EZY Captain gets the boot
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Thats fine willie. I'm not suggesting you were in the "arrogant" bracket!
I'm sure, and I would hope that just as I have found very few captains to be in the complacent and arrogant camp you hopefully find relatively few guys of my experience level to be over-exuberant and ego driven. 
The widely varying experience levels on the flight deck at ezy makes the need for a clearly defined policy on stable approaches and adherence to SOP important, but I can't help thinking the management were looking for a "victim" with this case. FDM data alone without extensive investigation into the other variables is surely not enough to terminate someone's employment.
The captain who is the subject matter of this thread was neither arrogant or complacent, and I always found him to be a safe operator.
One arrogance bought about by over exuberance and ego and othe other arrogance brought about by complacency and ego.
The widely varying experience levels on the flight deck at ezy makes the need for a clearly defined policy on stable approaches and adherence to SOP important, but I can't help thinking the management were looking for a "victim" with this case. FDM data alone without extensive investigation into the other variables is surely not enough to terminate someone's employment.
The captain who is the subject matter of this thread was neither arrogant or complacent, and I always found him to be a safe operator.
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SR71
For that to be true BALPA would have to be complicit in things as they have to give permission before the specifics of any violation can be released to the company. The exception being if an ASR is filed for said incident.
I have gone through 500' at bug plus 15 before due to environmental factors with the throttles close to the idle gate and never had so much as a phone call which to me suggests some degree of common sense applies. Of course prior to that the approach had been sensably managed and was not rushed. I am also aware of several other significant incidents which could have led to an individuals demotion or sacking when common sense was applied.
If this chap has been the victim of some sort of vendetta by senior managers (which I personaly find hard to believe) then he will have grounds for constructive dismissal in which case the Flidras data and the handling of previous incidents would work in his favour and I'm sure BALPA would take his case up as they would have been fully aware of the proceedings.
For my money one of two things has happened here
1 The incident was so serious the company had no real choice.
2 The Captain was asked to attend a debrief of the incident and selected the wrong attitude in the debrief which then led to concern over the way he would operate in the future and therefore dismissal.
For that to be true BALPA would have to be complicit in things as they have to give permission before the specifics of any violation can be released to the company. The exception being if an ASR is filed for said incident.
I have gone through 500' at bug plus 15 before due to environmental factors with the throttles close to the idle gate and never had so much as a phone call which to me suggests some degree of common sense applies. Of course prior to that the approach had been sensably managed and was not rushed. I am also aware of several other significant incidents which could have led to an individuals demotion or sacking when common sense was applied.
If this chap has been the victim of some sort of vendetta by senior managers (which I personaly find hard to believe) then he will have grounds for constructive dismissal in which case the Flidras data and the handling of previous incidents would work in his favour and I'm sure BALPA would take his case up as they would have been fully aware of the proceedings.
For my money one of two things has happened here
1 The incident was so serious the company had no real choice.
2 The Captain was asked to attend a debrief of the incident and selected the wrong attitude in the debrief which then led to concern over the way he would operate in the future and therefore dismissal.
BitMore...
You are obviously well informed on this case. Do enlighten us.....
Or are you just making wild guesses based on nothing coming anywhere near factaul evidence?
Or perhaps arguing for the sake of it!
FDM data alone without extensive investigation into the other variables is surely not enough to terminate someone's employment.
Or are you just making wild guesses based on nothing coming anywhere near factaul evidence?
Or perhaps arguing for the sake of it!
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The 1000' IMC and 500' AAL are ICAO recommended figures. The Blue Book.
Airlines follow these recommendations in the same way that they take a certain amount of fuel as reserves or avoid obstacles by a certain minimum amount. These airlines are following 'best practice' as detailed in the ICAO document.
Those airlines that choose not to follow these recommendations are simply choosing to ignore what has become the industry standard procedures to improve flight safety.
