El Al flight nearly crashed in Jerusalem hills
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El Al flight nearly crashed in Jerusalem hills
El Al flight nearly crashed in Jerusalem hills - Haaretz - Israel News
El Al flight nearly crashed in Jerusalem hills
An El Al passenger flight nearly crashed in the hills near Jerusalem last November, due to a pilot error that has now led to the flight captain's demotion.
The incident, which is being reported here for the first time, occurred while the plane was landing at Ben-Gurion Airport. It is currently being investigated by the Ministry of Transportation's Civil Aviation Authority.
The wide-bodied Boeing 767 jet was returning from Europe with hundreds of passengers on board. As it was circling prior to landing at Ben-Gurion, the pilot initiated a descent that brought the plane lower than the permitted altitude. At the time, he was over Modi'in, which is located in the Judean Hills. A source in the Civil Aviation Authority therefore characterized the maneuver as dangerous, saying the pilot could have hit a hillside. An accident was only averted at the last minute, when the cockpit crew recognized the danger and regained altitude.
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Continued in article link above...
El Al flight nearly crashed in Jerusalem hills
An El Al passenger flight nearly crashed in the hills near Jerusalem last November, due to a pilot error that has now led to the flight captain's demotion.
The incident, which is being reported here for the first time, occurred while the plane was landing at Ben-Gurion Airport. It is currently being investigated by the Ministry of Transportation's Civil Aviation Authority.
The wide-bodied Boeing 767 jet was returning from Europe with hundreds of passengers on board. As it was circling prior to landing at Ben-Gurion, the pilot initiated a descent that brought the plane lower than the permitted altitude. At the time, he was over Modi'in, which is located in the Judean Hills. A source in the Civil Aviation Authority therefore characterized the maneuver as dangerous, saying the pilot could have hit a hillside. An accident was only averted at the last minute, when the cockpit crew recognized the danger and regained altitude.
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Continued in article link above...
Any such outcome is always better than headlines. What is disconcerting however is not the incident although that is serious enough, but the last paragraph in the story. It should not take such drastic action on the part of a foreign regulatory body to force the change:
Are El Al's 767's not equipped with EGPWS? The story does not explain why the crew "recognized the danger and regained altitude." If not, why not, if so, Don Bateman saved another airplane load of passengers. I know another major carrier that brags about it's safety culture but still only completed a fleetwide installation of EGPWS within the last two years.
At the end of last year, the American Federal Aviation Administration downgraded Israel's aviation safety rating to Category 2, which is commonly assigned to developing countries. In response to the lower rating, the Civil Aviation Authority created a new administrative body to deal with the deficiencies cited by the FAA. The department is headed by a former vice president of El Al, Benny Livneh.
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Contradictory Messages
"This was a breach of safety procedures that could have resulted in mass casualties," the Civil Aviation Authority source noted. "It's very serious and should be treated as a near miss."
El Al said: "El Al has attached the greatest importance to flight safety and the safety of our passengers ever since the airline was founded. Because of the improper conduct of the captain of the Boeing 767, El Al decided to involve the relevant professional authorities. The pilot was grounded, and the authorities have agreed that for a period of four months, he is to be downgraded to copilot, after which he will have to requalify as captain. The safety of the passengers and crew were at no time endangered
Union backs pilot
Following the incident, El Al's management sought to institute severe sanctions against the pilot. However, the El Al pilots union, backed by the Israel Air Pilots Association, objected strenuously. The parties therefore ultimately reached a compromise under which the pilot would only be allowed to work as a copilot, rather than as captain, for several months, until he completes additional professional training and requalifies as a captain.
El Al said: "El Al has attached the greatest importance to flight safety and the safety of our passengers ever since the airline was founded. Because of the improper conduct of the captain of the Boeing 767, El Al decided to involve the relevant professional authorities. The pilot was grounded, and the authorities have agreed that for a period of four months, he is to be downgraded to copilot, after which he will have to requalify as captain. The safety of the passengers and crew were at no time endangered
Union backs pilot
Following the incident, El Al's management sought to institute severe sanctions against the pilot. However, the El Al pilots union, backed by the Israel Air Pilots Association, objected strenuously. The parties therefore ultimately reached a compromise under which the pilot would only be allowed to work as a copilot, rather than as captain, for several months, until he completes additional professional training and requalifies as a captain.
