts are valid, the statement about pull to go up...pull all the way back and you go down is a simplified version of what "stick and rudder" says...
now
some have said the captain was flirting...well the copilot didn't say: hey, we are below 10,000' aren't we?????
sadly, some people have gotten along in flying by being personable and not professional.
I've seen attractive people get ahead without a full understanding of flying...and goofy looking people, who have a full understanding of flying, not get ahead.
life is like that.
However, "Stick and Rudder" also make a small reference to the more precise way of controlling altitude with elevator and speed with power...in a limited sense for instrument pilots.
Both concepts are valid, the statement about pull to go up...pull all the way back and you go down is a simplified version of what "stick and rudder" says...
now
some have said the captain was flirting...well the copilot didn't say: hey, we are below 10,000' aren't we?????
sadly, some people have gotten along in flying by being personable and not professional.
I've seen attractive people get ahead without a full understanding of flying...and goofy looking people, who have a full understanding of flying, not get ahead.
life is like that.
Attitude + Power = Performance
A pilot needs to immediately and always be able to accurately evaluate and establish attitude and power to fly. And you are not mentally where the plane is going to be in the 1 minute or 10 minutes, your job title is PASSENGER.
GF
A pilot needs to immediately and always be able to accurately evaluate and establish attitude and power to fly. And you are not mentally where the plane is going to be in the 1 minute or 10 minutes, your job title is PASSENGER.
GF
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My 2p worth
I blame the 'Go Around' culture.
Missed the 500' gate? ............Go Around.
Late configuring?................Go around.
A bit long, even when light?.............Go Around.
Something happens.. maybe a caution?..............Go Around.
Lose an engine on final.........(like FR at Rome?) ......Go around.
Unstable approach? fix it? ..nope....Go around!
So when this guy, in an a/c with manual throttles got in trouble,what do you think?
er....wot...............I know!
Go around!
Stall recovery in IMC not so easy.
Training not so easy. Just teach them to Go Around!
Why did he haul back on the stick so hard that he overpowered the pusher?
Cause he was GOING AROUND! soon his probs will be over!
Why did she pull the flap in?? Cause she was GOING AROUND!
Soon all will be well!
(Hope it never happens to me).
I blame the 'Go Around' culture.
Missed the 500' gate? ............Go Around.
Late configuring?................Go around.
A bit long, even when light?.............Go Around.
Something happens.. maybe a caution?..............Go Around.
Lose an engine on final.........(like FR at Rome?) ......Go around.
Unstable approach? fix it? ..nope....Go around!
So when this guy, in an a/c with manual throttles got in trouble,what do you think?
er....wot...............I know!
Go around!
Stall recovery in IMC not so easy.
Training not so easy. Just teach them to Go Around!
Why did he haul back on the stick so hard that he overpowered the pusher?
Cause he was GOING AROUND! soon his probs will be over!
Why did she pull the flap in?? Cause she was GOING AROUND!
Soon all will be well!
(Hope it never happens to me).
GF
what I meant is that the airline environment is very specialized and standardiazed and at that point EVERYONE must be properly indoctrinated, to the strict regulated, tigh ass ways ofthe 'AIRLINES',...but airmanship or at least sometime makeing your own decisions is very applicable,...the hard, hard work and constant deciosion making that you learn during you commercial/CFI or MIL work does help,..to weed out the weak, the lazy,...[maybe fine pilots] but not for the airlinese....
.... the AIRLINES muse make sure that training is a nightmaerish hell that wont be soon ever forgotten,...by lester,....but the pilots coming in don't have to be too smart with our lineage/heritage of barnstormers', fools, and crazies, so the to hire Lester
to wash 80% of the applicants out in groundschool,...5% out in the sim and pay the rest big bucks....and for those who think it's good to be too smart,...the mountains, tempests and oceans don't care,...as we all remember how it ended with Watkins and he was the best
Safe flying, and dial in and extra ton for me too GF
PA
what I meant is that the airline environment is very specialized and standardiazed and at that point EVERYONE must be properly indoctrinated, to the strict regulated, tigh ass ways ofthe 'AIRLINES',...but airmanship or at least sometime makeing your own decisions is very applicable,...the hard, hard work and constant deciosion making that you learn during you commercial/CFI or MIL work does help,..to weed out the weak, the lazy,...[maybe fine pilots] but not for the airlinese....