The use of the OFDM/FLIDRAS data to initiate contact, through Base Facilitator, with an individual is also 'best practice' and is used in the event that a pilot has exceeded a Class 2 limitation or regularly exceeds the same limitation. To allow the pilot to continue flying in the same manner after this knowledge has been unearthed would be foolish in the extreme.
It will only be a matter of time before the pilot exceeds the limitation to such an extent that recovery will be a matter of chance or damage or destruction will occur.
If a pilot has been warned, perhaps more than once, that his flying is outside the accepted norms and then chooses to ignore that advice and once again triggers the FLIDRAS/OFDM then his actions will finally be made known to the airline management.
If this sequence of events takes place then it is almost certain that he deserves no more than his P45 and a view of the door.
I am certain that this is the procedure followed here by easyJet.
Airlines follow these recommendations in the same way that they take a certain amount of fuel as reserves or avoid obstacles by a certain minimum amount. These airlines are following 'best practice' as detailed in the ICAO document.
Those airlines that choose not to follow these recommendations are simply choosing to ignore what has become the industry standard procedures to improve flight safety.
The use of the OFDM/FLIDRAS data to initiate contact, through Base Facilitator, with an individual is also 'best practice' and is used in the event that a pilot has exceeded a Class 2 limitation or regularly exceeds the same limitation. To allow the pilot to continue flying in the same manner after this knowledge has been unearthed would be foolish in the extreme.
It will only be a matter of time before the pilot exceeds the limitation to such an extent that recovery will be a matter of chance or damage or destruction will occur.
If a pilot has been warned, perhaps more than once, that his flying is outside the accepted norms and then chooses to ignore that advice and once again triggers the FLIDRAS/OFDM then his actions will finally be made known to the airline management.
If this sequence of events takes place then it is almost certain that he deserves no more than his P45 and a view of the door.
I am certain that this is the procedure followed here by easyJet.
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The 1000' IMC and 500' AAL are ICAO recommended figures. The Blue Book.
Airlines follow these recommendations in the same way that they take a certain amount of fuel as reserves or avoid obstacles by a certain minimum amount. These airlines are following 'best practice' as detailed in the ICAO document.
Those airlines that choose not to follow these recommendations are simply choosing to ignore what has become the industry standard procedures to improve flight safety.
Airlines follow these recommendations in the same way that they take a certain amount of fuel as reserves or avoid obstacles by a certain minimum amount. These airlines are following 'best practice' as detailed in the ICAO document.
Those airlines that choose not to follow these recommendations are simply choosing to ignore what has become the industry standard procedures to improve flight safety.
The use of the OFDM/FLIDRAS data to initiate contact, through Base Facilitator, with an individual is also 'best practice' and is used in the event that a pilot has exceeded a Class 2 limitation or regularly exceeds the same limitation. To allow the pilot to continue flying in the same manner after this knowledge has been unearthed would be foolish in the extreme.
i)the purpose of QAR data retrieval must be to detect persistent occurrences and not isolated incidents.A pattern must be proven.
ii)all data confidential in accordance with union rules
iii)right to appeal
It will only be a matter of time before the pilot exceeds the limitation to such an extent that recovery will be a matter of chance or damage or destruction will occur.
If a pilot has been warned, perhaps more than once, that his flying is outside the accepted norms and then chooses to ignore that advice and once again triggers the FLIDRAS/OFDM then his actions will finally be made known to the airline management.
If this sequence of events takes place then it is almost certain that he deserves no more than his P45 and a view of the door.
I am certain that this is the procedure followed here by easyJet.
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kick the tires
I know the guy well, in my opinion he didn't deserve to be sacked. Simple really. I'm hardly going to give the finer details in a public forum. That's not up to me.
Besides which, your posts on the matter indicate you have some knowledge of the individual concerned, and you feel his termination was justified. I happen to disagree with you. I think we should leave it at that.
I know the guy well, in my opinion he didn't deserve to be sacked. Simple really. I'm hardly going to give the finer details in a public forum. That's not up to me.
