Plane Down in Hudson River - NYC
Zone,
Same with our ops. Cosmo means well, but really doesn't know what he's talking about.
Leave the APU on for takeoff as SOP? Unless needed for MEL or performance issues, leave it off.
Want to leave it on Cosmo? Fine. In the future we could have a 45 page thread regarding an accident where the crew aborted and burned after getting a APU fault light before V1. Pick your favorite "can of worms" off the shelf for opening at anytime Cosmo
Same with our ops. Cosmo means well, but really doesn't know what he's talking about.
Leave the APU on for takeoff as SOP? Unless needed for MEL or performance issues, leave it off.
Want to leave it on Cosmo? Fine. In the future we could have a 45 page thread regarding an accident where the crew aborted and burned after getting a APU fault light before V1. Pick your favorite "can of worms" off the shelf for opening at anytime Cosmo
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Update On Ntsb Public Hearing Re Us Airways A-320 Hudson River Ditching Accident
************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
June 4, 2009
************************************************************
UPDATE ON NTSB PUBLIC HEARING ON THE US AIRWAYS A-320 HUDSON
RIVER DITCHING ACCIDENT
************************************************************
The National Transportation Safety Board today released
additional information about the Board's scheduled public
hearing on the January 2009 ditching of the US Airways A-320
into the Hudson River.
The hearing, originally scheduled for two days, has been
expanded to three. It will convene at 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday,
June 9, 2009, and is expected to conclude mid-day on
Thursday, June 11. It will be held at the NTSB's Board Room
and Conference Center, 429 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington,
D.C. The room is lighted for television and a mult box is
provided for sound.
On January 15, 2009, at approximately 3:27 p.m. EST, US
Airways flight 1549, an Airbus Industrie A320 bound for
Charlotte, North Carolina, incurred multiple bird strikes
during its initial departure climb from New York's La
Guardia Airport (LGA). The airplane subsequently lost thrust
to its engines and ditched in the Hudson River approximately
three and a half minutes after striking the birds and about
five minutes after leaving LGA. To date, of the five
crewmembers and 150 passengers on board, five serious
injuries have been reported.
The Safety Board will also open the public docket at the
start of the hearing. The public may view and download the
docket contents on the web under the "FOIA Reading Room" at
http://www.ntsb.gov/Info/foia_fri-dockets.htm at that time.
The information being released is factual in nature and does
not provide analysis or the probable cause of the accident.
The docket will include investigative group factual reports,
interview transcripts, Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
transcripts, Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data and other
documents from the investigation. In addition, docket items
that will be used as exhibits during the public hearing will
be available on the website under "Public Hearings"
The hearing, which is part of the Safety Board's efforts to
develop all appropriate facts for the investigation, will
cover a wide range of safety issues including:
* Pilot training regarding ditching and forced landings on
water.
* Bird detection and mitigation efforts.
* Certification standards regarding ditching and forced
landings on water for transport-category airplanes.
* Cabin safety training, emergency procedures and equipment.
* Certification standards for bird ingestion into transport-
category airplane engines.
An agenda is posted on the Board's website at
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2009/agenda.htm. A live webcast
of the proceedings will be available on the Board's website
at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/hearing_sched.htm. Technical
support details are available under "Board Meetings." To
report any problems, please call 703-993-3100 and ask for
Webcast Technical Support.
Directions to the NTSB Board Room: Front door located on
Lower 10th Street, directly below L'Enfant Plaza. From
Metro, exit L'Enfant Plaza station at 9th and D Streets
escalator, walk through shopping mall, at the CVS store (on
the left), and take escalator (on the right) down one level.
The Board room will be to your left.
###
Media Contact: Peter Knudson
(202) 314-6100
[email protected]
************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
June 4, 2009
************************************************************
UPDATE ON NTSB PUBLIC HEARING ON THE US AIRWAYS A-320 HUDSON
RIVER DITCHING ACCIDENT
************************************************************
The National Transportation Safety Board today released
additional information about the Board's scheduled public
hearing on the January 2009 ditching of the US Airways A-320
into the Hudson River.
The hearing, originally scheduled for two days, has been
expanded to three. It will convene at 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday,
June 9, 2009, and is expected to conclude mid-day on
Thursday, June 11. It will be held at the NTSB's Board Room
and Conference Center, 429 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington,
D.C. The room is lighted for television and a mult box is
provided for sound.