.... the AIRLINES muse make sure that training is a nightmaerish hell that wont be soon ever forgotten,...by lester,....but the pilots coming in don't have to be too smart with our lineage/heritage of barnstormers', fools, and crazies, so the to hire Lester
to wash 80% of the applicants out in groundschool,...5% out in the sim and pay the rest big bucks....and for those who think it's good to be too smart,...the mountains, tempests and oceans don't care,...as we all remember how it ended with Watkins and he was the bestSafe flying, and dial in and extra ton for me too GF
PA
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For the record, Capt. Renslow was married with 2 children
Renslow family keeps focused, hopes hearings lead to changes : Home: The Buffalo News
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I had the opportunity to attend part of the public hearing in DC last spring, and I have spent some time reviewing the CVR transcript and the DFDR plots. Now that the Board has published their findings, I thought I might share my observations on the data.
Although the cockpit chatter was excessive and in violation of the sterile cockpit rule, I also do not note any missed callouts or procedural steps. The approach briefing was fine (with one major exception that I’ll discuss below). This may be another example of the investigators being more distracted by the crew conversation than the crew itself was. They simply do not show evidence of inattention, insofar as I can tell.
The major issue, in my view, centers on the approach reference speed bugs. The crew had apparently received performance data via ACARS that did not include reference to ice. They then bugged speeds that were not adjusted for ice accretion, as required by the manufacturer’s data. Further, they re-checked the bugs during the descent checklist at 22:13:42.
Now, this takes place in the middle of their conversation about ice. I find it remarkable that neither crewmember raises the issue of re-bugging for ice speed additives. This is not a case of overlooking it; they were talking about it. They knew exactly what they had on the airplane. It was as present in their attention as it could possibly have been. And yet neither of them raised the issue of speed additives.
Perhaps the oversight was earlier when they transmitted the request for performance data. I believe they should have included the ice requirement at that time; however, this is very typical type of slip. But are Colgan crews so reliant on ACARS performance data that they do not review and update it? Or did this crew, in their minds, actually review the data but see no flaw, because they did not fully understand the function of the ice reference switch and its corollary effects?
I can only conclude that they simply didn’t know about the additive requirement. This is a case of both a serious training breakdown and the absence of a professional culture that foments active learning.
In any other case, we would say that failing to adjust the bugs was a slip due to inattention. In this case, we can’t say that. Their attention was on the topic. They completed an approach briefing while their attention was on the topic. It is inconceivable to me that both pilots, while focused on ice, would miss this item unless they didn’t know about it.
The result is that the captain had an entirely different plan when he initiated the final deceleration than he should have had. He was aiming for a target speed that was too slow.
His response to the shaker was clearly inappropriate. I should point out that I have documented other cases of nearly identical responses in other icing accidents or incidents. If we dismiss the tailplane stall misconception, then before we desecrate this man's grave, it may be worth considering all of those poor fools who have managed to ignore GPWS "pull up" warnings until they hit the mountain. This also has been a recurring event around the world. Why? I would suggest that reconciling an incorrect mental model with imminent disaster can be incredibly challenging in the allotted timespan, particularly if the fatigue question actually has a role to play. Moreover, loss of control in a large transport is nothing less than terrifying, particularly when it is completely unexpected and does not align with one's mental model.
The role of fatigue is grossly misunderstood as it may apply to this accident. I do not see, in my read of the CVR, any indications whatsoever that this crew was not fully alert. I see no slips or lapses that might indicate such, and their conversation was sufficiently lively that microsleeps are unlikely. Rather, if it plays a role at all, it will be in the crew’s difficulty with reconciling their mental model with the actual dynamics of the event.
I can guarantee one thing. Neither of these people started their day, whenever that was, with the intention of ending it the way they did. Nonetheless, they failed at a task that I am sure both took great pride in. We owe them their dignity, and we can preserve that without excusing their failures if we shed our smugness and study the systemic weaknesses, reinforcing our defenses in depth to prevent similar occurrences.
Although the cockpit chatter was excessive and in violation of the sterile cockpit rule, I also do not note any missed callouts or procedural steps. The approach briefing was fine (with one major exception that I’ll discuss below). This may be another example of the investigators being more distracted by the crew conversation than the crew itself was. They simply do not show evidence of inattention, insofar as I can tell.
The major issue, in my view, centers on the approach reference speed bugs. The crew had apparently received performance data via ACARS that did not include reference to ice. They then bugged speeds that were not adjusted for ice accretion, as required by the manufacturer’s data. Further, they re-checked the bugs during the descent checklist at 22:13:42.