Besides which, your posts on the matter indicate you have some knowledge of the individual concerned, and you feel his termination was justified. I happen to disagree with you. I think we should leave it at that.
Rananim;
I agree with your assessment re "personal limits" and company limits but in an FDA Program how is one to know those personal limits and how is one to assign high risk to one operation and low risk to another if not by company limits only? I actually agree with the first poster who merely expresses what FDA Programs are all about in the first place, but that said...such limits can be exceeded for years without result but the risk is higher. The term I used for this phenomena was "stochastic" which means "a high degree of probability but with one outcome more likely than most others".
We all know pilots with great hands and feet and superior thinking skills which likely permit broader personal standards. In fact, I've seen such flying in the data...way outside the SOPs but actually flown quite beautifully...what is one to do with such data and information? We know of others who, at one time or another are less endowed but do a credible, safe job and we may know one or two who should find other work. We see all these in the data. We train rather than fire but that does not mean firing is out of the question; we have a policy for this- it's called the Safety Reporting Policy and one loses ones job for egregious, negligent or intentionally illegal acts, not for lack of competency or ability nor for SOP violations although if such violations fall into the above category, all bets are (and should be) off.
Regarding firing, (I have written this here earlier in this thread but now that it's back on track I would like to re-emphasize), we have a solid management-pilot agreement which provides for "mavericks" and others who's flying indicates untoward trends. Firing is not among them, but peer-intervention and training certainly are. As you know, the way our industry works, (like most professions) is, that almost certainly by the time a pilot is "noticed" in the data by the FDA pilots, his/her reputation is already known and flags are up, and it is no longer merely a flight safety problem but a human factors problem with much broader implications and solutions.
I hasten to add that none of this is to comment on the EZ firing; that is their own internal affair and while I have strong opinions of such use of safety data, each airline must establish what best works for them.
Quote:
I disagree strongly.You make an assumption.Breaking company limits persistently does not necessarily lead to "damage" or "destruction".Breaking ones own limits does this.If a pilot breaks the company rules,he's a maverick,a bit of a rebel as they say.If the same pilot flies beyond his own limitations or capabilities,then he becomes unsafe.However,I am not saying that breaking company limits is not a reason for dismissal.It can be.
It will only be a matter of time before the pilot exceeds the limitation to such an extent that recovery will be a matter of chance or damage or destruction will occur.
We all know pilots with great hands and feet and superior thinking skills which likely permit broader personal standards. In fact, I've seen such flying in the data...way outside the SOPs but actually flown quite beautifully...what is one to do with such data and information? We know of others who, at one time or another are less endowed but do a credible, safe job and we may know one or two who should find other work. We see all these in the data. We train rather than fire but that does not mean firing is out of the question; we have a policy for this- it's called the Safety Reporting Policy and one loses ones job for egregious, negligent or intentionally illegal acts, not for lack of competency or ability nor for SOP violations although if such violations fall into the above category, all bets are (and should be) off.
Regarding firing, (I have written this here earlier in this thread but now that it's back on track I would like to re-emphasize), we have a solid management-pilot agreement which provides for "mavericks" and others who's flying indicates untoward trends. Firing is not among them, but peer-intervention and training certainly are. As you know, the way our industry works, (like most professions) is, that almost certainly by the time a pilot is "noticed" in the data by the FDA pilots, his/her reputation is already known and flags are up, and it is no longer merely a flight safety problem but a human factors problem with much broader implications and solutions.
I hasten to add that none of this is to comment on the EZ firing; that is their own internal affair and while I have strong opinions of such use of safety data, each airline must establish what best works for them.
Last edited by PJ2; 25th Jul 2008 at 23:19.
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Ranamin, your post served to flesh out a few elements which I perhaps glossed over. However, I did not assert or suggest that a single event should lead to sacking.
Having said that, in one case I know of, a pilot was sacked after a single Class 2 event. This was because he asserted to the Chief Pilot that his way was better and that the company SOPs were rubbish. A little humility and a less abrasive attitude would have led to a sim session and a line check and back to work in a week, but he was sacked, and rightly so.
