Plane Down in Hudson River - NYC

[Dani]

Barit1, I agree that if you are very close to the runway you wont make it.

But still if you are max flexed, your climb gradient is higher than your gliding angle. Check your books. Most modern airliners have more than the needed 4-5°.

For a turn you need 2 minutes that means 1-2000 feets. You still have a little excess speed from climb out speed to best gliding speed. You also want to bank a little more than 30°, the faster you turn the faster you are on a inbound heading.

Checking the ILS: Means tune on your ILS (opposite direction) when climbing out. You will see if you are above a 3°. Do it every day and you get a feeling of how good you climb is on a average day.

Sorry, my thinking is not hindsight. I have tried this a few times and we have done it in the simulator (before the Hudson accident). If you don't like my reasoning, then ok. I just want to give you a set of tools. I'll promise you: The next similar accident will not turn out as well as this one, because ditching is a very dangerous thing, and they will not make it successfully. Everyone today thinks that ditching is the first option. It is not! It's the last.

Dani

[Obie]

Dani is obviously way ahead of the professional pilots who frequent this forum.

[BOAC]

Dani - I'm not really sure WHY I'm bothering to reply to you, but here goes, and statements like

And it is confirmed: They would have made it to La Guardia.

lead me to to seriously question your claimed profile.

However, what is the point of that statement? It may well be true. So? I'm pretty sure the crew would have been mentally reviewing the progress as it went along. Looking at the timeline I cannot believe you would have committed to La G, not being 100% sure

a) what had actually happened
b) what else might fall off
c) what the implications would be if it went wrong on finals

and

d) did the trial allow for a reduced power takeoff?
f) did it assume 'normal' climb profile to 3000'?
f) has it been 'confirmed' with 2 stopped front fans?

On that last topic I can assure you that your descent profile is NOT what you think it is. I discovered that in a Harrier. I suggest you leave this topic alone?

[olster]

Obie:nice irony.BOAC:absolutely correct.Also,'increase bank angle to turn back'.Increased bank angle equates to increased drag equals higher rate of descent.It's all in 'aerodynamics for toddlers'.Sully:you and your crew did a fantastic job under extraordinarily demanding conditions.

[p51guy]

Being above a 3 degree glideslope on the opposite runway would happen on almost every takeoff but needing to make a steep 180 degree turn makes it meaningless. Also if they aren't using that runway for arrivals that day it is probably not turned on. Sully did the only thing he could to make the best of a very bad situation without making a high risk 180 to see if he could make it back to the runway.

[punkalouver]

Originally Posted by Dani

You also want to bank a little more than 30°, the faster you turn the faster you are on a inbound heading.

Checking the ILS: Means tune on your ILS (opposite direction) when climbing out. You will see if you are above a 3°. Do it every day and you get a feeling of how good you climb is on a average day.

So on departure you are fumbling around with the ILS frequency back at the airport instead of being set up for your departure? Do you actually do this kind of stuff instead of concentrating on your departure?

And then are you supposed to land downwind on the relatively short runway?
How about some realistic statements?

[fauxpaw]

There are a lot of interesting documents on the NTSB hearing site in addition to the CVR transcript. In particular I found the flight crew interviews to be a very interesting read. A couple of examples:

from First Officer Skiles -

When asked how he liked working for the company, he said “no one likes working with the company”. He said given the alternatives it was “not so bad”.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
When asked to compare the captain’s proficiency to other pilots he had flown with, he said it was extremely high. He said the captain’s greatest strength was that he was still “blown away” by his professionalism. He could not think of an area in which the captain could improve. When asked if he heard anyone ever complain about flying with the captain, he said he never read the captain’s name on the “bathroom wall”.

from Captain Sullenberger -

In the previous interview with Captain Sullenberger, he stated that what helped him during this situation was that he “understood the concept of management of energy”. He was asked to further explain what he meant. He said he was not specifically referring to ditching but about the entire incident. He said since the situation was so time critical, at such a low speed and altitude over populated area, with so few options, he was able to fairly quickly consider all of the alternatives he was aware of and pick the one that would lead to the best outcome. There was not a lot of time to review the options. Asked where he learned about energy management, he stated the difference between flying a smaller and larger airplane is the energy involved and the total energy was the sum of two terms – height, which represents potential energy, and kinetic energy. He said raising the nose would decrease kinetic and increase potential, and vice versa. He said it was those sorts of things that were required to successfully fly a jet because there are higher speeds and altitudes involved. He thought it was something that was gained through experience.