Now, this takes place in the middle of their conversation about ice. I find it remarkable that neither crewmember raises the issue of re-bugging for ice speed additives. This is not a case of overlooking it; they were talking about it. They knew exactly what they had on the airplane. It was as present in their attention as it could possibly have been. And yet neither of them raised the issue of speed additives.
Perhaps the oversight was earlier when they transmitted the request for performance data. I believe they should have included the ice requirement at that time; however, this is very typical type of slip. But are Colgan crews so reliant on ACARS performance data that they do not review and update it? Or did this crew, in their minds, actually review the data but see no flaw, because they did not fully understand the function of the ice reference switch and its corollary effects?
I can only conclude that they simply didn’t know about the additive requirement. This is a case of both a serious training breakdown and the absence of a professional culture that foments active learning.
In any other case, we would say that failing to adjust the bugs was a slip due to inattention. In this case, we can’t say that. Their attention was on the topic. They completed an approach briefing while their attention was on the topic. It is inconceivable to me that both pilots, while focused on ice, would miss this item unless they didn’t know about it.
The result is that the captain had an entirely different plan when he initiated the final deceleration than he should have had. He was aiming for a target speed that was too slow.
His response to the shaker was clearly inappropriate. I should point out that I have documented other cases of nearly identical responses in other icing accidents or incidents. If we dismiss the tailplane stall misconception, then before we desecrate this man's grave, it may be worth considering all of those poor fools who have managed to ignore GPWS "pull up" warnings until they hit the mountain. This also has been a recurring event around the world. Why? I would suggest that reconciling an incorrect mental model with imminent disaster can be incredibly challenging in the allotted timespan, particularly if the fatigue question actually has a role to play. Moreover, loss of control in a large transport is nothing less than terrifying, particularly when it is completely unexpected and does not align with one's mental model.
The role of fatigue is grossly misunderstood as it may apply to this accident. I do not see, in my read of the CVR, any indications whatsoever that this crew was not fully alert. I see no slips or lapses that might indicate such, and their conversation was sufficiently lively that microsleeps are unlikely. Rather, if it plays a role at all, it will be in the crew’s difficulty with reconciling their mental model with the actual dynamics of the event.
I can guarantee one thing. Neither of these people started their day, whenever that was, with the intention of ending it the way they did. Nonetheless, they failed at a task that I am sure both took great pride in. We owe them their dignity, and we can preserve that without excusing their failures if we shed our smugness and study the systemic weaknesses, reinforcing our defenses in depth to prevent similar occurrences.
Thanks, PA, agree completely based on mil, airline and my present gig. Airline flying is, in its own way, specialized and requires its own mindset and skills.
Thanks again, GF
Thanks again, GF
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
So 25 NTSB recommendations to say never forget the most basic tenet of pilot training - don't stall on the approach and if you do, at least know how to recognize it and attempt a recovery. Staggering.
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Mansfield
These slides from the Operations presentation "Airspeed Selection and Stall Training Procedures" seem relevant to your questions:
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Colgan’s Training Program
• Ground school covered function of ref speeds switch but not actual use
• Neither training manual nor simulator training modules mentioned switch
• Colgan guidance after accident discussed switch position in relation to airspeed bugs
Colgan Checklist
• Normal checklist did not mention ref speeds switch once “after start” check was complete
• Procedure did not require crews to cross-reference bugs with ref speeds switch position
• Items corrected after accident
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps the oversight was earlier when they transmitted the request for performance data. I believe they should have included the ice requirement at that time; however, this is very typical type of slip. But are Colgan crews so reliant on ACARS performance data that they do not review and update it? Or did this crew, in their minds, actually review the data but see no flaw, because they did not fully understand the function of the ice reference switch and its corollary effects?
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Colgan’s Training Program
• Ground school covered function of ref speeds switch but not actual use
• Neither training manual nor simulator training modules mentioned switch
• Colgan guidance after accident discussed switch position in relation to airspeed bugs
Colgan Checklist
• Normal checklist did not mention ref speeds switch once “after start” check was complete
• Procedure did not require crews to cross-reference bugs with ref speeds switch position
• Items corrected after accident
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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I don't see basic flying skills a requirement by the regional airlines looking for the cheapest help they can get. They rely on automation to compensate and sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't. This time it didn't. Basic stall recovery is quite simple and is taught from initial training to solo. Just add power and lower the nose. No need to get too technical about it. It is a simple concept.