If the event occurred because of an error and is not intentional then the normal course of action would follow as I have outlined above.
If a pilot repeatedly and regularly flags up Class 2 events then there are only so many times you can talk to him, put him in the sim to ensure he knows the SOPs or line check him to see that he follows SOPs before you have to ask yourself why him and why so often.
If the only way to stop the pilot from persistently triggering Class 2 events is firing, then so be it.
How many mavericks or cowboys do you want flying in your airline?
Having said that, in one case I know of, a pilot was sacked after a single Class 2 event. This was because he asserted to the Chief Pilot that his way was better and that the company SOPs were rubbish. A little humility and a less abrasive attitude would have led to a sim session and a line check and back to work in a week, but he was sacked, and rightly so.
If the event occurred because of an error and is not intentional then the normal course of action would follow as I have outlined above.
If a pilot repeatedly and regularly flags up Class 2 events then there are only so many times you can talk to him, put him in the sim to ensure he knows the SOPs or line check him to see that he follows SOPs before you have to ask yourself why him and why so often.
If the only way to stop the pilot from persistently triggering Class 2 events is firing, then so be it.
How many mavericks or cowboys do you want flying in your airline?
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Why should you be told?
As Max Mosely would say, it's none of your business.
What went on is between the pilot concerned and the airline concerned. The details of which should and indeed must remain, confidential. That is the whole basis of FLIDRAS/FOQA and long may it remain so, otherwise it will lose it's value.
What went on is between the pilot concerned and the airline concerned. The details of which should and indeed must remain, confidential. That is the whole basis of FLIDRAS/FOQA and long may it remain so, otherwise it will lose it's value.
rubik101;
from post #214,
If I might enquire regarding how you do FDA and crew contacts...
How many "Base Facilitators", who are authorized to examine and use FLIDRAS data for crew contact, do you have? Are they non-management pilots? Are they volunteers or do they get a certain amount of time away from flying duties to do this safety work? How is your FDA information communicated to management? Are they supportive, involved and interested or do they dismiss FDA information?
I have many more questions but don't want to take up bandwidth - If you're inclined to pm, (and I am very interested), I would very much like to know more about how your airline does FDA work. Many thanks in advance.
from post #214,
The use of the OFDM/FLIDRAS data to initiate contact, through Base Facilitator, with an individual is also 'best practice' and is used in the event that a pilot has exceeded a Class 2 limitation or regularly exceeds the same limitation.
How many "Base Facilitators", who are authorized to examine and use FLIDRAS data for crew contact, do you have? Are they non-management pilots? Are they volunteers or do they get a certain amount of time away from flying duties to do this safety work? How is your FDA information communicated to management? Are they supportive, involved and interested or do they dismiss FDA information?
I have many more questions but don't want to take up bandwidth - If you're inclined to pm, (and I am very interested), I would very much like to know more about how your airline does FDA work. Many thanks in advance.
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PJ2, I will put this reply on the forum as it seems that many people have little idea of how the reporting system works.
This is how the system works in the airline I work for but I am assured by other colleagues that this is the industry standard here in the UK.
The data from the Flight Data Monitoring Equipment is downloaded in different ways. The older systems record the data onto a disk or hard drive and this is then accessed by an Engineer either after every flight or a series of flights when the aircraft lands at a base. The most modern systems have a bank of mobile 'phones in the E&E bay which transmit the data after every flight.
The delivery point of all this data is an independent and specialist data analysis company or in-house department, generally run by ex pilots and engineers. These companies or departments are charged with analysing the received data. Bear in mind that there are often a hundred or more parameters being monitored continually during the flight. The system is generally started when oil pressure registers on the first engine started or 'brakes on/off'.
Class 1 events, such as a momentary overspeed in flight or taxiing at a few knots over the recommended speed or small deviations from the ILS will merely be registered and added to the huge mass of events already collected. No further action is taken.