Playing the real time animation also reinforces how very little time was available for decisions and actions.

[Dani]

I'm really sorry I have to insist. I agree with all professionals above, that the performance of crew 1539 was outstanding. I bow myself to Sully and lift my hat. Really. I just want to share some important information about this accident or similar ones. I talked to too many pilots who think that ditching is a sure thing now and that they would act from now on like Sully did. There will be a terrible accident soon, because those kind of all engine failures happen. I know that some members in this forum don't like somebody critizising a magnificent job of a fellow professional - the same mechanism that happens when a physician experience an incident in the emergency room, or another highly qualified professional gets under fire. This is poor CRM, because we all learn from experience from others, and we shouldn't close our eyes to important facts. Even when all turned out to be good.

BOAC, I highly respect you and your contributions. But you could bring on an endless lists of if's and when's. Of course he didn't know the state of his aircraft, of the path to go, of how much time left. That's why you have to stick to rules of thumbs and schematic thinking. You are looking in hindsight (not me) if you say that the ditching was succesful, that's why it was the best solution. What would you have said when something would have turned out slightly worse? What would happen if he wouldn't have made it over George Washington Bridge? Would he have flown under? Over and stalled? What if a ship would have blocked his touchdown area? At the moment he turned on HDG 220, he didn't know where he would land, and ditching was his last option (first was Teterboro).

HDG 220 was an instruction from a ATC controller who had no idea what happened. Taking on the initiative is the most important thing in a case where time factor is critical (something Captain Sullenberger did). He could never know if he would make it to Teterboro. But he knew exactly how far away he was from LGA.

As I said, if it still wouldn't have worked out back to the TO RWY, he could have ditched in the East River (the piece of water that surrounds LGA). At the time of the birds' impact, East River was closer than Hudson River (where he ditched finally). There is also better rescue service close to an airport.

From a real professional, I would expect that you can at least accept some points of my reasoning, and don't dismiss it in globo as some weird idea. It is assured that they would have made it back. So it cannot be weird. So please, all pilots in the world: Consider at least for a short moment that it is possible for some aircraft types to return to the starting point from a certain height (e.g. above thrust reduction altitude). And, please, consider ditching always as your last option. It has worked this time. Nearly never before. Never try this in the open sea (unless you have to). Try to have a plan you sit in your cockpit at all times, try to find out what you would do at a certain time at a certain point (when you don't need it yet). Ask your friendly sim instructor for a try if session time permits.

Thanks for sacrificing your valuable time to read this post,
Dani

[BOAC]

OK, Dani, I'll bite one more time. Yes, you have a theoretical point - you are probably right that there is a very good chance of getting back to the departure end of your runway in ideal circumstances. It is the stark presentation of your 'theory' that has caused all the turmoil here. Statements like the 'second best choice', 'they could have made it back', 'not the best choice' and so on.

I think you should make a big effort to meet the good Captain. Ask him what went through his mind when he came around the corner and (luckily) had a good view of the metropolis spread out around all the option airfields.

Perhaps, as you have done now, if you had tempered your initial post considerably the reaction may have been better.

[brak]

Disclaimer: I am not a pilot (clearly), I am not even a real SLF

That said, I think part of the decision making process and something that is not being discussed now, may have been mitigation of negative outcome. LaGuardia airport is located in a densely populated area. An unsuccessful return would have been a disaster not only for the passengers but potentially for a large amount of people on the ground. Going into the river avoids at least significant collateral damage, if things go badly.

As far as East River goes, if you know New York, you would notice that East River is less than half the width of Hudson, is crossed by no less than 5 bridges and has a big island in the middle (so really there are two rivers right at the same lattitude where the plane eventually landed). The portion of East River near LGA that turns to the east (Hells Gate really) is even smaller and completely unsuitable for landing (barely suitable for navigation, which I know having sailed there a time or two ). So, East River would have been a terrible choice for ditching and almost guaranteed failure.

[Marsh Hawk]

Here is Sully's own response taken directly from the NTSB flight crew interviews (links posted on previous page just before the CVR transcript).