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Dash 8 Buffalo'd by Dumb Warnings
a.*** "In the next few seconds, a so-called "stick pusher" automatically tried to suddenly lower the nose of the aircraft to gain airspeed and lift as a way to recover from the stall. The captain fought that device three separate times, deepening a stall that eventually became unrecoverable."
*
b.*** “the board reaffirmed its preliminary conclusions that a startled and inadequately trained crew reacted improperly to the stall.”
*
“In detailing the sequence of events as the plane quickly lost airspeed as it descended toward the airport on a stormy night, investigators and board members reiterated that Capt. Renslow reacted improperly to a so-called "stick shaker" warning that the plane was about to lose lift. Contrary to Colgan's training, he aggressively raised the nose."That's very unusual behavior," said Tom Haueter, the board's top aviation investigator. "I quite frankly can't explain it."
*
In the next few seconds, a so-called "stick pusher" automatically tried to suddenly lower the nose of the aircraft to gain airspeed and lift as a way to recover from the stall. The captain fought that device three separate times, deepening a stall that eventually became unrecoverable.
*
*
Solution: 1. Fighting a stick-pusher by opposing it is instinctive, particularly when caught by surprise. You have to ask yourself: "if there'd been no stick-pusher fitted and just a stick-shaker, would the captain have carried out a standard stall recovery?” The stick-pusher is meant to encourage and stimulate a response in the correct direction (i.e. the pilot is supposedly stimulated to lower the nose and reduce the angle-of-attack whilst selecting max power). However the practical effect is the innate human instinct to oppose the most evident characteristic of the surprise anomaly. That’s why the captain raised the nose repeatedly, compounding the situation and embedding the aircraft in an unrecoverable accelerated stall.
************ 2.* A far more realistic human-factored arrangement would be an audio stall warning that cut in as the AoA exceeded a logical threshold and then changed pitch as the AoA increased. Think in terms of an identifiable low volume, low-pitched moan upsweeping to a high volume, high-pitched scream as the AoA increases. It would need a cut-out for use in malfunctions, however its use for stimulating a correct response for stall recovery would be far more instinctive than the offensive stick-pusher interfering with the flight-controls. The psychology is undoubtedly in favour of the audio alert. I can recall when the first RAWS warning was fitted to the SP2H Neptune. Prior to this fitment of a Radar Altimeter Warning System, we had a mere non attention-getting radalt height-selectable bug-initiated red light (non-flashing) adjacent to the Radar Altimeter. It was in no way attention-getting. The RAWS introduced an aural alert and a flashing red light whose frequency (of flashing and aural tone) changed in consonance as both the rate of descent increased and the radar altitude decreased. That system must have saved countless numbers of P-2’s and P-3’s involved in low-level Julie hexing and MAD trapping at night at 300ft. You tended to get distracted by trying to visually ontop the sonobuoy lights and retro-markers and flame-floats and markers marine. On a starry night you could easily become confused by lights in the water intermingling with the stars of the sky (there being no visible horizon) – especially when turning steeply to counter cross-wind drift. I can recall responding promptly and correctly to sudden aural/visual RAWS alerts on numerous occasions. The chop-rate cooked off for three seconds passing 300ft, went silent until 100 feet and then cut in continuous as you passed 100 feet ASL. But the background continuous tone went on telling you that you had a rate of descent – and only cut out with a rate-of-climb transition. That’s old technology. Imagine what they could now do with aural/visual AoA warnings on an approach. I prefer pitch-toned alerters, rather than muttered artificial voice warnings.
*
c.** These accident pilots (Buffalo’s Dash8 and Amsterdam’s Turkish 737) were criticized for missing the speed trend indication. But that’s a non-obvious little bug lost in a sea of bugs on the panel. Aural alert cut-in is a TRUE ALERTER, whereas (proven at Buffalo) the stick-pusher is a proven killer. It alarms rather than alerts.
Summary:
The “go for it” escape mentality. i.e. I blame the inbred 'Go Around' culture.
Missed the 500' stabilized approach gate? ............Go Around.
Late configuring?................Go around.
Landing a bit long, even when light?.............Go Around.
Something happens.. maybe a low-key caution or latish ATC clearance?..............Go Around.
Lose an engine on final.........(like FR at Rome?) ......Go around.
Unstable approach? fix it? ..nope....Go around!
So when this guy, in an a/c with manual throttles got in trouble, what do you think his instinct was?