Class 2 events will trigger an 'alarm' and be investigated. Class 2 events include such things as Terrain warnings, flight below MSA, TCAS events, attitude exceedances, Take off or landing configuration warnings, large deviations from the Glideslope or Localiser below certain heights and prolonged overspeeds, amongst many others.
This event is then communicated to the airline, to a small group of pilots, generally two or three, who are responsible for investigating, analysing and reporting the event to the management. It may be that the Localiser and G/Slope deviation was caused by the aircraft breaking off to do a circle to land and so no further action will be required. (Some of us do actually do 'circle to land' approaches!)
However, if the event merits further action then the Base Facilitator, a non management pilot, will be given the details and he will then contact the pilot concerned. If it is determined that the event is a one-off, momentary lapse in concentration leading to a mistake, then perhaps a brief visit to the sim or a line check or maybe even no further action will be taken. The management will not have any knowledge of the name of the pilot but will be made aware of the actual event.
There are events where management will be informed immediately, these will include hard GPWS warnings, landings with the wrong Flap setting or greatly excessive speed on touchdown. These events are considered near-accidents and need to be investigated thoroughly. Generally the pilots will be suspended until the results of the investigation are known.
If a pilot repeatedly triggers events and further investigation, training and instruction reveals that his attitude or ability or lack of knowledge is the cause then he will be told that he is under observation. After two or more further events then it may well be decided that further remedial action is fruitless and that the pilot will be sacked.
The data is not meant to be routinely used by management to monitor the behavior of pilots, nor should it be. Used correctly this system is a very effective and useful tool which has greatly enhanced flight safety in all the airlines that have a robust and well run structure in place to run their FLIDRAS/FOQA or whatever you want to call it.
This is how the system works in the airline I work for but I am assured by other colleagues that this is the industry standard here in the UK.
The data from the Flight Data Monitoring Equipment is downloaded in different ways. The older systems record the data onto a disk or hard drive and this is then accessed by an Engineer either after every flight or a series of flights when the aircraft lands at a base. The most modern systems have a bank of mobile 'phones in the E&E bay which transmit the data after every flight.
The delivery point of all this data is an independent and specialist data analysis company or in-house department, generally run by ex pilots and engineers. These companies or departments are charged with analysing the received data. Bear in mind that there are often a hundred or more parameters being monitored continually during the flight. The system is generally started when oil pressure registers on the first engine started or 'brakes on/off'.
Class 1 events, such as a momentary overspeed in flight or taxiing at a few knots over the recommended speed or small deviations from the ILS will merely be registered and added to the huge mass of events already collected. No further action is taken.
Class 2 events will trigger an 'alarm' and be investigated. Class 2 events include such things as Terrain warnings, flight below MSA, TCAS events, attitude exceedances, Take off or landing configuration warnings, large deviations from the Glideslope or Localiser below certain heights and prolonged overspeeds, amongst many others.
This event is then communicated to the airline, to a small group of pilots, generally two or three, who are responsible for investigating, analysing and reporting the event to the management. It may be that the Localiser and G/Slope deviation was caused by the aircraft breaking off to do a circle to land and so no further action will be required. (Some of us do actually do 'circle to land' approaches!)
However, if the event merits further action then the Base Facilitator, a non management pilot, will be given the details and he will then contact the pilot concerned. If it is determined that the event is a one-off, momentary lapse in concentration leading to a mistake, then perhaps a brief visit to the sim or a line check or maybe even no further action will be taken. The management will not have any knowledge of the name of the pilot but will be made aware of the actual event.
There are events where management will be informed immediately, these will include hard GPWS warnings, landings with the wrong Flap setting or greatly excessive speed on touchdown. These events are considered near-accidents and need to be investigated thoroughly. Generally the pilots will be suspended until the results of the investigation are known.
If a pilot repeatedly triggers events and further investigation, training and instruction reveals that his attitude or ability or lack of knowledge is the cause then he will be told that he is under observation. After two or more further events then it may well be decided that further remedial action is fruitless and that the pilot will be sacked.