On January 15, 2009, at approximately 3:27 p.m. EST, US
Airways flight 1549, an Airbus Industrie A320 bound for
Charlotte, North Carolina, incurred multiple bird strikes
during its initial departure climb from New York's La
Guardia Airport (LGA). The airplane subsequently lost thrust
to its engines and ditched in the Hudson River approximately
three and a half minutes after striking the birds and about
five minutes after leaving LGA. To date, of the five
crewmembers and 150 passengers on board, five serious
injuries have been reported.
The Safety Board will also open the public docket at the
start of the hearing. The public may view and download the
docket contents on the web under the "FOIA Reading Room" at
http://www.ntsb.gov/Info/foia_fri-dockets.htm at that time.
The information being released is factual in nature and does
not provide analysis or the probable cause of the accident.
The docket will include investigative group factual reports,
interview transcripts, Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
transcripts, Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data and other
documents from the investigation. In addition, docket items
that will be used as exhibits during the public hearing will
be available on the website under "Public Hearings"
The hearing, which is part of the Safety Board's efforts to
develop all appropriate facts for the investigation, will
cover a wide range of safety issues including:
* Pilot training regarding ditching and forced landings on
water.
* Bird detection and mitigation efforts.
* Certification standards regarding ditching and forced
landings on water for transport-category airplanes.
* Cabin safety training, emergency procedures and equipment.
* Certification standards for bird ingestion into transport-
category airplane engines.
An agenda is posted on the Board's website at
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2009/agenda.htm. A live webcast
of the proceedings will be available on the Board's website
at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/hearing_sched.htm. Technical
support details are available under "Board Meetings." To
report any problems, please call 703-993-3100 and ask for
Webcast Technical Support.
Directions to the NTSB Board Room: Front door located on
Lower 10th Street, directly below L'Enfant Plaza. From
Metro, exit L'Enfant Plaza station at 9th and D Streets
escalator, walk through shopping mall, at the CVS store (on
the left), and take escalator (on the right) down one level.
The Board room will be to your left.
###
Media Contact: Peter Knudson
(202) 314-6100
[email protected]
************************************************************
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Plane’s Impact With Hudson Recalled as ‘Violent’ Jolt
The New York Times reports about the first day of the hearing of the NTSB about the ditching in the Hudson River.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/ny...0usair.html?hp
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/ny...0usair.html?hp
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The NTSB have released the cockpit voice recorder transcript and the flight data recorder analysis during the currently ongoing three days hearing into the accident.
At 15:25:09 TOGA (takeoff thrust) is set and a normal departure commenced for 2 minutes, then:
15:27:10.4 HOT-1: birds.
15:27:11.0 HOT-2: whoa.
15:27:11.4 CAM: [sound of thump/thud(s) followed by shuddering sound]
15:27:12.0 HOT-2: oh #.
15:27:13.0 HOT-1: oh yeah.
15:27:13.0 CAM: [sound similar to decrease in engine noise/frequency begins]
15:27:14.0 HOT-2: uh oh.
15:27:15.0 HOT-1: we got one rol- both of 'em rolling back.
15:27:18.0 CAM: [rumbling sound begins and continues until approximately 15:28:08]
15:27:18.5 HOT-1: ignition, start.
15:27:21.3 HOT-1: I'm starting the APU.
15:27:22.4 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:27:23.2 HOT-1: my aircraft.
15:27:24.0 HOT-2: your aircraft.
15:27:24.4 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:27:25.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters begins]
15:27:26.5 FWC: priority left. [auto callout from the FWC. this occurs when the sidestick priority button is activated on the Captain's sidestick]
15:27:26.5 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:27:28.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters ends]
15:27:28.0 HOT-1: get the QRH... [Quick Reference Handbook] loss of thrust on both engines.
15:27:30.0 FWC: [sound of single chime begins and repeats at approximately 5.7 second intervals until 15:27:59]
15:27:32.9 RDO-1: mayday mayday mayday. uh this is uh Cactus fifteen thirty nine hit birds, we've lost thrust (in/on) both engines we're turning back towards LaGuardia.
15:27:42.0 DEP: ok uh, you need to return to LaGuardia? turn left heading of uh two two zero.