*
Why did the copilot pull the flap in, thus exacerbating the high AoA incipient stall into an accelerated stall?? Cause she (also) was in GOING AROUND mode!
*
Conclusion:** All other prelude factors (fatigue, complacency, inattentiveness, commuting, non-sterile cockpit chat, improper icy approach speed (the ice reference switch), lack of an autothrottle etc) were contributing and preliminary, i.e. they helped set the stage. However this type of dumbo setup occurs daily - in aviation globally. The true airmanship trick is in then avoiding the coup-de-grace of completing the Swiss Cheese hole alignment. That’s where the timely alert (but do not alarm) hardware comes into its own during a highly dynamic event. If the alerting system is properly keyed to ping the pilots into a sudden awareness of their peril and offers an instinctive solution (lowering the nose and increasing power quickly makes the very annoying high-pitched squeal noise diminish), then success is practically automated. However on the Dash 8 and in many other stick-pusher types, the converse is true. It would be something easily practiced in a simulator….. then stall recovery becomes truly instinctive and is accomplished safely at the incipient stage, with or without a stick-pusher. The NTSB emphasis is on training pilots to escape from sudden stalls. My opinion is that you need the appropriate system to stimulate a correct response. What they have in the stick-pusher is a lethal incentive for instinctive denial and contrariness i.e. to oppose the sudden foreign and unfamiliar flight-control input. Even an “old head” could be sucked into that mistake. What is needed is not necessarily a defence in depth…… just an appropriate last minute life-saver. That’s presently missing. The stick-pusher is a psychologically inappropriate device, given the go-round mindset that’s a large part of modern airline training.
*
b.*** “the board reaffirmed its preliminary conclusions that a startled and inadequately trained crew reacted improperly to the stall.”
*
“In detailing the sequence of events as the plane quickly lost airspeed as it descended toward the airport on a stormy night, investigators and board members reiterated that Capt. Renslow reacted improperly to a so-called "stick shaker" warning that the plane was about to lose lift. Contrary to Colgan's training, he aggressively raised the nose."That's very unusual behavior," said Tom Haueter, the board's top aviation investigator. "I quite frankly can't explain it."
*
In the next few seconds, a so-called "stick pusher" automatically tried to suddenly lower the nose of the aircraft to gain airspeed and lift as a way to recover from the stall. The captain fought that device three separate times, deepening a stall that eventually became unrecoverable.
*
*
Solution: 1. Fighting a stick-pusher by opposing it is instinctive, particularly when caught by surprise. You have to ask yourself: "if there'd been no stick-pusher fitted and just a stick-shaker, would the captain have carried out a standard stall recovery?” The stick-pusher is meant to encourage and stimulate a response in the correct direction (i.e. the pilot is supposedly stimulated to lower the nose and reduce the angle-of-attack whilst selecting max power). However the practical effect is the innate human instinct to oppose the most evident characteristic of the surprise anomaly. That’s why the captain raised the nose repeatedly, compounding the situation and embedding the aircraft in an unrecoverable accelerated stall.
************ 2.* A far more realistic human-factored arrangement would be an audio stall warning that cut in as the AoA exceeded a logical threshold and then changed pitch as the AoA increased. Think in terms of an identifiable low volume, low-pitched moan upsweeping to a high volume, high-pitched scream as the AoA increases. It would need a cut-out for use in malfunctions, however its use for stimulating a correct response for stall recovery would be far more instinctive than the offensive stick-pusher interfering with the flight-controls. The psychology is undoubtedly in favour of the audio alert. I can recall when the first RAWS warning was fitted to the SP2H Neptune. Prior to this fitment of a Radar Altimeter Warning System, we had a mere non attention-getting radalt height-selectable bug-initiated red light (non-flashing) adjacent to the Radar Altimeter. It was in no way attention-getting. The RAWS introduced an aural alert and a flashing red light whose frequency (of flashing and aural tone) changed in consonance as both the rate of descent increased and the radar altitude decreased. That system must have saved countless numbers of P-2’s and P-3’s involved in low-level Julie hexing and MAD trapping at night at 300ft. You tended to get distracted by trying to visually ontop the sonobuoy lights and retro-markers and flame-floats and markers marine. On a starry night you could easily become confused by lights in the water intermingling with the stars of the sky (there being no visible horizon) – especially when turning steeply to counter cross-wind drift. I can recall responding promptly and correctly to sudden aural/visual RAWS alerts on numerous occasions. The chop-rate cooked off for three seconds passing 300ft, went silent until 100 feet and then cut in continuous as you passed 100 feet ASL. But the background continuous tone went on telling you that you had a rate of descent – and only cut out with a rate-of-climb transition. That’s old technology. Imagine what they could now do with aural/visual AoA warnings on an approach. I prefer pitch-toned alerters, rather than muttered artificial voice warnings.