Are El Al's 767's not equipped with EGPWS? The story does not explain why the crew "recognized the danger and regained altitude."
I would hate to think that the crew were indeed bailed out by the EGPWS system.
There was obviously a mistake made in being where they were and it's just as likely that something didn't add up in the cockpit either by instruments or vision out the cockpit window (the proverbial mountain goat in the clouds) CVR's often have crews talking to themselves about something being not right and they indeed discover/recover the problem before the EGPWS goes off. It's the dismissive over confident crew that needs the EGPWS to give them another chance.
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I have executed that approach to that runway at least 20 times, and can attest to the fact that it is fairly "tricky," especially at night or in low vis conditions.
The procedure not only has tight airspace restrictions due to the Jerusalem overflight restrictions, but requires you to stay tight to the airport downwind, then lose lots of speed and lots of altitude while executing a 180 degree turn and attempting to line up with the runway, and configure for landing, all at the same time.
It is especially a tough approach for a First Officer to execute, especially in reduced visibility conditions or at night, for the simple reason that he will be executing a left 180 degree turn from the right seat. And when the Captain is executing the approach, it is extremely difficult or almost impossible for the F/O to monitor outside the cockpit while the Captain attempts to maintain visual contact, due to the requirement to monitor parameters inside.
The procedure not only has tight airspace restrictions due to the Jerusalem overflight restrictions, but requires you to stay tight to the airport downwind, then lose lots of speed and lots of altitude while executing a 180 degree turn and attempting to line up with the runway, and configure for landing, all at the same time.
It is especially a tough approach for a First Officer to execute, especially in reduced visibility conditions or at night, for the simple reason that he will be executing a left 180 degree turn from the right seat. And when the Captain is executing the approach, it is extremely difficult or almost impossible for the F/O to monitor outside the cockpit while the Captain attempts to maintain visual contact, due to the requirement to monitor parameters inside.
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Some questions for the informed.....
Was this a EGPWS event? If so, I'm guessing Honeywell analyzed the data and reported back.
Is there any official report of this incident?
Also, is anyone aware of software version/position source for the EGPWS on the aircraft in question.
Position source and software version can be extremely important in provided additional protected areas near the airport as outlined in this article.
http://www.flightsafety.org/asw/aug0...g08_p18-20.pdf
Was this a EGPWS event? If so, I'm guessing Honeywell analyzed the data and reported back.
Is there any official report of this incident?
Also, is anyone aware of software version/position source for the EGPWS on the aircraft in question.
Position source and software version can be extremely important in provided additional protected areas near the airport as outlined in this article.
http://www.flightsafety.org/asw/aug0...g08_p18-20.pdf
lomapaseao;
[quote]I'm not sure that there is necessarily a direct correlation here with EGPWS.quote]
No, I'm not sure there is a correlation here either - that's the reason I posed the question.
That said, any incident that was serious enough to be reported would invariably set off the GPWS, (but not by the EGPWS. Here is why I think this:
The crew likely would not have come to such a conclusion before an EGPWS warned them of terrain. A "Terrain Ahead" warning is a lot earlier than a "Terrain, PULL UP" warning from a GPWS.
In other words, it is my inclination to doubt that EGPWS was installed.
If this was the serious incident it is being portrayed as, the EGPWS would likely have gone off before the crew came to a conclusion that they were too low.
If it wasn't installed, the crew may or may not have come to their conclusions before a "GPWS Pull UP" warning, simply because such a warning is much later by virtue of the fact that it is "looking down, not ahead", (sorry, not offering a "lesson" in GPWS as I think you know all this - but expanding upon my reasons for asking, and thinking the way I have).
Raymond767's description of the approach is excellent and offers a notion on the difficulty of the approach. Perhaps this aspect was part of the incident.