The data is not meant to be routinely used by management to monitor the behavior of pilots, nor should it be. Used correctly this system is a very effective and useful tool which has greatly enhanced flight safety in all the airlines that have a robust and well run structure in place to run their FLIDRAS/FOQA or whatever you want to call it.
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A good description Rubrik however in EZY this all comes with a HUGE caveat. If the crew files and ASR or writes a coment on the journey log about the incident the data is inmediately released to management. All confidentiality is lost and this data will then be used by the base captains in his tea and biscuits chat.
In fact there is no confidentiality unless you keep your mouth shut and hope for the best.
In fact there is no confidentiality unless you keep your mouth shut and hope for the best.
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I think the 3rd from last paragraph covered that point, though not well enough, it would seem.
You are right to point out that filing an ASR will cause the Flight Data to be collected to establish exactly what happened, as is the case in the airline I work for.
If you have an 'event' which you know will have triggered a Class 2 report then you would be well advised to file an ASR as soon as you land.
Owning up, so to speak, will be seen by the management as the first and correct reaction to such an incident. Failing to file the report and keeping your mouth shut will not enable you to avoid the consequences. Data collection rates are over 98% so your indiscretion will almost certainly not go unnoticed.
Far better to own up, discuss why it happened and ensure that it won't happen again, if at all possible. If done properly then you may just get away with a slapped wrist and a gentle reminder not to do it again. Ignoring it will be seen as deviousness on your part and frowned upon, and quite rightly so.
There must be a 'no-blame' attitude to the use of this data until and unless it can be proved that the event was caused by flagrantly disregarding SOPs or a deliberate and reckless action. If this is subsequently proved to be the case on two or more occasions then dismissal is the only safe remedy left to the airline.
You are right to point out that filing an ASR will cause the Flight Data to be collected to establish exactly what happened, as is the case in the airline I work for.
If you have an 'event' which you know will have triggered a Class 2 report then you would be well advised to file an ASR as soon as you land.
Owning up, so to speak, will be seen by the management as the first and correct reaction to such an incident. Failing to file the report and keeping your mouth shut will not enable you to avoid the consequences. Data collection rates are over 98% so your indiscretion will almost certainly not go unnoticed.
Far better to own up, discuss why it happened and ensure that it won't happen again, if at all possible. If done properly then you may just get away with a slapped wrist and a gentle reminder not to do it again. Ignoring it will be seen as deviousness on your part and frowned upon, and quite rightly so.
There must be a 'no-blame' attitude to the use of this data until and unless it can be proved that the event was caused by flagrantly disregarding SOPs or a deliberate and reckless action. If this is subsequently proved to be the case on two or more occasions then dismissal is the only safe remedy left to the airline.
rubik101;
Many thanks for your thorough and very helpful reply. In my view you describe a system which is healthy, robust and does it's job in terms of raising and/or maintaining an acceptable level of safety at your airline.
If I might be permitted a few supplementaries...
Would you consider that either non-pilots or retired pilots who were not on the equipment being monitored would be able to do as effective or accurate a job of analyzing the daily flight data? I assume they're different than the base facilitators or would I be incorrect there? Either way, do they fly most of the time and volunteer their time for FDA work or are they provided with time away from flying duties to do this work, (supported by management).
Given the 98% fleet coverage indicated, if two or three base facilitators are able to handle the Class 2 events including investigation, the crew-contact process (which is not always straightforward and can be quite time-consuming) and, where indicated, time to coordinate with management, would it be fair to say that the fleet size is such that 2 or 3 pilot-facilitators handle the work-load well enough or is there always a need for more resources given the importance of the work?
Do the pilots support the approach taken (use of data) or do they have a choice? In a situation where the pilots' union is strong, there is a need to bring and keep the union onside and even take some of the responsibility for the program including handling Class 2 outcomes such as retraining and so on. Is this the case at your airline?