*
c.** These accident pilots (Buffalo’s Dash8 and Amsterdam’s Turkish 737) were criticized for missing the speed trend indication. But that’s a non-obvious little bug lost in a sea of bugs on the panel. Aural alert cut-in is a TRUE ALERTER, whereas (proven at Buffalo) the stick-pusher is a proven killer. It alarms rather than alerts.
Summary:
The “go for it” escape mentality. i.e. I blame the inbred 'Go Around' culture.
Missed the 500' stabilized approach gate? ............Go Around.
Late configuring?................Go around.
Landing a bit long, even when light?.............Go Around.
Something happens.. maybe a low-key caution or latish ATC clearance?..............Go Around.
Lose an engine on final.........(like FR at Rome?) ......Go around.
Unstable approach? fix it? ..nope....Go around!
So when this guy, in an a/c with manual throttles got in trouble, what do you think his instinct was?
*
Why did the copilot pull the flap in, thus exacerbating the high AoA incipient stall into an accelerated stall?? Cause she (also) was in GOING AROUND mode!
*
Conclusion:** All other prelude factors (fatigue, complacency, inattentiveness, commuting, non-sterile cockpit chat, improper icy approach speed (the ice reference switch), lack of an autothrottle etc) were contributing and preliminary, i.e. they helped set the stage. However this type of dumbo setup occurs daily - in aviation globally. The true airmanship trick is in then avoiding the coup-de-grace of completing the Swiss Cheese hole alignment. That’s where the timely alert (but do not alarm) hardware comes into its own during a highly dynamic event. If the alerting system is properly keyed to ping the pilots into a sudden awareness of their peril and offers an instinctive solution (lowering the nose and increasing power quickly makes the very annoying high-pitched squeal noise diminish), then success is practically automated. However on the Dash 8 and in many other stick-pusher types, the converse is true. It would be something easily practiced in a simulator….. then stall recovery becomes truly instinctive and is accomplished safely at the incipient stage, with or without a stick-pusher. The NTSB emphasis is on training pilots to escape from sudden stalls. My opinion is that you need the appropriate system to stimulate a correct response. What they have in the stick-pusher is a lethal incentive for instinctive denial and contrariness i.e. to oppose the sudden foreign and unfamiliar flight-control input. Even an “old head” could be sucked into that mistake. What is needed is not necessarily a defence in depth…… just an appropriate last minute life-saver. That’s presently missing. The stick-pusher is a psychologically inappropriate device, given the go-round mindset that’s a large part of modern airline training.
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For those in the U.S., PBS Frontline on Tuesday will have a program on the Buffalo crash and regional airlines.
FRONTLINE: Coming Soon - Flying Cheap | PBS
FRONTLINE: Coming Soon - Flying Cheap | PBS
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Face It
Aviation safety starts with the pilot...and his commitment to being well above average...this must be combined with the commitment of his airline to provide training that is well above average.
A pilot never stops learning. A good one anyway.
And, the colgan crash had two below average pilots and a below average training program.
Pull up the flaps? Pull up on the stick? Something ain't right somewhere.
Money would have made these pilots better...more training, better training, better evaluation. AND if the airline had started with better candidates even the above would have been enhanced.
did the copilot say she learned at embry riddle in Arizona?
Its hard to be a copilot in the non flying pilot role...you must be ahead of everything, and be tactful enough to be able to help the captain/PF out of trouble before he gets into it.
But all too often, the pilot not flying, who happens to be a copilot...just sits and enjoys the ride.
OUCH.
A pilot never stops learning. A good one anyway.
And, the colgan crash had two below average pilots and a below average training program.
Pull up the flaps? Pull up on the stick? Something ain't right somewhere.
Money would have made these pilots better...more training, better training, better evaluation. AND if the airline had started with better candidates even the above would have been enhanced.
did the copilot say she learned at embry riddle in Arizona?
Its hard to be a copilot in the non flying pilot role...you must be ahead of everything, and be tactful enough to be able to help the captain/PF out of trouble before he gets into it.
But all too often, the pilot not flying, who happens to be a copilot...just sits and enjoys the ride.
OUCH.