15:27:43.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters begins]
15:27:44.0 FWC: [sound of single chime, between the single chimes at 5.7 second intervals]
15:27:46.0 RDO-1: two two zero.
15:27:50.0 HOT-2: if fuel remaining, engine mode selector, ignition.* ignition.
15:27:54.0 HOT-1: ignition.
15:27:55.0 HOT-2: thrust levers confirm idle.
15:27:58.0 HOT-1: idle.
15:28:02.0 HOT-2: airspeed optimum relight. three hundred knots. we don't have that.
15:28:03.0 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:28:05.0 HOT-1: we don't.
15:28:05.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine, if we can get it for you do you want to try to land runway one three?
15:28:05.0 CAM-2: if three nineteen-
15:28:10.6 RDO-1: we're unable. we may end up in the Hudson.
15:28:14.0 HOT-2: emergency electrical power... emergency generator not online.
15:28:18.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters ends]
15:28:19.0 HOT-1: (it’s/is) online.
15:28:21.0 HOT-2: ATC notify. squawk seventy seven hundred.
15:28:25.0 HOT-1: yeah. the left one's coming back up a little bit.
15:28:30.0 HOT-2: distress message, transmit. we did.
15:28:31.0 DEP: arright Cactus fifteen forty nine its gonna be left traffic for runway three one.
15:28:35.0 RDO-1: unable.
15:28:36.0 TCAS: traffic traffic.
15:28:36.0 DEP: okay, what do you need to land?
15:28:37.0 HOT-2: (he wants us) to come in and land on one three...for whatever.
15:28:45.0 PWS: go around. windshear ahead.
15:28:45.0 HOT-2: FAC [Flight Augmentation Computer] one off, then on.
15:28:46.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen (twenty) nine runway four's available if you wanna make left traffic to runway four.
15:28:49.9 RDO-1: I'm not sure we can make any runway. uh what's over to our right anything in New Jersey maybe Teterboro?
15:28:55.0 DEP: ok yeah, off your right side is Teterboro airport.
15:28:59.0 TCAS: monitor vertical speed.
15:29:00.0 HOT-2: no relight after thirty seconds, engine master one and two confirm-
15:29:02.0 DEP: you wanna try and go to Teterboro?
15:29:03.0 RDO-1: yes.
15:29:05.0 TCAS: clear of conflict.
15:29:07.0 HOT-2: -off.
15:29:07.0 HOT-1: off.
15:29:10.0 HOT-2: wait thirty seconds.
15:29:11.0 PA-1: this is the Captain brace for impact.
15:29:14.9 GPWS: one thousand.
15:29:16.0 HOT-2: engine master two, back on.
15:29:18.0 HOT-1: back on.
15:29:19.0 HOT-2: on.
15:29:21.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine turn right two eight zero, you can land runway one at Teterboro.
15:29:21.0 CAM-2: is that all the power you got? * (wanna) number one? or we got power on number one.
15:29:25.0 RDO-1: we can't do it.
15:29:26.0 HOT-1: go ahead, try number one.
15:29:27.0 DEP: kay which runway would you like at Teterboro?
15:29:27.0 FWC: [sound of continuous repetitive chime for 9.6 seconds ]
15:29:28.0 RDO-1: we're gonna be in the Hudson.
15:29:33.0 DEP: I'm sorry say again Cactus?
15:29:36.0 HOT-2: I put it back on.
15:29:37.0 FWC: [sound of continuous repetitive chime for 37.4 seconds ]
15:29:37.0 HOT-1: ok put it back on... put it back on.
15:29:37.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:29:41.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:29:43.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:29:44.0 HOT-2: no relight.
15:29:45.4 HOT-1: ok lets go put the flaps out, put the flaps out.
15:29:45.0 EGPWS: caution. terrain.
15:29:48.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:29:48.0 HOT-2: flaps out?
15:29:49.0 EGPWS: terrain terrain. pull up. pull up.
15:29:51.0 DEP: Cactus uh....
15:29:53.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen forty nine radar contact is lost you also got Newark airport off your two o'clock in about seven miles.
15:29:55.0 EGPWS: pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up.
15:30:01.0 HOT-2: got flaps out.
15:30:03.0 HOT-2: two hundred fifty feet in the air.