I assume the facilitators are "in for the long haul" and neither rotate through a larger roster or leave the job after, say, six months as it takes such a long time to gain the experience necessary to make the judgement calls required. Is this the case?
Your comment regarding ASRs is valuable and of great interest. For the most part we have kept the two separate to prevent identification of the crew by management (who receive all ASRs but which are all de-identified). We have recently altered that approach such that FLIDRAS data is provided to both management and union safety investigators in an incident (such as a tail-strike or turbulence event etc), but we still do not coordinate ASRs with "Class 2" type events.
In any situation where the pilots' union is relatively strong there is the twin responsibilities of protection of the crew member and the need and responsibility to deal effectively and clearly with safety issues where competency and/or "maverick" behaviour is indicated. Such twin roles are difficult to balance and execute but that they must be, with safety taking priority.
Again rubik101, your willingness to engage these questions publicly is of enormous value to all simply for reasons you state and is of benefit to me through comparisons with our own approach and set-up. It has been an exceptionally difficult task to establish at our airline not because the pilots are not onside but because, from all evidence, management is not. After a decade, only two of five fleet types are monitored and one of those fleet types is monitored at a rate of less than 60%, the "statistical" method being seen as a viable, acceptable way to do flight data analysis. A popular commuter-level jet is our new-hire entry and main captain-promotion airplane but it is not monitored at all; similarly, two wide-body fleet types are not monitored. We have been lobbying for 100% coverage since the beginning but were told data analysis would be expanded onto other fleet types when it was "commercially viable", whatever that meant.
The value of this forum is admirably demonstrated in the direction this thread has ultimately taken. Information about a very valuable but little-understood flight safety program is here for all to read, passengers and journalists alike. For a professional aviator (40 years, 35 at a major carrier) and flight data specialist, to be able to compare approaches at different carriers, in confidence but in public so that we may ourselves make progress in our own data analysis work is very valuable indeed and I extend my thanks for your candidness and time once again.
Many thanks for your thorough and very helpful reply. In my view you describe a system which is healthy, robust and does it's job in terms of raising and/or maintaining an acceptable level of safety at your airline.
If I might be permitted a few supplementaries...
Would you consider that either non-pilots or retired pilots who were not on the equipment being monitored would be able to do as effective or accurate a job of analyzing the daily flight data? I assume they're different than the base facilitators or would I be incorrect there? Either way, do they fly most of the time and volunteer their time for FDA work or are they provided with time away from flying duties to do this work, (supported by management).
Given the 98% fleet coverage indicated, if two or three base facilitators are able to handle the Class 2 events including investigation, the crew-contact process (which is not always straightforward and can be quite time-consuming) and, where indicated, time to coordinate with management, would it be fair to say that the fleet size is such that 2 or 3 pilot-facilitators handle the work-load well enough or is there always a need for more resources given the importance of the work?
Do the pilots support the approach taken (use of data) or do they have a choice? In a situation where the pilots' union is strong, there is a need to bring and keep the union onside and even take some of the responsibility for the program including handling Class 2 outcomes such as retraining and so on. Is this the case at your airline?
I assume the facilitators are "in for the long haul" and neither rotate through a larger roster or leave the job after, say, six months as it takes such a long time to gain the experience necessary to make the judgement calls required. Is this the case?
Your comment regarding ASRs is valuable and of great interest. For the most part we have kept the two separate to prevent identification of the crew by management (who receive all ASRs but which are all de-identified). We have recently altered that approach such that FLIDRAS data is provided to both management and union safety investigators in an incident (such as a tail-strike or turbulence event etc), but we still do not coordinate ASRs with "Class 2" type events.
In any situation where the pilots' union is relatively strong there is the twin responsibilities of protection of the crew member and the need and responsibility to deal effectively and clearly with safety issues where competency and/or "maverick" behaviour is indicated. Such twin roles are difficult to balance and execute but that they must be, with safety taking priority.