Hmm..you wouldn't "hate to think" that a crew was bailed out by the TCAS though, would you? Either a loss of SA occurred and they realized it, (just like the 727 crew did moments before they crashed northwest of Washington Dulles during a dark-and-dirty approach, Accident Report), or a regular GPWS installation saved them. An EGPWS would have gone off before, or about the same time they figured their situation out.
IMHO...just thinking it through.
[quote]I'm not sure that there is necessarily a direct correlation here with EGPWS.quote]
No, I'm not sure there is a correlation here either - that's the reason I posed the question.
That said, any incident that was serious enough to be reported would invariably set off the GPWS, (but not by the EGPWS. Here is why I think this:
The crew likely would not have come to such a conclusion before an EGPWS warned them of terrain. A "Terrain Ahead" warning is a lot earlier than a "Terrain, PULL UP" warning from a GPWS.
In other words, it is my inclination to doubt that EGPWS was installed.
If this was the serious incident it is being portrayed as, the EGPWS would likely have gone off before the crew came to a conclusion that they were too low.
If it wasn't installed, the crew may or may not have come to their conclusions before a "GPWS Pull UP" warning, simply because such a warning is much later by virtue of the fact that it is "looking down, not ahead", (sorry, not offering a "lesson" in GPWS as I think you know all this - but expanding upon my reasons for asking, and thinking the way I have).
Raymond767's description of the approach is excellent and offers a notion on the difficulty of the approach. Perhaps this aspect was part of the incident.
I would hate to think that the crew were indeed bailed out by the EGPWS system.[/
IMHO...just thinking it through.
Last edited by PJ2; 4th Feb 2009 at 00:04.
PJ2
OK I am with you now. But if the approach is so difficulut that it sets off an EGPWS before the crew recognizes that they are out of the box than we shoud expect accidents specifically at that airport on aircraft without EGPWS.
OK I used that dammable word "if" now does anybody have any data for unrecognized dangerous approaches to this airport bailed out by EGPWS vs last second pull-ups because they didn't have an EGPWS
That said, any incident that was serious enough to be reported would invariably set off the GPWS, (but not by the EGPWS. Here is why I think this:
The crew likely would not have come to such a conclusion before an EGPWS warned them of terrain. A "Terrain Ahead" warning is a lot earlier than a "Terrain, PULL UP" warning from a GPWS.
In other words, it is my inclination to doubt that EGPWS was installed.
If this was the serious incident it is being portrayed as, the EGPWS would likely have gone off before the crew came to a conclusion that they were too low.
If it wasn't installed, the crew may or may not have come to their conclusions before a "GPWS Pull UP" warning, simply because such a warning is much later by virtue of the fact that it is "looking down, not ahead", (sorry, not offering a "lesson" in GPWS as I think you know all this - but expanding upon my reasons for asking, and thinking the way I have).
Raymond767's description of the approach is excellent and offers a notion on the difficulty of the approach. Perhaps this aspect was part of the incident.
The crew likely would not have come to such a conclusion before an EGPWS warned them of terrain. A "Terrain Ahead" warning is a lot earlier than a "Terrain, PULL UP" warning from a GPWS.
In other words, it is my inclination to doubt that EGPWS was installed.
If this was the serious incident it is being portrayed as, the EGPWS would likely have gone off before the crew came to a conclusion that they were too low.
If it wasn't installed, the crew may or may not have come to their conclusions before a "GPWS Pull UP" warning, simply because such a warning is much later by virtue of the fact that it is "looking down, not ahead", (sorry, not offering a "lesson" in GPWS as I think you know all this - but expanding upon my reasons for asking, and thinking the way I have).
Raymond767's description of the approach is excellent and offers a notion on the difficulty of the approach. Perhaps this aspect was part of the incident.
OK I am with you now. But if the approach is so difficulut that it sets off an EGPWS before the crew recognizes that they are out of the box than we shoud expect accidents specifically at that airport on aircraft without EGPWS.