15:30:04.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:30:06.0 GPWS: too low. gear.
15:30:06.0 CAM-2: hundred and seventy knots.
15:30:09.0 CAM-2: got no power on either one? try the other one.
15:30:09.0 4718: two one zero uh forty seven eighteen. I think he said he's goin in the Hudson.
15:30:11.0 HOT-1: try the other one.
15:30:13.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:30:14.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine uh, you still on?
15:30:15.0 FWC: [sound of continuous repetitive chime begins and continues to end of recording]
15:30:15.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:30:16.0 HOT-2: hundred and fifty knots.
15:30:17.0 HOT-2: got flaps two, you want more?
15:30:19.0 HOT-1: no lets stay at two.
15:30:21.0 HOT-1: got any ideas?15:30:22.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine if you can uh....you got uh runway uh two nine available at Newark it'll be two o'clock and seven miles.
15:30:23.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:30:23.0 CAM-2: actually not.
15:30:24.0 EGPWS: terrain terrain. pull up. pull up. ["pull up" repeats until the end of the recording]
15:30:38.0 HOT-1: we're gonna brace.
15:30:38.0 HOT-2: * * switch?
15:30:40.0 HOT-1: yes.
15:30:41.1 GPWS: (fifty or thirty)
15:30:42.0 FWC: retard.
15:30:43.7 [End of Recording]
15:30:43.7 [End of Transcript]
To both of them
HOT-1: Hot microphone 1 (captain)
HOT-2: Hot microphone 2 (first officer)
RDO: radio transmissions from US1549
DEP: radio transmissions from La Guardia Departure Control
CAM: cockpit area microphones
4718: radio transmission from flight Eagle 4718
FWC: flight warning computer
TCAS: traffic and collision avoidance system
PWS: predicitive windshear system
GPWS: ground proximity warning system
EGPWS: enhanced ground proximity warning system
At 15:25:09 TOGA (takeoff thrust) is set and a normal departure commenced for 2 minutes, then:
15:27:10.4 HOT-1: birds.
15:27:11.0 HOT-2: whoa.
15:27:11.4 CAM: [sound of thump/thud(s) followed by shuddering sound]
15:27:12.0 HOT-2: oh #.
15:27:13.0 HOT-1: oh yeah.
15:27:13.0 CAM: [sound similar to decrease in engine noise/frequency begins]
15:27:14.0 HOT-2: uh oh.
15:27:15.0 HOT-1: we got one rol- both of 'em rolling back.
15:27:18.0 CAM: [rumbling sound begins and continues until approximately 15:28:08]
15:27:18.5 HOT-1: ignition, start.
15:27:21.3 HOT-1: I'm starting the APU.
15:27:22.4 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:27:23.2 HOT-1: my aircraft.
15:27:24.0 HOT-2: your aircraft.
15:27:24.4 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:27:25.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters begins]
15:27:26.5 FWC: priority left. [auto callout from the FWC. this occurs when the sidestick priority button is activated on the Captain's sidestick]
15:27:26.5 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:27:28.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters ends]
15:27:28.0 HOT-1: get the QRH... [Quick Reference Handbook] loss of thrust on both engines.
15:27:30.0 FWC: [sound of single chime begins and repeats at approximately 5.7 second intervals until 15:27:59]
15:27:32.9 RDO-1: mayday mayday mayday. uh this is uh Cactus fifteen thirty nine hit birds, we've lost thrust (in/on) both engines we're turning back towards LaGuardia.
15:27:42.0 DEP: ok uh, you need to return to LaGuardia? turn left heading of uh two two zero.
15:27:43.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters begins]
15:27:44.0 FWC: [sound of single chime, between the single chimes at 5.7 second intervals]
15:27:46.0 RDO-1: two two zero.
15:27:50.0 HOT-2: if fuel remaining, engine mode selector, ignition.* ignition.
15:27:54.0 HOT-1: ignition.
15:27:55.0 HOT-2: thrust levers confirm idle.
15:27:58.0 HOT-1: idle.
15:28:02.0 HOT-2: airspeed optimum relight. three hundred knots. we don't have that.
15:28:03.0 FWC: [sound of single chime]
15:28:05.0 HOT-1: we don't.
15:28:05.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine, if we can get it for you do you want to try to land runway one three?