Asked why he felt that the river was a superior landing choice, Captain Sullenberger stated that choosing to return to LGA was an irrevocable choice, and if he had made a turn toward LGA then realized he could not make it, he would have had no other options or enough altitude to return to the river. He was told that he cleared the George Washington Bridge by 900 feet. He stated before he would make the decision to land on a runway, he would need to be sure that he could make it without landing short or long, he could line up the flight path with the runway, he could stay on the runway, and that he would have a sink rate that was survivable and would not collapse the landing gear and create a post crash fire. He thought that being a little short could have been catastrophic for those on the airplane or those on the ground. He could not afford to make the wrong decision and he was confident that he could make a successful water landing.

Thoughts on choosing river or LGA into the context of Threat and Error Management: it was clear to me based on our position, altitude and airspeed and heading away from airport and time it required me to maintain control of airplane and analyze situation that a return to LGA was not possible. We were too far away, too low and too slow for TEB. Only other option that was long enough, smooth enough, wide enough was the river.

[Will Fraser]

Sully obviously subscribes to the airman's code, 'A bird in the hand is worth two in Flatbush'

[punkalouver]

I would think full flap with no power available would lead to a high sink rate and much harder landing. Partial flap is the way to go.

[Marsh Hawk]

RazorFoundation, the Captain's reasons for choosing the flaps setting can be found in the pages of the NTSB flight crew interviews. It's the one that is seventh down from the top on this main page (the 33 page document). I just spent an engaging hour reading it myself.

CD List Of Contents

[Will Fraser]

Complete guess, but it's possible that Sully figured some portion of the tail would contact the water first, and a shallow AoA might risk the nacelles biting first,, so the angle presented to the surface at touchdown allowed for more aluminum to hit and slow the a/c before the nose dropped. Look at the upturn of the hull at the aft break upward toward the tailcone, see if you get my 'drift'.

Will

[Marsh Hawk]

Okay, I went and found the section(on page 29) where Sully discusses why he chose the flaps setting, for those who don't feel like checking out the entire interview. I assure you though, it's worth reading in its entirety.

Asked about the flap setting selected prior to landing, Captain Sullenberger said that he called for flaps 2 and believed that they achieved that because he saw FO Skiles move the flap handle, felt the flap extension begin and the aircraft made the movement and sound that the flap extension usually made, and he observed on his PFD on the speed tape that a lower speed was possible. Asked why he made the decision to continue the landing with Flaps 2, Captain Sullenberger stated that there were operational advantages to using Flaps 2 that became obvious to him. He knew that going to Flaps 3 would not give him much more of an advantage in terms of lowering the stall speed and drag would have increased. He said he was concerned about having enough energy remaining to successfully flare the airplane and reduce the rate of descent sufficiently for landing. From his experience, Flaps 2 would give him a slightly higher nose attitude when landing. He said he felt that in the accident situation, Flaps 2 was the optimum setting.

[Diamond Bob]

East River was closer than Hudson River (where he ditched finally). There is also better rescue service close to an airport.

I doubt very much that any "rescue service" at LGA would have been any match for Vince Lombardi and his fellow skippers at NY Waterway.

Also, Dani, you seem so sure he could have made it back to the runway, yet just a few posts previous someone was saying that sim tests showed pilots making it back 50% of the time.

[Intruder]

Maybe because with the more stabilized approach he accomplished, he already had as close to a "zero flight path angle" as was required!

When was the last time you leveled off from an idle descent at Flaps 2 (or 20) and decelerated?

When was the last time you tried to level off as you threw out all your flaps, and did not descend even 1" below the target altitude?

[Intruder]

I talked to too many pilots who think that ditching is a sure thing now and that they would act from now on like Sully did. There will be a terrible accident soon, because those kind of all engine failures happen.

How many pilots? How many experienced airline pilots?

It's one thing to try to land a light twin with 1 or 2 people in the water, but a whole different ball game with a fast, heavy airplane with a couple hundred!

Any pilot with any sense would realize that the environment in the Hudson River that day was as benign as could ever happen -- no waves, current with the airplane... To expect such a benign environment as a "sure thing" is total insanity!

[muduckace]

Late in the game here

Forgive me if this has not come up before but the threads are allmost in the thouands.

I had allways thought the ideal water ditch to be high AOA allowing the aircraft to slow gradually. The hudson river experience gave me a visual of a low AOA thus allowing the wings (especially engines) to provide the most stable encounter with terra agua. (most past have been a nasty snap and roll)

Being the first water sucessfull ditching soo well doccumented by video... Question?? Have any of of you pilots here been taught to water ditch at a low AOA or has this sucessfull procedure created a new standard for water ditching?