OK I used that dammable word "if" now does anybody have any data for unrecognized dangerous approaches to this airport bailed out by EGPWS vs last second pull-ups because they didn't have an EGPWS
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PJ2 -
"Either a loss of SA occurred and they realized it, (just like the 727 crew did moments before they crashed northwest of Washington Dulles during a dark-and-dirty approach....."
There was some concern from many pilots (myself included) about the completeness of the investigation surrounding that accident. Not enough attention was payed to the possibility of a pressure differential on the West side of the hill they flew into because of the strong surface wind that could have caused the altimiter to give the wrong altitude.
"Either a loss of SA occurred and they realized it, (just like the 727 crew did moments before they crashed northwest of Washington Dulles during a dark-and-dirty approach....."
There was some concern from many pilots (myself included) about the completeness of the investigation surrounding that accident. Not enough attention was payed to the possibility of a pressure differential on the West side of the hill they flew into because of the strong surface wind that could have caused the altimiter to give the wrong altitude.
lomapaseo;
The aircraft that serve this airport aren't included in our FOQA Program, because, we've been told, it's too expensive and they prefer the "statistical" approach with the bits and pieces we collect.
That said, the question on data, FOQA or ASAP/ASRs is a good one. The approach into Bombay (now Mumbai as we know) onto 27 was the same - there's a hill about 12nm out that used to set off the GPWS on the L1011-500. Same thing currently occurs into LAS onto 19, about 9nm to the NE near Nellis AFB. These aren't "false" warnings but are known and charted. I'm not aware of any such notes/cautions on the Jepps into Ben Gurion.
The aircraft that serve this airport aren't included in our FOQA Program, because, we've been told, it's too expensive and they prefer the "statistical" approach with the bits and pieces we collect.
That said, the question on data, FOQA or ASAP/ASRs is a good one. The approach into Bombay (now Mumbai as we know) onto 27 was the same - there's a hill about 12nm out that used to set off the GPWS on the L1011-500. Same thing currently occurs into LAS onto 19, about 9nm to the NE near Nellis AFB. These aren't "false" warnings but are known and charted. I'm not aware of any such notes/cautions on the Jepps into Ben Gurion.
DC-ATE;
Yes, I agree, and I note with interest the dissenting statements in the report. There are at least two other such accidents I am aware of...the DC9 CFIT into Charlotte, NC, and a Canadair "NorthStar" (DC4 type with Merlins) accident into the East face of Mt. Slesse near the Canada-US border just south of Chilliwack - strong winds, lee side, returning to VR after an engine failure. There was also a Lear medivac off Massett, British Columbia, likely due to an altimeter setting error...30.17 instead of 29.17. I was flying that night into Vancouver and the isobars were a tight round circle in the vicinity.
Not enough attention was payed to the possibility of a pressure differential on the West side of the hill they flew into because of the strong surface wind that could have caused the altimiter to give the wrong altitude.
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Yes, aware of a couple of those as well. It's a shame that some of these "cases" have been closed with the pilots left holding the blame. Same with the UAL MDW 737 that I think I've mentioned on here. Most of us think it was ICE on the unheated tail, but because the Chicago Fire Department said they saw no ice on the wings or tail, there couldn't of been any. Of course they didn't mention that the aircraft was on fire when they got there! Duh, no wonder there wasn't any ice!
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I'll pose the same questions as before (see previous post)
As to EGPWS warnings, if not a direct GPS feed to unit, and appropriate software/terrain database installed, close to the airport, protections are disabled to virtual GPWS status due to lack of confidence in position (even if FMS has a GPS input). All EGPWS manufacturers, Boeing, Airbus, and regulatory authorities STRONGLY recommend direct GPS input to EGPWS.
Future software will take advantage of Geometric Altitude (GPS derived) to further enhance (in case of incorrectly set altimeters) protections.
As to EGPWS warnings, if not a direct GPS feed to unit, and appropriate software/terrain database installed, close to the airport, protections are disabled to virtual GPWS status due to lack of confidence in position (even if FMS has a GPS input). All EGPWS manufacturers, Boeing, Airbus, and regulatory authorities STRONGLY recommend direct GPS input to EGPWS.