15:28:05.0 CAM-2: if three nineteen-
15:28:10.6 RDO-1: we're unable. we may end up in the Hudson.
15:28:14.0 HOT-2: emergency electrical power... emergency generator not online.
15:28:18.0 CAM: [sound similar to electrical noise from engine igniters ends]
15:28:19.0 HOT-1: (it’s/is) online.
15:28:21.0 HOT-2: ATC notify. squawk seventy seven hundred.
15:28:25.0 HOT-1: yeah. the left one's coming back up a little bit.
15:28:30.0 HOT-2: distress message, transmit. we did.
15:28:31.0 DEP: arright Cactus fifteen forty nine its gonna be left traffic for runway three one.
15:28:35.0 RDO-1: unable.
15:28:36.0 TCAS: traffic traffic.
15:28:36.0 DEP: okay, what do you need to land?
15:28:37.0 HOT-2: (he wants us) to come in and land on one three...for whatever.
15:28:45.0 PWS: go around. windshear ahead.
15:28:45.0 HOT-2: FAC [Flight Augmentation Computer] one off, then on.
15:28:46.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen (twenty) nine runway four's available if you wanna make left traffic to runway four.
15:28:49.9 RDO-1: I'm not sure we can make any runway. uh what's over to our right anything in New Jersey maybe Teterboro?
15:28:55.0 DEP: ok yeah, off your right side is Teterboro airport.
15:28:59.0 TCAS: monitor vertical speed.
15:29:00.0 HOT-2: no relight after thirty seconds, engine master one and two confirm-
15:29:02.0 DEP: you wanna try and go to Teterboro?
15:29:03.0 RDO-1: yes.
15:29:05.0 TCAS: clear of conflict.
15:29:07.0 HOT-2: -off.
15:29:07.0 HOT-1: off.
15:29:10.0 HOT-2: wait thirty seconds.
15:29:11.0 PA-1: this is the Captain brace for impact.
15:29:14.9 GPWS: one thousand.
15:29:16.0 HOT-2: engine master two, back on.
15:29:18.0 HOT-1: back on.
15:29:19.0 HOT-2: on.
15:29:21.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine turn right two eight zero, you can land runway one at Teterboro.
15:29:21.0 CAM-2: is that all the power you got? * (wanna) number one? or we got power on number one.
15:29:25.0 RDO-1: we can't do it.
15:29:26.0 HOT-1: go ahead, try number one.
15:29:27.0 DEP: kay which runway would you like at Teterboro?
15:29:27.0 FWC: [sound of continuous repetitive chime for 9.6 seconds ]
15:29:28.0 RDO-1: we're gonna be in the Hudson.
15:29:33.0 DEP: I'm sorry say again Cactus?
15:29:36.0 HOT-2: I put it back on.
15:29:37.0 FWC: [sound of continuous repetitive chime for 37.4 seconds ]
15:29:37.0 HOT-1: ok put it back on... put it back on.
15:29:37.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:29:41.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:29:43.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:29:44.0 HOT-2: no relight.
15:29:45.4 HOT-1: ok lets go put the flaps out, put the flaps out.
15:29:45.0 EGPWS: caution. terrain.
15:29:48.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:29:48.0 HOT-2: flaps out?
15:29:49.0 EGPWS: terrain terrain. pull up. pull up.
15:29:51.0 DEP: Cactus uh....
15:29:53.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen forty nine radar contact is lost you also got Newark airport off your two o'clock in about seven miles.
15:29:55.0 EGPWS: pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up. pull up.
15:30:01.0 HOT-2: got flaps out.
15:30:03.0 HOT-2: two hundred fifty feet in the air.
15:30:04.0 GPWS: too low. terrain.
15:30:06.0 GPWS: too low. gear.
15:30:06.0 CAM-2: hundred and seventy knots.
15:30:09.0 CAM-2: got no power on either one? try the other one.
15:30:09.0 4718: two one zero uh forty seven eighteen. I think he said he's goin in the Hudson.
15:30:11.0 HOT-1: try the other one.
15:30:13.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:30:14.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine uh, you still on?
15:30:15.0 FWC: [sound of continuous repetitive chime begins and continues to end of recording]
15:30:15.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:30:16.0 HOT-2: hundred and fifty knots.
15:30:17.0 HOT-2: got flaps two, you want more?