Again rubik101, your willingness to engage these questions publicly is of enormous value to all simply for reasons you state and is of benefit to me through comparisons with our own approach and set-up. It has been an exceptionally difficult task to establish at our airline not because the pilots are not onside but because, from all evidence, management is not. After a decade, only two of five fleet types are monitored and one of those fleet types is monitored at a rate of less than 60%, the "statistical" method being seen as a viable, acceptable way to do flight data analysis. A popular commuter-level jet is our new-hire entry and main captain-promotion airplane but it is not monitored at all; similarly, two wide-body fleet types are not monitored. We have been lobbying for 100% coverage since the beginning but were told data analysis would be expanded onto other fleet types when it was "commercially viable", whatever that meant.
The value of this forum is admirably demonstrated in the direction this thread has ultimately taken. Information about a very valuable but little-understood flight safety program is here for all to read, passengers and journalists alike. For a professional aviator (40 years, 35 at a major carrier) and flight data specialist, to be able to compare approaches at different carriers, in confidence but in public so that we may ourselves make progress in our own data analysis work is very valuable indeed and I extend my thanks for your candidness and time once again.
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PJ2, you would do well to try and find someone in BA who deals with their system. It was the first airline in the UK around 15 to 20 years ago to introduce such a system and has been very well tried and tested. BALPA (The pilot's Union) and the BA Pilot's Council were heavily involved with the introduction of the system, as you might imagine when a pioneering system is about to be thrust upon the pilot community in BA. I think you will be able to find the history of the introduction as it was all well documented and quite public.
When the equipment was first installed on the whole fleet in our company, the data was collected and analyzed but no actions taken until the whole system was thoroughly checked over a period of many months.
Once education, instruction and information were given to the pilots the rates of such things as late configuration, ILS deviations, speed deviations, flap speed exceedances and many others, fell quite dramatically, some by a factor of 20 or more!
Further experience and settling of the system over the past few years has seen events reduce to a consistently below industry average. Incidentally, ICAO is provided with the data collected in a graphical format, with no identification, simply to provide operators with a comparison to the industry averages. They also have data on such things as bird strikes, TCAS events, level busts and many others.
The company that collects the data in our case is an independent company who analyse data from several airlines. Most of the analysts are ex pilots, ex mainly through loss of license on medical grounds.
The facilitators at each base tend to be Captains who have been with the company some time. They are not always Training Captains, though some are.
The benefits of such a system in the interests of flight safety cannot be over-emphasised.
If you have any influence within your company then you would be well advised to push for the introduction of a comprehensive and complete system. The benefits might never be seen in the happy and ideal case that your company never has an accident. However, what such a system will most certainly do is to increase conformity to SOPs, hence raising safety standards within the company and a marked reduction in the events that might be seen as 'dangerous' by a very wide margin.
I commend the system to the house.
When the equipment was first installed on the whole fleet in our company, the data was collected and analyzed but no actions taken until the whole system was thoroughly checked over a period of many months.
Once education, instruction and information were given to the pilots the rates of such things as late configuration, ILS deviations, speed deviations, flap speed exceedances and many others, fell quite dramatically, some by a factor of 20 or more!
Further experience and settling of the system over the past few years has seen events reduce to a consistently below industry average. Incidentally, ICAO is provided with the data collected in a graphical format, with no identification, simply to provide operators with a comparison to the industry averages. They also have data on such things as bird strikes, TCAS events, level busts and many others.
The company that collects the data in our case is an independent company who analyse data from several airlines. Most of the analysts are ex pilots, ex mainly through loss of license on medical grounds.
The facilitators at each base tend to be Captains who have been with the company some time. They are not always Training Captains, though some are.
The benefits of such a system in the interests of flight safety cannot be over-emphasised.
If you have any influence within your company then you would be well advised to push for the introduction of a comprehensive and complete system. The benefits might never be seen in the happy and ideal case that your company never has an accident. However, what such a system will most certainly do is to increase conformity to SOPs, hence raising safety standards within the company and a marked reduction in the events that might be seen as 'dangerous' by a very wide margin.
I commend the system to the house.