Future software will take advantage of Geometric Altitude (GPS derived) to further enhance (in case of incorrectly set altimeters) protections.
Shore Guy;
Yes, that is my understanding of both the requirements and the outcomes, as provided on the Honeywell website if I recall.
Our manuals do not fully provide that information so crews will not know whether their EGPWS is connected directly to the GPS or what it means to EGPWS accuracy if it isn't connected. Many of our a/c do not have GPS. Where some information is mentioned, (different chapters, depending on the airplane type), it is anything but clear whether the connection is "direct", or is "GPS", but through the FMC.
Whether El Al's installation takes GPS information or uses FMGC information (even given what you say), I cannot state.
As to EGPWS warnings, if not a direct GPS feed to unit, and appropriate software/terrain database installed, close to the airport, protections are disabled to virtual GPWS status due to lack of confidence in position (even if FMS has a GPS input). All EGPWS manufacturers, Boeing, Airbus, and regulatory authorities STRONGLY recommend direct GPS input to EGPWS.
Our manuals do not fully provide that information so crews will not know whether their EGPWS is connected directly to the GPS or what it means to EGPWS accuracy if it isn't connected. Many of our a/c do not have GPS. Where some information is mentioned, (different chapters, depending on the airplane type), it is anything but clear whether the connection is "direct", or is "GPS", but through the FMC.
Whether El Al's installation takes GPS information or uses FMGC information (even given what you say), I cannot state.
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Raymond - I too have flown the approach about the same number of times. While I agree its a bit "tricky" its not all that bad. Its been a while, but if I recall you come abeam the airport at 4000ft and not below, then descend to 3000, turn the corner 180 degrees and continue descent and you are on the centreline.
I've flown it both at night and during the day and there is certainly a risk of high energy as our airline data suggests, but if one briefs accordingly, slows down early and maintains terrain awareness its not difficult.
The big problem as you say is trying to lose altitude and speed at the same time. If one comes snotting in abeam at 300 knots it'll be really difficult, but from 220 downwind (which the controllers don't mind), it works a treat.
This is from someone who first flew it from the RH seat with about 400hours total time, in a 767.
Not a standard ILS, but certainly not the hardest approach I have ever flown.
Note: I have no accurate idea of what happened to the EL Al, so make no comment, the above is about the approach only!
I've flown it both at night and during the day and there is certainly a risk of high energy as our airline data suggests, but if one briefs accordingly, slows down early and maintains terrain awareness its not difficult.
The big problem as you say is trying to lose altitude and speed at the same time. If one comes snotting in abeam at 300 knots it'll be really difficult, but from 220 downwind (which the controllers don't mind), it works a treat.
This is from someone who first flew it from the RH seat with about 400hours total time, in a 767.
Not a standard ILS, but certainly not the hardest approach I have ever flown.
Note: I have no accurate idea of what happened to the EL Al, so make no comment, the above is about the approach only!
Not familiar with the reported approach, could someone confirm it happened while performing the ILS for runway 26?
As an occasional visitor to TLV, I think they are testing an ILS installation on RW30, which would augment the present non-precision or visual approach.
The VOR app onto RW30 is not approved in my airline, so we fly an RNAV visual. This is done in LNAV/VNAV with AP engaged and I have to say it is quite impressive. We used to get quite a few 'events' using this runway which have pretty much stopped with the new procedure.
I remember doing it the 'old way' and I'd agree with ornithopter and categorise the approach as 'moderately interesting' but not 'difficult'. You generally flew the extended centreline of 12, broke off and went downwind at 4,000' then were cleared for a visual onto 30. The trick seemed to be to slow up & configure early to keep the groundspeed down, which let you turn inside the hills without ending up high and fast.
** Pure speculation ** - Mod'in is about 10 miles away from TLV, which suggests they were on the NP app for 30. The fact that they got close to the ground before realising probably points to an approach in IMC and/or at night with some confusion over MDA or a platform altitude, I'd guess...