15:30:19.0 HOT-1: no lets stay at two.
15:30:21.0 HOT-1: got any ideas?15:30:22.0 DEP: Cactus fifteen twenty nine if you can uh....you got uh runway uh two nine available at Newark it'll be two o'clock and seven miles.
15:30:23.0 EGPWS: caution terrain.
15:30:23.0 CAM-2: actually not.
15:30:24.0 EGPWS: terrain terrain. pull up. pull up. ["pull up" repeats until the end of the recording]
15:30:38.0 HOT-1: we're gonna brace.
15:30:38.0 HOT-2: * * switch?
15:30:40.0 HOT-1: yes.
15:30:41.1 GPWS: (fifty or thirty)
15:30:42.0 FWC: retard.
15:30:43.7 [End of Recording]
15:30:43.7 [End of Transcript]
To both of themHOT-1: Hot microphone 1 (captain)
HOT-2: Hot microphone 2 (first officer)
RDO: radio transmissions from US1549
DEP: radio transmissions from La Guardia Departure Control
CAM: cockpit area microphones
4718: radio transmission from flight Eagle 4718
FWC: flight warning computer
TCAS: traffic and collision avoidance system
PWS: predicitive windshear system
GPWS: ground proximity warning system
EGPWS: enhanced ground proximity warning system
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Amazing - shiver runs down my spine when I read it. Again, congratulation to the crew.
And it is confirmed: They would have made it to La Guardia. In cases like these, if you make it 2 engines up to this point, you always can make it back if you lost them! Just turn immediatly back to your runway. If you are in doubt, tune your ILS and you see if you are above or below the 3 degrees. All engine out would be about 4-5 degrees depending on your configuration. You might want to have a small margin.
Dani
And it is confirmed: They would have made it to La Guardia. In cases like these, if you make it 2 engines up to this point, you always can make it back if you lost them! Just turn immediatly back to your runway. If you are in doubt, tune your ILS and you see if you are above or below the 3 degrees. All engine out would be about 4-5 degrees depending on your configuration. You might want to have a small margin.
Dani
Is that an expected response from a pilot? or is aviate-navigate-communicate (which takes more time) a more likely response?
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You might want to have a small margin.
With several hundred lives potentially at stake, both on board and on the ground, a small margin ain't good enough.
Besides, the GS check would only be valid AFTER you've lost a significant amount of energy doing a 180. By that time, you've run out of options.
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It's confirmed they would have made it back to LaGuardia? I haven't seen any quotes from the captain or co-pilot of that flight that says anything of the sort.
The only reference I can find is in the NY Times link posted above by DLH208 about the touchdown point being further away than the runway, evident in hindsight. Sully commented "I couldn't afford to be wrong" about returning to the airport.
I'm not sure how this translates to a confirmation that they would have made it, unless somebody's run a few simulator re-enactments on this particular flight?
The only reference I can find is in the NY Times link posted above by DLH208 about the touchdown point being further away than the runway, evident in hindsight. Sully commented "I couldn't afford to be wrong" about returning to the airport.
I'm not sure how this translates to a confirmation that they would have made it, unless somebody's run a few simulator re-enactments on this particular flight?
Last edited by Marsh Hawk; 10th Jun 2009 at 18:20.
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playing the odds game
It has been reported that the NTSB has conducted sim tests with pilots to see could they have made it back to LGA ,with a success rate of around 50%
And these pilots may probably have expected the failure or at least were aware that they were in a sim with no pressure as to the outcome. !
So , in my humble opinion, the crew here made the absolute best decision in short time with immense pressure. 50 % isnt good enough !
And these pilots may probably have expected the failure or at least were aware that they were in a sim with no pressure as to the outcome. !
So , in my humble opinion, the crew here made the absolute best decision in short time with immense pressure. 50 % isnt good enough !
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Don't get me wrong. I admire the Cactus crew and said that they did a perfect job.
The decision to ditch was only the second best though.
The only error was that they accepted the HDG 220.
My decision at this very moment would have been: "negative, turning back to La Guardia immediatly." ATC would have needed to clear the way.
The thinking of Sully (“I couldn’t afford to be wrong.”) is absolutely correct. No human being can calculate in a split second if it is enough or not. But if you did your thinking ahead (we call it anticipated decisionmaking), you don't have to do the decision when you need it. The decision is: if you can make it out on two engines, you can always make it back without. Try it out in the sim. It always works!
My "small margin" was ment for the descent planning, not for the safety thinking. It means: plan that you have a little more altitude than you might want to have. But not too much, because if you are too high it's as dangerous as too low. If it still doesn't work: Turn away and make your ditching parallel to La Guardia.
I also don't think that the ditching-decision was more than a small safety margin, because history has shown that a succesful ditching was very unlikely. They only ditched because they had no other option at that later stage. We don't know how the chances where for ditching, probably far less than 50%.
Finally I repeat that I don't want to blame anyone and mostly not the US1539 crew. I just want to share my experience to others who might once need it. The ditching worked this time. Maybe next time not.
Dani
The decision to ditch was only the second best though.
The only error was that they accepted the HDG 220.
My decision at this very moment would have been: "negative, turning back to La Guardia immediatly." ATC would have needed to clear the way.
The thinking of Sully (“I couldn’t afford to be wrong.”) is absolutely correct. No human being can calculate in a split second if it is enough or not. But if you did your thinking ahead (we call it anticipated decisionmaking), you don't have to do the decision when you need it. The decision is: if you can make it out on two engines, you can always make it back without. Try it out in the sim. It always works!
My "small margin" was ment for the descent planning, not for the safety thinking. It means: plan that you have a little more altitude than you might want to have. But not too much, because if you are too high it's as dangerous as too low. If it still doesn't work: Turn away and make your ditching parallel to La Guardia.
I also don't think that the ditching-decision was more than a small safety margin, because history has shown that a succesful ditching was very unlikely. They only ditched because they had no other option at that later stage. We don't know how the chances where for ditching, probably far less than 50%.
Finally I repeat that I don't want to blame anyone and mostly not the US1539 crew. I just want to share my experience to others who might once need it. The ditching worked this time. Maybe next time not.
Dani
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Dani, I have little doubt that a modern twin operating at low TOW and TOGA (rated) thrust will perform as you describe. But that's not how modern airliners are operated; running out of EGT margin prematurely gets pretty expensive.
Have you tried this 180 stunt on a long runway using all available Tflex (Tass, etc)? Might discover a pucker factor there.
Have you tried this 180 stunt on a long runway using all available Tflex (Tass, etc)? Might discover a pucker factor there.
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Stupid!
"And it is confirmed: They would have made it to La Guardia. In cases like these, if you make it 2 engines up to this point, you always can make it back if you lost them! Just turn immediatly back to your runway. If you are in doubt, tune your ILS and you see if you are above or below the 3 degrees. All engine out would be about 4-5 degrees depending on your configuration. You might want to have a small margin.Dani"
Tune your ILS??? The ILS for the runway you just departed has the GS beam pointed behind you, not at you! Quick, what's the ILS freq for the opposite runway? Oh, if it exists, it almost assuredly turned off. Do you even know Glidleslope beam width to know how high you are? Didn't think so.
GB
Sorry, folks, for the rant.
Tune your ILS??? The ILS for the runway you just departed has the GS beam pointed behind you, not at you! Quick, what's the ILS freq for the opposite runway? Oh, if it exists, it almost assuredly turned off. Do you even know Glidleslope beam width to know how high you are? Didn't think so.
GB
Sorry, folks, for the rant.
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I'd prefer that we drew a line under all this 'perfect hindsight' guff and moved on. Much as I dislike the release of CVRs, now that it is 'out', may I with huge respect for C Sully and his crew suggest it be kept for posterity and used as an example of 'how to do it'? I am enormously impressed.
Sully and his crew pulled off the most amazing aeronautical feat for many a year.Any 20/20 hindsight commentary such as 'they could have made it back to LGA' highlights some of the utter,ill-informed,anonymous garbage that passes for expert opinion on pprune.
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Well said BOAC.
Until it happens to you you don't know how you will react.
They did a great a great job,they all walked away and they can always get a new aircraft !
I guess Dani you have never had a total engine failure at low level for real,try it, it may just change your view on things.
Until it happens to you you don't know how you will react.
They did a great a great job,they all walked away and they can always get a new aircraft !
I guess Dani you have never had a total engine failure at low level for real,try it, it may just change your view on things.